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Foreword 
This documentary collection on the Soviet occupation of Romania, Hun-
gary, and Austria is the result of an academic collaboration between many 
historians from these three countries. It can be traced back to a conference 
sponsored by the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Research on War Conse-
quences, Graz/Vienna (director: Stefan Karner), and the Center Austria of 
the University of New Orleans (director: Günter Bischof) and held at the 
Austrian Cultural Forum in Budapest in June 2010 under the patronage of 
the Austrian ambassador, Michael Zimmermann, and the then-head of the 
Austrian Cultural Forum, Elisabeth Kornfeind. The editors owe their thanks 
in particular to these two institutions, which promoted the conference and 
supported the research initiative to make a comparative study of the Soviet 
period of occupation in Romania, Hungary, and Austria. Historians from all 
three countries met at the conference and discussed the topic in accordance 
with five aspects: political developments in the context of Soviet foreign 
policy following World War II; Soviet economic policy; the role of the Red 
Army (from 1946 officially the Soviet Army); the role of the Soviet intelli-
gence service; and the policy towards prisoners of war.
At the conference the idea emerged to collect the insights gained dur-
ing the partial opening of archives over the last two decades and publish 
them in an English-language book, in order to make the research results 
available to a broader audience. As a printed publication was lacking up 
to that point, the editors decided to undertake this. Its realization would 
not have been possible without the support of the “Zukunftsfonds” of 
the Republic of Austria. Particular thanks must go to the president, Kurt 
Schulz, and the general secretary, Herwig Hösele, as well as the former 
president, Waltraud Klasnic. Further thanks are due to the current head of 
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xii Foreword
the Austrian Cultural Forum in Budapest, Susanne Bachfischer, who contin-
ued to support the project generously.
The documentary collection is divided into three parts. The section on 
Romania contains 24 documents, while the part on Hungary is made up of 
17 documents, and 36 documents are published on Austria. The endpoint 
was selected in the case of Romania and Hungary as the systemic trans-
formation that concluded in 1948. In the case of Austria, it made sense 
to select the abandonment of negotiations on the State Treaty in October 
1949, as it marked the transition to a longer-term occupation of Austria.
All documents are briefly introduced. More detailed information and 
explanatory notes on the documents are provided in the footnotes. The 
four editors are responsible for the content of the introductory text.
The editors thank the members of the editorial board for their valuable 
contribution to this volume: Florian Banu (National Council for Study of 
the Former Securitate Archives, Bucharest), Dorin Dobrincu (A.D. Xenopol 
Institute of History of the Romanian Academy of Sciences, Iaşi), Claudiu 
Secaşiu and Virgiliu Ţârău (National Council for Study of the Former Secu-
ritate Archives, Bucharest), Magdolna Baráth (Historical Archives of the 
Hungarian State Security), Tamás Stark (Institute of History of the Hun-
garian Academy of Sciences), Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marx, Dieter 
Bacher, Walter M. Iber, and Harald Knoll (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for 
Research on War Consequences, Graz/Vienna). We would also like to thank 
Brandon Keene of New Orleans for his help in the final phase of the book 
production.
The editors
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Introduction
The fate of Eastern Europe after World War II was decided by the Soviet 
Union alone. Great Britain and the United States had no influence on 
the Soviets; Eastern Europe was Soviet military, political, and economic 
space from the outset. The undoing of the cordon sanitaire that had been 
installed after World War I against the Soviet Union and Germany was Sta-
lin’s top priority. Stalin indeed had no master plan for the construction of 
an “Eastern bloc,” but Eastern Europe’s Sovietization was a foregone con-
clusion, and this was uninfluenced by Anglo-American actions. There was 
no timeline for the establishment of Soviet-type regimes; the pace varied 
country by country. The strategies were varied and flexible. Stalin avoided 
excessive risks and was ready to pull back a step or two in order not to lose 
achievements, but this never put into question his main goal: the enlarge-
ment of the Soviet sphere of influence in Europe and the most important 
issue—the permanent weakening of Germany. Never again, he felt, should 
Germany be able to attack the Soviet Union. Previous Cold War historiogra-
phy failed to distinguish between two distinct, albeit interrelated, political 
processes. One was the creeping introduction of Soviet-type regimes; the 
other, Soviet imperial expansion. Even before the political systems were 
Bolshevized, East-Central Europe had become Soviet military and economic 
space. The urgency of economic colonization is shown by the fact that the 
Soviet-Romanian economic agreement, which delivered large chunks of the 
Romanian economy into Soviet ownership, was signed on May 8, 1945—
Victory Day in Europe. Besides the establishment of an economic empire, 
Moscow extended the Soviet Union’s military borders into the occupied ter-
ritories in Europe. Imperial expansion, in turn, furthered the goal of Sovi-
etization.
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Stalin’s aim was not merely to prevent great power centers from 
emerging on the European continent. First and foremost, he wanted to 
forestall Germany’s rapid re-strengthening after the war.1 Germany had 
to be permanently weakened and rendered harmless. There was no master 
plan to achieve this, but there were strategies, which Stalin altered depend-
ing on the situation, that later allowed him to appear to be a cunning tacti-
cian (assisted by his confidante Vyacheslav Molotov). Stalin was aware that 
Germany could not be destroyed (“Hitlers come and go, but the German 
people, the German state, will remain”).2 His experiences after World War 
I, when Germany was politically and militarily devastated and yet within a 
few years became so strong again, were Stalin’s most important motivation 
for weakening the German Reich, from which Austria ultimately profited 
by becoming independent. At the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Mos-
cow in 1943, Austria was declared the “first victim” of Nazi Germany by 
the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States. They felt it should 
be re-established as a separate state—to refuse the strongly held Austrian 
desire of the interwar period to unite with Germany. All other (Western) 
plans for a Danubian-Balkan federation were rejected by the Soviets, as 
they were diametrically opposed to Moscow’s great power interests in 
East-Central Europe.3
1  Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Jochen Laufer, “Die UdSSR und die Zone-
neinteilung Deutschlands (1943/44),” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 43 (1995): 
309–331, here 311.
2  On Soviet planning for Germany, see, among others, Alexej Filitow, “Stalins Deutsch-
landplanung und -politik während und nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in 50 Jahre sow-
jetische und russische Deutschlandpolitik sowie ihre Auswirkungen auf das gegenseitige Ver-
hältnis, eds. Boris Meissner and Alfred Eisfeld (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1999), 
43–54; Jochen Laufer, “Der Friedensvertrag mit Deutschland als Problem der sowje-
tischen Außenpolitik. Die Stalin-Note vom 10. März 1952 im Lichte neuer Quellen,” 
Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, vol. 52 (1/2004): 99–118, here 103; Aleksei M. Filitov, 
“SSSR i germanskii vopros: Povorotnye punkty (1941–1961gg.),” in Kholodnaya Voina 
1945–1963gg. Istoricheskaya retrospektiva. Sbornik statei, eds. N.I. Egorova and A.O. Chu-
bar’yan (Moscow: Olma-Press, 2003), 223–256, here 225.
3  Aleksej Filitov, “Sowjetische Planungen zur Wiedererrichtung Österreichs 1941–1945,” 
in Die Rote Armee in Österreich. Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955. Beiträge, eds. Stefan 
Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx (Graz: Oldenbourg, 2005), 27–37; Peter Ruggenthaler, 
“Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert werden sollte,” in ibid., 61–87; Wolfgang Muel-
ler, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich 1945–1955 und ihre politische Mission (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2005); Barbara Stelzl-Marx, Stalins Soldaten in Österreich. Die Innensicht der sow-
jetischen Besatzung 1945–1955 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2012), 33–39, 87–92.
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Soviet motivations were complex. Eastern Europe was of course a “war 
trophy” and provided security. But the Soviet Union was scrambling for 
parts of Mitteleuropa even before the war began. The separation of ideol-
ogy and pragmatism would be artificial. Both were present in Soviet poli-
cies and reinforced each other. The function of Eastern Europe in the Soviet 
empire in the early 1950s helps explain why Stalinist regimes were imposed. 
The vassal states lost their sovereignty and functioned as client states offer-
ing military, economic, and political services to the imperial center. The 
communist leaderships in Eastern Europe performed them out of ideologi-
cal conviction.
We can assume that Stalin would have maintained the alliance with the 
United States and the United Kingdom if these two had accepted without 
protest the brutal Soviet approach in Eastern Europe. For security reasons 
alone, Stalin was interested in maintaining the alliance with the United 
States and the United Kingdom after the war had ended.4 As later events 
would show, when the Soviets had to choose between continued coop-
eration with the West and unbridled control of East-Central Europe, they 
opted for the latter. The Soviet leadership furthermore hoped for additional 
U.S. aid and deliveries in order to provide assistance in reconstruction. Yet 
Stalin miscalculated considerably when—following Roosevelt’s assurance 
in Yalta that the United States would quickly withdraw from Europe, as 
it had done after World War I—he assumed that the United States would 
in fact leave the entire continent to the hegemony of the USSR.5 Stalin’s 
approach in Eastern Europe, however, and especially in Germany, increas-
ingly aroused the concerns of London and Washington that the USSR was 
looking to expand. The case of Poland made the revolutionary imperialism 
of the Soviet power particularly clear.6
4  On this, see, above all, the works of the Russian historian Vladimir Pechatnov. 
Most recently: V.O. Pechatnov, Stalin, Ruzvel’t, Trumen: SSSR i SShA v 1940-kh gg. – 
Dokumental’nye ocherki (Moscow: Terra, 2006); Vladimir Pechatnov, The Allies are Press-
ing on You to Break Your Will… Foreign Policy Correspondence Between Stalin and Molo-
tov and Other Politburo Members, September 1945–December 1946. CWIHP. Working 
Paper No. 26 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1999).Vladimir Pechatnov, 
“‘Soyuzniki nazhimayut na tebya dlya togo, chtoby slomit’ u tebya volyu…’. Perepiska 
Stalina s Molotovym i drugimi chlenami Politbyuro po vneshnepoliticheskim vopro-
sam v sentyabre-dekabre 1945g.),” Istochnik (2/1999): 70–85, 78.
5  Ibid., 75. On Yalta, see recently S.M. Plokhy, Yalta: The Price of Peace (New York: Viking 
Press, 2010).
6  On Poland, see Anthony Kemp-Welch, Poland under Communism: A Cold War History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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How flexible was Stalin’s policy toward Eastern Europe and, especially, 
Germany with regard to finding a balance with the West? It is clear that 
Stalin’s foreign policy neither sought aggressively to export world revolu-
tion nor possessed a merely defensive character that only considered the 
security of the USSR. Its clear objective, however, was the expansion of the 
Eastern Bloc in order to consolidate the rule and political system of the 
Soviet Union. In realizing his foreign policy goals and in the application of 
his policy of subjugation, Stalin proceeded gradually and cautiously.7 The 
security-political interests of the Soviet Union were satisfied by creating 
a “security belt” and went hand-in-hand with an export of revolution that 
was never unconditionally risky and the imperialist strengthening of Soviet 
power.8 Stalin was in no way the “gravedigger” of world revolution.
In order to understand Stalin’s foreign policy toward the Eastern Bloc, 
one must consider several aspects that have been consolidated by recent 
studies.9 Alongside the creation of a “security zone” and the removal of gov-
ernments hostile to the USSR in the Eastern Bloc countries, the zone con-
stituted the best way “to obtain economic benefits from the region, initially 
in the form of reparations and resource extraction.”10 It must be kept in 
mind that for the Soviet leadership, Eastern Europe was also an operational 
base for the future expansion of the rule and system of the Soviet Union 
to France, Italy, and other Western European countries. The power vacuum 
that emerged in Central Europe following the end of World War II was filled 
by the Soviet Union. Its military presence constituted the basis for the sup-
7  Stefan Creuzberger and Manfred Görtemaker, “Das Problem der Gleichschaltung 
osteuropäischer Parteien im Vergleich. Eine Synthese,” in Gleichschaltung unter Sta-
lin? eds. Creuzberger and Görtemaker, 419–434; Eduard Mark, Revolution by Degrees: 
Stalin’s National-Front Strategy for Europe, 1941–1947. CWIHP. Working Paper No. 31 
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2001).
8  In the mid-1990s Zubok and Pleshakov coined the term “revolutionary-imperialism 
paradigm” (world revolution on the basis of imperial policies by strengthening Soviet 
power). According to this, there was no contradiction between the promotion of the 
export of revolution and the construction of a powerful Soviet empire on the basis of 
geopolitical security interests. See Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside 
the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996).
9  Mark Kramer, “Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in 
Eastern Europe, 1944–1953,” in Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist 
Regimes in East-Central Europe, ed. Vladimir Tismaneanu (Budapest–New York: CEU 
Press, 2009), 50–102.
10  For this and the following, ibid., 58–71.
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port of communists faithful to Moscow and for the subsequent communist 
takeovers in the individual countries.
The approach toward Eastern Europe exhibited for a long time by the 
Western powers, above all the “percentages agreement” with Churchill in 
October 1944 in Moscow, as well as Roosevelt’s announcement that U.S. 
troops would be withdrawn from Europe, strengthened the Soviet leader-
ship in the assumption that Washington and London would in principle 
allow Moscow a free hand in the creation of a security zone. The Western 
concession of allowing the Red Army to take Prague and Berlin also contrib-
uted to this.11
This role of the Red Army as the “liberator from the Nazi yoke” was the 
foundation for Soviet domination in this region, at least in Czechoslova-
kia, where the political ascendance of the Communist Party occurred during 
the course of 1947, and in Bulgaria, where local communists implemented a 
political transformation themselves. In orienting themselves toward Moscow, 
many—at least temporarily—saw a guarantee of protection against German 
“revanchism.” In a recent article the Czech historian Vít Smetana pointed 
out that in Czechoslovakia, the policies of President Edvard Beneš and Jan 
Masaryk “paved the way to the communists on their march to power.”12
Ultimately, Yugoslavia and Albania, which believed they had liberated 
themselves from German and Italian occupation, were the only countries 
able to evade Soviet hegemony. All resistance in other countries was broken 
by the terror of the Soviet occupiers. Even in eastern Poland, the popula-
tion suffered enormously under the occupation following the Soviet inva-
sion in 1939 as a consequence of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. In Katyn, Stalin had 
around 20,000 Polish officers and representatives of bourgeois circles and 
the intelligentsia murdered. The Soviet army did not come to the assistance 
of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) during the Warsaw Uprising 
against Nazi rule; in fact, the Home Army was the target of Soviet repres-
sion. Both in Hungary13 and in Romania, and particularly in the Soviet 
11  Pechatnov, Stalin, Ruzvel’t, Trumen: SSSR i SShA v 1940-kh gg.
12  Vít Smetana, “Concessions or Conviction? Czechoslovakia’s Road to the Cold War and 
the Soviet Bloc,” in Imposing, Maintaining and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain: The Cold 
War and East-Central Europe, eds. Mark Kramer and Vít Smetana (Lanham, MD: Lex-
ington Books, 2013), 55–87.
13  On Hungary see, above all, László Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956: Between 
the United States and the Soviet Union (Budapest–New York: CEU Press, 2004).
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Occupation Zone in Germany14 and Austria,15 hardly anyone regarded the 
Red Army as a liberator with the exception of the Nazi victims. Any popu-
larity of the communist parties in these countries resulted predominantly 
from their resistance to Nazi rule.16 Only in Czechoslovakia was there a 
strong workers’ movement, though there was above all—and this was deci-
sive for Stalin—in Edvard Beneš a “bourgeois” president recognized by 
the entire population. He was prepared to be used by the USSR as a will-
ing political instrument, in exchange for Stalin’s readiness to condone and 
support the expulsion of national minorities from Czechoslovakia, above 
all the Sudeten Germans and the Hungarians living in Slovakia. In order to 
achieve these aims, Beneš pledged absolute allegiance and assured Stalin of 
extensive restructuring measures. In contrast to all other countries, Stalin 
was thus able to build on a powerful political foundation in Czechoslovakia 
and could thus forgo the usual occupation regime.17
But in general, there was no rush: Marxist thought was teleological, the 
victory of communism inevitable. The question is why the United States did 
not even do the small things it might have done to impede or slow down the 
process of Sovietization and Soviet imperial penetration. Such steps could 
have included a more consistent policy of non-recognition of the undemo-
cratic East European regimes, a stiffer protection of America’s own compa-
nies in Eastern Europe against Soviet takeovers and nationalization, politi-
cal and even financial assistance to democratic political parties, insistence 
on exercising the rights of the Western powers in the Allied Control Com-
mittees including the collection of economic data, the freedom of western 
officials to travel into the Soviet zone, etc. Until 1948, when the scope of 
Sovietization became apparent, the Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe 
obviously was not so bad for the United States. Two wars started there in 
the space of a quarter-century, and the hegemony of a great power in the 
lands between the Soviet Union and Germany may have seemed more con-
ducive to continental stability and peace than the full restoration of national 
14  Norman M. Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupa-
tion, 1945–1949 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995).
15  This is also linked to the cases of rapes and lootings. See Stelzl-Marx, Stalins Soldaten 
in Österreich, 408–428, 466–495.
16  Kramer, Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern 
Europe, 58–71.
17  See Gerhard Wettig, “Beneš, Stalin, die Vertreibung der Deutschen und die Sowje-
tisierung der Tschechoslowakei,” in Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 
(2013), 57–89.
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independence and sovereignty. This also means that the reasons for the U.S.-
Soviet standoff that developed into the Cold War must be sought elsewhere.
Soviet Penetration and the Political Significance of the Occupation 
of Romania, Hungary, and Austria
The conference in Yalta sanctioned the Molotov-Ribbentrop line and the 
annexation of the Baltic States on the dubious principle that Soviet secu-
rity enjoyed primacy over the national self-determination of small states. 
The Soviets took wartime arrangements seriously. Soviet political and mili-
tary official Kliment Voroshilov declared of Hungary in 1945: “This is our 
territory and we shall determine who can enter.”18 In “Vostochnaya Evropa,” 
Soviet Eastern Europe, all states except Czechoslovakia (and Bulgaria after 
the end of 1947) remained under Soviet military occupation and were amal-
gamated into the Soviet defensive and economic perimeter. Regarding the 
Soviet occupation of Austria, there is much to support the view that the 
USSR systematically delayed the commencement of negotiations on a treaty 
for Austria,19 as it was not interested in a swift withdrawal of its troops 
from Austria. In the peace treaties with Hungary and Romania, the Soviet 
Union was granted the right to station troops in both countries for the pur-
pose of supplying its occupation troops in Austria.20 In this way the Soviet 
Union had stationed tens of thousands of soldiers abroad that it did not 
have to fund. Romania, Hungary, and Austria had to pay for the costs of 
occupation, which was another enormous burden on the national budgets 
and a great relief for the USSR.  
The strategic importance of Austria is evident in Soviet files for the 
first time in April 1945. In Moscow’s Foreign Office (People’s Commissariat 
for Foreign Affairs), the significance of the occupation of Austria for the 
18  “Minutes of a Normal Meeting of the ACC, 6 September 1945,” in Gergő Cseh Bend-
egúz, ed., Documents of the Meetings of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary (Buda-
pest: MTA Jelenkor-kutató Bizottság, 2000), 78. 
19  Wolfgang Mueller, “Anstelle des Staatsvertrages: Die UdSSR und das Zweite Kontrol-
labkommen 1946,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner and Robert Kriechbaumer, Die Gunst 
des Augenblicks: neuere Forschungen zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität (Vienna: Böhlau, 
2005), 291–320, here 314.
20  Peter Ruggenthaler, “Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde: Sowjetische Öster-
reich-Politik 1945 bis 1953/55,” in Karner and Stelzl-Marx, Die Rote Armee in Öster-
reich, 649–726, here 709.
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maintenance of the Red Army’s troop presence in Southeastern Europe was 
discussed.21 The significance of this arrangement was clear to the Ameri-
cans, and it was also a thorn in their side. At the 1946 Paris Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, the United States sought to conclude a treaty on Austria, 
which would have led to a Soviet troop withdrawal in Hungary and Roma-
nia as well.22 However, the Americans admittedly did not expect that Stalin 
would jump on board. This tactical step was far more an attempt to sound 
out Stalin’s intentions on the German question to see whether he would 
be prepared to abandon his policy of spheres of influence.23 With Molotov’s 
formal demand for the revision of the Byrnes plan (for Germany’s demili-
tarization and decades-long neutralization), which was then under discus-
sion, and the tactic of promoting the Soviet Union as the defender of Ger-
man unity, it became clear to the Americans and British that Stalin did not 
seek an agreement with the Allies over Germany.
Initially, a tactical benefit was thus assigned to the Austrian ques-
tion—both from the Western and from the Soviet perspective. With the 
repeated attempts in Paris to raise the Austrian question, the Western side 
attempted to uncover the Soviet cards.24 For them it was first and fore-
most a question of discovering the true intentions of Soviet policy. With 
this strategy, they really did drive the Soviet Union into a corner. Foreign 
Minister Molotov was left with no option but to brusquely reject all talks 
on Austria. He no longer pointed out that Austria was not yet sufficiently 
“cleansed of fascists” and that the Austrians must be assisted in this matter. 
Instead, he allowed himself the following remarkable statement: “The USSR 
will leave its troops in Austria as long as it has the right to do so.” Thus 
from the Soviet perspective, the military presence in Romania and Hungary 
continued to be secured, and an agreement on the German question was 
ruled out.  This finally became clear to the Western powers in Paris.
In 1947 the Hungarian communist leader Mátyás Rákosi was con-
cerned about a possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Austria and with 
this from Hungary. Yet Molotov assured him that the conclusion of an Aus-
21  Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Stalin, Tito und die Österreich-Frage. Zur 
Österreichpolitik des Kreml im Kontext der sowjetischen Jugoslawienpolitik 1945 bis 
1949,” in Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung (2008), 81–105, here 87–88.
22  Peter Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy 1945–1953, Habil-
itationsschrift (University of Graz, 2013), 77.
23  Hanns Jürgen Küsters, Der Integrationsfriede. Viermächte-Verhandlungen über die Frie-
densregelung mit Deutschland 1945–1990 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000), 278.
24  For details, see Ruggenthaler, The Concept of Neutrality, 75–82.
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trian state treaty was not foreseeable in the near future.25 And in October 
1949, the question of troop presence in Hungary and Romania was the deci-
sive reason why Stalin had the negotiations on the Austrian state treaty 
broken off. As the resolutions of the CPSU Politburo published in this vol-
ume demonstrate,26 Stalin was not prepared in 1949 to please the Yugoslav 
leader Josip Broz Tito by signing a state treaty for Austria. For Stalin inter-
preted the determination of the Western powers to withdraw from Austria 
as support for Yugoslavia.  Stalin’s split with Tito had grave consequences 
for Soviet policy in Southeastern Europe and thus for Austria as well.27 In 
addition, the Soviets discovered significant oil reserves in Austria (the larg-
est connected oil field in Central Europe at that time), through which they 
supplied the Eastern European satellite states with high-quality crude oil.28
Soviet policies after the war aimed to transform Eastern Europe 
according to the political, economic, and military interests of the Soviet 
Union. These policies included fixing new boundaries, ethnic cleansing, 
extending the Soviet military perimeter to the newly occupied territories, 
the construction of a Soviet economic empire, and last but not least, the 
imposition of the Stalinist system. Poland was shifted westward, which 
entailed the forced removal of millions of Germans. Czechoslovakia ceded 
the strategically crucial Carpatho-Ukraine to the Soviet Union—Beneš had 
already offered it to Stalin in 1939—and Moscow arranged the restoration 
of the prewar Romanian-Hungarian border and re-annexed Bessarabia. 
Although there is no disagreement that the Soviets sought a unilateral 
sphere of influence in the “adjacent” countries, a large body of literature 
maintains that the introduction of Stalinist systems may not have been 
inevitable and was triggered by assertive U.S. policies such as the Marshall 
Plan.29 Two simultaneous and interrelated processes must be discerned 
25  Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin 
to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 149.
26  They were first published in German and Russian in Stefan Karner et al., ed., Die Rote 
Armee in Österreich. Sowjetische Besatzung 1945–1955. Dokumente. Krasnaya Armiya v 
Avstrii. Sovetskaya okkupatsiya 1945–1955. Dokumenty (Graz: Oldenbourg 2005).
27  Ruggenthaler, Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde, 678–681.
28  Walter M. Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich. Zur Vorgeschichte der 
OMV 1945–1955. Veröffentlichungen des Ludwig Boltzmann-Instituts für Kriegsfol-
gen-Forschung, vol. 15 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2011), 107 and 130–133.
29  E.g., Melvyn Leffler, The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War, 1947–1953 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994); Vladislav Zubok and Constan-
tine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, 
MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1997).
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here, which are blurred in scholarship. Traditionally Sovietization has been 
described and interpreted as the train of events leading to the communist 
seizure of power and the eventual introduction of Stalinist political sys-
tems. However, there was another process unfolding simultaneously with, 
and not independently of, the gradual Stalinization of Eastern Europe. 
This was Soviet imperial penetration, the takeover of the economies and 
defense establishments of Eastern Europe, and the creation of Soviet mili-
tary and economic space in the region. Stalin had a well-thought-out strat-
egy for the countries in Eastern Europe that manifested itself in popular-
front governments.30 He chose this strategy to minimize Western reaction 
to the introduction of communist regimes. Stalin wanted communist rev-
olution in Europe without having to forgo the advantages of association 
with the West.
In March 1946 Stalin instructed Polish communists not to rush but 
“to move gradually toward socialism by exploiting elements of the bour-
geois democratic order.”31 The aim was to lay the groundwork for a “decisive 
struggle against the reactionaries.” After meeting Stalin on April 1, 1946, 
Hungarian communist leader Mátyás Rákosi was much more explicit. At a 
secret meeting of the party leadership on May 17, 1946, he revealed that the 
establishment of a proletarian dictatorship was on the agenda. He told his 
audience that all earlier caution should be discarded once the peace treaties 
were signed and the elections in Western Europe were over: “Whenever a 
country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat or for 
socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard to whether the respective 
country is in a capitalist environment or not.” The communist leader, who 
had stood at Stalin’s side on the last November 7 parade before the Ger-
man invasion of the Soviet Union, also revealed that Hungary’s Communist 
Party and Social Democratic Party would be merged and that a new Com-
munist International would be established.32
Rákosi’s speech convincingly refutes the axiom, held by many in both 
the East and the West to the present day, that before 1947 Stalin had not 
30  See Mark, Revolution by Degrees.  
31  See Kramer, Stalin, Soviet Policy and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern 
Europe, 1945–1948, 51–102.
32  Rákosi’s report at the meeting of the Political Committee of the HCP, May 17, 1946. 
Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára (Archive of the Institute of Political History) 274. 
f., 2 cs., 34. őe., 18. A brief excerpt from the document was published in Csaba Békés, 
Soviet Plans to Establish the COMINFORM in Early 1946: New Evidence from Hungarian 
Archives, CWIHP Bulletin No. 10 (1998), 135–136. 
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planned to transform the countries of the region according to the Soviet 
model, and that therefore this process took place only after the announce-
ment of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, almost as a reaction 
to them. There is no doubt that the process of completing the communist 
takeover of power, as well as driving the countries, often in conflict with 
one another, into one camp, and the formation of the Cominform truly did 
take place as a consequence of the situation resulting from the Marshall 
Plan, though all this had significant antecedents. 
The above axiom is usually supported by the arguments, backed by the 
new sources, that the local communist leaders in the first few postwar years 
received little information about Stalin’s intentions. Yet the reality is that 
the communist parties from the start, that is, as early as the fall of 1944, 
were very well aware of their task and acted accordingly. The immediate 
goal was not, in fact, the assumption of power, but rather the acquisition 
of a monopoly on power while formally maintaining the democratic insti-
tutions and preserving, at least in part, the appearance of democracy. This 
would make it possible to introduce the Soviet system gradually, smoothly 
and through “peaceful” means, that is, without civil war. For Stalin imag-
ined all this to be realizable based on cooperation maintained with the 
Western Allies, and therefore it was important that public opinion in the 
West retain the hope that all was not yet lost in Eastern Europe. 
At the same time, the Soviet leaders regarded this region as of pri-
mary strategic importance, and we now know that they were even ready 
to undertake armed conflict for the sake of retaining the region. The lat-
est research also shows that, independently of the formal constitutional 
conditions and the mainly coalition-based political arrangements, as early 
as 1945 and 1946, the local communist parties were in such dominant posi-
tions in all countries of the region. On this basis we may speak of quasi-
Sovietized (Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania) and pre-
Sovietized (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) countries, rather than a democratic 
interlude or limited parliamentary democracy.33
Even though a detailed tactical directive bearing Stalin’s signature on 
the manner of assuming power has not surfaced (and is not likely to emerge 
in the future), in a certain sense we may rightly regard Rákosi’s speech 
delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Com-
33  Csaba Békés, Európából Európába. Magyarország konfliktusok kereszttüzében, 1945–1990 
[From Europe to Europe: Hungary in a crossfire] (Budapest: Gondolat, 2004).
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munist Party on May 17, 1946, as the missing “script” for the stealthy revo-
lution.
Even though the timing and strategy of Soviet penetration varied from 
country to country, there were well-discernable patterns. In former German 
satellites the Soviets seized crucial segments of the national economies. In 
the former Axis states the Soviet-led Allied Control Commissions (ACC)—
the inter-Allied organizations in charge of the implementation of the armi-
stice agreements—were conveyor belts of Moscow’s local policies with no 
effective resistance on the part of the Western members; in these countries 
the ACCs’ Soviet chairmen, rather than the governments, controlled home 
policies. Occasionally Moscow intervened directly in domestic affairs or 
worked through the local communist parties. Democratic parties were, in 
Rákosi’s words, carved up “like salami”; opposition leaders were arrested, 
tried, and even executed if necessary. Bulgaria’s Nikola Petkov was a case 
in point.34 Clandestine communists infiltrated democratic parties and sub-
verted them from within. Communist parties were able to gain all key posi-
tions of power: oversight of internal affairs, including the police and secret 
police; and the domination of local governments, as well as the army and 
security services and some of the economic portfolios. When “democratic” 
procedures did not work, the communists organized mass protests and 
incited violence, assisted by the deliberate recruitment of former members 
of national socialist parties such as the Hungarian Arrow Cross.35
Simultaneously with the gradual destruction of the democratic par-
ties and introduction of Stalinist methods, the USSR took control of the 
economies in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. This served a dual purpose: 
economic and financial gain as well as furthering political penetration. 
Romania signed an agreement of economic cooperation with Moscow in 
May 1945. This extended Soviet control to many sectors of the Romanian 
economy: food processing; the petroleum, timber and coal industries; met-
allurgy; glass; aviation; and navigation. This was followed by a similar agree-
ment with Hungary in August 1945 that involved bauxite, aluminum, coal, 
34  On Bulgaria, see Evgenija Kalinova and Iskra Baeva, Bălgarskite prechodi 1939–2005 
(Sofia: Paradigma, 2006). Translated into German as Iskra Baeva and Evgenia Kalin-
ova, Bulgarien von Ost nach West. Zeitgeschichte ab 1939 (Vienna: Braumüller, 2009).
35  On the recruitment of former fascists, see Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of 
a Jewish Communist (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); László Borhi, 
Hungary in the Cold War 1945–1956: Between the United States and the Soviet Union 
(Budapest and New York: CEU Press, 2004); Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold 
War, 1945–1955: The Leverage of the Weak (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1999).
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manganese, and part of the oil production and refining industry, as well 
as various branches of industrial production, aviation, and navigation. In 
Romania, Sovroms—Soviet-Romanian joint companies—were set up, while 
joint-stock or fully Soviet-owned companies were established in Hungary. 
These companies were controlled by their Soviet managing directors and 
provided Moscow unlimited access to their produce with guaranteed prof-
its that were transferred annually. The Soviet shares in these companies 
were held by an agency called GUSIMZ (State Agency for Soviet Property 
Abroad), which controlled the Soviet economic empire in Europe and Asia.36 
The companies in Eastern Europe were established without time limitation, 
revealing that Soviet colonization was planned for the long term. Mos-
cow received a blank check at the conference in Potsdam to seize former 
German and Italian (and in the Far East, Japanese) assets. Moscow used 
this provision even to take Allied—American, British, or French—prop-
erty without compensation.37 The access to the economy was a central ele-
ment in consolidating Soviet hegemonic power over the states of Central 
and Eastern Europe. However, in Eastern Austria, the Soviets’ long-term 
entrenchment in the economy failed. Negotiations with the Austrian gov-
ernment over bilateral corporations (for example, in the oil industry) were 
called off under pressure from the Western powers in 1945–1946.38
In their Eastern Europe policy from 1944 to 1948, the Americans privi-
leged stability over protecting national independence.39 President Roosevelt 
envisioned Great Britain and the Soviet Union securing peace in Europe. 
Soviet hegemony in the East was no great price to pay for postwar coop-
eration, even if it involved a violation of national self-determination in the 
lands between the Soviet Union and Germany. 
Washington missed the opportunity to occupy Prague in 1945 and 
effectively ceded Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union.40 After some vacil-
lation President Harry S. Truman—in spite of sometimes strident anti-
36  Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War; Walter M. Iber and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., Stalins 
Wirtschaftspolitik an der sowjetischen Peripherie – Ein Überblick auf der Basis sowjetischer 
und osteuropäischer Quellen (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2011); Stelzl-Marx, Stalins Sol-
daten in Österreich, 277–285.
37  For nationalization without compensation, see Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War, chap-
ter 4.
38  Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich, 55–59.
39  For an overview, see Geir Lundestad, American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 
1943–1947 (Tromsö: Universitatsforlaget, 1978).
40  Kramer, Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern 
Europe, 1944–1953, 64.
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Soviet rhetoric—was ready to accept communist-dominated governments. 
Shortly after the conference in Yalta, the United States explored a more 
assertive line: the U.S. minister in Bucharest tried to persuade the Roma-
nian king to oust the communist fellow traveler Petru Groza, who had been 
installed in March under Soviet pressure.41 In November 1945 the president 
dispatched a fact-finding mission to Romania and Bulgaria, which con-
firmed that these countries were under Soviet domination. Even so, in Feb-
ruary 1946 the Truman administration recognized Romania in return for 
a pledge to hold free elections that everybody knew would never be kept. 
By fall 1946 several prominent members of the Truman administration con-
cluded that there was no point in supporting the Czechoslovak democrats, 
since they had lost their battle with the communists. After the Hungarian 
communist putsch on May 31, 1947, executed at Stalin’s written instruction, 
Senator Arthur Vandenberg declared that the Greek and the Hungarian 
events were “parallel tragedies but cannot have parallel treatment.”42 
Although Hungary was not the highest concern, the State Department 
wanted to take energetic action and to send a fact-finding mission to Buda-
pest.  The United States sought British support. The Foreign Office believed 
that Hungary and Romania were countries where decisive Soviet influence 
should be allowed, even if this meant communization, as they had no bear-
ing on the British position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus it made no 
sense to entangle Britain in this affair. The whole exercise seemed point-
less; the Americans would only be “making fools of themselves.” Although 
Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin denounced the Soviet Union for imposing 
dictatorships and declared that the policy of “appeasement” was over, he 
saw no reason to protest either.43 London made it known that Britain would 
not take part in the tripartite committee of investigation proposed by the 
Americans. In Poland the roles were reversed. There Great Britain encour-
aged a tougher stance against the Soviets, while the United States opposed 
it. The Polish government postponed holding elections in March 1946, 
and therefore the British proposed joint action against the Polish govern-
ment and the suspension of loans to Poland. Washington rejected the call 
41  T.V. Volokitina et al., eds., Tri vizita A. Ya. Vyshinskogo v Bukharest. 1944–1946.  Doku-
menty rossiiskikh arkhivov (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998).
42  Mátyás Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések 1940–1956 [Memoirs], vol. 1, 377; Congressional 
Record (Vol. 93: 80th Congress, Part 5), 6306–6307.
43  Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War; Stanley M. Max, The Anglo-American Response to the 
Sovietization of Hungary 1945–1948 (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 
1990). 
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for joint action and continued to provide loans for the Poles, while London 
refused to sign a new Anglo-Polish loan agreement.44 
In Central Europe the dividing line between East and West was Aus-
tria. London concluded that Soviet domination of Austria would have disas-
trous effects on Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Italy. The British Ministry of 
Defense agreed that Austria was strategically vital to Great Britain because 
of its crucial Central European location on the Danube. The Truman admin-
istration regarded Austria as a test case of Anglo-American resolve against 
Soviet intimidation and listed it as an American priority along with Greece, 
Turkey, Italy, and France, where the Americans thought communist take-
over might be imminent. Hence the United States shored up the strug-
gling Austrian economy, reoriented its trade toward the West, and assumed 
responsibility for Austria’s trade deficit. Soviet possession of Austria would 
have placed the USSR in a position to outflank Central Europe and Italy in a 
military offensive.45
If the American empire in Western Europe, to use the term coined by 
historian Geir Lundestad, was by invitation, Soviet domination in Eastern 
Europe was by coercion.46 Eastern Europe was Soviet military and economic 
space, and the formally independent states lost their sovereignty. The hege-
monic power regularly intervened in their domestic affairs. 
Soviet Policies towards Romania, Hungary, and Austria
Romania was the first Axis state to experience occupation by the Red Army. 
The offensive carried out by the Second and Third Ukrainian Fronts in 
August 1944 led to the collapse of the German forces in Moldavia and to 
the coup of August 23, 1944, as a result of which the regime of Marshal Ion 
Antonescu was removed from power and Romania abandoned its alliance 
with Germany. The coup of August 23, 1944, upset the initial calculations 
of the Kremlin, which had counted upon a rapid military occupation of the 
country and the imposition from the outset of a communist-dominated 
44  See Marek Kazimierz Kamiński, W obliczu sowieckego ekspansjonizmu – Polityka Stanów 
Zjednozonych i Wielkiej Brytanii wobee Polski i Czechoslowaceji 1945–1948 (Warsaw: 
Instytut Historii PAN, Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2005).
45  Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War.
46  Geir Lundestad, The American “Empire” and Other Studies in U.S. Foreign Policy in a 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press; Oslo: Norwe-
gian University Press, 1990).
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   15 2015.02.17.   6:53
16 Introduction
government. To Moscow’s surprise, at the moment when the Red Army 
entered Bucharest, power was taken by the government led by General 
Constantin Sănătescu, which included all the political parties: the National 
Peasant Party (NPP), the National Liberal Party (NLP), the Social Demo-
cratic Party (SDP), and the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Although 
the new Romanian cabinet had shown itself ready to negotiate and to 
sign an armistice with the Allies, the Kremlin, invoking arguments of a 
military nature, dragged its feet for almost three weeks before signing the 
document. As a result, when the discussions began in Moscow between the 
Romanian delegation led by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and the representatives of 
the Soviet Union, Britain, and the United States, the territory of Romania, 
with the exception of Transylvania, was, from a military standpoint, under 
the complete control of the Red Army. 
On September 12, 1944, the governments of the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom concluded the Armistice Conven-
tion with the Romanian government. It imposed harsh political, military, 
and economic conditions. According to the military provisions of the armi-
stice, Romania was obliged to put at the Allies’ disposal 12 infantry divi-
sions and to allow the Red Army unhindered passage over the country’s ter-
ritory. From the economic point of view, under the title of war reparations, 
Romania agreed to pay the sum of 300 million dollars (at their 1938 value) 
and to return the goods taken from Soviet territory. Other provisions of 
the Armistice Convention stipulated the arrest of war criminals; the abo-
lition of “pro-Hitlerite” political, military, and paramilitary organizations; 
and the introduction of censorship.47 Supervision of the fulfillment of the 
armistice conditions was assigned to the Allied Control Commission, in 
which the Soviet Union held the dominant position, since the U.S. and Brit-
ish representatives were reduced to the status of simple observers. Marshal 
Rodion I. Malinovskii was named head of the commission. In fact, through 
the armistice Stalin countered the effects of the August 23, 1944, coup and 
created the instrument by which the Soviet Union took complete control 
of Romania.48 In addition to the provisions of the convention, which guar-
anteed the Soviet Union a dominant role in the political and economic life 
47  See the text of the armistice in Marin Radu Mocanu, ed., România. Marele sacrificat al 
celui de-al doilea război mondial. Documente (Bucharest: Arhivele Statului din România, 
1994), document no. 182, 310–324. 
48  Dennis Deletant, Teroarea comunistă în România. Gheorghiu-Dej şi statul poliţienesc 
1948–1965 (Iaşi: Polirom, 2001), 53–54.
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of Romania, Stalin was also able to use two efficient means to totally sub-
ordinate Romania, namely the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and the 
problem of Transylvania’s status.
Although on August 23, 1944, the importance of the RCP in Roma-
nian society was insignificant—the number of its members being under 
1,000—the presence of the Red Army in the country was to constitute the 
fundamental element in the RCP’s rise to power. The model for the RCP’s 
conquest of power fit perfectly into the Eastern European blueprint. The 
coalition of the National Democratic Bloc, which had brought together the 
NPP, NLP, SDP, and the RCP, was replaced on September 26, 1944, by the 
National Democratic Front (NDF), a grouping that included—alongside 
the RCP and SDP—the Ploughmen’s Front, the Hungarian People’s Union, 
and some of the trade unions. Under the protection of Soviet bayonets and 
with the unconditional aid of the Kremlin, the RCP and its allies launched 
in autumn 1944 and winter 1945 a massive and aggressive campaign aimed 
at destabilizing political life in Romania and taking control of the key min-
istries: those of the armed forces, justice, and the interior. The campaign 
was orchestrated by the RCP with the blessing of the Kremlin to increase 
pressure on the Sănătescu and Rădescu governments in order to “democ-
ratize” political life, in other words, to consolidate the communists’ role 
in the Romanian government. Another lever through which Moscow exer-
cised pressure on the Romanian authorities was the implementation of the 
armistice provisions. Thus, taking advantage of the disorder provoked in 
particular by the communists and the Red Army between September 1944 
and March 1945, Moscow repeatedly accused the Romanian government 
of deliberately “sabotaging” the implementation of the armistice clauses. 
Amid increasing political tensions and accusations launched by the NDF 
against the Rădescu government, the Kremlin decided at the end of Febru-
ary 1945 to intervene decisively in Romania by sending Andrei Ya. Vyshin-
skii to Bucharest. The latter demanded that King Michael I dismiss the 
Rădescu government and replace it with a cabinet led by Dr. Petru Groza.49 
After several days of tergiversation, the king was forced, on March 6, 1945, 
to accept the imposition in power of the Groza government, formed from 
representatives of the NDF and of dissident groups in the NLP and NPP.
49  See Radu Ciuceanu et al., eds., Misiunile lui A.I. Vâşinski în România. (Din istoria 
relaţiilor româno-sovietice, 1944–1946). Documente secrete (Bucharest: Institutul 
Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 1997).
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Alongside the provisions of the armistice convention and the role of 
the RCP, the third efficient means that Stalin wielded to impose Soviet 
interests in Romania was, without a doubt, the question of Transylvania. 
Point 19 of the convention declared the Second Vienna Award of August 
30, 1940, null and void and stipulated the return to Romania of “Tran-
sylvania or of the greater part of it.” With this reserved phrasing, the 
Great Powers left open the possibility of a revision of the borders in the 
Trianon peace treaty, in the hope that the Hungarian government would 
thus be tempted to stop fighting the war alongside Germany. This calcula-
tion proved to be correct as, on October 15, 1944, Miklós Horthy, regent of 
Hungary, indeed tried to follow Romania’s example. However, the attempt 
was thwarted by the rapid reaction of the Reich. Although Stalin declared 
on repeated occasions that all of Northern Transylvania had to be returned 
to Romania, he still did not hesitate to use this matter as a pressure point 
on the Sănătescu and Rădescu governments. Thus, invoking political and 
military reasons—including atrocities committed by paramilitary troops 
against the Hungarian population in the region—in November 1944 the 
Allied Control Commission decreed the expulsion of the Romanian author-
ities from Northern Transylvania and the introduction of Soviet military 
administration. The Romanian authorities’ later requests to rescind this 
measure were categorically rejected by the Soviets. The Kremlin made a 
favorable response in this matter conditional on the creation of a “demo-
cratic” government. Indeed, on March 9, 1945, three days after the forma-
tion of the Petru Groza cabinet, Stalin approved the return of Northern 
Transylvania to Romanian administration. Besides this gesture of goodwill 
shown towards the new government, designed to consolidate its internal 
prestige, Stalin’s decision had another significance. From the Soviet lead-
er’s point of view, with the imposition in power of the Groza government, 
Romania had permanently entered the Soviet sphere of influence. Later 
Hungarian efforts to regain part of Northern Transylvania were in vain, 
since Moscow’s main concern was to have a Romania secure in terms of 
Soviet interests.
The Kremlin’s calculations proved to be correct, since immediately after 
the Groza government’s installation in power, the latter began to imple-
ment the measures that paved the way for the adoption of the Soviet model 
in all domains of political, economic, and cultural life.
What made Romania and Hungary different from Austria was that 
Austria came under four-power occupation, whereas the other two expe-
rienced a unilateral Soviet invasion. Hence the West had a great deal of 
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influence in Austria; it had very little in Hungary and possibly even less in 
Romania. The U.S. representative in Romania, Burton Berry, recognized 
this early on and devoted himself to upgrading his collection of ancient 
coins and rugs.
The situation in Hungary was misleading. On the surface the com-
munists displayed caution and a willingness to cooperate with the other 
political forces. Free elections were held in Budapest and followed by an 
unfettered national election in 1945, resulting in a 57 percent victory by 
the Smallholders Party, leaving the Hungarian Communist Party with a 17 
percent minority role. Until 1948 there existed a multiparty system with a 
functioning parliament; cultural, academic, and political pluralism; and a 
semblance of free speech. However, all this was a façade that concealed a 
surreptitious but harsh process of Sovietization. In 1945 party leader Rákosi 
revealed that “elections did not play an important role in communist plans” 
and that they had other means at their disposal. This included the “subver-
sion” of democratic parties “from within” with the help of fellow travelers 
and clandestine communists hiding in their ranks, as well as mass demon-
strations, intimidation, and arrest. All this was made possible by the fact 
that from the outset, the communists dominated the army, the police and 
secret police, the security services, and the local governments, as well as the 
judiciary, which the Communist Party was able to instruct to hand down 
sentences that served its interests. The parliament had no significant role 
to play. Its functions were taken over by the Supreme National Council, an 
organ controlled by communists, which had a constitutional mandate to 
pass laws. This body was used to vote on legislation that would not have 
passed in parliament, such as the Soviet-Hungarian Economic Agreement 
of 1945. Economic policy, including the formulation of the budget, was 
usurped by the communist-dominated Supreme Economic Council, estab-
lished in December 1945 at Stalin’s direct instruction. Rákosi revealed in 
closed communist circles numerous times that communist moderation was 
tactical and temporary.
Soviet representatives got involved when necessary. After the elec-
tion Molotov instructed the Communist Party to renegotiate the coali-
tion agreement so as to get the Interior Ministry, the key portfolio in 
seizing power. Thus in late 1945 the Soviet minister in Budapest, Pushkin, 
reported that the government was reliably pro-Soviet. In January 1946 he 
summoned Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy and President Zoltán Tildy and 
told them to stop “playing around with the Soviet Union” and to pursue 
a “policy of friendship.” Party ideologist József Révai launched an all-out 
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onslaught for power: “the truce is over, comrades,” he declared. In May 1946 
the communists announced the establishment of a “dictatorship of the pro-
letariat” without regard to the international or domestic conditions. Soon a 
“conspiracy against the republic” was “exposed” by the communist-run mili-
tary intelligence, which culminated in the disposal of the prime minister in 
May 1947. Tildy understood the consequences and asked U.S. intelligence to 
get him out of the country.
Simultaneously with all this, the Soviets launched their drive to Sovi-
etize the economy. Only three months after the signing of the Romanian-
Soviet economic agreement, Moscow signed a treaty of similar scope with 
the Hungarians. This agreement and the Potsdam Declaration, which 
allowed the USSR to seize what it considered to be former Axis assets (more 
often than not, this meant Western-owned property), provided the legal 
basis for the Soviet economic penetration. In this way Moscow got unlim-
ited access to raw materials such as coal, bauxite, manganese, and crude 
oil, and control of communications and factories in important branches of 
industry. This was not all. The Soviets extracted funds well beyond the value 
of reparation payments. Finally, the seizure of Western assets furthered the 
goal of getting rid of all non-Soviet external economic influence in Hun-
gary. The “bourgeois sabotage” trials held in 1948 were crucial in justifying 
the Iron Curtain by convincing the public that Western companies were 
nothing more than covers for spying and sabotage.
In summary, it can be said that the Hungarian experience was very dif-
ferent from the Austrian and very similar to that of Romania, where the 
pace of destroying the multiparty system may have been faster and Soviet 
intervention more open, but the ultimate aims were the same and the 
methods were very much alike. As points of comparison: Andrei Vyshinskii 
bullied the Romanian king to dismiss the government and appoint Petru 
Groza in March 1945; Stalin instructed Rákosi to get rid of Ferenc Nagy in 
May 1947; Valeriyan Zorin’s appearance in Prague sealed the fate of democ-
racy in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. 
Exclusive Soviet influence in Austria was limited to the short period 
in which the Red Army was the only occupation power in Eastern Aus-
tria—in other words, before the Western Allied powers entered Austrian 
territory. The Soviet occupation of Austria has been well researched in the 
last few years, based on now-accessible Russian archives. Various research 
projects with the participation of Russian institutions and historians, 
since 2008 also under the umbrella of the Austro-Russian Commission of 
Historians (chairmen: Stefan Karner and Aleksandr O. Chubar’yan), dem-
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onstrate this. They have produced a number of publications in German 
and Russian.50
Although there were no Soviet plans to occupy all of Austria, Austria 
was also something like a test case and/or a bargaining chip for the Soviet 
Union to see how far it could go without being pressured by the West. Sta-
lin tried to install a puppet government in Vienna ad hoc immediately after 
the Red Army crossed onto Austrian soil at the end of March 1945. But the 
head of the provisional government, Karl Renner, was obviously not the 
person Stalin was hoping for and was in a better position than his subordi-
nates in Eastern Europe. In contrast to the social democratic/socialist par-
ties in East-Central Europe, there was no breeding ground for communism 
within the Austrian Socialist Party (SPÖ). Anti-communism was deeply 
rooted in Austria and achieved a fundamental consensus with the conser-
vative People’s Party (ÖVP) in its attitude towards the Soviet occupiers.51 
In contrast to Romania and Hungary, Austria was occupied by four pow-
ers, and in the Allied Commission (AC) for Austria (officially not an Allied 
Control Commission) the Soviets had few legal means of influence, espe-
cially after signing the Second Control Agreement in 1946. The agreement 
gave the Austrian government room for maneuver. After the autumn 1945 
elections, which were devastating for the Communist Party (KPÖ), only one 
communist minister (the minister for industry and electrification) was part 
of the government. The agreement was a Soviet accommodation with the 
West but had the side effect of delaying the start of the state treaty nego-
tiations. This delay was quite useful to the Soviet Union at that time. The 
USSR could only protest against Austria’s participation in the Marshall 
Plan but could not take legal steps against the signing of bilateral treaties 
(such as, in this case, between the United States and Austria). Still, fears of 
a communist coup d’état prevailed and were intentionally stirred up by the 
Western powers (“After Budapest, Vienna!”).52 As far as can be seen from 
the Soviet documents, Moscow did not intend a coup d’état in Vienna dur-
50  See, above all, Karner and Stelzl-Marx, Die Rote Armee in Österreich; Stelzl-Marx, Sta-
lins Soldaten in Österreich; Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung in Österreich; Rug-
genthaler, The Concept of Neutrality in Stalin’s Foreign Policy 1945–1953 and the works 
cited below. Currently Barbara Stelzl-Marx is working on “(Soviet) Children of Occu-
pation.”
51  Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, “Unter sowjetischer Kontrolle: Zur Regier-
ungsbildung in Österreich 1945,” in Die Rote Armee in Österreich, eds. Karner and 
Stelzl-Marx, 97–140.
52  Günter Bischof, Austria in the First Cold War, 104.
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ing these years and even left the Communist Party (KPÖ) to itself in many 
cases. The “Figl-Fischerei,” secret talks between the KPÖ party leaders and 
the chancellor in 1947, were not “salami-slicing” based on the Hungarian 
recipe, but rather autonomous actions of the KPÖ—without consultation 
with Moscow. In 1948 Moscow even reprimanded the KPÖ leadership over 
its separation plans, which Yugoslav comrades had advised them to carry 
out.53 The Soviet Occupation Zone of Austria was of great importance for 
the Soviets until the Eastern bloc was consolidated and as long as German 
assets and Austrian oil were lucrative and profitable.54 The answer to why 
Eastern Austria under Stalin did not end up in the Eastern bloc lies outside 
the scope of this book.55 Until 1949, Stalin’s main goal apparently was main-
taining the status quo in terms of military policy in Central Europe.
The Soviet power, moreover, pursued from the outset a strict yet not 
unbroken denazification policy in Austria; in contrast to the Eastern Euro-
pean states, however, it never used this as cover for actions against all non-
communist opposition. “Only” some 2,000 Austrians were arrested, and 
about 1,000 of them were sentenced and deported to the Soviet Union.56 
Approximately 200 of them were sentenced to death, primarily for anti-
Soviet espionage, and shot dead in Moscow.57 By 1949 the Soviet Union 
had already allowed a large proportion of the Austrian prisoners of war to 
return home. Starting in 1947, they organized regular transports back to 
53  Ruggenthaler, Warum Österreich nicht sowjetisiert wurde, 667–673; Mueller, Die sowje-
tische Besatzung in Österreich 1945–1955 und ihre politische Mission, 194. 
54  See the study based on Soviet documents by Iber, Die Sowjetische Mineralölverwaltung 
in Österreich. On the Soviet economic empire in Austria, see also Stelzl-Marx, Stalins 
Soldaten in Österreich, 265–308.
55  See Peter Ruggenthaler, “The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing 
Debate,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13 (4/2011): 172–212, here 193–199.
56  Harald Knoll and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, “Wir mussten hinter eine sehr lange Liste von 
Namen einfach das Wort ‘verschwunden’ schreiben: Sowjetische Strafjustiz in Öster-
reich 1945–1955,” Sowjetisierung oder Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspo-
litik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945–1955. Schriften des Hannah-Arendt-Instituts 
für Totalitarismusforschung, vol. 32, eds. Andreas Hilger, Mike Schmeitzner, and Cle-
mens Vollnhals (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2006), 169–219; Harald Knoll 
and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, “Sowjetische Strafjustiz in Österreich. Verhaftungen und 
Verurteilungen 1945–1955,” in Die Rote Armee in Österreich, eds. Karner and Stelzl-
Marx, 217–321.
57  Barbara Stelzl-Marx, “Death to Spies: Austrian Informants for Western Intelligence 
Services and Soviet Capital Punishment during the Occupation of Austria,” Journal 
of Cold War Studies 14 (4/2012): 167–196; Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx, 
eds., Stalins letzte Opfer. Verschleppte und erschossene Österreicher in Moskau 1950–1953 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2009).
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   22 2015.02.17.   6:53
23Introduction
the homeland.58 The USSR had never used the prisoner-of-war question 
as a bargaining chip (even if there were intermittent—yet unsuccessful—
attempts to combine this question with the demand for the return of Soviet 
displaced persons still in Austria).59 The mass sentencing of foreign prison-
ers of war from 1949 took place above all against the backdrop of retaining 
manpower, as a further retention of prisoners of war would have violated 
the Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union had admittedly never signed 
it, but the Western powers repeatedly complained to the USSR about the 
incomplete repatriation. From this point on, Moscow always pointed out 
that the convicts only remained in the Soviet Union due to war crimes or 
other offenses.60
In the Soviet Union, a total of at least 513,766 Hungarian, 187,367 
Romanian, and 156,681 Austrian war prisoners were registered in the 
GUPVI camp system.61 Of this total, 459,011 Hungarians, 132,755 Roma-
nians, and 145,790 Austrians were repatriated.62 The others largely died in 
the camps. In addition, there were tens of thousands of Hungarian and 
Romanian civil internees.
It has been estimated that the Soviet Union removed 13 billion dol-
lars (the equivalent of the Marshall Plan funds for Western Europe) from 
its empire in Europe, but in light of specific calculations based on archival 
evidence, this figure may be far higher.63 Although the final sum is impos-
sible to calculate, removals from Hungary alone may have amounted to 1.5 
billion dollars in contemporary currency, which is roughly the amount the 
Soviets took out from Austria—an estimated 1.4 billion. Romania paid an 
estimated 1.5 billion dollars, and Finland several hundred million. To this 
58  Stefan Karner, Im Archipel GUPVI. Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung in der Sowjet-
union 1941 –1956 (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1995), 198.
59  Stefan Karner and Peter Ruggenthaler, “(Zwangs-)Repatriierungen sowjetischer 
Staatsbürger aus Österreich in die UdSSR,” in Die Rote Armee in Österreich, eds. Kar-
ner and Stelzl-Marx, 243–273, here 267.
60  Stefan Karner and Harald Knoll, “Verurteilte Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion. 
Zum Stand der Forschung,” in Österreicher und Sudetendeutsche vor sowjetischen Mili-
tär- und Strafgerichten in Weißrussland 1945–1950. Avstriiskie i sudetskie nemtsy pered 
sovetskimi voennymi tribunalami v Belarusi 1945–1950. gg., eds. Stefan Karner and 
Vjačeslav Selemenev (Graz: Verein zur Förderung der Forschung, 2007), 36–47.
61  “Glavnoe Upravlenie po delam Voennoplennykh i Internirovannykh,” Main Adminis-
tration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees (of the USSR).
62  Karner, Im Archipel GUPVI, 79.
63  Paul Marer, “Soviet Economic Policy in Eastern Europe,” in Reorientation and Commer-
cial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to 
the Joint Economic Committee (U.S. Congress, 1972), 145.
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we must add an estimated 10–19 billion dollars from East Germany.64 In 
today’s currency, these amounts would be 10 times larger.
Payments included the dismantling of factories and removal of agri-
cultural and industrial inventories as war trophies, arbitrarily fixed repa-
rations, the maintenance of the Soviet army, compensation for Hungarian 
debt to Nazi Germany and damages incurred by German assets payable 
to the USSR, as well as transfers of usually fictitious profits from Soviet-
ized companies. Soviet companies and other arrangements gave the Soviet 
Union unlimited access to raw materials and energy carriers in Eastern 
Europe such as uranium, coal, timber, steel alloys, bauxite, aluminum oxide, 
and crude oil. The assets received free of charge in occupied Europe were 
resold to the states of the region between 1952 and 1956, adding to the 
already hefty transfer of funds to the imperial center.
K K K
There is no need to separate the ideological and imperial aspects of Soviet 
expansion. The two were intertwined. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe 
went simultaneously with the creeping introduction of Stalinist systems 
that ruled by terror and the liquidation of democratic elements. These poli-
cies had nothing to do with American foreign policy, which was fairly com-
placent in Eastern Europe until 1948. When the Soviet leadership was faced 
with the choice of cooperation with the former Allies or total domination of 
the adjac
64  Iber and Ruggenthaler, eds., Stalins Wirtschaftspolitik an der sowjetischen Peripherie; 
Borhi, Hungary in the Cold War; Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History 
of the German Zone of Occupation, 1945–1949 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Har-
vard University Press, 1995); Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationszahlungen 
der SBZ/DDR 1945–1953 (Berlin: Elbe-Dnjepr-Verlag, 2004).
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nt states, it opted for the latter. Eastern European sources reveal that 
Soviet policy toward the vassal states was not a response to American 
actions. The communist tactic of moderation lasted until the peace treaties 
with the former German satellites were concluded. The introduction of pro-
letarian dictatorships was announced well over a year before the Marshall 
Plan. Economic exploitation that exceeded widely justified claims on repa-
ration began when the war in Europe ended.
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DOCUMENT No. 1:
Memorandum on Atrocities Committed by Soviet Troops
September 12, 1944
Report no. 640 of the Romanian General Inspectorate of the Gendarmerie on 
behavior by Soviet troops in the Romanian countryside.
Ilfov County
On the night of September 8–9 at 22:00, the Ciofrângeni Gendarmerie post 
patrol, composed of Sergeant Motoc Constantin and soldier Stoica Nedelea, 
while carrying out duties in Izvorani village, was disarmed by five Russian sol-
diers, who also took the correspondence suitcase, 50 cartridges, and 650 lei.
On September 10 of this year, Russian soldiers removed the radio device 
from the Roşu Gendarmerie postand even took a uniform jacket with them.
Prahova County
Hătcărău commune: on August 30 of this year, Russian soldiers took two 
barrels of wine from Simion Banu and sacks full of oats from Constantin 
Cristea. The nun N.N. was raped.
Drăgăneşti commune: on August 30 of this year, 67,000 lei [were taken] 
from Gheorghe Olaru; drugstore products worth 200,000 lei [were taken] 
from Marica Popescu; two horses and a cart [were taken] from Maria Voicu; 
a cart [was taken] from Toma Bâră.
Ciorani commune: on August 30 of this year, resident Mihalache Petre 
was shot dead, and afterwards 60,000 lei, a watch, and a ring were taken; 
300,000 lei from Chirilă Chiriţa; 250,000 lei from Gheorghe Stănescu; 
180,000 lei and a watch [was taken] from Gheorghe Popescu; from the local 
farm: 10 horses, six steeds, two carts, three pairs of harnesses, two pigs, 
and 1,800 kilograms of oats [were taken]. 
Adâncata commune: on August 30 of this year; two horses, corn, oats, and 
birds from Ion Gheorghiu.
Albeşti commune: on August 30 of this year, the local gendarme post was 
destroyed and gendarmes dispersed.
Bucov commune: 15 residents [were] robbed; the office of the gendarmerie 
post [was] devastated, officers pursued, and their equipment removed.
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Valea Călugărească commune: August 28, 1944: 3,000,000 lei stolen from 
the post office; in the train station, a railcar carrying the Iaşi University 
library collection [was] broken into and books [were] dispersed. Addition-
ally, two railcars with wheat and corn were divided among the residents. 
The local gendarmes had their equipment removed.
Coşlegi commune: on August 31, devastation of the estate residences of 
Dobrescu, Cristopol, and Urlăţeanu, as well as the taverns of Bărănescu, T. 
Cristea, M. Iacobescu, and M. Stănescu; same with the gendarmerie post.
Măgurele commune: on August 31 of this year, a bicycle from the gendarmerie 
post; from the Center of Operations: 29 horses, eight carts, three supply wag-
ons, four trucks, one vehicle, five pairs of harnesses, 3,000 liters of gasoline, 
15 barrels, 15,000 kilograms of oats, 15,000 kilograms of wood, 53 weapons, 
50 belts, 30 cartridges; from the Replenishment Center, quantities of cof-
fee, pearl barley, soap, tobacco, tea, cans, oats, and barley, as well as differ-
ent military materials [were taken]; three taverns were devastated; they took 
60 sheep from Gheorghe Obiloiu; four horses from Ştefan Obiloiu; a carriage 
from M. Ionescu; two daughters of N.N. [were] raped; Ion Păun [was] shot 
dead; four trucks from the Ploieşti depot; one horse and 10,000 lei from baker 
Constantin Popa; one horse from the Bălteşti gendarmerie post [was taken].
In Pietroşani commune, on August 31, the estate residence of Colonel Bosi 
was devastated.1
Ploieştiori commune, on August 31, two residences, four taverns, and a veg-
etable garden were devastated; resident Nicolae Barosanu wasshot dead and 
Veta Dumitrică wounded; three old women were humiliated; a radio device 
and truck parts were taken away from Gheorghe Dobrin; two gendarmes, 
officers, were deprived of their equipment, and two gendarmes, in military 
training, were severely hit; the post’s chief was pursued to be shot.
Blejoi commune, on August 31 of this year: two residences, a cooperative, 
and a tavern were devastated; Ştefan Cordinoiu was shot dead.
1  This is probably a reference to Robert C. Bossy (1896–1973), a Romanian career officer 
in the anti-aircraft artillery. Royal adjutant to King Michael I (July 1, 1943–December 
30, 1947); head of the Royal Military Household (August–November 1944). In 1948 he 
emigrated and later settled in Switzerland. Colonel (as of June 8, 1940); brigadier gen-
eral (as of April 1,1945). Withdrawn from active service (August 9, 1946) and placed in 
the reserve a year later.
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Brazi commune, on August 31 of this year, railcars carrying refugee luggage 
were devastated in the train station; two horses were taken awayfrom the 
gendarmerie post.
Gherghiţa commune, on September 2 of this year, 30 horses and many pigs 
were taken from a local farm.
Negoieşti commune, on September 2 of this year, the gendarmerie post was 
devastated.
Poseşti commune, on September 2 of this year, the chief of the gendarmerie 
post was disarmed, five taverns and four residences were devastated. An 
elderly woman, Maria Alexandru, was shot dead.
Ogretin commune, on September 2 of this year, two carriages and two 
chaises were stolen, Dumitru Salahoru’s grain depot was devastated, and 
the telephone wires were cut.
In Podenii Vechi commune, on September 2 of this year, six residences were 
devastated and six girls were raped.
In Hăbud commune, on September 2, 1944, the gendarmerie post was dev-
astated and the soldiers kicked out.
In Teişani commune, on September 3 of this year, two residences were dev-
astated, and a girl, Elena Gh. Petre, was shot dead.
In Scăioşi commune, on September 3 of this year, all the vehicles, horses, 
and carts from the Regiment 9 anti-aerial base. Four horses and a carriage 
were taken from Grigore Cristea.
At the Brazi refinery, the chief of the gendarmerie post was disarmed, and 
the residences and casino of the refinery were devastated.
In Fulga commune, on September 4 of this year, 550 kilograms of sugar, 700 
kilograms of flour, and a radio device were stolen from Vasile Ştefănescu.
In Poiana Vărbilău commune, on September 4 of this year, two horses with 
saddles were taken from the gendarmerie post.
In Comarnic commune, during the night of September 4–5 of this year, two 
shops were devastated and items stolen from a gendarme officer.
In Drajna commune, on September 5, 1944, the gendarmerie post, the coop-
erative, two taverns, a shop, and a number of residences were devastated, 
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and items worth 57,000,000 lei were stolen. Two mechanical shops were 
destroyed and all their materials, worth 30,000,000 lei, were stolen.
In Izvoarele commune, on September 5 of this year, Gogu Niculescu’s res-
taurant was devastated.
In Chițorani commune, on August 28, 1944, Mrs. Vaciov was shot because 
she refused to give up a blanket. The administrator Gheorghe Tănăsescu 
was also shot because he resisted his wife being raped. Similarly, the orderly 
of Lieutenant Coroiu was shot because he opposed the rape of a woman. A 
number of residents were also robbed.
Signed: [illegible]
Source: Arhiva Consiliului Naţional pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității București, fond 
Documentar, dosar nr. 13762, ff. 126–128 (henceforth quoted as ACNSAS).
K
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DOCUMENT No. 2:
Note on Soviet Abuses
September 13, 1944
The following report of the Romanian Secret Intelligence Service outlines some 
incidents between members of the Soviet army and Romanian authorities and 
civilians, as reported by the gendarmerie.
As a follow-up to 32.157 from September 12, 1944, we report below on the 
following cases that demonstrate the behavior of Soviet troops:
Olt County
Coteana commune
–  They entered the gendarmerie post by force, asking the gendarmes 
to bring them wine and women. They used their weapons, firing on 
gendarmes.
–  From resident Vasile Marinescu they took watches, clothes, and a 
number of household items.
–  They robbed Jean Guran of 200,000 lei, one horse, one saddle, 
clothes, and food. 
In Corbu commune
–  From resident Marin Bădescu they took two barrels of wine, three 
clocks, and clothes.
–  From a priest, Diţulescu, they took clothes and jewelry.
In Gostovăţ commune
–  They took an automobile from owner Lelia Manolescu.
In Chilia commune
–  A Soviet officer entered the courthouse and fired a number of 
revolver shots into the portrait of King Michael2 and the Queen 
2  Michael I, King of Romania (born 1921). Son of the Romanian heir to the throne 
Prince Carol, and Princess Helen of Greece. King of Romania from July 20, 1927, to 
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Mother Elena,3 which were completely destroyed, causing grave 
offense to their majesties.
–  The commander general of a motorized column with the indicative 
RKO Military Office 59956, under the pretense that he wanted to go 
hunting, asked the Olt County Hunting Inspector, Reserve Captain 
Ciulei Leonida, if he could borrow for three to four hours, on his 
word of honor,a Grenner hunting weapon, 12 mm caliber, along with 
the cartridge box and 30 cartridges, which he did not return.
In Vulpeşti commune
–  On September 9 of this year, at 10:30, an inebriated Soviet soldier 
shot dead gendarme sergeant Gagiu Petre, chief of Dobroteasa post, 
who was in Vulpeşti commune on business, to prevent the infringe-
ment of a woman’s residence. The sergeant was accompanied by 
gendarme soldier Bangău Teodor, contingent 1936, native of Fra-
gila village, Soroca County, who disappeared at the same time as the 
Russian assassin.
In Romanaţi County
–  On September 9 of this year, about six Russian soldiers were rob-
bing one house after another in Devesel commune. Upon their 
arrival at the school, a top sergeant gendarme, chief of patrol, inter-
vened, and the post chief arrived in the meantime. A hand-to-hand 
fight broke out between the gendarmes and Russian soldiers. The 
Russian soldiers retreated, only to return in larger numbers, armed 
with automatic weapons. To prevent being disarmed, the gen-
darmes fled and hid. 
June 8, 1930, and from September 6, 1940, to December 30, 1947. Michael I was the 
architect of the law of August 23, 1944, that ended political and military cooperation 
with Nazi Germany. He subsequently attempted from 1944 to 1947 to prevent Roma-
nia from being Sovietized. The communists ultimately forced him to abdicate on 
December 30, 1947. In early 1948 he went into exile in Switzerland. Only in 1997 was 
his Romanian citizenship returned to him.
3  Queen Mother Helen of Greece (1896–1982) was the daughter of King Constantine I 
of Greece and his wife Sophia of Prussia. From 1921 to 1928, she was married to Prince 
Carol II of Romania. From 1930 to 1940, she lived mainly in Florence. In 1940 she 
returned to Romania, where she remained until the expulsion of the royal family in 
1948.
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The case is being investigated by the Gendarme Legion’s commander and a 
Soviet officer.
Vâlcea County
–  Information Center ABA from the city of Râmnicu Vâlcea reports 
that it no longer has a phone connection with the city of Sibiu 
because the cables were cut by the Russians. The phone connection 
with the intelligence and warning posts from the Olt Strait to Sibiu 
functions only to Călimăneşti, a situation that is paralyzing the aer-
ial information and warning office of Râmnicu Vâlcea’s garrison.
Dolj County
–  In Puţuri commune, resident Petre Nicolaescu was robbed of 
2,000,000 lei.
In the city of Craiova
–  Incidents and complaints have multiplied.
–  On the outskirts of and outside the city, isolated officers are robbed 
of watches and money.
–  The civilian population is halted and their luggage, horses, carts, 
food, etc. stolen. 
–  Forestry directorate no. 7 from Craiova complained to a Soviet com-
mander that wood was being taken away from their warehouses. 
The officer stated that we should be ashamed because Romanian 
troops in Russia took everything, and now the Russian army needs 
machines, provisions, wood, etc., in order to go to Berlin.
–  At the courthouse’s stable, Russian soldiers were ordered to take 
the horses and leave feeble ones in their place. This occurrence was 
stopped by our guards. 
–  CFR inspection unit no. 3 from Craiova complains that on the night 
of September 7–8 of this year, Russian military broadcast units dis-
rupted the phone lines, hindering connections with Corabia, Calafat, 
Piatra Olt, R. Vâlcea, and Costeşti.
–  On the afternoon of September 9 of this year, two Soviet soldiers 
attempted to rob the residence of the owner Tomescu from the 
Bariera Vălcii district. The gendarmes intervened, arrested one of 
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them, and took him to the gendarmerie post. After a short while, 
two officers and a number of armed soldiers arrived at the post, dis-
armed the gendarmes, freed the Russian soldier, and even took a 
horse that belonged to the gendarmes.
–  On the night of September 9–10 of this year, four Russian soldiers 
armed with automatic weapons entered the residence of Captain 
Ştefăniu, captain of a motorized battalion, at 23 Salvator Street and 
demanded from the captain all the gold he had in the house, namely 
jewelry. The captain threatened them with two grenades he had in 
the house, and the Russian retreated.
–  On the same night, the Russian soldiers entered the residence of 
citizen N.N. on Brâncoveanu Street and raped his wife and daughter.
–  The mood of the population is worsening. Military guards are being 
requested everywhere.
Gorj County
–  Soviet troops cut the phone lines at random locations between 
Târgu Jiu and Brăneşti, a distance of 60 kilometers.
Mehedinţi County
–  On September 6 of this year, Soviet soldiers stole an accordion from 
a shop.
–  On the night of September 6–7, 10 armed Soviet soldiers entered 
Hotel Victoria and raped the hotel’s female concierge. 
Source: ACNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar nr. 13953, vol. 2, ff. 132–136.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 3:
Romanian-Soviet Memorandum regarding Romanian Participation  
in the War against Germany and Hungary
September 28, 1944
On September 25, 1944, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii and the chief of the Roma-
nian General Staff, General Gheorghe Mihail, met to discuss which Romanian 
military forces were to participate in the military operations against Hungary 
and Germany. These issues were discussed and finally resolved on October 26 
by a Romanian-Soviet memorandum signed by General V.P. Vinogradov of the 
Allied Control Commission in Romania, and General Nicolae Rădescu, chief of 
the Romanian General Staff. The memorandum stipulated not only the number 
of Romanian military forces to join the Red Army, but also which commands and 
military units would be demobilized and/or dissolved. This last proposal was a 
flagrant violation of the armistice agreement from September 12, 1944, which 
also deprived Romanian authorities of the necessary forces to maintain order 
and peace inside the country. In fact, the Kremlin intended to drastically reduce 
the number of military forces on Romanian soil in order to prevent any potential 
reaction against Red Army forces.
Following the discussions that took place on September 25, 1944, between 
the marshal of the Soviet Union, R.I. Malinovskii,4 and the Romanian 
Army chief of staff, Adjutant General Mihail,5 and later between Lieuten-
4  Marshal Rodion Ya. Malinovskii (1898–1967). Soviet career military officer. Com-
mander of the Third Ukrainian Front (December 1943–April 1944); commander of the 
Second Ukrainian Front (May 1944–May 1945). Led the Second Ukrainian Front in 
the Iaşi-Chişinău operations (August 20–23, 1944), which led to Romania’s defeat and 
exit from the war. Later led the Second Ukrainian Front in the military campaigns in 
Hungary and Austria. President of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Romania 
(1944–1945).
5  Gheorghe Mihail (1887–1982). Romanian career military officer. Put on reserve status 
on September 6, 1940, by General Ion Antonescu, who also arranged his house arrest 
in Sinaia; reactivated on August 23, 1944; chief of the General Staff (August 23, 1944–
October 12, 1944); general inspector of the infantry and army; put on reserve status 
in 1947. Arrested by communist authorities on January 20, 1948, accused of sabotage 
along with “a group of landowning saboteurs in Ilfov County” and in custody for two 
years. Afterwards accused of “intense activity against the working classes” and sen-
tenced to 12 years in prison on January 23, 1957. Was imprisoned in Văcăreşti, Piteşti, 
Ocnele Mari, Sighet, and Jilava andreleased on October 10, 1957.
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ant General V.P. Vinogradov6 and the representative of the government 
and the Romanian High Command, Romanian Army Chief of Staff, Army 
Corps Adjutant General Rădescu,7 for the application of point 1 in the armi-
stice agreement between the governments of the USSR, the United King-
dom, and the United States of America on the one hand, and the Romanian 
Government on the other hand, from September 12, 1944, the undersigned 
agreed to the following:
I. The Romanian Government and the Romanian High Command, in order to 
continue military operations begun on August 24, 1944, against Germany 
and Hungary, will proceed with the following great units and military units:
a). Infantry divisions 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 11, 18, 19, and 21
 Mountain division 3
 Motorized division 8
 Cavalry division 1
b). Army Corps Command II, VI, IV, and VII
c). Army Command 1 and 4
The Army Corps and Divisions will have their commands, troops, and 
services organized according to the annex tables in the present memorandum.
The armies will be composed organically of transmission and police 
units, as well as rear and service units.
II. Special Troops
a). An Aviation Corps composed of:
–  Four reconnaissance wings IAR. 39 assigned to those four Army 
Corps [listed under 1/b].
–  A bombardment wing Ju. 88
6  Vladislav Petrovici Vinogradov (1899–1962). Deputy of the president of the Allied 
(Soviet) Control Commission in Romania (September 1944–February 1945). Head of 
General Staff and later head of Soviet military delegation of the Allied Control Com-
mission (February 1945–1946).
7  Nicolae Rădescu (1874–1953). Career military officer and Romanian politician. Oppo-
nent of Ion Antonescu, interned in labor camp (1941–1942). Chief of General Staff 
of the Romanian Army (October 15–December 6, 1944). Last prime minister before 
communist takeover of the government. Escaped from the country in 1946 and then 
became an important figure in the Romanian exile community. 
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–  A bombardment group composed of two dual-engine airplane wings, 
Savoia 79
–  A pursuit group composed of two wings, Messerschmidt 109 G
–  A pursuit group composed of two wings IAR 80
–  A fighting and dive bombardment group composed of two wings: 
fighter wing Henschel 129 and dive bombardment wing Ju. 87
b). An anti-aerial artillery regiment composed of four 75 mm Vickers 
batteries and four 20–37 mm batteries.
c).Pioneer Units
The Fourth Army will have 30 Pioneer Battalions
The First Army will have 35 Pioneer Battalions
d).Pontoneer Units
Battalion 1 and 2, Heavy Pontoon
Companies 12, 18, 19, and 21, Light Pontoons
e).Communication Units
Communication Battalion 51 of the First Army
Communication Battalion 53 of the Fourth Army
Battalion 22, Line Constructor
f).Units of the Army AA Artillery
The First and Fourth Armies will each have a mixed A.A. Artillery Divi-
sion, each composed of two 75 mm Vickers batteries and three 20–37 mm 
batteries.
III. The units shown above will be reorganized and completed according to 
the tables, on the front, without interrupting operation against Germany 
and Hungary, in the following way:
In Northern Transylvania
The Fourth Army will be composed of Army Corps Commands 2 and 6, 
Infantry Divisions 3, 6, 9, 11, 18, 21, and Transport Division 8.
In Hungary
The First Army will be composed of Army Corps IV and VII with Infan-
try Divisions 2, 4, 19, Mountain Division 3, and Cavalry Division 1.
IV. The reorganization and completion of units and major units men-
tioned in the present memorandum will be finished on October 20, 1944, 
24:00.
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V. For the making up of losses during combat:
a). Each Army Corps will have a regiment for multiple purposes to pre-
pare necessary requirements for infantry, artillery, and special units.
The composition of the marching regiment: three infantry battalions, 
an artillery division, and special sub-units. 
b). The Aviation Corps will be strengthened by the dispatch of person-
nel prepared in corresponding schools.
VI. For the completion of Higher Units and units shown in the present 
memorandum, the following will be used: the personnel, animals, means of 
transportation, armament, Higher Units materials, and Romanian Army 
units that are not included in the present memorandum.
The remainder of units will be:
a). Dissolved:
–  Third Army Command
–  Army Corps Commands 1 and 3
–  Cavalry Army Corps
–  The Moto-mechanized Troops Command
–  Ten infantry and mountain divisions
–  A moto-mechanized division
–  Three cavalry divisions.
b).Demobilized as peace units:
–  Army Corps Command 5
–  Mountain Troops Command
–  Three infantry or mountain divisions
The dissolution and demobilization will be finished on December 1, 1944.
VII. To accomplish on time the transport of personnel, materials, and 
possessions required for completing great units and the indicated units, 
the Romanian General Staff is arranging transport requests that will be 
included in the general transport plan of the Romanian Railways.
VIII. The present memorandum will go into effect at the moment of its 
signing. Arranged in Bucharest in two copies, each in Romanian and Rus-
sian, a copy for each side.
ADDITIONAL NOTE
As government commissioner and representative of the Romanian 
High Command, I declare that I feel the Allied (Soviet) Control Commis-
sion’s decision on the number of the Romanian military units allowed to 
continue their existence within the country’s territory is not justified by 
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the obligations imposed on Romania by the September 12, 1944, armistice 
agreement (Article 1, Article 18, annex to Article 18), stipulations that may 
not be modified by this memorandum.
I sign this memorandum, imposed by the Allied (Soviet) Control Com-
mission, in order to avoid damaging consequences to common operations 
against Germany and Hungary.
A copy of Note no. 2748 of the Romanian Commission for the Applica-
tion of the Armistice is annexed. 
Signed:  CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF
 ADJUTANT GENERAL N. Rădescu
[Appendix]
Memorandum for the General Staff
Undated [October 1944]
Mr. Chief of General Staff,
In response to your memorandum number 681.866 of October 25, 
1944, I have the honor to inform you of the following.
The text in the September 12, 1944, armistice agreement that deals 
with the issue raised by you is Article 1.
This article stipulates that we must participate in the common war 
with no less than 12 infantry divisions.
This commission believes that the cited text cannot be interpreted as 
imposing the dissolution and demobilization of Romanian divisions left 
inside the country.
Signed: The President of the Romanian Commission
For the Application of the Armistice
Christu8
Source: Arhivele Militare Romane Piteşti, fond 5418, Marele Stat Major-Sectia 
III Operatii, dosar nr. 2845, ff. 30–34 (henceforth quoted as AMR).
8  Ion Şerban Christu (1895–1953). Romanian diplomat in pre-communist government. 
Member of the Romanian delegation sent to finalize the armistice of September 12, 
1944, President of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice 
(September–November 1944), member of the Romanian delegation at the 1946 Paris 
Peace Conference. Removed from Ministry for Foreign Affairs, arrested by communist 
authorities on May 5–6, 1950. Died in communist prison at Sighetu Marmatiei.
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DOCUMENT No. 4:
Report No. 30.001 from the Intelligence Service (SI) of the War Ministry 
Presented to the Minister of War, General Mihail Racovitză,  
on the Surveillance of the SI’s Activities and Personnel by Special  
Soviet Authorities
October 4, 1944
Immediately after Soviet troops entered Romania, officers of the Romanian intel-
ligence services who had previously operated in Russian territory during the war 
were pursued for interrogation. After the war, some of those found guilty for war 
crimes were sentenced by Romanian courts. Others were handed over by the Roma-
nian authorities to the Soviet authorities, and then sent to the gulag until 1955. 
Memorandum by the Intelligence Service of the War Cabinet regarding  
the Soviet Surveillance of Intelligence Service Personnel
I. As reported by our Note on September 27 of this year, Soviet NKVD 
authorities located in Bucharest are taking into custody and detaining peo-
ple without the assistance of Romanian authorities, and without the precise 
motive being known behind these acts and the agency committing them.
This procedure was and is being used against the staff of the intelli-
gence service and against its informants.
In regard to this situation, I refer to the following cases:
1. On September 22 of this year, the arrest of Captain Ostrovschi Leon,9 for-
mer chief of the Eastern Front Intelligence Center, was attempted. Follow-
ing the officer’s protests, he was released.
9  Leon A. Ostrovschi (1908–1988). Cavalry captain. According to Securitate documents, as 
leader of the Seventh Cavalry Regiment, he allegedly instigated soldiers under his com-
mand to commit summary executions among the population of Edineţ (Bessarabia), as 
retaliation against perceived injustices committed by some of the locals in 1940, on the 
occasion of the Soviet ultimatum and the Romanian Army’s withdrawal from the region. 
Continued activities for the Intelligence Service on the Eastern Front (1942–1944), sen-
tenced in 1947 to 25 years for war crimes by Soviet authorities. In 1957, he was handed 
over to Romanian authorities by Soviet authorities, his sentence was partially com-
muted, and he was later deported (exiled) to the Bărăgan plain (1959–1964).
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   44 2015.02.17.   6:53
45SOVIET OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA
2. On September 26 of this year, at 13:30, [employee] Neagu Stan,10 former 
secretary of the Judicial Office in Odessa, was arrested at his home and has 
not been released.
3. On October 30, 1944, Caterciko Vladimir,11 a Russian immigrant and 
informant in our service responsible for problems relating to irredentist 
actions of Russian immigrants, was arrested at his home.
4. On October 2, a group of six Soviet soldiers, under the pretext of want-
ing to be quartered, identified the residence of a certain high official in the 
Service.
5. As ascertained in the appended note,12 other intelligence service officers 
and officials represent the object of interest for Soviet NKVD authorities.
II. In addition to what has already been mentioned, the service staff is 
intimidated from executing their assigned missions, recognizing that they 
are subject to arrest by the NKVD without any knowledge about their situa-
tion by Romanian authorities. 
The undersigned—with the address No. 32.492 from September 30 of this 
year—I appealed at M. St. M., Section II,13 to show the case of Captain 
Ostrovschi Leon and of the official Neagu Stan, demanding to make known 
to them that the intelligence service agrees to provide the necessary details 
concerning the activities of its staff when requested officially and by the rel-
evant bodies.
As these measures seem not to have achieved their objective, I request 
that you consider informing the government itself of the situation, a prac-
tice performed in other municipalities in this country and by the person-
nel of other state or even private authorities, in order to intervene along-
side the competent Soviet authorities, so that the inquiries, targeting 
10  Stan I. Neagu (1916–?). Code name Neagu Stanciu, special agent of the Judicial Section 
of the Intelligence Service. Arrested and detained by communist authorities (1951–1956).
11  Vladimir Caterciko (Katreciko). Mentioned in a Securitate document from February 8, 
1957, as recently arrived from the USSR and described as a representative in Romania 
of a terrorist and anti-Soviet group, known as “The Brotherhood of True Russians” 
(Bratstvo russkoi pravdy). Arhiva Serviciului Român de Informaţii, fond “X,” dosar nr. 
48.340/Buc., vol. 456, ff. 130.
12  Not published.
13  Marele Stat Major, Secţia a II-a: The Second Section of the General Staff, Intelligence 
and Counterintelligence was the military agency for collecting intelligence, while the 
Intelligence Service was the civilian agency, although working under the military’s 
command.
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state or private officials—Romanian subjects—and which concern Soviet 
authorities, are made in agreement with the chiefs of competent police 
authorities.
Signed:  CHIEF OF I.S. COLONEL Lissievici14
Source: Arhivele Serviciului Român de Informaţii, fond “X,” dosar nr. 48.340/
Buc., vol. 408, ff. 366–368 (henceforth quoted as ASRI).
K
14  Ioan Lissievici (1898–1974). Romanian artillery officer. Operated in the Special Intel-
ligence Service as chief of Section I, Foreign Intelligence; commander of Regiment 
14 Artillery during World War II (December 31, 1943–September 25, 1944); chief of 
Special Intelligence Service (September–December 1944). Arrested in March 1945, 
handed over to Soviet authorities, he was interrogated at Lubyanka concerning his 
activities with the Intelligence Service and then released by the communist authori-
ties in December 1945. Arrested again in 1949 and sentenced to 15 years’ hard labor 
for “conducting intense activity against the working classes” in 1957. After passing 
through Uranus, Făgăraş, Jilava, and Gherla prisons, instead of being released in 
1963, he was in internal exile in the Bărăgan region (1963–1964).
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DOCUMENT No. 5:
Romanian Note to the ACC regarding the Implementation  
of the Armistice Agreement
November 11, 1944
The armistice agreement was signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944. The 
agreement established Romania’s political, economic, and military obligations. 
Even so, the Red Army continued to treat Romania as an occupied state, commit-
ting numerous abuses. For instance, the Soviet military command in Dobrogea 
intervened in the region’s internal and administrative politics, giving orders and 
directives, thus taking the place of Romanian legal authorities.
We have been informed that in Dobrogea, the Soviet Military Command 
has duties incompatible with the provisions of the armistice agreement, 
because in the respective areas, it decides on administrative matters of a 
domestic nature that are incumbent upon Romanian authorities. 
As an example, the appointment order of Captain Alexander 
Mihailovici as helper and deputy to Lieutenant Colonel Dubowitzky for the 
command of Constanţa County, an order issued by Colonel Sidorov, men-
tions, among other duties:
–  maintaining order in the region
–  the right to arrest any person who disobeys orders or ordinances 
issued
–  the right to stop demonstrations and meetings
From these duties, it is established that their enforcer can directly inter-
vene in the administration and police duties of the respective territory, 
bypassing Romanian authorities. In fact, as a result of the Soviet Military 
Command order, and without any formal request or previous agreement 
with Romanian authorities, private machines, tractors, working animals, 
and others were removed.
The situation thus created contradicts the provisions in Article 17 of 
the armistice agreement, which states that, with the exception of a limited 
area behind the front line, Romanian administration is restored. It is true 
that the same article mentions that “the Romanian administrative bodies, 
in the interest of restoring peace and security, are obligated to execute the 
instructions and orders of the Allied (Soviet) High Command, in order to 
ensure the fulfillment of the armistice conditions.” However, this stipula-
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tion must be understood in the sense that these restrictions come from the 
Allied (Soviet) High Command and the Allied Control Commission, respec-
tively, through the medium of the Romanian Commission for the armistice 
application, and are imparted to the superior central authorities of Roma-
nian administration, so that these will, in turn, command their own respec-
tive bodies. If we were to accept the regional Soviet military command 
giving orders to Romanian administrative bodies, these bodies would find 
themselves receiving orders from two places, from their hierarchically supe-
rior authorities and from the Soviet Command, orders that may eventually 
not overlap, thus causing the misleading and inoperative implementation 
of Article 17 from the Armistice Convention. This would occur especially if 
the Soviet Command were to take direct measures over the population.
The above conditions concerning the civil administration are also valid 
for the headquarters and units of the Romanian military, since they receive 
orders from the General Staff and thus may encounter different orders, 
emanating from different forums. Article 1 of the armistice agreement 
specifies that only “the military operations against Germany and Hungary 
will be led by the general leadership of the Allied (Soviet) High Command,” 
while the interior units will remain under Romanian leadership.
Therefore, we ask that you recognize that the duties and jurisdiction of 
the regional Soviet military command should be limited to Soviet military 
administration.
Regarding the implementation of Article 3 and its annex, we have the 
honor to present some cases and the interpretation we accorded them.
1.  On the entire territory of Dobrogea, many district commanders or 
other various Soviet delegates present themselves to civil authori-
ties and force them to provide all kinds of materials, threatening to 
take them if they do not comply.
The annex to Article 3 stipulates providing the Allied (Soviet) 
High Command with Romanian military, aerial, and naval struc-
tures and installations, that is, ports, piers, barracks, airfields, etc., 
requested for military needs. According to Article 3, the Romanian 
government and the Romanian High Command must provide these 
through their own bodies. Regarding the materials of civil authori-
ties and private individuals, these must be seized through legal 
means by the competent Romanian bodies. 
2.  On October 24, a number of Soviet officers arrived at the Carmen 
Silva Military Sanatorium, requesting the Romanian non-commis-
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   48 2015.02.17.   6:53
49SOVIET OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA
sioned officer, left as a warden, to surrender the entire sanatorium, 
without any official documentation.
That military sanatorium belongs to the military structures 
category mentioned in the annex to Article 3, but the non-com-
missioned officer warden did not hold the power to hand over the 
sanatorium, and much less so directly, without receiving an act from 
competent authorities.
We submit the above deliberations in order to assist an exact 
interpretation and application of the armistice conditions, in letter 
and in spirit.
Signed: The President of the Romanian Commission
 For the Application of the Armistice
 Ion Christu
Source: Arhiva Ministerului Afacerilor Externe Bucureşti, fond 71/1939 E9, vol. 
189, ff. 165–166 (henceforth quoted as AMAE).
K
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   49 2015.02.17.   6:53
50 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA
DOCUMENT No. 6:
Report on the Interrogation of Intelligence Officers by SMERSH regarding 
Romanian Intelligence Activities on the Eastern Front 
October 12, 1944
Some officers and employees of the Romanian intelligence services operating previ-
ously on Soviet territory were arrested and interrogated by the Soviet counterintel-
ligence organs on their activities on the Eastern Front, especially on informants 
who were left behind on Soviet territory and continued to be active in the USSR.
Report No. 166605 from the Judicial Office of the Intelligence Service 
(SI) of the War Ministry, regarding the detainment, transport to 
Bulgaria, and interrogation of an SI employee by the SMERSH 
organization attached to the Third Ukrainian Front
Special Agent N. Stanciu of the Judicial Office was arrested on September 26, 
1944, at 13:15 at his home on 22 Sebastian Street by two Soviet officers—lieu-
tenants; he was transported in a military truck and taken first to 2 Enăchiţă 
Văcărescu Street, where there is an inn and a hotel, and was held here until 
September 30, 1944, and then transported again to 52 Mircea Vodă Street.15
On October 5, 1944, he was taken aboard a military truck from this 
place to Bulgaria—through Olteniţa, Călăraşi, and Silistra—to the city of 
Tîrnovo, where he arrived on October 7, 1944, and was held here until Octo-
ber 8, 1944, when he was brought back to the country and escorted by a 
Soviet lieutenant, and was released on October 9, 1944.
The authorities who arrested him have the name “Operativnaya Kontr-
Razvedka Smersh (SMERSH),” attached to the Third Ukrainian Front.
The Russian lieutenant who arrested and investigated him inside the coun-
try is named Petro (his family name is unknown); he was escorted by Lieuten-
ant Bairuşev; he did not find out the name of the major who investigated him at 
Tîrnovo—it seems that he was the chief of the respective organization.
From the moment of his arrest until his release, he was continuously 
interrogated. 
The first question asked was: How many people he killed during the 
time he was in Russia, and how many people he recruited and left on a mis-
sion in Odessa.
15  Code name of Stan I. Neagu.
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Then he was asked to provide an autobiography beginning at age eight, 
insisting especially on his “recruitment,” the situation, the rank, and the 
course of activities in this service.
He was interrogated about Lieutenant Colonel [C.] Perju,16 who he was, 
what his occupation was, how the authorities and population knew him, 
and then who was the boss prior to Lieutenant Colonel Perju.
He was additionally interrogated about the following [persons of 
this Service]: Major [I.] Curăraru,17 Capts. Arghir,18 [Gh.] Demetriad,19 [R.] 
Hariton,20 Dumitrescu Vasile,21 Boris Georgescu,22 Tănăsescu.23
16  Constantin I. Perju (1898–?). Romanian infantry officer. Participated in World War I 
and began activity on March 1, 1918. Led the Special Intelligence Service Center no. 1 
Cernăuţi (1942), then no. 3 Odessa (1942–1944), Galaţi and Timişoara (1944). On trial 
first by the People’s Tribunal in Bucharest (1945), and then sent to the USSR and sen-
tenced to 25 years for war crimes.
17  Ioan Şt. Curăraru (1902–?). Romanian gendarmes officer, native of Bessarabia. 
Detached to the Special Intelligence Service within the ranks of the agency of the 
Eastern Front (1940–1944). Led Special Team “C” with the mission of recruiting and 
instructing agents who would operate behind the front, on the territory controlled by 
the Red Army, in Crimea, the Nicolaev region, Transnistria, Bessarabia, and Bucovina 
(November 1943–August 1944). On trial in the People’s Tribunal in Bucharest (1945) 
and later sentenced to 15 years in prison for war crimes (1947), only to be sentenced 
again for the crime of “intense activity against the working classes” (1957). Afterwards 
he was deported to the Bărăgan region (1960–1964).
18  Nicolae Gh. Cociubei (also known as Arghir) (1895–1970). Captain in the reserve, native of 
Bessarabia, superior staff employee of the Special Intelligence Service (1937–1945), deputy 
head of the Odessa Information Center (1942–1944), then part of Special Team “C” (1944). 
Arrested twice (March 1945 and 1951); imprisoned in Jilava and Făgăraş prisons.
19  Gheorghe S. Demetriade (1910–?). Special Intelligence Service employee (1934–1945), chief 
of the counterintelligence office of the Odessa Information Center (1942–1944). Arrested 
by the Securitate and handed over to Soviet authorities (1948), sentenced in the USSR 
to 25 years hard labor, then returned to Romanian authorities (1956), after which he was 
released in 1957. Allowed to leave the country and settle in the United States (1965).
20  Code name of agent Romeo A. Aurite (1912–?). Superior staff employee of the Special Intel-
ligence Service (1940–1945). Arrested in 1951, held in custody without trial (1951–1955).
21  Vasile C. Dumitrescu (1916–1992). Lawyer, then Special Intelligence Service employee 
(1941–1944). Aide to the chief of Judicial Bureau of Odessa Information Center no. 3 
(1941–1943), then Chişinău Information Center no. 2 (1943–1944). After the front’s 
dissolution (August 1944), missing, but probably evacuated with the Chişinău Infor-
mation Center, led by Gheorghe Balotescu, with the retreating German troops. After 
a short time in an American prisoner-of-war camp in Germany (1945–1946), he joined 
the American counterintelligence services (CIC) in West Germany. Settled in Munich, 
participated in organizations of Romanian refugees, especially editing newspapers 
and compiling a history of Romanian exile, published posthumously.
22  Unidentified.
23  Possibly Vasile Şt. Tănăsescu (1914–?). Member of the Special Intelligence Service, 
chief of a special team in the counterespionage wing that oversaw the USSR Legation 
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They demanded that he tell them who Volodia (Vladimir Iankovskii)—
a top informant— was, and what the Service’s informants were doing in 
Odessa; they also interrogated him about individuals of Russian origin who 
were recruited for the service and about those sent to the front line for 
intelligence.
He was also interrogated about the Odessa Judicial Office, who headed 
this office, what activities were conducted at this office, and how many peo-
ple were arrested by this office.
During the time that Special Agent N. Stanciu was detained at 52 Mir-
cea Vodă Street, Dima Feodor (without a leg),formerly in Odessa Service 
Center 3, who had been taken to this place after being arrested by the Rus-
sians in the city of Tulcea, took advantage of the Soviet sergeant-guard’s 
inattention, broke open a side door, and escaped on October 3, 1944.
To all the questions of the Soviet interrogators shown above, the public 
servant Stanciu answered as recorded in the attached personal confidential 
report.24
In light of all that is mentioned above, we request that you proceed 
according to the laws.
Signed: JUDICIAL COUNSELOR Cpt. Mag. I. Vlăduţă25
Source: ASRI, fond “D,” dosar nr. 9.060/Buc., vol. 2., ff. 350–351.
K
in Bucharest (1937–1939), then chief of Cetatea-Albă Information Center (1943–1944). 
Arrested 1951, held in custody (1951–1955).
24  Not published. The report summarizes the key issues for SMERSH investigators.
25  Ion I. Vlăduţă (1898–?). Lieutenantcolonel, magistrate, early service in the Artil-
lery. Magistrate within the Military Police – the judicial branch of the Special Intel-
ligence Service (1943–1947); led the Judicial Bureau of Odessa Information Center 
no. 3 (1943–1944), then the Judicial Branch of the Special Intelligence Service (1945–
1946). Arrested in 1950 and held in custody, under the suspicion of having conducted 
“intense activity against the working classes” (1951–1956).
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DOCUMENT No. 7:
Letter by the Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission  
in Romania, Lieutenant- General V.P. Vinogradov, to the President  
of the Council of Ministers, Army Corps Adjutant General Constantin 
Sănătescu,regarding the Armistice Agreement
November 2, 1944
The armistice agreement of September 12, 1944, imposed on Romania bur-
densome economic, political, and military tasks. Despite Romanian authori-
ties’ efforts to fulfill these requests, USSR representatives in the Allied Control 
Commission in Romania frequently accused the Romanian government of fail-
ing to fulfill the provisions of the armistice agreement. The Soviet side actually 
intended to use these accusations to increase the pressure on Romanian authori-
ties and bring the Communist Party to power.
His Highness, 
Mr. President of the Council of Ministers
Army Corps Adjutant General Sănătescu,
Mr. Prime Minister,
The amount of time that has passed since the day when the armistice con-
vention was signed was sufficient to allow the Romanian government to 
start actual fulfillment of the convention’s clauses.
Nevertheless, the Allied Control Commission cannot help but note 
completely unsatisfactory progress in implementing the armistice agree-
ment, which can be explained by a lack of desire and goodwill on the part of 
the Romanian government to assure fulfillment of the armistice clauses by 
Romanian authorities.
This is due to the fact that those agreement articles that have not 
required special preparation and have met no objective difficulties have not 
been fulfilled. As an example, we may take a look at Article 2 of the armi-
stice convention.
Thus far, not all German and Hungarian subjects living on Romanian 
territory have been interned, and those interned are kept in conditions that 
allow them to leave the camps every day, with no punishment for keeping 
contact with adherents of their movement, and for unrestricted receipt of 
parcels. Such conditions have allowed a number of subjects to desert. As 
a result not of objective conditions, but the Romanian government’s lack 
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of desire to meet the armistice convention, the completely unsatisfactory 
fulfillment of Article 5 of the agreement must be explained. The Romanian 
authorities have therefore failed to present complete information on Soviet 
and allied citizens who have been forcefully displaced to Romania.
Supply of these citizens is not assured and, for this reason, these citi-
zens are in difficult material conditions.
We have proven that various representatives of the Romanian admin-
istration are trying to influence Soviet citizens by any possible means, per-
suading them not to seek repatriation to the Soviet Union.
Article 8 in the armistice convention requires the Romanian govern-
ment to forbid export or expropriation of various goods (including posses-
sions and currency) owned by Germany or Hungary, or their citizens, or 
individuals residing on their territory or the territory occupied by those 
countries, without the consent of the Allied (Soviet) High Command.
Nonetheless, the Romanian government has not taken the necessary 
measures to ensure the application of Article 8 of the armistice agreement, 
either by passing respective laws or orders, or by enforcing effective control 
of the indicated goods and currency.
At present, goods and currency owned by indicated individuals can be 
taken away without any verification, which is a breach of Article 8 of the 
agreement. 
Article 11 of the armistice agreement is clearly ignored by the Roma-
nian government. For a month and a half, the Romanian government has 
done virtually nothing to implement Article 11 of the armistice agreement, 
and subsequent pressure by the Allied Control Commission, as late as the 
second half of October, made Mr. Christu present his proposals for repa-
rations; we must note that the content of these proposals is completely 
unsatisfactory and shows a lack of desire to seriously and practically con-
sider reparations to compensate for the damage inflicted by Romania on 
the Soviet Union.26
Fulfillment of Article 12 of the armistice agreement on restoration of 
goods owned by the Soviet Union not only fails to be enforced but encoun-
ters obstruction by Romanian authorities.
26  In Article 11 of the armistice convention of September 12, 1944, Romania was 
required to pay reparations to the USSR “because of the losses caused to the USSR by 
Romanian military operations and the occupation of Soviet territory.” The sum of 300 
million U.S. dollars was payable in six years in the form of trade goods (oil products, 
grain, wood, ships, various machines, etc.).
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Until October 20, over a month after the signing of the armistice, com-
pletely unsatisfactory and incomplete data were received from Mr. Christu 
on the location of factories taken out of the Soviet Union, while at almost 
any factory,staff members of the Allied Control Commission actually dis-
cover large quantities of machines, installations, lathes, tractors, and other 
goods. At the same time, there are many cases of dismantling installations, 
selling them to private individuals, and concealing these activities, whereas 
Romanian authorities remain completely inactive about these occurrences. 
The installations are stolen and then rot.
To this date, the Romanian government has done nothing to assign 
accountability to private individuals for evading the surrender of goods 
transported from the USSR, which are concealed and often sold. 
The organization headed by General Cassian,27 which has been set up 
for the restitution of Soviet property, operates in a completely unsatisfac-
tory way and makes the shipment of these goods proceed in an unaccept-
ably slow manner. 
The number of similar examples abounds, but even the proof shown 
above is sufficient to reveal existing sabotage by Romanian authorities with 
regard to the effort by the Romanian government to fulfill the clauses of 
the armistice.
The present state of affairs can no longer be tolerated.
The fulfillment of the armistice convention’s clauses in the shortest 
possible amount of time is the Romanian government’s obligation, the 
implementation of which it has sought to avoid until now. 
This avoidance has expressed itself in delayed fulfillment of the armi-
stice’s clauses, in tabling clearly unreasonable and deliberately unacceptable 
proposals to the Soviet government with regard to the methods by which 
Romania intended to fulfill its obligation in Article 11 of the armistice con-
vention, such as attempts to overinflate the prices of goods provided on the 
account of these obligations, etc.
The Allied Control Commission requests that the Romanian govern-
ment cease its policy of delaying the fulfillment of the obligations it con-
sented to in the armistice convention of September 12 and to start seriously 
rapid and conscientious fulfillment of all armistice obligations.
27  Gheorghe Cassian (1892–?). Romanian career military officer. Colonel starting in 
1938, then brigade general from 1943.
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The Allied Control Commission draws the Romanian government’s 
attention to the grave situation created in connection with the fulfillment 
of the armistice of September 12 of this year and requests that measures be 
taken to ensure the fulfillment of the convention without delay.
Signed: The delegate of Allied Control Commission President
 In Romania
 Lieutenant-General Vinogradov28
Allied Control Commission Chief of Staff,
Major Guard General Vasiliev29
The text of this document was submitted by the vice-president of the Allied 
Control Commission, Lieutenant-General Mr. Vinogradov, on November 2, 
1944, to the Army Corps Adjutant General Sănătescu,30 the president of the 
Council of Ministers.
Source: Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale Bucureşti, fond Ministerul Propa-
gandei Naţionale, Presa internă, dosar nr. 2/1944, ff. 24–26 (henceforth quoted 
as ANIC).
K
28  Lieutenant General Vladislav Petrovici Vinogradov (1899–1962). Deputy of the presi-
dent of the Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Romania (September 1944–Febru-
ary 1945). Head of General Staff and later head of Soviet military delegation of the 
Allied Control Commission (February 1945–1946).
29  Unidentified.
30  Constantin Sănătescu (1885–1947). Army general, Romanian career military officer. 
Served in World War I, head of Royal Military House (1943–1944), president of Coun-
cil of Ministers (1944), chief of General Staff (December 12, 1944–June 19, 1945).
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DOCUMENT No. 8:
Note by Marshal Rodion Malinovskii on the Administration  
of Northern Transylvania
November 20, 1944 
On October 25, 1944, Romanian and Soviet troops liberated Northern Transyl-
vania. According to Article 19 of the September 12, 1944, armistice agreement, 
Transylvania or the greater part thereof was to become part of Romania. Despite 
this stipulation, the argument that atrocities were being committed by Romanian 
paramilitary bands in the region was used by Soviet authorities to prevent return 
of the Romanian administration to Northern Transylvania. The Kremlin thus 
exploited the issue of Transylvania as blackmail and made its official response 
to the following letter contingent on the “democratization” of political life in 
Romania. It was only after the communist Petru Groza government was set up 
on March 6, 1945, that Stalin permitted the return of the Romanian administra-
tion to Northern Transylvania.
The armistice agreement states that the Transylvanian question will 
be solved by the peace treaty when it is decided that Transylvania or the 
greater part thereof will become part of the Romanian state.
As a result, it is not possible to re-establish Romanian administration in 
Transylvania until the signing of the peace treaty.
Signed: Malinovskii
 (R. MALINOVSKII)
Source: AMR, fond. 5418, Marele Stat Major-Secţia III Operaţii, dosar nr. 2845, 
ff. 261–262.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 9:
Order of the Allied Control Commission in Romania on Relations  
between the Red Army and the Romanian Authorities
November 29, 1944 
After the military occupation of Romania, the Soviet military command and mili-
tary units in Romania issued instructions to Romanian authorities and civilians 
with regard to the supply of food and quarters. Many such instructions were con-
trary to the provisions of the armistice agreement. Likewise, many abuses com-
mitted by Red Army soldiers were frequently recorded. Confronted with this situ-
ation, the Allied Control Commission decided to intervene in order to halt abuses 
and illegal activities.
By information received in the form of complaints and claims from the 
Ministry of War and other ministries in Romania, and private organiza-
tions and individuals, it is known that Red Army units, the military com-
mand in different locations, and individual Red Army soldiers are imposing 
all kinds of requirements on local administrative agencies and private indi-
viduals.
These requests are to provide food and fodder, lodging and equipment, 
without orders by the High Command and without reimbursement, as well 
as for employment of the civilian population for unimportant work to serve 
Soviet military institutions.
There were cases of arbitrary requisition of military premises and 
depots without prior agreements with local Romanian authorities. 
Soviet military commanders in some counties are creating problems for 
the Romanian deputies charged with supplying food, cattle, and vegetables 
needed for workers and functionaries in various enterprises and institu-
tions. 
Apart from this, the unlawful confiscation of different goods from their 
owners continues.
Measures will be taken to:
1.  Stop demands for food supplies and other goods from the local Roma-
nian authorities, organizations, and private individuals from the local 
population, and abide by the armistice agreement.
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All these requests for food, premises, and apartments must be satisfied 
by the local administrative authorities according to your request, and 
based on the corresponding forms envisioned by Article 10 of the armi-
stice agreement. The same applies to supplying Red Army units that 
are passing through.
2.  Forbid Soviet military units and individual soldiers to confiscate goods 
belonging to Romanians, goods not included under the category of 
spoils of war previously brought from the USSR. 
3.  Do not impede delegates of the Romanian authorities seeking to meet 
the supply needs of urban populations, industrial institutions, and the 
Romanian Army.
4.  Do not interfere with conflict management of Romanian authorities and 
private individuals.
5.  Forbid conduct completely devoid of tact in their relations with the rep-
resentatives of Romanian authorities, firms, and other organizations.
In this manner, you will train all personnel under your command.
Signed:  Vinogradov
Source: ACNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar nr. 4018, ff. 360.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 10:
Note regarding Conduct of Police and Gendarmerie Personnel  
vis-à-vis Representatives of the Soviet Armed Forces
February 2, 1945 
The attitude of the Romanian army, gendarmerie, and police with regard to 
Soviet soldiers who committed offenses on Romanian territory was regulated by 
an order of the General Staff in September 1944, but this order was cancelled 
as a result of intervention by the Allied Control Commission in Romania. Roma-
nian military authorities requested instructions on how their army, police, and 
gendarmerie were to behave given the alarming increase of incidents caused by 
Soviet soldiers. 
I. In the initial order No. 984.200 from September 30, 1944, the General 
Staff signaled the attitude the Romanian Army, gendarmerie, and police 
members must take in relation to the various criminals dressed in uniforms 
of the Allied armies.
This order was cancelled at the request of the Allied Control Com-
mission, to be replaced by another order, which was nevertheless never 
declared because an agreement was never reached concerning the need for 
this order and the language proposed by the general staff. 
The many incidents and attacks that have continued lately with 
increased intensity against army personnel and materials, as well as 
civilians,call for urgent and imperative attention and a change in the regu-
lation of response procedures by the army and the authorities.
Presently, because of the lack of such regulation and the fact that all 
who acted have been arrested, judged, and sentenced by the Soviet com-
mand, our authorities lack initiative and are powerless in the face of all the 
incidents provoked by soldiers in Soviet uniforms. Even sentinels, patrols, 
and other military security personnel lack the courage to follow orders; 
thus they allow their being disarmed and maltreated, and allow for removal 
of materials under their custody.
The current state of affairs has also contributed the general nature of 
the Ordinance Law, which prescribes the death penalty for all those who 
commit armed attacks against Allied soldiers but fails to establish instances 
of legitimate defense of self and goods, as well as the execution of regula-
tion orders.
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Because of this situation, the Romanian command and authorities fre-
quently appeal to the General Staff, pointing out incidents and attacks per-
petrated by Allied soldiers, and also request information regarding whether 
the right to legitimate defense, as stipulated in the Penal Code, may still be 
applied in relation to Allied soldiers or whether this is considered a hostile act. 
For all these reasons, the General Staff considers it necessary and 
urgent to clearly spell out the attitude of the army, the authorities, and the 
police when the behavior and actions of Soviet troops go against the law, 
regulations, and orders, as well as in instances of legitimate self-defense 
and defense of private and state property.
II. The Gendarmerie General Inspectorate shows, in Letter No. 52.535 
to the Ministry of Internal Cabinet Affairs, that as a result of the differ-
ent orders, the authorities and especially police and gendarmerie personnel, 
during interventions to settle conflicts provoked by elements dressed in 
Soviet army uniforms, do not know which stance to take when confronted 
with aggression or even gunshots.
This state of uncertainty diminishes the public order personnel’s ability 
to intervene, as the disorderly elements wearing the Soviet army uniform, 
who can include deserters and common criminals, can take action protected 
by this uniform and give orders concerning gendarmerie personnel proce-
dures when these gendarmes intervene preventively or repressively against 
theft, and especially when thieves react with the use of firearms, knowing 
that, until they are identified, it is unknown whether they are Soviet sol-
diers or Romanian deserters.
The prime minister has sent this report of the Gendarmerie General 
Inspectorate of the Romanian Commission for the Application of the Armistice 
in order to make the necessary request to the Allied Control Commission.
As a result of this situation, which is causing grave moral and material 
handicap to the authorities and civilians by placing them in the impossible 
situation of defense and identification of the perpetrators dressed in Allied 
uniforms or deserters or Romanian general criminals, the following condi-
tions, in agreement with the Judicial Counselor of the Commission for the 
Application of the Armistice, are proposed:
1.  We request the Allied Control Commission’s approval for:
a.  Sentinels, armed guards, and those in charge of the safety of state 
goods should be authorized to halt a person,even to the point of 
opening fire, to execute their orders. Civilians and military person-
nel who find themselves in legitimate defense or find their resi-
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dence being burglarized should be authorized to open fire when 
their life or belongings are threatened, according to legal provisions 
found in Romanian laws.
b.  Incidents arising in relation to those mentioned above should be 
investigated by a joint committee under the direction of a Soviet 
delegate when the victim is a Soviet citizen, or under the direction 
of a Romanian delegate when the victim is a Romanian citizen.
Signed: GENERAL COUNSELOR FOR MILITARY MATTERS
 GENERAL Pretorian S.31
Source: AMR, fond 1834, Comisia Română Pentru Aplicarea Armistiţiului, dosar 
nr. 199, ff. 506–507.
K
31  Division General Septimiu Pretorian (1893–?). Romanian career military officer. 
Served in World War I and World War II. Military counselor in Romanian armistice 
delegation (September 1944–October 1946), general secretary of Ministry of War 
(October 1946–July 1947), head of General Staff (December 12, 1947–January 30, 
1948); discharged May 1, 1948. Member of the Romanian Communist Party, arrested 
July 1948, sentenced to 12 years in prison, pardoned in 1951.
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DOCUMENT No. 11:
Note by Chief of Staff Army Corps Adjutant General  
Constantin Sănătescu to Lieutenant-General Vinogradov regarding 
Disarmament of Romanian Units
March 5, 1945
In the context of the political crisis in Romania instigated by members of the 
Communist Party that resulted in the resignation of the Nicolae Rădescu govern-
ment, the Allied Control Commission decided on February 28, 1945, to disarm 
numerous Romanian military units, as well as all military guards who protected 
the Ministry of War and the General Staff. Soviet authorities thus sought to 
forestall possible reaction by the Romanian army in support of General Nicolae 
Rădescu during the political crisis in Romania. The head of the Romanian Gen-
eral Staff protested vehemently against the measures taken by the Allied Control 
Commission in Romania, but these protests were to no avail.
In response to your note no. B.430 of February 28, 1945, I have the honor to 
bring the following to your attention:
1. The removal of all weapons from the units specified in the note above, 
from the units in charge of guarding factories that produce war materials, 
from the materiel depots, and from the premises of the War Ministry and 
the general staff, not only represent demeaning measures for the Romanian 
Army but also put the Supreme Command and the retention of our matériel 
in moral and material uncertainty.
2. The general staff draws the attention of the Allied Control Commission to 
the fact that disarmament of all the guards and units mentioned results in 
the gravest consequences for the morale of the entire population, as well as 
of the army, which must not be subjected to such contradictory treatment 
that, on the front, they are fighting comrades whose continuous efforts are 
required, while on their own territory they are subjected to imprisonment, 
disarmament, and abuse. 
3. Explaining these measures by saying that these units or guards will not 
request the use of weapons is surprising, because in any army in the world, 
any sentinel and guard who has to maintain the security of a building or 
depot must have a weapon.
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Justifying this disarmament on the grounds that the use of weapons 
by enemy elements to the state must be avoided is in contradiction with 
the previous stipulation, because if there is such an apprehension, then the 
guards should be strengthened and armed all the more.
4. The general staff protests these acts of disarmament, which constitute a 
categorical violation of the armistice agreement’s stipulations, and wants to 
reveal to the Allied Control Commission the grave consequences that result 
from leaving our military institutions to arbitrary action by scoundrels, 
consequences that make it easier for deserters and imprisoned individuals 
to escape and that also demoralize the Romanian Army.
As a result, we request immediate repeal of these measures. 
Signed: General Chief of Staff Army Corps General C. Sănătescu 
Source: AMR, fond 1834, Comisia Română Pentru Aplicarea Armistiţiului, dosar 
nr. 199, ff. 91–92.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 12:
Report to L.I. Beriya on the Political Situation in Romania32
March 5, 1945
With the forced resignation of General Nicolae Rădescu’s government, the politi-
cal crisis in Romania reached its peak. The democratic parties and the king’s 
entourage considered putting forward a non-party cabinet to be headed by Prince 
Barbu Ştirbey to prevent the formation of a predominantly communist govern-
ment under Petru Groza’s leadership. The following document describes the polit-
ical developments and the influence exercised by the USSR through the Allied 
Control Commission, which enforced disarmament and the drastic reduction of 
the Romanian army, police, and gendarmerie forces and supported the continu-
ous communist assault on the public administration throughout the country.
[Bucharest]
Top secret
Moscow, NKVD of the USSR—to Comrade Beriya33
We hereby submit to you a report on the political situation and events in 
Romania as of March 4, 1945. 
The issue of forming a democratic coalition government remains open. 
The King’s camarilla, consisting of Prince [Barbu] Ştirbey, [I.M.] 
Stârcea,34 and Colonel [Octav] Ulea,35 is strongly influencing the king with 
its objections to approval of the formation of Petru Groza’s cabinet.36
32  Sent to I. Stalin, V. Molotov, and G. Malenkov. 
33  Lavrentii Pavlovich Beria (1899–1953). Soviet politician, marshal of the Soviet Union, 
deputy premier (1946–1953), and chief of the Soviet Security Service NKVD/MGB 
(1938–1953). After Stalin’s death, was arrested, sentenced to death, and executed.
34  Ioan Mocsony-Stârcea (1909–1992). Major landowner, industrialist, and Romanian dip-
lomat (1934–1944). Marshal of the Royal Household (1942–1944). Arrested in 1947 by 
the communist authorities and sentenced initially to two years’ imprisonment, later in 
1954 to 15 years. Released in 1964, he emigrated in the same year to Switzerland.
35  Octav Ulea (1889–1960). Romanian military career officer, served in World War I. Direc-
tor of the Royal Household (1930–1940); minister of the Royal Household and head of 
the Civil Chancery (1940–1947). He accompanied King Michael into exile (1948). Colo-
nel in the reserve (June 1, 1938); brigadier general in the reserve (August 3, 1945).
36  Petru Groza (1884–1958). Romanian politician. Began his career as deputy of the 
Romanian National Party in 1919, then entered the People’s Party and served as min-
ister. Founded and led the Ploughmen’s Front, the interwar group that later became 
important by association with the communists. This led to his position as prime min-
ister (1945–1952), and then as formal head of state (1952–1958).
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Late in the evening of March 2, a consultation was held in the king’s 
palace. It was presided over by the king and attended by [Dumitru] Negel,37 
Ştirbey,38 [Iuliu] Maniu,39 and [Constantin I.C.] Brătianu,40 and it was 
decided to continue delaying the formation of a democratically concen-
trated government. In pursuit of this goal, Tătărescu,41who is a puppet of 
this clique, met with Petru Groza early in the morning of March 3 and put 
forward new claims, notwithstanding the fact that an agreement on the dis-
tribution of ministerial posts and the participation of Tătărescu’s group in 
the government had been reached on March 2. 
During the evening of March 3, Petru Groza was received by the king 
three times. The king told Petru Groza that, according to the constitution, 
he wants all parties, including the Ţărănesc and the Liberal parties, to par-
ticipate in the government, whereas this fact is not sufficiently taken into 
account in the list of government members put forward by Petru Groza. 
Petru Groza answered that, considering the political situation, there is 
no other option than to form a democratic coalition government and that 
37  Dimitrie Negel (1890–1969). Landowner and administrator of the Crown Domains 
(1942–1947) and marshal of the Royal Court (1944–1947). Undersecretary of state for 
supply at the Ministry of National Economy (May 26–November 17, 1941); minister 
of agriculture (August 23–November 4, 1944); minister ad-interim of justice (October 
13–November 4, 1944).
38  Barbu Ştirbey (1872–1946). Romanian politician. Member of the Romanian Academy. 
President of the Council of Ministers and minister of the interior (June 4–20, 1927).
Involved in the armistice talks for Romania’s exit from the war (1944).
39  Iuliu Maniu (1873–1953). Romanian politician. Began his career in the Hungarian 
Parliament before 1918. After Transylvania’s unification with Romania, he became 
deputy, minister, and prime minister in a number of governments. Member and pres-
ident of the National Peasant Party. Opponent of Carol II and the Antonescu dicta-
torship. Possibly the most important opponent of the government organized by the 
communists in 1945–1947. Arrested in 1947, involved in a highly publicized trial, and 
sentenced to life in prison. Died in Sighet prison.
40  Constantin I.C. (Dinu) Brătianu (1866–1950). Romanian politician. President of the 
National Liberal Party (1934); deputy and minister in a number of governments. 
Opponent of Carol II and Antonescu dictatorships. Also a leader of anticommunist 
opposition. Arrested in 1950; died in prison at Sighet.
41  Gheorghe Tătărescu (1886–1957). Romanian politician; member of National Liberal 
Party; prime minister (1934–1937, 1939–1940). One of the most important allies of 
King Carol II, including after Carol established his personal dictatorship in 1938. 
Tătărescu was isolated by democratic political circles after Romania’s exit from the 
German alliance, as he approached the communists and the alliance dominated by 
them, leading the dissident faction of the National Liberal Party. This earned him the 
position of vice prime minister and minister of foreign affairs (1945–1947). Removed 
by communists in 1947, arrested and imprisoned without trial.
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cooperation between the National-Democratic Front and the historical par-
ties is not possible. 
The members of the government proposed by Petru Groza are notseen 
as acceptable by the leaders of the historical parties because, in their opin-
ion, no members of the Ţărănesc Party and no liberals were included. 
In spite of the fact that Petru Groza formulated the issue of urgent cabi-
net formation very rigidly, the king told him that he would call for him again. 
As a consequence, the king succeeded in postponing the final decision 
on this issue until Monday, March 5. 
The big demonstration of the National-Democratic Front in Bucharest 
that had been planned for today, and at which they had planned to demand 
the formation of the cabinet headed by Petru Groza to be completed, was 
postponed until Monday.42
In the event that the king does not give his consent, the leadership of 
the compatriot is preparing for the formation of the intended cabinet of 
Petru Groza.43 They intend to push it through without [the king’s] permis-
sion by appealing to the public. 
We are implementing the necessary organizational measures. 
The leadership of the Allied Control Commission continues to further 
reduce the Bucharest garrison and to remove armaments. 
Three of our divisions are expected to arrive in the vicinity of Bucha-
rest on March 4–5. 
The situation in the capital and in the other central cities continues to 
be tense. 
The leadership of the Ţărănesc Party thinks that an occupation by 
Soviet troops would be preferable for Romania’s future to the king’s volun-
tary consent for the government proposed by Petru Groza. 
On March 2, Dinu Brătianu declared that he is not able to take part in 
the cooperationist government—not for reasons of party political pride but 
because the compatriot [Petru Groza] will gain the majority and will make a 
number of decisions in which the historical parties will be forced to partici-
pate, a fact that the liberals do not approve of. 
42  National-Democratic Front. Created on October 12, 1944, by the Romanian Commu-
nist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Ploughmen’s Front, the Patriotic Union, 
and the Work General Confederation. 
43  Meaning the communists. 
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The king, Maniu, and Brătianu are highly dissatisfied with the fact that 
the British and the Americans are not interfering with present events in 
Romania. 
There are rumors that, on the evening of March 3, a telegram of 
unknown contents was sent from the king’s palace to London. There are 
also rumors that simultaneously, telegrams were sent to Beneš, asking him 
to intervene in Romanian affairs and to inform comrade Stalin about it. 
There are rumors that the king, Maniu, and Brătianu have decided to 
delay the formation of the new government until they receive an answer 
from London. According to these rumors, this will create a tense atmo-
sphere in the country, forcing the Russians to take some kind of drastic 
measures, which will then demonstrate that they are actively intervening in 
Romanian internal affairs. 
According to information from our agents, the king is planning to 
entrust N. Lupu with the formation of a cabinet in the event that comrade 
Vyshinskii categorically demands the quick formation of a government.44
N. Lupu will have to accept all proposals from the National-Democratic 
Front but will not implement them. 
The deputy director of the “Secret Information Service,” Kintescu,45 has 
been instructed to immediately compile a list of 200 members of the intel-
ligentsia who have not been involved in politics and remain out of it. 
One can assume that this is how they want to select people for the for-
mation of a “government of experts.”
The officers of the Romanian army are agitating among the soldiers by 
telling them that the internal situation in the country is very dangerous as 
a result of the fact that the issue of Romania’s independence is currently 
at stake. The soldiers are being told that they must be prepared to take up 
arms. 
Soldiers of the Romanian units who support the National-Democratic 
Front are systematically flogged. 
44  Nicolae Gh. Lupu (1876–1946). Romanian doctor and politician. Liberal deputy in 
Moldavia (1907), then minister of the interior (1919–1920), minister of labor as a 
Peasant Party member but in liberal governments (1927–1928), vice-president of the 
National Peasant Party (1926–1927 and 1934–1946), he laid the foundations of a Peas-
ant Party dissidence with the aim—approved by the communists—of weakening the 
main opposition party, the NPP (1946). 
45  Gheorghe Kintescu (1901–1948). Deputy director of the Secret Intelligence Service 
(1944–1945), arrested and sentenced for “conspiracy” against the Groza government 
(1946), died in prison.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   68 2015.02.17.   6:53
69SOVIET OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA
When a military transport with industrial machinery designed to be 
sent to the USSR was unloaded in the city of Constanţa on March 1, an aer-
ial bomb was discovered. The transport had been loaded on February 22 at 
the Malaxa Factory.
On the night of March 1–2, the workers’ committees of the oil refiner-
ies continued to disarm the gendarmerie guards in the city of Ploieşti. By 
the morning of March 2, the guards in all plants were disarmed. 
In the Română-Americană, Lacea-Română,46Xenia,Vega,Orion, and 
Columbia factories, the following arms were confiscated: six light machine 
guns, 25 sub-machine guns, 171 grenades, 26 rifles, 14 handguns and 23 
boxes with cartridges. 
In the Astra-Română Factory, the workers confiscated three trucks full 
of arms and ammunition from the gendarmes. 
Despite the armed resistance of the gendarmerie guards in this factory 
and the fact that it was they who opened fire, they were disarmed. 
The workers of the oil refinery in Ploieşti are in a combative mood. 
Reactionary statements were made by officials and engineers. 
Gendarmes distributed the leaflets for the nationalist Ţărănesc [lead-
ers] in the city of Leu; in Caracal the people occupied the building of the 
prefecture, expelled the old prefect, and appointed the compatriot Olteanu 
as the new one. 
There was no opposition from the gendarmes. 
The inhabitants of the city of Turnu Severin elected a new prefect—
the advocate Baselai who is a supporter of the national-democratic front—
instead of the old prefect Ionescu, who was a protégé of Rădescu.47
Ovakimyan, Timofeyev, Kuznetsov48
Reprinted in T.V. Volokitina et al., eds., Vostochnaya Evropa v dokumentakh ros-
siiskikh arkhivov 1944–1953gg. Tom I 1944–1948 gg. Moscow: Sibirskii khrono-
graf 1997, pp. 167–170.
46  Probably Dacia Română.
47  Dumitru Bazalan. Lawyer, born in 1908; appointed director of the prisons (1945–
1948) and chief of the road communication service in the Bucharest Directorate for 
Militia (1948–1954). 
48  G.B. Ovakimyan: head of the Third Department of the First Administration of 
the NKVD. A.S. Kuznetsov: head of the First Secret Department of the NKVD. P.P. 
Timofeyev: head of the First Department of the Second Administration of the NKGB 
of the USSR.
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DOCUMENT No. 13:
Agreement of Economic Cooperation between the Kingdom of Romania 
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
May 8, 1945
After leaving the alliance with Germany on August 23, 1944, Romania found 
itself completely isolated from its raw material resources and important com-
modity markets. In order to get out of this isolation and to have the resources 
needed for the economy, Romania had to have a strong economic partner. 
Therefore, negotiations with the Soviet side appeared to provide the only pos-
sible solution, given the military and political context of the time. The USSR 
used economic cooperation as a basis to ensure long-term exploitation for maxi-
mum profit from Romanian economic resources and to provide the USSR with a 
commanding influence on important sectors of the Romanian economy. A few 
months later, the USSR signed an identical agreement with Hungary with simi-
lar consequences.
In order to ensure the development of economic relations in the manner most 
conducive to the reciprocal interests of the two countries, the government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the government of Romania have 
decided to establish, through this Agreement on Economic Cooperation, the 
principles on which economic cooperation between the two countries will be 
based and which are inspired, on the one hand, by the need to restore and 
elevate the production possibilities of Romania, and on the other hand, by the 
commercial interests of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Chapter 1. FIELDS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Article 1. Investment of the USSR’s expertise and capital in the intensifica-
tion of Romanian economic activities will find its application particularly in 
the following sectors:
A. AGRICULTURE
1. A Soviet-Romanian scientific institute for research will be founded, which 
will enable an exchange of experiences and achievements regarding the 
improvement of agricultural production, especially the expansion of indus-
trial crop cultivation.
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Within this institute, there will be an exchange of experts and techni-
cians, specialists in mechanized agriculture, as well as in problems dealing 
with the enlargement and improvement of existing crops.
2. Providing agricultural machines and tools for use will be encouraged, 
either through rental form or through permanent ownership, in order to 
equip mechanized agricultural centers that are being created on Romanian 
territory. 
B. INDUSTRY
1. In the food processing industry, participation with regard to the new 
food processing industry (factories of canned vegetables, fruits, the indus-
trialization of dairy products, concentrated foods, etc.)
2. Participation in petroleum and coal prospecting, exploration, and 
exploitation, through the founding of Romanian-Soviet enterprises that 
will create new industries for processing combustible fossils and their deriv-
atives. 
Romanian-Soviet enterprises will be created with the purpose of 
exploiting metal ore deposits in Romania. These enterprises will explore 
and exploit new mineral regions and will build contiguous industrial plants 
for processing minerals and metals.
3. In the processing industry, participation in the exploitation and 
industrialization of timber: on the one hand, it will facilitate particularly 
the contribution of modern equipment to respective factories and the local 
railways responsible for the operations of forestry industries damaged in 
the war, and on the other hand, the export to the USSR of timber material 
produced in the respective factories; likewise, participation in the develop-
ment of the glass and window industries, as well as cooperation in the iron 
and steel industry.
C. TRANSPORTATION, WATERWAYS
1.  Participation at industrial facilities responsible for port outfitting 
and assembly of hydraulic plants, with regard to the electrification 
of thoroughfare [roads] and the distribution of electricity in cities 
and villages.
2.  Arrangement, through mutual agreement between the two states, 
regarding navigation operations on the Danube and the sea for the 
vessels belonging to the two states and existing Romanian companies.
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3.  Arrangement, through mutual agreement between the two states, 
regarding the exploitation of airways concerning both states.
D. COMMERCIAL BANKING
Establishment of banking organizations with joint participation, which 
should first of all follow the financing of different operations, such as those 
resulting from the commercial exchanges between the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and Romania, as well as those deriving from this coop-
eration agreement.
Chapter II. MODALITY OF COOPERATION
Article 2. The two governments will support each other in establishing the 
joint organizations and associations that are destined to carry out the gen-
eral plan of cooperation displayed in Chapter 1, Article 1. 
In the plan mentioned above, the organizations commissioned by 
the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will establish, 
through mutual agreement with the interested individuals or associations 
in Romania or with the authorities or organizations recommended by the 
Romanian government, the modes of participation that may consist of 
either enlarging the possibilities for activity of some existing enterprises 
or organizations—through the contributions of organizations directed by 
the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—or through 
the establishment of organizations with joint participation that may use, 
through rentals or leases, existing enterprises and explorations, or those 
which may directly receive concessions for explorations or exploitations.
Participation of the organizations designated by the government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as shown at either point of mutual 
interest in the preceding paragraph, and given the current situation of the 
Romanian economy and the exceptional debts with which they must com-
ply in a timely manner, as much as possible, will consist of a contribution of 
equipment and goods intended for the enhancement of production poten-
tial of the respective branches of the Romanian economy, or consist of a 
means of payment that will permit the acquisition of equipment or goods 
where such may be found.
Article 3. The participation agreements established between the orga-
nizations commissioned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics govern-
ment on the one hand, and the authorities, organizations, individuals, and 
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associations interested in Romania and recommended by the Romanian 
government on the other hand, will be subject to approval by the compe-
tent bodies in the two countries.
Article 4. Aside from the forms of cooperation mentioned above, the 
Romanian government will enable the processing of raw materials provided 
by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in existing factories inside of 
Romania.
Article 5. The annual results produced by the organizations authorized 
by the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, according to 
the stipulations set by participation quotas found in every form of coop-
eration shown above, may be liquidated toward the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics in accordance with the provisions set by commercial arrange-
ments, and by payments that will be established periodically (annually) 
between the two governments, bearing in mind the net possibilities of 
Romanian export, as well as the balance of payments at the closing date of 
those arrangements. 
Chapter III. FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 6. A Commission composed of representatives from the two govern-
ments will meet periodically to examine the status of the different activities 
found in the general plan of cooperation in Article 1, as well as the over-
all status of economic relations between Romania and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics resulting from annual commercial arrangements, or 
from other economic arrangements established between the two govern-
ments according to the Economic Agreement of Cooperation.
In regards to the increasingly complex character toward which eco-
nomic relations between Romania and the USSR are heading, the purpose 
of this Commission will be to supervise periodically all of these activities, 
coordinating efforts and signaling to leading circles the deficiencies and 
means of improvement. 
Article 7. The commercial exchanges between Romania and the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as payments between the two coun-
tries, will be regulated by separate agreements based on maintaining a bal-
ance between the reciprocal trade of goods and the mutual treatment con-
cerning non-commercial payments. 
Article 8. The current Agreement of Cooperation will be subject to 
ratification by both governments and will go into effect on the date of the 
approval of the documents in Bucharest; it will remain in effect for a period 
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of five years, beginning on the date of the signing. If not cancelled one year 
before its expiration, it will be renewed informally and extended with the 
possibility of annulment, given one year’s notice.
Done in Moscow, in two original copies in the Romanian and Russian lan-
guage, both copies being authentic.
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Representative,  Romanian
 Government
 Representative,
Signed:  A.I. Mikoyan
 M. Durma49
Source: ANIC, fond Casa Regală, dosar nr. 38/1945, ff. 15–16. A.
K
49  Lawyer and financier. Director of Romanian Credit Bank. Although not an enlisted 
member of the Liberal Party, he was appointed secretary general (1936–1937), under-
secretary of state (March 6–April 11, 1945) at the Finance Ministry, and finance min-
ister (April 11–August 23, 1945) in the Groza cabinet.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   74 2015.02.17.   6:53
75SOVIET OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA
DOCUMENT No. 14:
Memorandum of Agreement on Economic Cooperation between  
the Kingdom of Romania and the USSR
May 8, 1945
The memorandum of agreement set up the general framework for establishing 
the future Romanian-Soviet joint-stock companies (sovroms) in key areas of the 
Romanian economy: Sovrompetrol, Sovrombank, Sovromtransport, Sovromlemn, 
and TARS. Nevertheless, evidence of Soviet intent to appear as a benefactor was 
provided by 2,000 tractors made available “for utilization,” which, however, were 
the property of Romanian citizens and Romanian institutions. This intent was 
also demonstrated when an urgent problem concerning Romanian cotton mills 
was solved; prior to this, the Allied Control Commission authorities had rejected 
the import of cotton from third countries.
In relation to the signing in Moscow of the Agreement bearing today’s date, 
regarding the economic cooperation between the Kingdom of Romania and the 
USSR, and with the purpose of a more effective, practical application of the 
main principles enacted by the agreement above, the Romanian Minister of 
Finance, M. Durma, commissioned by the Romanian government, and the Peo-
ple’s Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR, A.I. Mikoyan, commissioned 
by the USSR government, have signed the current memorandum pertaining 
to the content and forms of organization of the two countries’ cooperation in 
some sectors of the Romanian economy mentioned in this agreement. 
A. AGRICULTURE
1. The government of the USSR agrees to cede for utilization to the Roma-
nian government 2,000 tractors, which according to Article 12 of the Armi-
stice Convention, must be given back to the USSR.
The parties will agree to the tractor usage conditions within a month of 
the signing date of the current memorandum.
B. INDUSTRY
I. Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum
1. The Romanian government and the USSR government agree to establish 
a Soviet-Romanian company for the exploration, exploitation, processing, 
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and sale of petroleum and petroleum products; participation in this com-
pany may be extended to private companies, individuals, and associations.
2. The Romanian government cedes to this company the following contribu-
tion: 
a)  Concessions of new oil fields according to a list to be agreed upon by 
the two governments.
b)  At least 50 percent of crude oil due in the form of royalties to the 
Romanian state.
3. The USSR government cedes to the company contributions in the form of 
necessary equipment for the development of its activities, equipment that 
will be put to use according to the development of the company’s activities 
and its program.
4. Each of the two governments will possess equal responsibilities in the 
leadership of this company’s activity; in the company’s governing body the 
two governments will be represented by an equal number of votes, with 
a president from the Romanian side and a vice-president from the Soviet 
side. The executive functions will be given to a general director chosen by 
the Soviet side and a general director deputy chosen by the Romanian side.
5. The Romanian government will grant the company the option to explore 
other open land tracts not included in the list provided in point 2, as well as 
all of the exploitation rights obtained from these explorations according to 
Romanian laws in effect.
6. The judicial, financial, and technical conditions regarding the organiza-
tion of the company’s activities will be determined within two months fol-
lowing the signing of the current memorandum through a separate agree-
ment between the two governments.
Chapter II. TIMBER INDUSTRY
In order to achieve economic cooperation in the field of exploitation and 
the industrialization of the forestry economy, the development of different 
branches of the Romanian forestry industry, and the export of manufac-
tured timber products from Romania to the USSR, as well as other coun-
tries, the two governments will instruct the respective bodies to study the 
conditions, volume, and forms of cooperation within two months from the 
signing of the agreement, and to present proposals regarding the finaliza-
tion of the respective terms.
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Chapter III. METALLURGY, MACHINERY, MINING, AND GLASS INDUS-
TRIES
1. The USSR government and the Romanian government have agreed for 
the respective economic organizations from the USSR to participate in the 
Reşiţa Iron Works and Fields joint-stock company.50 The Romanian govern-
ment will assist this organization in acquiring stock from the aforemen-
tioned company, in a sum at least equal to the amount of this company’s 
debts to the USSR for the Krivoi Rog iron ore and the metals brought by 
Romania from the USSR.51
2. The Romanian government will guarantee to the USSR organizations the 
possibility to gain knowledge of technical documents, maps, and all data nec-
essary for the exploitation of metal and other ores, after which the two gov-
ernments will determine the respective volume and forms of cooperation.
3. In order to achieve cooperation in the glass industry, the two govern-
ments will entrust their own respective bodies to study, within two months 
from the signing of this agreement, the volume and forms of cooperation 
and to present proposals concerning the development and endowment of 
the glass industry in Romania.
C. TRANSPORTATION
I. WATERWAY TRANSPORTATION
1.  The government of the USSR and the government of Romania agree 
to establish a Soviet-Romanian navigation company for the admin-
istration of river and maritime transportation, and for the use of 
50  The Reşiţa Iron Works and Fields was the largest metallurgical company during the 
interwar period, created in 1920 through the patrimony of the Austrian multinational 
capital company StEG. Having gone through successive ownership from foreign cap-
ital, such as English, Austrian, Czechoslovak, and French, it was taken over by the 
German company Hermann Göring Werke during World War II, despite the efforts of 
the Romanian state to stop this. Technologically, the company owned the most mod-
ern industrial equipment in the country, manufacturing locomotives and track mate-
rial, iron bridges, laminate products, coal, electric motors, transformers, and arms.
51  The Soviets asserted that Romania had a series of debts to the USSR resulting from 
the application of the Commercial and Navigation Treaty between the Romanian 
Kingdom and the USSR, signed on February 26, 1941, in Moscow. Additionally, the 
Soviets asserted that some of these debts also resulted from the large quantities of 
iron and metal taken by the Romanian Army on Soviet territory during the Eastern 
Campaign of June 22, 1941, to August 23, 1944.
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Constanţa, Brăila, Galaţi, and Giurgiu ports;52 participation in this 
company may include private Romanian companies, associations, 
and individuals who possess vessels and naval construction and 
repair factories.
2.  The company’s founders will contribute, according to an agreement 
between the parties, river vessels, and port equipment. Maritime 
vessels and some of the river vessels will be made available to the 
company by the two governments according to the conditions of a 
long-term charter.
3.  The Romanian government will give the company, on lease, port 
installations from the aforementioned ports, as well as naval con-
struction and repair factories.
4.  The company’s leadership will be organized according to the same 
criteria as those found in the current memorandum concerning 
petroleum exploration and exploitation.
5.  The judicial, financial, and technical conditions regarding the orga-
nization of the company’s activities will be determined within two 
months following the signing of the current memorandum through 
a separate agreement between the two governments.
6.  The USSR government and the Romanian government agree that 
the maritime register of the USSR, the state insurance administra-
tion of the USSR (GOSSTRAKH), and the transport and shipping 
companies of the USSR, will perform, on Romanian land, opera-
tions determined by the statutes and decisions made in agreement 
with the respective Romanian companies, with private companies 
and individuals; to this end, they will be allowed to open branches 
and agencies in Romania and will cooperate with the corresponding 
Romanian bodies.
II. AIR TRANSPORTATION
1. In order to establish civilian communication ways within Romania’s ter-
ritorial boundaries, the Romanian government and the USSR government 
will jointly organize a civilian aviation company to which both govern-
52  Constanţa was the main maritime port of Romania, while Brăila and Galaţi, located 
near the Black Sea along the Danube River (and therefore navigable by large ships), 
were essential to Romania’s grain trade. Also, the Giurgiu port contained an impor-
tant petroleum terminal through which crude oil from the Prahova Valley was loaded 
onto river barges and exported to Central Europe.
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ments, through their respective bodies or organizations, will be one partici-
pant in equal shares.
2. The government of the USSR will bring to the company the necessary 
fleet of planes and motors, means of mechanization, and other technical 
equipment, and the Romanian government will provide to the company, for 
temporary usage, existing airports on Romania’s air routes, equipment, and 
facilities meant for servicing aerial transport, as well as the necessary land 
tracts to build new airports.
3. The company’s leadership will be organized according to the same criteria 
as those found in the current memorandum concerning petroleum explora-
tion and exploitation.
4. The Romanian government will grant the company the right to establish 
civilian airways over Romanian territory and to participate in international 
airways that pass over Romania.
5. The Romanian government will grant the USSR government, on a recip-
rocal basis, the right to conduct transit flights for civilian Soviet planes over 
Romanian territory, with or without landing in Romanian airports, render-
ing these airplanes the necessary services in equal measure to the services 
rendered to the company’s airplanes. 
6. The judicial, financial, and technical conditions regarding the organiza-
tion of the company’s activities will be determined within two months fol-
lowing the signing of the current memorandum through a separate agree-
ment between the two governments.
D. BANKS
In order to achieve economic cooperation in commercial banking, the two 
governments will entrust their own respective bodies to study, within two 
months from the signing of this memorandum, the volume and forms 
of cooperation and to present proposals regarding the finalization of the 
terms of agreement.
E. COTTON PROCESSING
1.  In order to ensure the integral usage of Romania’s textile industry’s 
capacity to produce, the USSR government agrees to make cotton 
available for processing yarn and fabrics in Romania, which in turn 
is obligated to return products to the USSR, according to the terms 
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and conditions mutually agreed upon. For the initial annual period 
beginning on the date of this memorandum’s signing, the USSR 
government makes available 20,000 tons of cotton.
This Memorandum was prepared in two original copies, each in the Roma-
nian or Russian language, both copies being authentic.
Signed: USSR Commissioner Romanian Government Commissioner
Source: ANIC, fond CC al PCR - Secţia Economică, dosar nr. 18/1945, ff. 2–7.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 15:
Romanian Position on the Establishment of a Joint Romanian-Soviet 
Timber Company
Undated [1945]
The specialists of the Autonomous Office of State Forests, under obligation to 
defend the “country’s general interests,” compiled a study in which they drew 
attention to the Soviet tendency to establish a de facto monopoly with regard 
to timber exploitation in Romania. Soviet plans to set up the Sovromlemn joint-
stock company amounted to planning to exhaust timber resources (a minimum 
of 1 million cubic meters per year) with only minimal investment of Soviet capi-
tal, provided not in cash but in “materials and installations, as well in shares of 
Romanian companies owned by the Soviet state.”
The Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Memorandum of Coopera-
tion between the USSR and the Kingdom of Romania also mentions eco-
nomic partnership between the two countries in the exploitation and 
industrialization of timber. 
The preliminary draft of the agreement convention discussed during 
the 2/7/1946 meeting,set to be finalized and put in application between the 
government of the USSR and the government of Romania, contains a num-
ber of provisions on which the following observations should be made:
1. Article 1 stipulates the establishment of the Romanian-Soviet For-
estry Company (SOVROMLEMN), for the collection, production, and sale 
of timber materials.
The collection and sale operations of timber materials are assigned to 
the State Ministry, which controls and directs these operations, and which, 
furthermore, should continue in the same form as now.
According to the explanations given by representatives from the USSR 
during the meeting mentioned above, the company has the right to exploit, 
industrialize, and sell timber in Romania, corresponding to the proposed 
goals.
The establishment and functioning of this company will occur accord-
ing to the commercial code and to Romanian laws currently in effect.
The same article stipulates that the Romanian government must pro-
vide, to the company and the founding authorities assigned to the Roma-
nian side, all the necessary means for the implementation of the conven-
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tion’s requirements and must additionally guarantee that the respective 
authorities meet the requirements regarding the founding of, and deposit 
of capital to, the aforementioned company. 
If this requirement applies to the Soviet government, since the partici-
pating organizations are state organizations, they cannot yet be applied to 
the Romanian state, except for the possible participation in this company 
of Romanian state organizations, such as the Autonomous Office of State 
Forests (CAPS) and perhaps the Church Fund and Community of Estates in 
Năsăud.
For this reason, the participation of Romanian capital cannot occur, 
except in accordance with stipulations established by the commercial 
code and Romanian laws, under the condition that the Romanian state 
cannot guarantee the deposit of capital and meet other requirements 
except for CAPS, which is a state institution, as well as the two institu-
tions mentioned above, currently under state tutelage and which partici-
pated in the company’s founding, a participation pending the approval of 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Estates and the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce.
These ministries may also establish the rate of shares, in the event that 
their subscription may be higher than that reserved for Romanian capital.
2. We do not agree with Article 3, which has as its objective the activi-
ties of the Company, since this may be interpreted as a monopoly regard-
ing the exploitation, industrialization and commercialization of timber in 
Romania.
Thus this article sets the company’s volume for activity and timber pro-
cessing at approximately 1 million cubic centimeters, which corresponds to 
a significant part of timber in Romania.
We request a specific stipulation stating that the company’s objective 
is the exploitation, industrialization, and sale of timber in Romania, in the 
same way as other forestry enterprises of similar nature, without establish-
ing a set quantity, one which will result from the company’s acquisitions, 
nor containing any state obligations or privileges.
In return, the company is at liberty to purchase the necessary materi-
als in conditions similar to other firms. 
3. Article 4, which concerns the registered capital of SOVROMLEMN, 
states the following:
a) The rate of disbursement of Soviet registered capital is applied not 
in cash, but in materials and installations, as well as in the shares of Roma-
nian companies owned by the Soviet State.
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We request that this capital disbursement rate be made in Romanian 
lei,53 originating from the payment of Soviet imports according to the com-
mercial agreement of May 8, 1945, and the acquisition of necessary indus-
trial goods should be made by SOVROMLEMN according to comparable 
prices and the corresponding qualitative delivery, imported according to 
existing commercial agreements on the date of importation. 
The capital contribution in the form of shares cannot be accepted by 
either side, because their appraisal is difficult to establish, and because they 
constitute the guarantee of obligations for each respective company.
b) The registered capital of the Romanian part will also be in lei, in the 
sum of 3 billion, with which SOVROMLEMN will acquire the timber mate-
rials from state forests, the Church Fund, and Community of Estates in 
Năsăud.
In the stipulations above, the Romanian government can guarantee 
the acquisition of materials from the above institutions according to their 
daily set value at the moment of exploitation, resulting from auction, up to 
the competing sum of 3 billion lei.
4. Article 5 stipulates that the Romanian government require the State 
Forestry House to assist, with its own contributions, the Church Fund,54 
and the Community of Estates in Năsăud in order to sell 1,000,000 cubic 
meters of wood material annually, at a long-term rate of 30 years and 10 
years, respectively.
53  The dollar was worth 10,000 lei officially but was worth over 40,000 lei in the stock 
market.
54  The Church Fund in Bucovina was founded shortly after the Hapsburg Empire occu-
pied Bucovina on June 19, 1783, intending to curb the influence of the Orthodox 
Church. In the middle of the 20th century, the Church Fund of Bucovina was consid-
ered a legal entity of public law, and a self-sustaining establishment represented by 
the Archbishop and Metropolitan of Bucovina or his delegates. After the installation 
of the Petru Groza government, the statute of the Bucovina Church Fund was modi-
fied so that the state could control the fund’s organization and operation. The fund’s 
patrimony consisted of 190,000 hectares of forest land.
The Community Estates of Năsăud consisted of 44 communes, founded in Năsăud 
by Maria Theresa in the 18th century. These communes were initially established as 
border guard communities, in which the border guards were a category of peasants 
who had to respect military obligations in exchange for emancipation from serfdom 
and some financial debts. In Transylvania six of these communities existed, three 
of which were Romanian and three Székely (Hungarian). The properties included 
consisted of forest land.
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Since SOVROMLEMN will be established and function as an anony-
mous company, these requirements cannot occur, because the company will 
be able to supply itself with:
a. timber materials, through the purchase of forest parcels that will be 
auctioned annually, from the institutions mentioned above, and from other 
owners of forests or purchases of timber materials from exploitations in 
free transactions.
Likewise, the exploitation procedure in the country applied by the 
CAPS, the Church Fund and the Community of Estates in Năsăud in forests 
owned by them is destined to intensify, so that the requirements found in 
the article mentioned cannot be applied.
b. The Romanian government may consent to the acquisition of forests 
by the CAPS for the purposes of exploitation, inaccessible today due to the 
lack of transport facilities such as Râşca in Baia County, Pipirig in Neamţ 
County, and Groşi in Someş County.
The object of this sale cannot extend past 20 years. Exploitation will 
occur according to the arrangement.
Payment for timber materials delivered for exploitation should be 
made according to rates derived from each variety of timber materials sold 
by the company.
All the equipment, of any kind, will remain in the ownership of the 
state upon the contract’s expiration.
The privileges requested in points II, III, IV, and V in Article 5, concern-
ing the exclusivity of exports to the USSR and the purchases and sales of 
foreign currency for import-export operations, are superfluous, since the 
company will enjoy the same rights as other forestry companies.
We would also like to mention that even the Association of State For-
ests does not enjoy such rights.
Concerning the stipulations of Article 7, which deals with the compa-
ny’s administration, we would like to request that Romanian citizens 
be recruited for its technical and administrative personnel, at the ratio 
of 2:3, and hired with the approval of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Estates.
The same article mentions that the company’s statute cannot be insti-
tuted as law but benefits only from the features granted by the commercial 
codes and other Romanian laws.
The statute will be subject to approval by the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Estates and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce.
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The country’s general interests, which require the maintenance and inten-
sification of exploitation within the country’s forests in order to eliminate 
speculation and to meet the needs of the destitute population as much as 
possible, as well to sustain currency, necessitate for their functioning that 
such activities not be impeded by the founding of forestry companies. 
Source: ANIC, fond Casa Regală, dosar. nr. 38/1945, ff. 2–3.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 16:
Note by General Vinogradov to Minister of Internal Affairs Teohari 
Georgescu regarding the Quartering of Soviet Troops55
December 6, 1945
Every day, relations between Red Army soldiers and Romanian citizens suf-
fered from abusive behavior by Soviet soldiers. Owners of apartments who were 
obliged to billet Soviet soldiers filed numerous complaints to Romanian authori-
ties indicating massive abuses. This point was also made by Sever Bocu, an 
important leader of the National Peasant Party, who accused the Soviet colonel 
Berescov of destroying goods inside his home. Communist authorities in Roma-
nia denied that such abuses were taking place. Instead, they punished those who 
“slandered” the Red Army.
Lately, it has been observed in many cases that residence owners in the cit-
ies and villages of Romania, where Soviet officers were quartered, are look-
ing to evict the officers in any way possible.
In order to achieve this, they resort to various ploys, provocations, and cal-
umnies. There are cases when the residence owners deprive Soviet officers 
of the most basic communal necessities (water, lights, heating, etc.).
Individuals with political objections to housing Soviet officers are pro-
ceeding in the same ways. For example, owner Sever Bocu from the town 
of Lipova,56 where the commander of a Red Army unit was quartered, Col. 
Berescov,57 has resorted to the most base calumny in order to rid himself of 
Berescov.
In his complaint against Col. Berescov, citizen Bocu writes:
55  Teohari Georgescu (1908–1976). Romanian communist leader, member of the Roma-
nian Communist Party from 1929, member of the Politburo of the RCP (1945–1952). 
Arrested February 18, 1953, imprisoned (1953–1956) and accused of “Right deviation”; 
eliminated from all functions in the party and government. 
56  Sever Bocu (1874–1951). Journalist and Romanian politician. Member of National 
Peasant Party, president of National Peasant Party organization in Timiş-Torontal 
County (from 1923); National Peasant Party deputy in parliament (1919–1938, 1946–
1947); arrested by communist authorities on May 5–6, 1950, died in 1951 in the peni-
tentiary at Sighetu Marmaţiei.
57  Unidentified.
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“I wish to trouble you with this complaint because of the unjust and brutish 
ways in which we have been treated in the last few months by Soviet units.” 
But Mr. Bocu does not mention any specific evidence to prove such behavior.
In his complaint, citizen Bocu writes about losing a collection from his 
library.
After the investigation, it was established that no collection was lost from 
Mr. Bocu’s library. The deeds specified in citizen Bocu’s request, concerning 
the abuses of the Soviet commander and the breaking of doors and win-
dows, similarly do not correspond to the truth. Colonel Berescov’s quarters 
in Mr. Bocu’s house were personally given by the town’s mayor. 
In his complaint against Colonel Berescov, citizen Bocu points to drunken 
bouts followed by insults and threats against the owner, which is also not 
true, because ever since the colonel suffered a severe stomach ailment, he 
has not been able to drink alcohol.
Every other deed indicated in Mr. Bocu’s complaints, following our inves-
tigations, has been proven to be untrue, and as a result, we will consider 
them calumny against the Soviet officer.
The whole matter consists of Mr. Bocu, who in the past was the director of 
the national peasant newspaper Vestul, which stopped circulating in 1944, 
continuing his corrupt affairs by heading the group of reactionaries in the 
town of Lipova.
Keeping in mind the facts mentioned above, we believe it necessary to take 
some measures against slanderers of the Red Army.
Concerning citizen Bocu, we believe he must be severely punished for the 
calumny against Col. Berescov.
Signed:  Vinogradov
Source: ACNSAS, fond Documentar, dosar nr. 4018, ff. 550–551.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 17:
Meeting of the Council of Ministers regarding the Establishment of the 
Soviet-Romanian Forestry Company
February 14, 1946
The similarity between the company Sovromlemn and companies with “imperial-
ist” foreign capital in the interwar period was so striking that communist prime 
minister Petru Groza focused on how “we can, very easily and plausibly, present 
this to the nation as exploitation made in the interests of the country and the 
entire population.” The document captures the numerous artifices to which he 
resorted in trying to shed a favorable light on the new company. This also dem-
onstrates that the Communist Party’s role was generally crucial in the economic 
realm as well (“any opinion given by Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej will also be the opinion of 
the government”).
The meeting commences at 19:00, presided over by Dr. P. Groza, President 
of the Council.
The following gentlemen are participating:
From the Soviet side: Coldanov,58 the commission’s president; Fino ghe-
nov,59 the Soviet Legation’s economic councilor; Juhovitski,60 councilor; 
Lasserso,61 councilor;
From the Romanian side: Eng. P. Bejan,62 Minister of Industry and Com-





62  Petre Bejan (1896–1978). Member of the National Liberal Party since 1927, undersec-
retary of state in a number of interwar governments. In the Groza government, he 
held the position of minister of industry and commerce (March 6, 1945–November 29, 
1946). President of the leadership committee of the National Liberal Party-Tătărescu 
(November 1947–May 1948). Arrested on May 5–6, 1945, and imprisoned in Sighet 
prison until July 1955. Deported and under house arrest in Bărăgan until 1959.
63  Romulus Zăroni (1906–1962). Minister of agriculture and domains in the Groza gov-
ernment (March 6, 1945–December 1, 1946), then minister of cooperation (December 
1, 1946–December 29, 1947; December 30, 1947–April 14, 1948).
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Solacolu,64 General Commissar of Foreign Trade; Aurel Vijoli,65 Coordinat-
ing Councilor in the Superior Economic Council; Eng. C. Rachieru,66 Gen-
eral Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Estates; Eng. I. Zeicu,67 
Councilor in the Ministry of Agriculture; Eng. Dan Ilie,68 Administrator 
of the Church Fund in Bukovina; Eng. Victor Ţurcanu,69 Guardian of the 
Church Fund in Bukovina; Eng. N. Grapini,70 Government Commissar to 
the Bistriţa-Năsăud Fund;
The interpreters were Eng. Lissievici,71 from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
and Major Sergiu Volosievici,72 from the Presidency of the Council of Min-
isters.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Gentlemen and Ministers, we 
summoned you here following a conversation that I had with the Soviet del-
egates regarding the establishment of the company Sovromlemn. In princi-
ple, by searching all of the details that I could gather before and after these 
conversations, I concluded that our agreement with the Soviet government 
concerning the establishment of this company is up to date. It has not lost 
its validity because it was set up for a two-month term, which has expired. 
We cannot consider this expiration a motive for annulment, because of the 
simple fact that it is unclear whether it was our Romanian side that caused 
64  Mircea Solacolu (1906–?). Originated from an old, liberal family, member of the 
National Liberal Party. Became a specialist in economic issues in the Groza gov-
ernment. Elected National Liberal Party deputy in 1946, but after sensing political 
changes, escaped to Switzerland in 1948, later settling in Brazil.
65  Aurel Vijoli (1902–1981). Member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Work-
ers’ Party (June 25, 1960–July 24, 1965); member of the Central Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party (July 24, 1965–November 28, 1974); administrator of the 
Romanian National Bank (April 1945–May 1946); governor of the Romanian National 
Bank (November 1947–November 1948); president of the Romanian People’s Republic 
Bank (November 1948–March 1952). Arrested by organs of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs in March 1952; accused of “undermining the national economy” (accused of 
mistakes in the currency reform from January 1952); released in September 1954 for 
lack of evidence. Readmitted to the party in 1956.
66  C. Rachieru, general secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture, excluded from the min-
istry in 1947 and put on trial because he approved the deforestation of Darvari forest, 
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this expiration, and by no means do I want for the Romanian state to be 
in the position of the one who receives obligations but then creates with-
drawal deeds and even attempts to withdraw based on these deeds that it 
created. This is a reason for prestige and earnestness. 
But aside from this reason, there is another one: we have a great inter-
est in establishing this company, which should commence its activities 
promptly, because, and I stress this one more time: we, by way of the agree-
ments concluded with the Moscow government, are for the first time in the 
position to exploit the riches of our country through cooperation and in 
favorable circumstances.
The exploitation of our country’s riches has, of course, been achieved 
before with the help of foreign capital. These exploitations nevertheless 
bore the stamp of monopoly, of exclusiveness, ensured over time by agree-
ments in favor of the exploiting foreign capital. We could not direct these 
exploitations, we did not participate in the benefits of this exploitation; we 
only participated in this exploitation in one way, which did not correspond 
to our rights and contributions. We all know the history of our coopera-
tion with foreign capital up now. This history cannot repeat. We approve of 
cooperation with foreign capital, we are happy about this capital, but the 
type of agreement regarding this issue must be one of an honest partner-
ship that eliminates at once leonine contracts. We, and those who cooperate 
with us, will contribute money, materials, and installations and will partici-
pate, according to our contribution, in benefits and losses.
This is why I also insist in the timber domain, as much as in transpor-
tation and petroleum, to fulfill an agreement and to establish the Sovrom-
lemn Company as quickly as possible: this company must be established in 
five or six days, a week at most.
I ask the gentlemen interpreting to translate and summarize what I 
have said, to show the Soviet friends that I have stated in this introduction 
what I showed them in private conversations we previously held.
Mr. Bejan asks to be excused because he is unable to participate in this 
meeting, as he must attend another meeting on a different schedule. I have, 
however, informed him of the issue at hand and he has agreed to what will 
follow.
You will be able to continue these conversations with him tomorrow.
(Minister Bejan leaves the meeting hall.)
D. Coldanov: Mr. President, how will we discuss this? Will there be a 
discussion about drafting a law, or will a platform of mutual agreement be 
established?
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Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Gentlemen, I have determined 
that the main reason for the delay in negotiations was the procedural mis-
take of not contacting the forest proprietors from the beginning and hav-
ing them enter the negotiations directly, without the help of intermediar-
ies, such as those intermediaries who do not possess forests or their own 
capital but who nonetheless enter the picture as advisers and founders 
of numerous companies. I admit that this procedure is a remnant of the 
old system, but in light of what I have just now stated, you alone have the 
initiative to arrive at this conclusion; precisely because we wish to break 
free from this prior practice, we are eliminating intermediaries, because 
they have their own interests in profit. They complicate matters through 
every means, they make life expensive, and many times they cause the 
profit gained by the work of the people—the reason that these riches are 
exploited in the first place—to veer into different directions away from its 
use by the people. 
Capital, large-scale capital, also has its own representatives. To the 
extent that intermediaries present themselves as the representatives of 
financial groups in order to contribute what forest proprietors might not 
have, namely money, they will be able to have the limited role of mediation 
between capital and this company, a role established inasmuch as this com-
pany needs funds for its activity. But then, of course, their role is reduced. 
The state of affairs thus formulated, they will run more smoothly, and we 
will be unable to exclude even those who contribute foreign capital. On the 
contrary, it will please us if these representatives of foreign capital decide 
to cooperate in the establishment of this company, once again, contributing 
capital.
What follows then is for you to contact immediately the known pro-
prietors—natural and judicial persons—of the forest tracts in this country, 
to commit them to your projects, negotiating with them directly, naturally, 
and maintaining contact and negotiations with those owners of forest 
tracts that have been employed in your projects, those of you who have the 
responsibility for projects whose purpose is this company’s establishment.
Then the negotiations with the forest proprietors will come together 
without delay, condensed and without obstacles. I would like a list of those 
we are mentioning to be created right now.
First of all is CAPS, represented by engineer Mr. Rachieru, Secretary-
General of the Ministry of Agriculture and Estates, who is also commis-
sioned to be administrator of this institution; then there are the public 
interest forests of judicial persons, represented by engineer and counselor 
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Mr. Ion Zeicu, followed by the Church Fund of Bukovina, represented 
by engineer Mr. Dan Ilie, the Fund’s administrator, and engineer Victor 
Ţurcanu, guardian of this Fund; then there is the Frontier Fund of Bistriţa-
Năsăud, represented by engineer Mr. Grapini, the government’s commis-
sar for this Fund. During the talks I have had with the Soviet delegates, we 
have agreed that the Bistriţa-Năsăud Fund is the owner of the forests, and 
Ragna is only a cooperative exploitation company of these forests. So it is 
not involved, it is instead the Fund that is of concern to us.
Eng. I. Zeicu: Then there is also the Community of Estates in 
Caransebeş. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Was it solicited?
Eng. I. Zeicu: No, Mr. President.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Here is these with which we have 
worked. Please look for the representatives of this company. The company’s 
president, together with a jurist and one of their technicians, should come 
to Bucharest immediately.
The bulk of these estate communities are very interesting; their for-
ests are very well kept. If the remark is made that the participation of these 
funds is not as interesting to the Soviets as that of the forest owners from 
regions closer to the Soviet border, I will answer: nothing is holding back 
the indirect exploitation of the Frontier Funds. The timber material should 
be exploited, supplied with capital, and replaced by another material that 
will be exploited by the Sovromlemn Company in the regions near the 
Soviet border. In this way we open possibilities for combining international 
commerce with Yugoslavia and other approved countries that can provide 
the materials needed by the Soviet Union or Romania. In any case, the 
timber material exploited by Sovromlemn in Banat constitutes a treasure 
that can be capitalized, something on which we can work together with the 
Soviet Union.
Then there are the Székely possessions in Ciuc County.
Eng. I. Zeicu: The private possessions in Ciuc comprise 11,000 hectares, 
left unexpropriated. 
Mr. P. Groza, President of the Council: But they represent possibly the 
most interesting resinous material. Please invite the representatives of the 
Székely possessions immediately. Councilor Zeicu, who is also the director 
of the judicial persons’ forests of public interest, must take this duty upon 
himself. What are the forest tracts in the Old Kingdom?
I. Zeicu: The Coroanei Estates and the Broşteni Estates, which is pri-
vate and the property of Prince Nicolae.
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Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Please invite General Mr. Mano-
lescu tomorrow and speak with him. What else do you have in Moldova?
I. Zeicu: The communities are smaller. There is a lot of misery there. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: What barbaric exploitations! 
This is what I do not want repeated in the Old Kingdom. Mr. Rachieru, as 
Secretary-General of the Ministry of Agriculture, for the forestry sector, I 
ask you to assume the responsibility of summoning these people.
I. Zeicu: There may also be the Guardians of Civilian Hospitals, which 
has forests divided in a number of parts and makes sales at public auctions. 
The institution also has forests in Prahova Valley and Vâlcea County.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Invite one of their representa-
tives as well.
Mr. Eng. C. Rachieru: We will follow your suggestion and invite all 
these representatives so as to cooperate with everyone. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Among the private owners, do 
you know amateurs? Who will assume the responsibility to invite more 
notable private owners?
C. Rachieru: We will also do that.
I. Zeicu: The forest proprietor association has them all registered.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: I was the president of the For-
estry Union in Romania for four years. Back then we were well organized. 
We were able to finalize cross beam export transactions with various for-
eign countries. 
C. Rachieru: You are our most competent and knowledgeable silvicul-
turist. Private forest proprietors are in the Ghica and Sturza families, which 
each have 20,000–30,000 hectares. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Please invite them tomorrow 
and negotiate with each one separately. Through this company’s establish-
ment, we will first of all take a big step forward from an economic stand-
point, because after we examine all the possibilities of rational exploitation, 
we will detach the minimum necessary for this company’s establishment 
from the offers made during the negotiations with the forest proprietors. 
From a political standpoint, doing so will rectify a great mistake, 
because this company’s establishment will no longer appear as the labor of 
someone interested in the rapid and irrational exploitation of timber mate-
rials, but rather as the participation, in the strict sense of the word, of all 
forest owners in this operation who will align themselves with what they 
do not possess so that they can benefit from the results. Therefore, I ask 
that you achieve, in principle, cooperation with these institutions and with 
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private proprietors of forests. If you do so, you will motivate, for example, 
an entire population in Ciuc County, because many proprietors of forests 
are there, and by doing so, they will also participate in this enterprise. The 
same thing is happening with the proprietors of other forest tracts. Thusby 
doing this we are popularizing exploitation, and we can very easily and 
plausibly present it to the people in this country as an exploitation achieved 
in the interests of the country and the entire population. 
So this is the way we can achieve the cooperation of the two nations, 
the Soviets and the Romanians, in the true meaning of the word; this is the 
truth especially concerning the Soviet people because over there, the par-
ticipant is the people. 
In conclusion, I think that in this way we did not open the possibil-
ity to negotiate endlessly, but rather specified that the responsibility you 
have assumed to negotiate with forest proprietors is limited to three or four 
days, thus taking a big step forward to founding this company.
Having established in these negotiations all the details concerning 
the exploitation of timber material within the Sovromlemn company, hav-
ing the ensured necessary minimum for starting its activity, I ask that you 
move on to examining the financial aspect. Then we will meet again and 
establish with whom to negotiate this problem. Of course I am not exclud-
ing those who have already taken part in negotiations. I think that many 
forest proprietors can bring forth cash, because many of them have avail-
able capital or the possibility to create funds by contracting mortgage loans. 
Therefore, preference must be given to those bringing cash contributions. 
I ask the Soviet representatives to be willing to receive these proposals 
and to communicate to us if they have a remark, because I regret that my 
time is limited.
Naturally, I understand that matters must be resumed tomorrow 
morning, but I wish to make a convivial request for those here to work 
together and be focused, guided by the idea that we must establish this 
company in a matter of days.
I entreat you to free yourself from other tasks, because I want to 
monopolize your capacity to work only for the establishment of this com-
pany in the days to follow, working day and night. 
D. Coldanov: Mr. President, I have listened with satisfaction to your 
presentation on the principles that must constitute the basis of the conven-
tion adjourning soon. Likewise, I listened very attentively to the enumera-
tion of forest proprietors that will be included in the adjourning convention 
and who must be present tomorrow for the beginning of negotiations. 
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When traveling to Romania, but especially when I entered Romanian 
territory, I had in my possession all the data concerning forest tracts and 
the forestry potential, which constitute the basis of negotiations with your 
representatives. There is no doubt that Romania deserves a leading place 
in relation to forestry percentages compared to other European countries. 
This is a very important issue. I also know, however, that Romanian for-
estry property is highly fragmented into various categories of proprietors. 
The state is among these proprietors and holds a large surface of forests, 
but there are private proprietors as well.
Gentlemen, for the establishment of this forestry company, just as for 
the founding of other companies, we have to keep in mind the three follow-
ing factors of great importance: (1) the organizational condition of the for-
estry enterprise in the country, (2) the technical level of forestry production 
in the country, and (3) the technical, common, and subordinate personnel 
available in the country.
I do not doubt that not all categories of proprietors are at the same 
level concerning these aspects. For example, our first concern was to meet 
those people in your agencies who are most likely to make the fulfillment 
of these three essential conditions possible. We have always intended for 
state enterprises to necessarily be among the participants. However, in the 
current state of affairs, about which I had the honor of reporting to you in 
yesterday’s discussion, I became convinced that cooperation with such state 
organizations is not possible. This is not an opinion of ours, it is not only 
a belief of ours, but was rather the indication itself given by the vice presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers, Mr. Gh. Tătărescu.
I do not want to repeat the causes of the difficulties up to this point. 
Since these difficulties have begun to be touched upon—and I treat them in 
relation to the state organization—I have been compelled to also touch on 
the cause for the long delay in negotiations.
Once again, I want to reiterate my opinion that private capital must be 
exploited more courageously. We are realistic people, the people of work, 
and because we are united in a drive to realize a great and good action, I 
want to turn to real deeds, more prompt and more rapid measures. You will 
no doubt agree with what I am about to say: when we began to rebuild the 
activities of our state, we were faced with great organizational difficulties, 
and we believed it rational, logical, and necessary, from an economic and 
political perspective, to attract private property to the rebuilding project.
I commend the term, proposed by Mr. Prime Minister, within which 
the negotiations regarding the convention’s conclusion must be finalized. 
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We had no longer hoped to encounter once more a new series of propri-
etors, whose number is very important. I believe, however, that by studying 
the possibilities of each of the suggested proprietors, we will make our task 
much easier. For this reason, I ask Mr. Prime Minister to inform me of the 
names of those who will seriously occupy themselves with these negotia-
tions. I have finished. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: I will inform you tomorrow 
before the meal, after completing the report on the discussions in the 
morning. I ask Mr. Minister Solacolu to organize the list of all proprietors 
tomorrow morning and to inform Mr. President Coldanov, even setting up 
a meeting tomorrow with new and old proprietors who have participated 
before in negotiations.
D. Coldanov: I want an explanation: Mr. President, after specifying 
that you would convene a second financial meeting, did you agree to invite 
the representatives of the Ausnit and Malaxa groups to this meeting?7374
73  Max Auschnitt (1888–1957). He spent his early childhood years in Vienna, where his 
father emigrated shortly after Max’s birth. He returned to Romania in 1910, found-
ing a commercial firm in Galaţi that imported sheet iron. He was apparently assisted 
by the intelligence services of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He took over the busi-
ness after his father’s death and extended it by establishing the United Association of 
Ironworks, which held a monopoly on the importation of sheet iron. Using his skills 
and inborn talents, Auschnitt rose rapidly, becoming the administrative delegate of 
the Resita Iron Works and Fields, the largest stock company of interwar Romania. 
Along with Nicolae Malaxa, with whom he partnered in profitable business trans-
actions, he entered King Carol II’s entourage, offering the king and his wife, Elena 
Lupescu, gifts and several shares in various companies, where Auschnitt himself was 
the major stockholder. This exchange offered Auschnitt protection and reliable con-
tracts with the Romanian state. The worsening of relations with King Carol II and 
Lupescu, as well as his growing rivalry with Malaxa, brought him to the brink of col-
lapse, exemplified by a trial in the summer of 1939. On March 14, 1940, Max Aus-
chnitt was sentenced to six years in prison and charged 200 million lei as reparations 
to the Resita Iron Works and Fields. He was pardoned by Marshal Ion Antonescu and 
fled to the West.
74  The Malaxa industrial plants bore the name of their founder, Nicolae Malaxa (born 
December 23, 1884,  died 1965, New Jersey, United States). Romanian engineer and 
industrialist, one of the most important in interwar Romania. After building a shop 
to repair train tracks and locomotives next to the Romanian Railway Center “Grivita,” 
along with political support, he closed a very profitable contract with Caile Ferate 
Romane (Romanian State Railroad Association) to build locomotives. Using the latest 
modern equipment from Germany and employing nearly 200 German workers, who 
had two-year contracts, Malaxa managed to manufacture competitive steam locomo-
tives. Malaxa also founded the Republica factory, where steel pipes were manufac-
tured, applying for the first time on the Continent the American model of lamination, 
“Stiefel.” Between 1937 and 1938, Malaxa built a factory that manufactured artillery 
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Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: When we proceed to the finan-
cial phase, yes, but I said it would be only in relation to their financial con-
tribution.
D. Coldanov: I would like for a certain state of affairs to be more 
emphasized, because then the situation changes. I want to ask whether you 
consider necessary the participation of the Malaxa and Ausnit groups in the 
company.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Do they have forests?
D. Eng. Rachieru: No.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: As long as they own forests, of 
course, I cannot leave out of the company those private proprietors who are 
organized and who will contribute as forest proprietors.
D. Finoghenov: I have information that the Malaxa firm has an enter-
prise with forests, named Cloşani , and the Ausnit group is working at 
exploiting the Sturza estate. Do you, Mr. President, exclude the participa-
tion of forest exploiters? I ask this question because forest exploitation is 
tied not only to exploitation but also to production. The exploitation of a 
forest arises not only from the fact that someone is a proprietor, but one 
who must also be a forest exploiter.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: When the Sovromlemn Com-
pany was constituted, I specified why I wish to appeal to forest propri-
etors first. After we have ensured the minimum contribution required for 
minimum exploitation, and after we have solved the financial aspect dur-
ing the second phase, ensuring the financial cooperation of those who pos-
sess capital, it means that we have established this company without the 
cooperation of existing forest exploiters. They will work within the national 
economy, and as much as I would not wish to form this company only with 
forest proprietors and financiers, then, as needed, I will see how I will 
appeal to forest exploiters, because I want to establish this company; but 
then it will assume a different character, another structure and other direc-
tives, because I cannot be led by the hand of these forest exploiters. 
munitions and arms next to the factory that produced locomotives. He manufactured 
munitions under license from Renault but had other projects based on Romanian 
ideas. In only 12 years, the Malaxa enterprises evolved into a large-scale project whose 
size rivaled that of other industrial concerns in Europe. The enterprises also benefited 
from Nicolae Malaxa’s good relations with King Carol II and his technical and busi-
ness acumen. After the beginning of World War II, due to German pressure, Nicolae 
Malaxa turned over 50 percent of his shares to the Romanian state on January 28, 
1941. On February 18, the rest of his stock was expropriated by the Romanian state.
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Neither Malaxa nor Ausnit are forest proprietors. They can participate 
in exploitation. And I want to ensure that everything that the Ausnit and 
Malaxa groups represent be utilized where it should, without either one of 
them leaving fields of activity, joining in this field that is more profitable 
and more virgin. This is what the general interests of our national economy 
require. I must ensure an economic equilibrium in this country.
D. Finoghenov: But what if the Ausnit and Malaxa groups will bring as 
participation their exploitations—will it be bad?
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: If the Ausnit and Malaxa groups 
have certain participations as shareholders or private proprietors, their par-
ticipation is received as such. During the first phase of negotiations, Ausnit 
and Malaxa will be able to participate as forest proprietors, not as exploit-
ers, and less so as participants to such exploitations somewhere.
D. Finoghenov: How should we understand your declaration and how 
should we inform the Soviet government of the Romanian government’s 
decision: as an abandonment of the old bases of negotiation, or as an addi-
tion to the old bases of discussion?
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: I do not think that now is the 
right time to communicate between the two governments, because this 
is a simple procedural task, which, with the benefit of a short-term loan, 
supplements the efforts already made to establish the company. The com-
pany will be completed as a result of the procedure already established, uti-
lizing everything realized in the first phase of the procedure. Thus we will 
gain something in addition;assuming, through reductio ad absurdum, that 
the result will be absolutely negative and that neither of the private pro-
prietors will want to participate in this company’s establishment, then we 
will continue on the previous path. However, I am making a cordial appeal 
to those present to exert all possible efforts in order to establish the com-
pany through this procedure, which is ideal, meaning through the contribu-
tions of forest proprietors, because in this way we engage both large and 
small proprietors in this cooperation, and the company will thus function 
more smoothly. We would thus have a situation different from the course 
we would be obliged instead to pursue for the establishment of Sovroml-
emn Company, with no forest proprietors and only with the help of certain 
forest exploiters, in other words, intermediaries.
Regarding the state’s participation, I believe that the CAPS (Autono-
mous Office of State Forests) company should participate as founder, pos-
sibly also in combination with forests and money. I appeal to Mr. Minister 
Zăroni, to the CAPS representatives, and to our other cooperators to make 
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the maximum effort to participate in the company established as such, par-
ticipating alongside other forest proprietors, natural or judicial persons, 
because then surely those representing the state, CAPS, and other propri-
etors will cooperate in the interest of the two communities, the Soviet and 
the Romanian. I don’t need to repeat it, but I must tell you once again that 
a forest proprietor, whether in the company or individually, always exploits 
rationally and with a focus on the future. An intermediary, however, a sim-
ple exploiter who is not a proprietor, seeks the maximum profit of a 20-to-
30-year exploitation,which leaves ruins in its wake, precisely what has hap-
pened up to this point. 
I see that the Soviet friends agree in principle with what I have said.
D. Coldanov: The forest proprietors’ adherence to the principles out-
lined by you will be considered in the next two to three days, during which 
time the situation of each proprietor recommended by you will be studied.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Their situation is clear and has 
been elucidated, so matters will not be delayed.
D. Coldanov: Then all the main points are clarified.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Please do not forget to contact 
the Supreme Economic Council.75
D. Coldanov: It seems to me that all the matters discussed today—in 
the current state of negotiations—have been clarified already. In particular, 
all discussions must be completed within the term arranged today. As such, 
the basic issues are settled. 
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: I would just ask that contact 
with the Supreme Economic Council not be neglected anymore. One of its 
representatives should be present at the discussion.
D. Coldanov: We do not know them. Please appoint someone from the 
Supreme Economic Council to speak with us.
D. Finoghenov: It should be someone stronger. 
75  The Supreme Economic Council was an inter-departmental organ, with the role of 
deliberating and coordinating ministries within the national economy. Formed dur-
ing the interwar period, the Supreme Economic Council was revitalized amid the 
extremely difficult economic conditions of 1945. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej took over 
as president of the Supreme Economic Council on November 27, 1945, and was elected 
secretary general of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. On 
June 2, Gheorghiu-Dej became chairman of the Council of Ministers. During this 
time, Gheorghiu-Dej, with the help of other counselors such as Ion Gheorghe  Maurer, 
played a key role in the decision-making of the Supreme Economic Council. This 
explains Groza’s insistent recommendations to Soviet representatives to contact the 
Supreme Economic Council.
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Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: They are all strong in the 
Supreme Economic Council because they are all only economists. The 
president or the secretary-general of the Economic Council will attend the 
discussions. Thus matters will be made easier, given that the convention 
must also pass through the Council of Ministers. Or, if someone from the 
Supreme Economic Council participates in the negotiations, then matters 
are very much alleviated. 
D. Finoghenov: There is another difficulty: last night you made the dec-
laration that you will co-opt two more individuals in the commission that 
will prepare the convention. Please tell us now the names of these two indi-
viduals whom you will appoint.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: I do not remember having 
said so. Maybe you are referring to the two new ministers who have been 
appointed to the government.
D. Finoghenov: That is how we understood it.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Maybe you are referring to two 
or three other forest proprietors from the CAPS. Actually, there will be oth-
ers who will also attend discussions.
D. Finoghenov: Please tell us who will represent the government in 
these negotiations.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: The government will be repre-
sented by a delegate from the Supreme Economic Council, which is also 
composed of the chiefs of the economic departments. Thus the government 
will be represented by its most qualified body.
D. Coldanov: Who will be the representative, in concrete terms?
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: The following ministers are 
members of the Supreme Economic Council: Bejan, Tudor Ionescu,76 
Romulus Zăroni, Anton Alexandrescu,77 Alexandrini,78 the governor of the 
National Bank…
76  Tudor Ionescu (born 1898). Chemical engineer, minister of mines and petroleum 
(March 6, 1945–November 30, 1946; December 1, 1946–December 29, 1947; December 
30, 1947–April 14, 1948).
77  Anton Alexandrescu (1905–1984). Romanian politician, member of National Peasant 
Party. Leader of peasantist dissidence, founded National Peasant Party-Alexandrescu 
in 1945. Minister of co-operation (March 6, 1945–November 30, 1946). After 1948, 
retained various administrative positions.
78  Alexandru Alexandrini (1902–1981). Liberal politician, member of the National Lib-
eral Party-Tătărescu, minister of finance (December 1, 1946–November 7, 1947). Later 
arrested; served time in Aiud and Râmnicu Sărat penitentiaries; released in 1963.
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The Supreme Economic Council is under the leadership of Mr. Minis-
ter Gheorghiu-Dej.79 The Council will send tomorrow the person whom it 
deems appropriate: its president or one of its members. I will request for 
Mr. President Gheorghiu-Dej to come and be present at the negotiations. 
Mr. Secretary-General Vijoli will also attend.
D. Coldanov: SoI understand that the first person to speak with will be 
Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: He has the right, however, to 
substitute any other individual for himself. I will nevertheless ask him to 
come to you personally. 
D. Coldanov: Therefore, any opinion that Mr. Gheorghiu-Dej conveys 
will also be the government’s opinion.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: The government will attend 
through its most competent institution.
D. Coldanov: So your answer is positive.
Dr. P. Groza, President of the Council: Of course it is.
The meeting is adjourned at 20:30.
Source: ANIC, fond Preşedinţia Consiliului de Miniştri – Stenograme, dosar nr. 
2/1946, ff. 81–97.
K
79  Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1901–1965). Member of the Central Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party (October 21, 1945–March 19, 1965). General secretary 
of Central Committee of the RCP (October 21, 1945–April 19, 1954); first secretary of 
Central Committee of the RCP (October 1, 1955–March 19, 1965).
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DOCUMENT No. 18:
Report of the Meeting between Stalin and the Romanian Communist Party 
Leaders on the Situation in Romania, April 2–3, 1946, Moscow
April 2–3, 1946
Soviet leaders I.V. Stalin, V.M. Molotov, and G.M. Malenkov and Romanian 
leaders Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Teohari Georgescu take part in the meet-
ing. All the participants to the talks are referenced in codes by the document.80 
The principal topic discussed was the organization of parliamentary elections in 
Romania. The document offers important information about the country’s politi-
cal, economic, and social condition: the nature of relations within the coalition 
government, dominated by the communists; the percentages that were to be allo-
cated to the parties forming parts of the coalition after the elections (the RCP 
hoped that the government bloc would win 70–75 percent of the votes); the fact 
that RCP members had infiltrated various parties and that some of them (nota-
bly the Ploughmen’s Front) were even controlled by the communists; the fact that 
the Soviets’ 1-million-dollar contribution in support of the electoral campaign 
had been exchanged in the “stock market” (black market) in Romania; the com-
munists’ attempts to attract peasants through populist methods; the persistence 
of the Northern Transylvania problem; the fact that Gheorghiu-Dej’s request to 
expel ethnic Germans from Romania met with reservations by Stalin; Romania’s 
tense economic situation; and the fact that,at Dej’s appeal, Stalin decided to 
hand over the members of Antonescu’s group to Romanian authorities for their 
trial inside the country.81
80  The practice of using pseudonyms, a common Bolshevik practice begun in 1917 and 
exported to communist nuclei throughout the world, occurred during this meeting. 
According to various sources, the five pseudonyms in the meeting are identified as fol-
lows: Al.: a Soviet (could be Molotov or Malenkov); Cr.: Teohari Georgescu; Fe: Gheo-
rghe Gheorghiu-Dej, RCPsecretary, whose clandestine pseudonym was Feraru; N.: 
Stalin; Ol.: a Soviet (could be Molotov or Malenkov). The document mentions Ik., an 
unidentified individual who also took part in the meeting but only at the end of it.
81  The present document was published in Romanian in Mihnea Berindei, Dorin Dobr-
incu, and Armand Goşu, eds., Istoria comunismului din România. Documente. Perioada 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej (1945–1965) (Bucharest: Editura Humanitas, 2009), pp. 47–59. 
The Soviet records were published in Romanian translation by the Russian historian 
Tatiana Pokivailova in “Contacte romano-sovietice in legatura cu alegerile [din 1946]”, 
in Analele Sighet. Anul 1946 – începutul sfârşitului (instituţii, mentalităţi, evenimente), 
vol. 3 (1996), pp. 413–418.
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Ol.:  What problems do you have to discuss?
Fe.:  First, the problem of the elections.
Ol.:  Which stage of the elections do you find yourself in?
Fe.:  We are still in the preparation stage of the elections.
Ol.:  The preparation can take a long time. When do you think you will hold 
elections?
Fe.:  Sometime in August.
Ol.:  Why in August? What is the link with holding elections in August?
Fe.:  We are linking elections first with the new harvest and secondly, we 
will gain enough time to prepare the elections well.
Ol.:  How do you think you will participate in the elections? On common 
lists?
Fe.:  There are two opinions on this. One argues that we participate jointly 
in a government coalition, and the second view proposes that the FND 
[the National Democratic Front] and [Gheorghe] Tătărescu  run sepa-
rately but establish an agreement of reciprocal assistance.
Al.:  How do you understand assisting Tătărescu outside of the coalition?
Fe.:  We understand this assistance in the sense that we will not attack each 
other, and where we encounter common enemies, we will join forces 
to crush them. However, even with the agreement that may be estab-
lished at the top, in practice we anticipate conflicts on the ground 
between Tătărescu’s followers and the masses supporting the FND.
Ol.:  Do you have a platform?
Fe.:  Yes.
Ol.:  Is the platform you propose also the coalition’s platform?
Fe.:  They are the platform points proposed by our party as a basis of discus-
sion with the other democratic forces, including Tătărescu.
Al.:  Have you discussed the platform with the other parties?
Fe.:  We have not yet discussed it, aside from the general talks with the 
Social Democrats. We discussed with Tătărescu some of the most 
important points of the program two days before arriving here.
Ol.:  What are those points?
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Fe.:  Nationalization of the Romanian National Bank, nationalization of 
insurance companies, control of the main banks, and control of the 
activities of cartels and associations with a monopoly profile.
Al.:  Is the platform you propose that of the party?
Fe.:  Yes, it is the RCP’s. Tătărescu also made a platform project, which is 
actually just empty words. We did not engage in talks based on his 
project but wish to make proposals so that our party will not drag 
behind Tătărescu’s proposals.
Al.:  Did Tătărescu show his project only to the communists?
Fe.:  Yes, only to us.
Al.:  What is the attitude of the other groups?
Fe.:  Positive. The Social Democrats agree in principle. Concerning 
Tătărescu, we only discussed the main points. He claimed to virtually 
agree to nationalization if this can bring us votes, but he has reserva-
tions about writing this detail in the platform.
Ol.:  That means he agreed with these things in principle? 
Fe.:  Yes, but he said that it may be better to do all these things after the 
elections, assuming that this may cause panic as well as economic and 
financial disturbances. And when we told him that we could not aban-
don these points, he let it be understood that he would be willing to 
have this point included in the platform.
Cr.:  This is in line with their old system. Everything that would bring votes 
was included in the platform, without these issues ever being achieved 
after elections.
Ol.:  What do you want to nationalize specifically?
Fe.:  BNR, insurance companies; to gain control of other important banks 
and of industry cartels.
Ol.:  What industry cartels do you have?
Fe.:  The sugar industry.
Cr.:  The cement industry.
Ol.:  Is cement a monopoly for you?
Cr.:  No, a cartel.
Ol.:  Are the railroads entirely the state’s?
Fe.:  Yes, and it also has a number of additional factories. The state has 
around one-third of all industries in its ownership.
Ol.:  What industries are you referring to?
Fe.:  For example, the Hunedoara Iron Works, which produces pig iron, 
steel, and iron. They currently produce semi-fabricates, but if they had 
a mill, they could produce finished products. This plant runs at only 10 
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percent of its capacity. Out of the five furnaces it has, only one works, 
and that at reduced capacity. The private industries are in a similar sit-
uation. For example, Resita and TNC are running at around 35 percent 
capacity.82
[Fe. shows the state of affairs in various departments  
of the national industry].
Ol.:  What are you lacking?
Fe.:  Coal, fire-resistant materials, and raw materials.
Ol.:  How much coal do you need?
Fe.:  I am unable to point to an exact number.
Ol.:  Let’s return to what we have already discussed. Why are you linking 
the nationalization of BNR with the elections?
Fe.:  We wanted to bring something new to the elections. We completed 
the agrarian reform, and after this, we need to take a further step. By 
nationalizing the BNR, we will strike at Brătianu and Maniu’s material 
base.
Ol.:  What other important issues do you have?
Fe.:  Dealing with the problem of the monarchy in the platform.
Ol.:  Do you hold special views on the monarchy?
Fe.:  We avoided this problem. We did not discuss it in the CC. This problem 
arose here because Tătărescu deems it the first point in his platform.
 [Tătărescu’s formulation is read.]
Ol.:  Does he believe you will accept his proposal?
Fe.:  We did not discuss this issue with him.
Ol.:  Do you think you should mention the king in the platform?
Fe.:  Keeping in mind that a monarchic sentiment exists in the country and 
that the “historic” parties and even Tătărescu are stressing this issue, 
we think it would be wise not to avoid this problem.
Ol.:  What is your formulation?
Fe.:  We did not include anything in the platform. Here we thought of a 
formulation, which has two versions.
[The first version is read out.] 
82  The Titan-Nădrag-Călan Metallurgical Works, owned by industrialist Max Auschnitt, 
was one of the most important industrial groups in Romania between 1920 and 1940.
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“…the guarantee of civil rights and liberties within the regime of the 
constitutional monarchy—as the basic establishment of the  
democratic Romanian state.”
Ol. [smiling]: This resembles Tătărescu’s formula.
Fe.:  We also thought the last part of the report does not fit, and this is why 
we have prepared a second version: “The guarantee of civil rights and 
liberties within the regime of the constitutional monarchy.”
Al.:  Do you think mentioning the monarchy in the platform will bring you 
votes?
Fe.:  Mentioning the monarchy in the platform will not repudiate a series 
of our points. We have to deal with reality. The monarchic sentiment 
still exists here.
Al.:  For the peasants?
Fe.:  Yes, especially in the countryside.
Al.:  Then there will be a government coalition during elections. But what 
about the other side?
Fe.:  I do not know exactly. Judging by the enemy press, it seems that they 
have a common line. But I cannot say if they will run on joint lists.
Al.:  We have to take into account the fact that the “historical”parties will 
also run on a joint list. Their troubles are bigger than yours.
Fe.:  We do not have any troubles.
Cr.:  We do have some friction. For example, with the social democrats.
Fe.:  There is some friction, but not the type of troubles that the “histori-
cals” have to deal with. There are two groups in the national-peasant 
parties, one focused on Maniu (the Transylvanians) and the second 
one on Mihalache.83
Al.:  What points do you have in the platform for the villages?
Fe.:  Cheap credits, machine rental stations, seed acquisition, etc.
Fe.:  What results do you think you will have in the elections?
83  Ion Mihalache (1882–1963). Romanian teacher and politician; participated in both 
World War I and World War II. Immediately after World War I he founded the Peasant 
Party, fighting for the peasants’ rights, for their emancipation, in both political and 
socioeconomic terms. In 1926, his party and the National Romanian Party of Iuliu 
Maniu merged to form the National Peasant Party, with Iuliu Maniu as president 
and Ion Mihalache as vice-president. Minister of agriculture (1928–1930); minister 
of the interior (1930–1931 and 1932–1933). In July 1947, he was arrested during the 
“Tămădău setup,” while attempting to flee the country, and sentenced to life impris-
onment (November 1947). He died in 1963, in the brutal prison of Râmnicu Sărat.
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Fe.:  If we organize a common front of all democratic forces, we can obtain 
70–75 percent of the votes. [Explains the problem of the 20 percent elec-
toral bonus, mentioning that the “historicals” introduced it in 1927 and 
that the Liberals and the Peasant Party people have profited from it.]84
Ol.:  What are the results of the agrarian reform?
Fe.:  The results are relatively good. Around 600,000 households received 
land.
Cr.:  Almost 700,000.
Ol.:  Families?
Fe.:  Yes, but a number of mistakes were made in the agrarian reform’s 
implementation.
Ol.:  What mistakes were made?
Fe.:  Even before March 6, 1945, we urged peasants to initiate the land 
reform, even though the law did not yet exist. The peasants were at 
first timid, but following action by our activists, they began to take 
their land. Some abuses were committed, bypassing some of our par-
ty’s provisions regarding the redistribution of land to those entitled to 
the land reform. [Gives various cases of abuse.]
Al.:  Did you reinforce the distinction of ownership to the peasants regard-
ing land? Did you give them property documents?
Fe.:  We formed an inter-ministry commission that monitors the imple-
mentation of the agrarian reform, and after the inspection, the titles 
are given.
Cr.:  No property titles have been given yet.
Al.:  If you do not give them property documents, they will not vote for 
you.
Fe.:  We want to divide up property titles during the electoral campaign, as 
one of the ways in which to attract peasants.
Al.:  That is just.
Ol.:  Does everyone agree with us concerning Transylvania?
Fe.:  The party has fixed its point of view concerning this issue. We consider 
the problem of Northern Transylvania to be definitively decided. We 
will not even bring up this issue.
Ol.:  Is it true that Groza had promised a part of Northern Transylvania?
84  According to the electoral law of 1926, the parties who gained a minimum of 40 per-
cent of the total votes won an electoral bonus, which consisted of half of the number 
of seats in the Assembly of Deputies (the main house of the Romanian Parliament).
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Fe.:  I have not heard anything of the sort. [Tells the story of the recep-
tion organized by Groza to honor Hungarian artists and about the 
questions Miss Hungary put to Groza concerning Northern Transyl-
vania]. Groza mentioned to us that the issue of granting administra-
tive autonomy to Northern Transylvania within the Romanian state 
may be discussed. I am unsure if he has mentioned this to others as 
well.
Ol.:  What is Maniu’s standpoint on the issue of Northern Transylvania?
Fe.:  He cannot openly take a standpoint that differs from ours, because he 
would compromise himself. But he is actually more concerned with 
what type of regime will be established in Romania than who will 
receive Northern Transylvania. He focuses attention on overthrowing 
the government. He maintains relations with Hungarian reactionar-
ies. We even intercepted some letters addressed to Maniu circles.
Session II
April 3, 1946
N.:  Will you take part in elections as a coalition?
Fe.:  Two options were discussed in the Central Committee of the Roma-
nian Communist Party: one, a government coalition; the other, the 
National-Democratic Front separately, and Tătărescu separately, cul-
minating in a non-aggression pact. [Fe explains why Tătărescu, who 
does not represent many votes, should be part of a government coali-
tion, showing that this will break the bourgeoisie’s front and further 
avert the danger of reactionaries targeting the National Democratic 
Front list as a communist list.]
N.:  It is fair. How do you understand the coalition?
Fe.:  A common governing platform for four years, a common list in elec-
tions, and the percentage-based distribution of mandates.
N.:  How are you distributing the coalition percentages?
F.:  Ploughmen’s Front—24 percent, Social Democrats—23 percent, 
RCP—21 percent, National Liberal Party—20 percent, People’s 
National Party—7 percent, National Peasant Party—5 percent.
N.:  Is the army voting?
Fe.:  We have not decided this issue yet. We thought that, since the army 
has not been cleansed of reactionaries, it might be the case that they 
should not vote.
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N.:  How big is your army?
Fe.:  120,000 people.
Ol.:  You have more with the air force, navy, and border guards, more than 
200,000.
N.:  We cannot deprive the army of its right to vote. Agitation and propa-
ganda must be intensified in the army, but you must give them to the 
right to vote. Do women vote?
Fe.:  Yes, they vote.
N.:  With equal rights, just like men?
Fe.:  With the same rights. 
N.:  Do the youth vote? At what age are they granted the right to vote?
Fe.:  We thought 18 and up.
N.:  Do you have many illiterates?
Cr.:  Approximately 40 percent of the population.
N.:  Many illiterates. I think you should grant the right to vote from 21 
years of age and up. At what age can one be elected?
Fe.:  25 years and up.
N.:  It’s good. Grant the right to vote from 21 years and up and the right to 
be elected from 25 years and up. Do you have an electoral law?
Fe.:  We do.
N.:  Do all the parties approve of it? Has the government ratified it?
Fe.:  We have not discussed it in the government yet.
N.:  Then there is no electoral law. You have the nationalization of the 
Romanian National Bank in your platform, and this is a good mea-
sure. You can also add the nationalization of insurance companies. 
Concerning the control of industrial cartels, you cannot achieve 
this through the banks. The control can be achieved either from the 
bottom up, with the help of trade unions, or from the top down by 
appointing the government’s general managers. Joint organizations 
can also be created. I doubt that you will be able to do that, and for 
that reason it is better to not include this in your platform, so that 
you do not scare them needlessly. [Laughs] Does Tătărescu agree with 
this?
F.:  Tătărescu agrees with all of these proposals. However, he says, “If you 
wish to, we can do it, but we should not include it in the platform, so 
that we do not scare the people.”
N.:  He is right. Carry out the control, but do not write this in the plat-
form. Any bank can exercise the control by directing credit and grant-
ing it or not to certain industries. This does not require a law or to 
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be mentioned in the platform. Do you mention the expropriation of 
landowners’ forests in the platform?
Fe.:  Most of the Central Committee members were in favor of removing 
this detail from the platform. When necessary, we can confiscate for-
ests, but we will not write anything in the platform, so we don’t scare 
them.
Ol.:  But this detail is still in the platform’s text.
N.:  It is not good to write this. Take it out. I see that you have included 
here the monopoly on foreign commerce. You will not achieve this, so 
there is no point in including it in the platform.
Fe.:  But can we include the control and management of foreign commerce?
N.:  You can achieve this by conducting a fair customs duties policy. For 
example, raise the duties on lemons if you do not want them to be 
imported. Lower the duties on items you want imported. Also, lower 
the duties on items you want exported, and if you have a special 
interest in the export of a certain item, grant an export bonus. Aside 
from this, you need good customs officers so that only what you want 
can enter and exit the country. You mention the reorganization and 
expansion of social insurance. What kind of insurance are you talk-
ing about? Against illness, against old age, or against unemployment? 
It must be specified. You will not be able to achieve insurance against 
unemployment. What you want must be written precisely.
You propose in the platform…“the reduction of indirect taxes to 
the point of cancellation.” You will not be able to achieve this. We also 
tried it for some time, but nothing came of it.
Fe.:  Let me give an example: A pair of boots costs 150,000 lei. Out of that 
sum, duties and taxes amount to 120,000 lei.
N.:  You can write down “reduction of indirect taxes,” but not their can-
cellation. You need to strengthen the currency and stop inflation. 
To achieve this, drastic economic measures must be taken. Budget 
expenses must be reduced.
Regarding “stabilization of national currency,” you fail to mention 
the methods to achieve this stabilization and how you want to achieve 
it, and at what rate, today’s rate? This is not enough, to mention in a 
four-year platform the maintenance of currency at the current depre-
ciation level. You must include in the platform…strengthening the 
currency.... Through the gradual elimination of inflation, you must 
increase the flow of money. You must cut costs: Reduce the army, liq-
uidate useless parts of business. Merchandise and goods must be pro-
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duced as much as possible, and then the value of money will increase. 
What do you understand by “improvement of agrarian reform”?
Fe.:  Obtaining cheap credits for peasants, rental stations of agricultural 
machines, obtaining seed, etc.
N.:  Then it is formulated the wrong way. Through “improvement” one may 
understand that you still want to take land from its owners. Why scare 
them needlessly, if you do not even have this intention? [Laughs] This 
phrase must be taken out. You can express the idea better using the 
phrase: “measures to support peasant households.”
Do you have compulsory primary education? The way that we 
have the requirement for parents to send their children to school, with 
the threat of penalty? You do not have anything written regarding 
compulsory primary education. You must take severe measures for all 
children to learn, and then you will not have any illiterates.
Cr.:  We have had the law on free and compulsory primary education for 
a long time, but the children of poor peasants are not able to go to 
school. Schools have no wood. The children are undressed, barefoot, 
and cannot attend school.
N.:  Yes, this surely must cost money. You have to write “measures for assur-
ing compulsory primary education.” You speak of civilian freedoms. You 
write, “…freedom of speech, freedom of written expression, etc., etc….” 
By all means, you must add “liberty of religious denominations.”
What do you understand by the reorganization of the army on a 
democratic basis?
Fe.:  A large number of reactionaries have remained in the army. The army 
must be re-educated and the reactionaries removed from its structure.
N.:  Even they [the leaders of the historic parties], when reading this detail 
in your platform, will of course promptly vote for the government 
coalition [laughs]. You must not write this into the platform. You 
produce panic in the army and alienate soldiers for no purpose. The 
cleansing of reactionaries must be achieved. Any government has the 
right to cleanse its army, but this must not be mentioned in the gov-
ernment platform. If you wish, you can speak of “strengthening the 
army.” There must be discipline in the army.
With regard to the nationalities living side by side, you advocate 
equality. Equality of nationalities is utopian. It is out of the question 
to speak of equality between nations. For example, Belgium is an inde-
pendent state, but one cannot speak of Belgium’s equality with the 
United States of America. It does not have its power nor its resources. 
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If you take two people, even they are not equal; one is smarter, more 
capable, more robust, etc. Even more so with regard to two nations. 
But it is possible to say “equal rights for nationalities living side by 
side.” “Equality” and “equal rights” are not the same thing.
[Looks at Tătărescu’s platform. Reads out:] “The consolidation of 
the constitutional monarchy regime, as the foundation of the Roma-
nian state, and the guarantee of its historical development.” [Laughs] 
And all of you agree with this proposal?
Fe.:  No. We have not even discussed this with him.
N.:  And what is your proposal?
Fe.:  We have not studied this item in the Central Committee; only here 
and now have we studied it together with Cr. Tătărescu’s platform, 
and we have realized that we cannot avoid the problem of the monar-
chy, and we have even studied the possibility of treating this issue not 
in a separate heading, but indirectly in relation to another issue.
N.:  Let’s see your proposal.
Fe.:  “Guarantee of rights and civil liberties as part of the constitutional 
monarchy regime.”
N.:  You should mention not only “guarantee of rights and liberties,” but 
“guarantee of the democratic regime.” This must be linked to state 
independence so that monarchy, when it threatens independence and 
sovereignty of the country, can be abolished by the people. [Dictates:] 
“guarantee of the democratic regime and of complete sovereignty of 
the Romanian state within the constitutional monarchy.” [Pondering] 
One might also write: “within” or “based on” or “on the principles of 
constitutional monarchy.”
Ol.:  “Based on” does not fit. It is close to Tătărescu’s formulation.
N.:  “Within” is best.
Ol.:  You have turned us into monarchists, too. [Laughs]
N.:  This formulation can be accepted. It is true, there is a difference 
between a monarchy and a republic, but it is not that big if the regime 
is democratic. For example, there was no monarchy in Hitlerite Ger-
many, but this regime was more disastrous than all monarchies. Let us 
see what else Tătărescu writes. [Reads out:] “…capital as generator of 
wealth…” [Laughs] Yes, it is interesting to see how well capital would 
generate wealth without workers. Without the labor of workers, capi-
tal is incapable of achieving this. It will remain in banks and rot. [Gets 
away from the texts]
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Concerning the Hungarians, you cannot write anything? Do Hun-
garians have schools in the country?
Cr.:  They even have a Hungarian university.
N.:  Yes? But what language do they use in court?
Cr.:  In the regions with a Hungarian minority of more than 30 percent, 
they speak both languages: Romanian and Hungarian.
Ol.:  But in institutions, authorities?
Cr.:  The same. For example, in Oradea, a city with a Hungarian majority, 
85–90 percent of functionaries are Hungarian. They still need to know 
Romanian.
Ol.:  Of course.
N.:  It must be formulated in the platform: “guarantee of rights for the 
Hungarian population in Romania to use freely their native language 
and to teach it in schools, as well as to use it in court.”
N.:  We have a nationalities statute that encompasses all of these rights.
Ol.:  Then it should be written: “consistent application of the nationalities 
statute.”
N.:  Well, let’s see how you will participate in the elections. Did Tătărescu 
request to enter the National Democratic Front?
Fe.:  No, he did not request it, but during elections he wants to run on joint 
lists. However, he is requesting 30 percent of the coalition’s mandates. 
He naturally does not have the last word.
N.:  This is a lot. You cannot give him 30 percent; give him less.
Fe.:  Tătărescu does not represent a force of numerical strength, but we 
consider his participation in the government’s coalition to be impor-
tant, in order to collectively strike a blow against the most reactionary 
part of the enemy camp.
N.:  It is fair.
Cr.:  Considering voting, he is not worth more than 10 percent. But to have 
him join us, we have agreed to give him 15–18 percent, at most 20 per-
cent.
N.:  Bargain with him, but give him less. How much did you envision for 
the Party?
Fe.:  21 percent.
N.:  You cannot take less for the party than what you give Tătărescu, under 
any circumstance.
Fe.:  We have a number of party members in other parties so that we will 
have more mandates.
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N.:  This is a different matter. But with a view to the people, you cannot 
officially request less. If you chose to run separately and not as part of 
a coalition, would you gain fewer votes than Tătărescu?
Fe.:  No, we would gain more votes than he.
N.:  Well, you see. Then why create a false opinion of the party’s strength? 
Your situation within other parties is unknown abroad, and they will 
draw the wrong conclusions. It will be said that you are weak, that you 
are only the third party. But to Social Democrats how much are you 
giving?
Fe.:  They requested 30 percent. We want to offer them 23 percent.
N.:  It is not good to give them more votes than yourself, either. If you ran 
on separate tickets, would they gain more votes than you?
Fe.:  It is difficult to say, but I do not think so.
N.:  If you give them more, the conclusion will be drawn that you admit 
you are weaker. How much are you giving the Ploughmen’s Front?
Fe.:  Twenty-four percent.
N.:  You can give them more; it is an organization that includes large 
peasant masses. But you cannot take less than other parties. You 
have to establish parity with them. If you add up the percentages: 
21+23+20=64; 64/3=21 and something. [After few moments of thinking 
it over:] Give equal percentages to the four major participants. Take 
21+23+20+24 percent =88 percent; 88/4=22. Give 22 percent to each of 
them, and the other parties will be the National People’s Party with 7 
percent,85 and the National Peasant Party with 5 percent.86 Will they 
accept this?
Fe.:  With the Social Democrats it will be difficult, because they know we 
have our people in other parties as well.
N.:  If they do not accept, give them some seats of your group. But offi-
cially, all four parties should be equal at 22 percent. And inside your 
country, it is not good for people to believe that you are weaker than 
85  The National People’s Party was formed in January 1946, through the transformation 
of the Union of Patriots, a satellite organization of the Romanian Communist Party, 
previously formed to attract intellectuals and bureaucrats who hesitated to enroll 
directly with the Communists. The National People’s Party participated in the 1946 
elections on the common list of the Democratic Parties Bloc.
86  National Peasant Party-Alexandrescu. A left faction of the National Peasant Party, 
founded in 1945 by Anton Alexandrescu; became a satellite of the Communist Party, 
with which it co-governed in 1945, participating in the 1946 parliamentary elections. 
Merged with the Ploughmen’s Front in 1948.
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you really are. The people will not understand what arrangements you 
have made and will believe that you admit yourself to be weaker than 
the others. You should not create a false assessment of your power.
Do you have any other questions?
Fe.:  In the country we have approximately 500,000 Swabians and Saxons. 
They have always been the vanguard of German imperialism and the 
focal point of reaction. Recently, they have begun to raise their heads 
again. We would like to expel them.
N.:  The war is over. It is difficult to expel now. Do they have the right to vote?
Fe.:  We were thinking about this issue. We would like to deprive them of 
the right to vote.
N.:  Are they Romanian citizens?
Fe.:  Yes.
N.:  Then it is difficult to deprive them of the right to vote. Only if you 
have a motive.
Fe.:  Most of them were registered in the Ethnic German Group, a Hitlerite 
organization. We can deprive them of the right to vote.
N.:  That’s it—if you have this option, then do it. You should have no 
mercy for them. Anything else? 
Fe.:  We would like the major war criminals to be handed over to us: 
Antonescu, etc., in order to put them on trial in our country.
N.:  [to Ol.] They haven’t yet got these criminals? They must get them.
Ol.:  The issue was delayed because of the Anglo-Americans’ approval.
N.:  To hell with the Anglo-Americans. Are they [Antonescu and his peo-
ple] not our prisoners? They must be sent to Romania.
Ol.:  The Anglo-Americans had reservations concerning the case, since they 
might have been requested by the Nuremberg Tribunal.
N.:  Fine, this refers to all war criminals. [To Fe. and Cr.]. Fine, you will get 
them.
Fe.:  We would like to discuss the issue of financial support for the elec-
tions.
N.:  For the Party?
Fe.:  Yes, for the Party.
N.:  How much do you need?
Fe.:  We would like to send around 15,000 activists throughout the country 
for three months of propaganda work: May, June, July.
N.:  How much money is needed?
Fe.:  Approximately 10 billion per month.
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Ol.:  Clearly, the figure has been studied more precisely. In the letter 14 bil-
lion per month was mentioned.
N.:  10 billion means a total of 30 billion. Do we have this money?
Ol.:  [After checking:] We have a total of 600 million lei. The amount is com-
pletely insufficient. On the basis of the armistice, we receive 13 billion 
lei per month. The issue is to reduce this amount now. We have the 
option not to reduce it and to give them the amount we have wanted to 
reduce. But even in this event, we would only be able to take only 2–3 
million per month from there, and by no means 10 billion.
N.:  But what if we bought lei?
Ol.:  This issue must be studied.
N.:  Would you be able to do something with dollars? Could you exchange 
them into lei?
Fe.:  Yes.
N.:  At what rate?
Fe.:  The dollar is 10,000 lei officially, but on the stock market it is more 
than 40,000 lei.
N.:  Then at what rate is it good to give them to you? Would you be able to 
exchange it at a rate of 30,000 lei?
N.:  Fine, then you will receive 1 million dollars. What else?
Cr.:  In Northern Transylvania there are Hungarian citizens brought there 
as civil servants for the Horthy regime during the occupation of the 
region. The majority of them are reactionaries. They promote chauvin-
ist propaganda and maintain an unhealthy atmosphere. We would like 
to send them to their homeland.
N.:  Have you spoken with the Hungarian communists about this?
Fe.:  We spoke with some comrades. They have agreed.
N.:  I spoke with Rákosi. He said they are afraid to take back Hungarians 
from Czechoslovakia and other countries. Settle this with them.
Cr.:  A number of Jews who were in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina 
when this region was liberated by the Red Army in 1940 have arrived in 
Romania from the USSR. We do not present this issue because they are 
not Romanian citizens, but they engage in stock market speculation 
and, at the same time, spread propaganda hostile to the Soviet Union.
Ol.:  We do not detain these people by force, nor did we send them to you. 
Love cannot be forced.
N.:  Their sympathies are of no concern to us.
Fe.:  A number of states, including Hungary, have received loans from the 
USA. Can we also accept them?
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N.:  If they give them to you, take them. [Laughs] But do not agree to 
terms that may affect your sovereignty. They gave a loan to Poland but 
established terms concerning how and for what to use it. If they want 
to establish terms to you as well, reply similarly. You can accept a loan, 
but without terms.
Fe.:  But what if they give us a loan to purchase machines and other materi-
als from them?
N.:  This is something else; it can be accepted. [Ik. arrives.]
[Fe. presents the Malaxa proposal to set up a Romanian-Soviet-Amer-
ican company to produce tractors.] N. and Ik. agree to the proposal. 
They will also participate. The issue remains to be studied and concrete 
proposals to be made.
N.:  Will you produce tractors on wheels or chain tracks?
Fe.:  We have not decided this issue yet.
N.:  At first, we had Ford tractors on wheels. After that, McCormick (Inter-
national) and now we produce tractors with chain tracks in four facto-
ries. You should not produce Ford because it generated poor results. 
We use tractors on chain tracks because we have extensive fields. For 
you, I think the McCormick tractor will work best, bearing in mind 
that your agricultural farms are not bigger than 50 hectares. At any 
rate, you will see.
Fe.:  We have proposals to build a factory for reed mace cellulose from the 
Danube Delta. 
N.:  We make it from wood, and the Finnish do the same. You can get good 
cellulose from reed mace. You can accept this proposal.
Cr.:  Proposals have been received from the Ploughmen’s Front, especially 
Groza, to transform this organization into a party.
N.:  Do you have other peasant parties?
Cr.:  Maniu’s National Peasant Party and that of Anton Alexandrescu.
N.:  You can name it “The Working Ploughmen’s Front” to distinguish it 
from Maniu’s Kulak Party. It is the same in Poland. There is the peasant 
party of Mikołaiczyk,87 in which all kulaks enter, and there is the Work-
87  Stanisław Mikołajczyk (1901–1966), Polish politician. Known for his opposition to the 
authoritarian Polish government formed after Jozef Pilsudski’s death. Maintained 
political functions during World War II in exile in London, became prime minister 
of the Polish government-in-exile in 1943–1944. Vice prime minister in Warsaw gov-
ernment (1945–1947), embroiled in a long-lasting conflict with communist authori-
ties. Escaped to the West after the massive communist election fraud and the risk of 
arrest.
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ing Ploughmen’s Front. You must focus all your attention on this party 
and send them two or three of your strongest and best prepared lead-
ers, in order to master the situation. This issue deserves every effort, 
because it is of high importance. Send the best and the toughest.
Fe.:  [shows the economic diagrams, which demonstrate the increasingly 
large scissors between production on the one side and prices on the 
other. At the same time, salaries are completely insufficient and goods 
extremely scarce.]
N.:  This is a characteristic feature of inflation. Drastic economic measures 
must be taken. Reduce the army. Aside from this, a capable and strong 
finance minister is needed.
Fe.:  If we are offered the Ministry of National Economy, can we accept it?
N.:  Do you have trained cadres?
Fe.:  We have cadres that have been trained well enough.
N.:  In this case, you can take it.
Cr.:  In the time of Rădescu, 80,000 men were in the police forces. Prior to 
March 6, their numbers were reduced to 30,000 men. We cannot cur-
rently cope with such a reduced force.
N.:  Eighty thousand was extremely large. You can increase your force to 
40,000 men. How big is your army?
Cr.:  One hundred twenty thousand.
Ol.:  With your other armed forces, such as the air force, navy, and border 
patrol, you have over 200,000. These numbers must be reduced.
Cr.:  The king is opposed.
N.:  You have to show him that there are no resources and that, in the cur-
rent inflationary circumstances, it is necessary to make this reduction. 
Does the king have a civil list?
Fe.:  Yes.
N.:  How much does he have on the civil list?
Cr.:  We do not know exactly. In either case, this does not mean much to 
him; he is one of the wealthiest landowners in the country. He owns 
extensive estates.
N.:  Were his lands not affected during the agrarian reform?
Cr.:  No.
N.:  And he was not generous enough to divide the land up for the peas-
ants himself?
Cr.:  He was not generous at all.
Source: ANIC, fond CC al PCR—Secţia Cancelarie, dosar nr. 28/1946, ff.1–16.
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DOCUMENT No. 19:
Transcript of Meeting of Romanian-Soviet Commission  
of Economic Cooperation
January 28, 1947
The document reveals the existing tensions between the Romanian and Soviet 
sides that resulted from the Soviet understanding of the cooperation concern-
ing the joint-stock Sovrom companies. The large sums of cash requested by the 
Soviet side as “legal benefits” indicate, even if only partially, the dimensions of 
economic exploitation to which the Romanian state was subjected. Within this 
context, the plea of the future prime minister of Romania, Ion Gheorghe Maurer, 
to establish the “Supervisory Cabinet of the Sovroms” was highly important and 
can be seen as a means to defend the Romanian national interest. This position 
caused  Maurer to recede into the political background for a decade; his protector, 
 Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, brought him back to the forefront of political life only 
in the summer of 1957.
Mr. Sergeyev proposes as plan of discussion:88
1.  Conclusion of the talks on Sovrompetrol and Sovromlemn that had 
started in Bucharest
2.  Working plan for 1947 of Sovromlemn and Sovrompetrol
3.  A general survey of the other Sovroms
4.  Problems related to the Soviet enterprises in Romania
Mr. Alexandrini agrees to the plan of discussion, but also believes that the 
following problems need to be addressed:
5.  Difficulties encountered in the previous cooperation
6.  Manufactures
7.  New areas of cooperation
Mr. Sergeyev would like to know which areas we are considering.
Mr. Alexandrini: Establishing new common enterprises for the production 
of coal, soot, and graphite electrodes.
Mr. Sergeyev: A tractor factory has been talked about.
88  Unidentified.
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Mr. Maurer:89 The tractor factory, as well as the reed cellulose factory, will 
be discussed at a later time, as we are still awaiting further explanations.
Mr. Sergeyev: Are you not waiting for us to provide explanations? We are 
ready to talk.
Mr. Maurer: We know. We are expecting information from somewhere else.
Mr. Sergeyev: Well. I would like to request that your experts make a report 
of the new enterprises, specifying projected output, availability of facilities 
and raw materials, how much is being produced now, necessary facilities, 
etc.
Mr. Maurer: The report will be made. I would like to propose to add to the 
discussion the problem of establishing a supervisory commission of Sov-
rom activities according to Article 6 of the May 8, 1945,agreement.
Mr. Sergeyev proposes to start the general discussion. He recapitulates 
those problems on which agreement has been reached.
1.  Sovrompetrol will sell abroad 70,000 tons of white petroleum prod-
ucts taken from the Romanian side’s contribution.
2.  The remainder of export products will be paid by the Romanian 
state in hard currency. 
3.  The prices will be the average of international prices in 1947.
4.  The established amounts, as well as those received from the Roma-
nian state, will be used by Sovrompetrol in order to purchase tech-
nical materials.
5.  The Romanian government will pay Sovrompetrol favorable prices 
that will enable profit.
6.  Profit sharing will be proportional to each side’s contributions.
The discussion moves to problems for which no solution has yet been 
found. The Soviet side has requested 2,081,354 dollars for Sovrompetrol, for 
petroleum products out of Romanian contributions and which the Roma-
nian state assumed from Sovrompetrol during 1946.
89  Ion Gheorghe Maurer(Jean Georges Maurer) (1902–2000). Member of Romanian 
Workers’/Communist Party (October 21, 1945–December 1955 and June 13, 1957–
November 28, 1974). Politburo member from 1960 to 1965, member of Executive Com-
mittee of the Central Committee of the RCP (1965–1974). 
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1.  The Soviet side has requested 2,163,000 dollars for Sovrompetrol to 
cover capital depreciation of Sovrompetrol’s equipment (resulting 
from unfair Romanian prices). 
2.  The Soviet side has requested payment of 2,500,000 dollars as profit 
that it was denied until January 1, 1947. It is reminded that the 
lump-sum is estimated because the exact amount cannot be deter-
mined.
The Romanian side recalls that it has agreed to an exorbitant payment of 
a lump sum in 1946, but that the profit will be calculated in lei and trans-
ferred to the USSR by means of the Agreement on Non-commercial Pay-
ments, according to Article 5 in the agreement signed on May 5, 1945. 
It is debated whether, from the fixed non-commercial payments per-
centage, a certain quota portion will affect Soviet profits or not.
Will it be discussed as a part of this committee or as part of the non-
commercial payments committee?
Mr. Sergeyev will consult with Mr. Bastrov and will give us a response.90
3.  The USSR’s profit from Sovrompetrol may be transferred in advance, 
but the size of the profit has not yet been established.
Mr. Alexandrini: Of course, as long as there will be a profit.
Mr. Maurer: The idea is that the profit is calculated at the end of the year 
on the basis of the final balance. We nevertheless agree to transfer certain 
amounts in advance and then to correct the final amount. Trimester bal-
ances may be made. The respective quota from the non-commercial pay-
ments agreement, however, must be taken into account. In other words, 
not the entire profit should be transferred, but only as much as possible, 
with the remainder utilized for investment.
Mr. Sergeyev: In discussions, a profit of 8 percent has been mentioned.
Mr. Maurer: The 8 percent has been mentioned as a legal return based on 
production units, but this does not determine the annual return, which can 
only be set according to the balance and which depends on the movement 
of capital.
90  Unidentified.
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The Soviet delegation points out a number of issues discussed in 
Bucharest that have already been resolved and says that the memorandum 
will be signed in Moscow during the talks.
1.  New land tracts for Sovrompetrol: Doiceşti, Şotânga, Călineşti, 
Filipeşti, Gura Drăgăneşti. Three tracts will be added to Annex 3 in 
the Convention, and the rest as a new item in the agreement.
2.  The right to survey at Arad and Chişinău-Criş.
3.  Common exploration and exploitation with Acex of five land tracts 
in Timişoara (three belonging to Acex and two to Sovrompetrol).
4.  Cooperation with Sonametan at Odorhei.
5.  Sovrompetrol’s right to operate at Prisaca and Valea Unguroaicei.
6.  Participation quota and right to operate on mountain plots 6 and 7, 
and 9.
Mr. Sergeyev points out that Sovrompetrol intends to extract 1,200,000 
tons of crude oil in 1947, to process 1,485,000 tons, and to conduct explora-
tion and exploitation drilling on 95,400 cubic meters out of 140,000 sched-
uled for the entire country, out of which only 36,000 cubic meters will be 
for exploration drilling, keeping in mind that in 1946 only 14,000 cubic 
meters were drilled countrywide.
Mr. Stupi reveals an offer of 1 million shares in the “Mining Credit Account” 
at the price of 50,000 per piece plus 3,000 brokerage; this is a total of 
53,000. With these shares in the “Mining Credit Account,” 46 percent of 
shares will be held, and a general meeting may be held if Article 203 of the 
commercial code is modified.91
Mr. Maurer requests the establishment of a Sovrom supervisory board, 
according to Article 6 of the Convention. He shows the importance of this 
request to the commission.
Mr. Sergeyev requests concrete proposals. How it will function, how many 
members, etc. Both sides will consider and make proposals.
Mr. Maurer: It is necessary to mention in the current discussion that the 
Sovroms are Romanian companies and that they are under Romanian juris-
diction just like other companies, according to the stipulations in the May 
8, 1945, agreement. This is necessary in order to avoid a number of difficul-
ties that have arisen to date.
91  Unidentified.
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Mr. Sergeyev wants to know the material basis that led to introducing the 
problem.
Mr. Maurer gives examples of the ways in which Sovromtransport utilizes 
its returns without consulting the National Bank of Romania, according to 
laws currently in effect, and of the Soviet proposals to split the Sovrom’s 
profits between both sides. He shows that this can produce serious difficul-
ties, in that we own a number of factories that have attracted other foreign 
capital, and according to the peace treaty’s clause of “most favored nation,” 
we must immediately and automatically employ identical treatment.
Mr. Sergeyev declares that he also foresaw discussing the problems in the 
Sovroms and that the Soviet side undertakes to solve these problems in a 
way that satisfies both sides.
Source: ANIC, fond CC al PCR - Secţia Economică, dosar nr. 12/1947, ff. 1–4.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 20:
Aide-memoire Drafted by British Oil Companies Operating  
in Romania [Excerpt]
April 15, 1947
Difficulties encountered by British oil companies in Romania92
[…]
Discrimination in favor of Sovrompetrol
1)  The petroleum law of 1942 has granted special privileges regarding 
land acquisition, taxation, credits, etc., to companies retaining at 
least 75 percent Romanian capital. These discriminatory rights were 
granted on grounds of special exception also to Sovrompetrol with 
only 50 percent Romanian capital.
2)  Concessions: Sovrompetrol is to be awarded any exploitable land 
tracts that will become available to the state, in a large number of 
promising regions that lie around oil regions already surveyed. Like-
wise, it was awarded a preference right to equal conditions over any 
other company at any auction of exploitable state-owned oil lands.
3)  Oil royalties: Although Sovrompetrol does not produce petroleum, 
it receives for production the majority of oil royalties payable to the 
state from the production of all companies in Romania.
4)  Exports and estimates: Sovrompetrol has obtained the right to 
receive without difficulties, as shown by its exports, the neces-
sary estimates for the purchase of foreign materials. Such a right 
has not been granted to any other oil company. During the last few 
92  English capital was invested in oil exploitation in Romania since the 19th century. 
In 1903 four British firms were active in Romania, and in 1910 Royal Dutch-Shell 
founded the company Astra Română. Oil production in Romania was the fourth larg-
est in the world in 1913, and by 1930 English capital owned a 20.62 percent share of 
oil industry in Romania, second only to Romania (26.62 percent). By 1931, 16 Eng-
lish companies were operating in Romania, of which Astra Română was the largest oil 
company in the country. In 1938, Romania was sixth in the world in oil production, 
first in Europe (not counting the USSR), and second in natural gas production. The 
offensive of German capital, through Kontinentale Öl AG, greatly weakened British 
positions in Romania and permitted the rapid formation of Sovrompetrol, through 
the Soviet substitution of the Germans.
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weeks, Sovrompetrol, with the help of a small Romanian represen-
tative, Carburant, made an offer to London agents for 70,000 tons 
of oil products, whose availability was guaranteed in Romania, in 
exchange for English pounds. 
Source: AMAE, fond Conferinţa Păcii. 1946, vol. 143, ff. 217–218.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 21:
Note regarding Soviet Claims on Formerly German-Owned  
Insurance Companies
April 1948
The Soviet Union’s continuing interest in obtaining maximum profit from taking 
over former German shares in various companies that had operated in Romania 
on August 23, 1944, can be clearly seen also from the measures taken to ensure 
Soviet preeminence in the field of insurance. The document demonstrates one of 
the strategies employed to impose Soviet views:
to label as “fascist” a law or a person that was opposed to Soviet interest in Roma-
nia.
On April 12, 1948, the following gentlemen appeared at the General Direc-
torate of R.A.A.S.:93 Belavin,94 director-general of the Vatra Dornei com-
pany; Carcaciov,95 administrative delegate for the Transylvania company; 
and Mr. Ghimişliu,96 director of Gostrakh, who came as a translator.
Mr. Belavin, after recounting the history of insurance companies in 
Romania, showed the following in his speech:
1)  The German insurance companies, namely Victoria, Vatra Dornei, 
and Transylvania, were transferred to the USSR as reparation for 
damages suffered at the hands of the Germans, and that as such, 
these companies must generate benefits, which are important for 
reconstruction in the USSR.
2)  These companies belong to and work for the Soviet Union. 
3)  By monopolizing insurance of Romanian state property, the Auton-
omous Administration of State Insurance is damaging these for-
merly German-owned insurance companies. It has caused them 
damages, especially by insuring cotton and industrial agencies. He 
stated that these damages have been brought to the knowledge of 
the Romanian government. He also stated that the Autonomous 
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Administration of State Insurance is competing unfairly by levying 
lower premiums than [Soviet-owned] insurance companies. 
4)  He also affirmed that the AASI law from 1942 is a fascist law and it 
contravenes Article 24, part b, in the peace treaty. Consequently, he 
requested that AASI notify superior authorities, in favor of:
a.  – The repeal of the R.A.A.S. law in the texts that prejudice USSR 
interests, in that it contravenes the text of Article 24, part b in 
the peace treaty;
b.  – AASI canceling the brochures headed for industrial offices, 
regarding their mandatory insurance to AASI 
c.  – R.A.A.S. revising its rate of charging premiums, increasing 
prices to the level applied by Soviet insurance companies.
Signed: Gh. Artenie
Source: ANIC, fond Ministerul Afacerilor Interne—Direcţia Administraţiei de 
Stat, dosar nr. 22/1948, ff. 49.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 22:
Soviet and Romanian Speeches Delivered on the Occasion of Signing 
Agreements on Joint Soviet-Romanian Companies in Bucharest
November 1, 1948
The ambassador of the USSR, S.I. Kavtaradze, and the delegation of Soviet 
experts on the one side, and Prime Minister Petru Groza and members of the 
Romanian government on the other, participated in the signing ceremony. Offi-
cial speeches were delivered by Vasile Luca, minister of finance, on the Romanian 
side and by Yatrov97 on the Soviet side.
On Monday, November 1, 1948, at 18:00, the signing ceremony for the 
Romanian-Soviet economic agreements took place at the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers.
On the Soviet side, the following persons participated: Mr. Ambassa-
dor S.I. Kavtaradze,98 together with the delegation of Soviet experts who 
negotiated with our delegation, and on the Romanian side: Dr. Petru Groza, 
President of the Council of Ministers, government members, and the 
respective delegation of experts.
After the conventions’ signing, the following spoke: Mr. Vasile Luca,99 
Minister of Finance on the Romanian side, and Yatrov,100 from the Soviet 
delegation.
Speech by Mr. Vasile Luca, Minister of Finance:
97  Unidentified.
98  Sergei (Sergo) I. Kavtaradze (1885–1971). Soviet politician (of Georgian nationality). 
General prosecutor of the USSR, survived the Great Terror of the 1930s. Retrieved 
later by Stalin, became adjunct of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Sent as ambassa-
dor to Bucharest (1945–1952); maintained close relations with the leadership of the 
Romanian Communist Party and had a key role in the Sovietization of Romania.
99  Vasile Luca (1898–1963). Romanian politician. Member of the Romanian Commu-
nist Party, imprisoned several times for political activity during the interwar period. 
Arrived to the USSR in 1940, held leadership positions in the Ukrainian Soviet Repub-
lic. Returned to Romania after the Soviet occupation in 1944 and became member of 
the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, as well 
as minister of finance (1947–1952). Accused of “right deviationism” and anti party 
activity; arrested and sentenced to death; sentence later commuted to life imprison-
ment; died in prison.
100  Unidentified.
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Friends and comrades, we have now signed two of the most important 
documents regarding the creation of new Romanian-Soviet companies, 
with which the economic cooperation between the People’s Republic of 
Romania and the Soviet Union enters a new phase.
In order to understand the importance of this cooperation, please 
allow me to speak briefly about the development, up to today, of economic 
relations between our republic and the Soviet Union. We all know that after 
the defeat of the Hitlerite hordes and the liberation of our country by the 
heroic Soviet Army, a series of enterprises and goods that were owned by 
the Germans in Romania passed, as war restitution, into the ownership 
of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government, keeping in mind the Roma-
nian government’s requests at that time, decided not to take these goods 
out of our country, but instead to incorporate them, together with us, into 
the Romanian economy and, as a consequence, support development of our 
national economy, thus revealing in particular that the Romanian people 
has decided this time to follow a new path in its development, the road to 
friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union, the road to removing those 
obstacles that were placed by reactionaries in the way of friendship and 
cooperation with the country of socialism.
The enemies of the people have not looked kindly upon this coopera-
tion. The enemies of the people understood clearly that the development 
of economic relations based on equality, on the basis of help given by the 
Soviet Union to weaker nations, destroys the lies and calumnies definitively 
and permanently and will also create a friendship between the hardworking 
people in our country and the peoples in the Soviet Union, a friendship that 
will never be shaken. Therefore, the enemies of the people did everything to 
compromise this economic cooperation. They placed all kinds of obstacles in 
the way of companies established after the war; they delayed their organiza-
tion and impeded their development; they did not back down from acts of 
sabotage against those workers who worked at these enterprises in order to 
compromise the economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.
The enemies of our people would have preferred cooperation with 
other countries; they would have preferred throwing our country into the 
arms of the Marshall Plan, thus sacrificing the national, economic, and 
social independence of our country. By compromising our cooperation with 
the Soviet Union, they hoped to compromise our friendly relations with our 
great neighbor in the East.
They have sought to isolate the Romanian people from the peoples 
of the Soviet Union, in order to impede the democratic development of 
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our country, and in order for them to regain their class privileges. How-
ever, over the years, beginning with August 23, 1944, and up to this day, 
they have received more determined blows that will lead to the definitive 
removal of the dominant classes from the country’s helm, from the leader-
ship of the country and of the people.
They have intended—as has been exposed so many times and as was 
exposed today at the closing of the trial we held101—through their actions 
against the people, through their acts of national betrayal, to impede the 
development of our democratic regime’s economy and to put the country 
into the service of imperialism, in order to create once again, and with the 
help of our country, the imperialist encirclement of the Soviet Union.
For the enemies of the people, the interests of the exploiting class were 
above the interests of the country and the people. Once the exploiting, 
capitalist elements were removed from the country’s helm, the obstacles 
standing in the way of the economic cooperation between Romania and the 
Soviet Union were also removed. One after another, all the difficulties cre-
ated by the enemy elements at the country’s helm before us were removed, 
and if we look at this economic cooperation through its development, we 
can affirm joyfully that the Soviet-Romanian enterprises, the Sovroms in 
our country, have become a key factor in the development of our economy 
and for the building of socialism in our country.
If we make a comparison with other cooperations in effect now in 
Western Europe, where the so-called Marshall Plan is being applied, we 
can clearly show the whole world that over there, factories and industrial 
plants are being closed and dissolved; that over there, millions of people are 
thrown into the clutches of poverty and unemployment; that over there, 
inflation, poverty, and hunger is devastating even those countries that were 
victorious in the war; that over there, the rights of the people are stifled 
by reactionaries, and there is no prospect for redress through the Marshall 
Plan, no economic stabilization, and no monetary stabilization. For exam-
101  Refers to the trial of “The Great Finance,” begun in October 1948 in the Military Tri-
bunal of Bucharest. The accused (many absent) were rear-admiral Horia Măcellariu; 
industrialist Max Auschnitt; engineers Alexandru Pop, Ioan Bujoiu, Alexandru 
Balş, and Dimitrie Gheorghiu; university professors George Manu and Nicolae 
Mărgineanu; professors Nicolae Petraşcu and Gheorghe Bontilă; and lawyers Eugen 
Teodorescu and Nistor Chioreanu. It was a show trial organized by the commu-
nist government; many of the charges were without factual basis, and many of the 
accused did not know one another. The verdict was handed down November 2, 1948, 
and the sentences were harsh.
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ple, the attempts in France, the fifth or sixth attempt, for monetary sta-
bilization and its failure; there is no prospect for redressing matters, the 
economic situation, as long as this country pursues the road of imperialist 
American expansion. The only escape for these people and this country is 
the fight against imperialism—against the destruction of these plans for 
pillaging, and not for the relief of nations.
For us, the help we have received from the Soviet Union, the eco-
nomic cooperation with our great neighbor in the East, and the economic 
cooperation with the new popular democracies have allowed us to defeat 
the consequences of the war and to overcome the consequences of the 
drought, thus heading down the road of our economic development step 
by step, strengthening our coinage through the reform we have made, and 
thus passing into a planned economy as a result of nationalizing the more 
important enterprises.
Through this cooperation, we are building a tractor factory and found-
ing a number of other enterprises. This means that we are setting out on 
the road to the concrete resolution of our agriculture’s mechanization; this 
means preparing socialism’s entry into the villages; this means strengthen-
ing our country’s economic and political independence.
On this road to a close economic cooperation between the Soviet 
Union, our country, and the popular democracies, such an enterprise, apart 
from this cooperation, is a deathblow to the imperialists. This represents 
breaking down the blockade the imperialists are trying to create around us 
in order to impede our economic development and enslave us, from an eco-
nomic and political viewpoint.
Our people, the working class in our country, is observing with utmost 
tension the further development of the economic cooperation between 
our country and the Soviet Union and is convinced that this coopera-
tion strengthens our country’s economic and political position, strength-
ens friendship between our people and the people of the Soviet Union, and 
strengthens the front of peace, the front of liberty, and the front of socialism.
The working class is working with increasing confidence and enthusi-
asm, organizing competitions for the building of socialism in our country. 
We are certain that these enterprises—the tractor factory, the chemical 
enterprise, and other companies that are in the process of being created—
will strengthen even more our working people’s confidence in the future. 
These enterprises are hastening the reconstruction of our country, its eco-
nomic development, and the building of socialism in the People’s Republic 
of Romania. [Loud applause]
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Mr. Yatrov’s speech
Friends and comrades, today we signed, on behalf of the government 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the government of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Romania, the founding agreement of the joint companies 
Sovrom-Tractor and Sovrom-Chim. This is a new contribution to the coop-
eration between our countries for strengthening the economy of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of Romania and for the development of important branches 
of its industry.
The cooperation between the People’s Republic of Romania and the 
Soviet Union, which came into being immediately after the destruction of 
fascist invaders, is developing successfully on the path of intensifying eco-
nomic relations and on the path of strengthening the friendship between 
the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the people of the 
People’s Republic of Romania.
Our economic cooperation is a new form of economic relations 
between the countries, based on the new principle of parity, of equality in 
contributions, of equality in leadership, and the principle of full sovereignty 
of our countries.
The establishment of the new joint companies Sovrom-Tractor and Sov-
rom-Chim confirms at once the unflinching strength of the foundation of 
economic cooperation between our countries, the unflinching foundation of 
friendship between our people. Today is an important day in the develop-
ment of our economic cooperation, because today, the conventions that will 
allow the People’s Republic of Romania the possibility to create for itself, in 
a short time period, a new branch of industry, the branch of tractor produc-
tion, are signed. Likewise, the People’s Republic of Romania will increase, 
in a very short time period, its production of chemical fertilizers and other 
products in the same category necessary for the Romanian economy.
I have to mention that we are referring to the construction and recon-
struction of big industrial plants in the important branches of the national 
economy. Soon Romania will be supplied with a large number of tractors 
constructed in the same way as most modern tractors of the Soviet Union. 
As is known, all the equipment necessary to build tractor factories will be 
delivered by the Soviet side. Likewise, the production will begin of the first 
units of chain track tractors, which will be delivered from the Soviet Union 
in the form of detached machine parts. The other industrial plant, which 
will produce fertilizers and other chemicals in greater quantities, will like-
wise be supplied with equipment delivered from the Soviet Union.
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A great and tense work stands before us, in order for both sides to 
be able to execute their assumed obligations in the terms stipulated by 
the conventions, in order to build and rebuild the industrial plants men-
tioned here and to ensure production in the necessary quantity and qual-
ity. Through our work regarding the economic cooperation, through our 
common work regarding the improvement of labor in the Soviet-Romanian 
joint companies, we have reason to be convinced that the tense and hard 
work that lies ahead of us, regarding the creation and development of the 
new Sovrom-Tractor and Sovrom-Chim companies, will likewise be exe-
cuted well and on time, respecting the terms indicated.
We view confidently our friendly economic cooperation, which is based 
on the principle of full parity, the principle of cooperation, and respect for 
the independence and sovereignty of our countries.
We express our confidence that this economic cooperative work will 
contribute further to strengthening our democratic, anti-imperialist camp, 
strengthening our mutual agreement, and leading us toward a closer famil-
iarity and stronger friendship between the peoples of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics and the people of the People’s Republic of Romania. 
[Loud applause]
Ceremony ends at 19:00.
Source: ANIC, fond Preşedinția Consiliului de Miniștri – Stenograme, dosar nr. 
11/1948, ff. 1–8.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 23:
Founding the Soviet-Romanian Film Company, Sovrom Film
August 9, 1947
The document reveals a great discrepancy between the amount of Romanian and 
Soviet capital to contribute to create the joint company Sovromfilm.
Sovromfilm was founded in January 1947 on the basis of the registered 
capital of 100,000,000 lei in cash. This capital was covered in the following 
way: 50,000,000 (fifty million) deposited by Sovexportfilmand 50,000,000 
(fifty million) by People’s Film.
In addition to Soviet registered capital, the Soviet side has contrib-
uted as a deposit films and advertising materials imported into the coun-
try before January, assessed by specialists to be worth 1,041,000,000 (one 
billion and forty one million) (the basis for calculation, as in all the settle-
ments with the Soviets, being the dollar’s official rate of exchange).
People’s Film made this contribution in cash, taking out a loan from 
CEC,102 which at present is completely liquidated.
Aside from this contribution, the Romanian side, i.e. People’s Film, 
also contributed 300,000,000 lei (6,000,000 dollars, after last year’s unof-
ficial rate of exchange, meaning 30,000,000,000 lei today). Because film 
exploitation on Romanian territory and abroad belongs exclusively to Sov-
romfilm, this money will not be even partially recovered by People’s Film 
but by Sovromfilm. Therefore the amount must be considered a contribu-
tion from the Romanian side to Sovromfilm.
What does Sovromfilm represent? An exclusive representative of stan-
dard (35 mm film) Soviet artistic film on Romanian territory.
In contrast to the situation of other Sovroms, alongside Sovromfilm 
exists Sovexportfilm, which deals with the following:
1)  Importation of film (positive and negative).
2)  Importation of standard (35 mm) artistic films, which are delivered 
for exploitation by Sovromfilm.
102  Casa de Economii și Consemnațiuni (C.E.C.). One of the oldest and most popular 
banking institutions held by the Romanian state, founded in 1864 by Prince Alexan-
dru Ioan Cuza.
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3)  Import of narrow films (16 mm) and thin devices, which it sells 
through the anonymous company O.C.R. [Office of Romanian Cin-
ematography], a company taken over as a good enemy.
4)  Broadcasting standard artistic films in villages, based on a con-
tract completed with Grupul Volant of the Department of Political 
Education of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist 
Party.
In Romania, the conditions for the exploitation of Soviet film and, there-
fore, the contributions between the Soviet side and the national side differ 
from those established in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria in the fol-
lowing way:
1)  In Hungary, the company Mafirt (analogous to People’s Film for 
us) succeeded in obtaining the monopoly on broadcasting Soviet 
film, which means that the Hungarian side is earning 50 percent of 
exploitation after the reduction of all expenses. Therefore, Mafirt 
finds itself privileged, in contrast to People’s Film, with 50 percent 
of the earnings going directly to Mafirt.
2)  In Czechoslovakia, where the industry and cinemas are nation-
alized, Soviet film is imported by Sovexportfilm and exploited 
through the Ministry of Information’s Service of Kinofication, 
by means of the cinema tax of approximately 35 percent per film 
(while in Romania, cinematographers pay Sovromfilm, on average, 
between 42 percent and 50 percent). 
The amounts established for us are divided in two; the Roma-
nian side 50 percent, and the Soviet side 50 percent, which, accord-
ing to the reported percentage mentioned above, generates returns 
of between 21 percent and 25 percent. Therefore, the private cine-
matographer is generally disadvantaged, and the Soviet side divides 
this advantage through Sovromfilm with the Romanian side. This 
helps the new company created, Sovromfilm, to develop and gain 
new prosperity perspectives. We must emphasize that the Roma-
nian side’s benefits help increase the capital of Sovromfilm, and 
for a considerable amount of time we can consider at least a partial 
benefit in the organization that participated in the establishment of 
Sovromfilm, namely People’s Film.
3)  In Austria, two types of cinemas exist. Some belong to private indi-
viduals; others (the majority), that had been German property in 
the past, are run by Sovromfilm. Soviet film is directly exploited 
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through Sovromfilm in their cinemas, as well as in the private ones, 
but on a case-by-case basis established by conventions. The creation 
of a Soviet-Austrian company based on the principles of Sovrom-
film is being planned.
Unresolved issues with People’s Film and Sovromfilm
1)  The contract between Sovromfilm and Sovexportfilm, namely the 
contract regarding the conditions of exploitation for Soviet film in 
Romania, has not been signed up to this point.
2)  The problem of strengthening the OCR [Office of Romanian Cin-
ematography] in Sovromfilm has not been resolved. This action 
assumes the deposit of new capital by People’s Film, capital it does 
not have.
3)  Tied somewhat to the previous point is the issue of exploiting 
existing cinemas in the People’s Film system and the acquisition 
of new cinemas. Even though comrade Belai103 always raises this 
issue, there is no inclination to resolve this amen ably. After com-
rade Chişinevschi’s104 proposal to divide the sphere of influence—
a proposal accepted by comrade Belai in personal discussions with 
comrade Chişinevschi—the concrete proposal by the People’s Front 
has followed to cede to Sovromfilm 12 cinemas on the territory of 
Moldova, Muntenia, Oltenia, and Dobrogea, regions remaining to 
be exploited by Sovromfilm. This proposal was not accepted by com-
rade Belai, who raises the issue of submitting ARO cinema and the 
Józsa Béla branch from Transylvania (which it received from the 
Cluj Regional). These goods, however, are the only bases of exis-
tence for People’s Film.
The main difficulty is lack of funds on both sides. A few ways out of this 
situation may exist:
1)  Attracting private capital. This task is impossible at the moment, 
not only because we do not wish to share our shares with private 
individuals, but primarily because capitalists wish to utilize their 
103  Unidentified.
104  Iosif Chişinevschi (Iosif Roitman) (1905–1962). Member of the Central Committee of 
the Romanian Communist Party (October 21, 1945–June 25, 1960); member of Polit-
buro of the CC of the Romanian Workers’ Party (February 24, 1948–July 3, 1957); 
responsible for the Propaganda, Foreign Affairs, External Cadres, and Administra-
tive-Political Sections of the Politburo.
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capital in a different way, one that would allow them to gain the 
most benefits in the shortest time. Not even from our sister orga-
nizations, such as the Patriotic Defense, or even other sectors in 
the Department of Political Education (such as the Party Publish-
ing House), have we encountered a wish to invest capital in People’s 
Front shares (we also advised them against it, because we under-
stand that they cannot immobilize their capital in our shares).
2)  Our second possibility would be the dissolution of People’s Film 
and the fusion of everything related to cinematography into Sov-
romfilm. I do not believe that, at the moment, we can claim that 
we do not need People’s Film any longer, since this organization 
has its purpose and because it has the possibility to carry out its 
activities as a purely national organization. One must observe that 
many cinematographers and film distributors in the country, as well 
as foreign ones, are negotiating with People’s Film and avoiding the 
Soviet-Romanian company. On the other hand, even Sovromfilm, 
through its actual system of work and through its cadres, does not 
ensure sufficiently the completion of the plans we have proposed.
3)  The third and best possibility is relieving the two sister organiza-
tions with credits from the Romanian National Bank and by offer-
ing the chance to acquire films abroad based on estimates at the 
official rate.
Signed: Secretary of Cinematography Commission N. Scurtu
Source: ANIC, fond CC al PCR - Secţia Propagandă şi Agitaţie, dosar nr. 41/1947, 
ff. 1–4.
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DOCUMENT No. 24:
Transcript of CC Romanian Workers’ Party Session regarding  
the Fate of Sovroms [Excerpts]
March 7, 1953
This document elucidates one moment in the exceedingly hard battle fought by 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and his associates to achieve the dissolution of the 
Romanian-Soviet joint enterprises and their reintegration into the Romanian 
economy. The document also illustrates the efforts to put the Sovroms (which 
continued to operate until 1956) on a basis of mutual economic benefit. 
The meeting report from March 7, 1953, in which the passing of Sovroms 
into the ownership of the Romanian state was discussed.
The following party members are present: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, 
Miron Constantinescu,105 Chivu Stoica,106 Alexandru Moghioroş,107 D. 
Coliu108 […]
Miron Constantinescu: Following the recent agreement between the Soviet 
government and the government of the Romanian People’s Republic, it 
was decided that eight Soviet-Romanian enterprises were to become state 
enterprises, meaning that the Soviet part of these companies would be pur-
chased by the Romanian state. These Sovroms are Sovrommetal-Reşiţa,109 
105  Miron Constantinescu (1917–1974). Member of the Central Committee of the Roma-
nian Communist Party (1945–1960 and 1969–1974). Member of the Politburo (1948–
1957); chairman of the Planning Commission (1949–1955); deputy chairman of the 
Council of Ministers (1954–1957).
106  Chivu Stoica (1908–1975). Member of the Central Committee of the Romanian 
Communist Party (October 21, 1945–February 17, 1975). Member of the Politburo 
(1952–1969); chairman of the Council of Ministers (1955–1962); chairman of the State 
Council (1965–1967).
107  Alexandru Moghioroş (Magyarosi) (1911–1969). Member of the Central Committee 
of the Romanian Communist Party (October 21, 1945–December 1968); member of 
the Politburo (1948–1965); deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers (1954–1967).
108  Dumitru Coliu (Dimităr Kolev) (1907–1985). Member of the Central Committee of 
the Romanian Communist Party (1945–1979); candidate of the Politburo (1952–1965); 
member of the Central Committee (1945–1979); candidate/alternate member of the 
Executive Committee of the Central Committee (1965–1969); chief of the State Con-
trol Commission (1960– 1966) and the Party Control Commission (1965–1969).
109  Sovrommetal produced steel, cast iron, railway material, and machine tools. It func-
tioned from July 19, 1949, to the summer of 1953.
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Sovromchim-Ucea,110 Sovromlemn,111 Sovromtractor in Stalin City,112 
Sovromcărbune from the Jiu Valley,113 Anina and Şotânga, Sovromgaz,114 
Sovrombanc,115 and Sovromconstrucţii.116 The following will remain 
Soviet-Romanian enterprises: Sovrompetrol,117 Sovromutilajpetrolifer,118 
Sovromnaval,119 Sovromtransport,120 and T.A.R.S. (Transporturile Aeri-
ene Româno-Sovietice).121The conventions for the written consent of these 
agreements will be signed shortly, but according to an agreement between 
both governments, our government must prepare a gradual succession 
110  Sovromchim produced explosives and a variety of chemicals: colors, varnishes, and 
fertilizers. It was founded on August 19, 1949.
111  Sovromlemn was tasked with exploiting forests, and the primary industrialization of 
wood by producing building timber, especially from coniferous trees. It was founded 
on March 20, 1946.
112  Sovromtractor produced the first Romanian tractors, under the license of the Soviet 
production, by adapting the capacities of the production of the former aircraft plant, 
Industria Aeronautica Romana (IAR). It was founded on August 19, 1949.
113  Sovromcărbune united the main coal mines of Romania while it produced mainly 
brown coal, but also mining hard coal. It was founded on July 4, 1949.
114  Sovromgaz handled the exploitation of the main deposits of natural gas in Roma-
nia and made sure it was transported safely to the industrial beneficiaries and the 
households. It was founded on March 20, 1946.
115  Sovrombanc was a Soviet-Romanian bank. Its portfolio contained all types of bank-
ing operations that were usual at that time, especially those being used to realize the 
clearing between the two states. It was founded on August 14, 1945.
116  Sovromconstrucţii was a gigantic civil and industrial construction monopoly engaged 
ina great variety of constructions, from bridges and streets to grain silos and work-
ers’ housing. It was founded on August 19, 1949.
117  Sovrompetrol exploited the most important oil fields of Romania. It functioned from 
July 17, 1945, to October 22, 1956.
118  Sovromutilajpetrolifer was founded in August 1952 by uniting several Romanian 
enterprises for the manufacture of equipment needed for the production and refin-
ing of petroleum, while it disposed of the capacities of the production in Câmpina, 
Ploiești, Bacău, Târgoviște, Reșița, and Bocșa. It was liquidated in September 1954.
119  Sovromnaval was funded in August 12, 1952, by dismantling from the Sovromcon-
structii the shipyards from Galati, Braila, Constanta and Turnu Severin. Its respon-
sibility was the shipbuilding and repair of riverine and maritime vessels. It was liqui-
dated on September 18, 1954.
120  Sovromtransport was founded on July 19, 1945, by taking over a big part of the 
Romanian fleet, while the ships were taken by the USSR as war trophies for repara-
tions, and later being included as the Soviet contribution for the new company. Its 
task was the transportation of goods and travelers on the Danube and the Black Sea. 
It was liquidated in September 1954.
121  T.A.R.S. (Transporturile Aeriene Româno-Sovietice – Romanian-Soviet Air Trans-
port) was founded in August 8, 1945, and exploited the complete Romanian air fleet, 
as well as the main airports of the country. Likewise, it operated the flights on inter-
national routes. It was liquidated in September 1954.
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of these enterprises. The first urgent matter is the Sovromcărbune enter-
prise. A provision arrived just yesterday, stating that the Soviet engineer 
comrades who are heading these enterprises should hand over their func-
tions to the delegates of our state. In this manner, the Ministry of Coal has 
already sent to Jiu Valley an adjunct minister to ensure reception and to 
Anina and Şotânga two directors were sent. At our request, the time limit 
for staying in our country was extended for two Soviet engineers. I don’t 
think it is my place here to explain in depth the importance of these mea-
sures, and the fact that this represents new assistance given by the Soviet 
Union to our economy’s development.
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej: There are some people who would like to cause 
trouble in such times of change. One must be careful of this fact and 
unmask any attempt to disturb peace. The leaders of these enterprises must 
be in the drawer, in the Regional Bureau’s safe; you must know them by 
name, meet them, talk to them, invite them to the Party’s Regional Bureau, 
give them attention and support them, document them, so that they feel 
that the regional committee is very interested in their factory’s fate. 
Miron Constantinescu: Aside from Soviet-Romanian enterprises, there 
are two more categories of enterprises in our country. Some Soviet enter-
prises that belonged to states at war with the Soviet Union are now under 
the ownership of the Soviet Union, and other enterprises are led by Soviet 
comrades but are former Austrian enterprises, and until the peace [sic] 
treaty [with Austria] is formally concluded, these are not under Soviet 
ownership but led by Soviet comrades. These two categories of enterprises 
will take on a new form soon, namely the Soviet enterprises Teba-Mediaş, 
Sebeş, Adesgo-Bucuresti, and 7 Noiembrie will pass into textile industries, 
those of the Ministry of Light Industry. Regarding the formerly Austrian 
enterprises, an agreement between the two governments—Romanian and 
Soviet—states that these enterprises will further remain under Soviet lead-
ership and Romanian administration. (…) As soon as these two resolutions 
are signed, probably in the month of March, then all the enterprises—be 
they actual Soviet enterprises or enterprises under Soviet control (since the 
peace [sic] treaty with Austria has not been completed)—will pass under 
Romanian administration.
Another issue discussed between the Soviet government and the 
Romanian government is the issue of some Romanian state enterprises 
leased to certain Sovroms. For example, the enterprise Refinery No. 4 
Telejean, some naval shipyards, the Câmpina Refinery, which were part 
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of the Sovrom system, but were under not Sovrom ownership, but Roma-
nian ownership. (…) For those Sovroms passing to the Romanian state, the 
enterprises leased out to them will be returned as state enterprises. For 
those Sovroms that will continue their activity as Soviet-Romanian enter-
prises—Sovrompetrol, Sovromutilajpetrolifer, Sovromnaval, TARS, Sov-
romtransport—in the case of these five Sovroms, the enterprises leased by 
the Romanian state to them will pass into the ownership of the Sovroms, 
meaning that the enterprises will be purchased by the Sovroms. The Roma-
nian side will bring as its contribution half of the respective enterprises’ 
value, and the Soviet side will purchase half of the respective enterprises’ 
value. The leased enterprises are in Sovrompetrol, Sovromtransport, and 
Sovromnaval. Likewise, the port facilities are leased out to Sovromtrans-
port (S.R.T.) Brăila, Galaţi, etc. Their status will be solved by their passing 
to the Romanian state, meaning S.R.T. will utilize them as each and every 
navigation company, and pay their respective transport. Similarly, the port 
facilities bought by the S.R.T. in recent years, either credited as mutual con-
tributions to S.R.T., or bought by S.R.T. with its own funds and which are 
currently present in our country, will be bought by the Romanian state. The 
reason for these measures is to ensure a single administration in the respec-
tive ports. All port facilities in the ports of Galaţi and Brăila will be under a 
single administration. For this reason, the facilities belonging to the S.R.T. 
or leased by the S.R.T. will pass to the Romanian state, and the state will 
lease them according to the tariff rates.
Source: ANIC, fond CC al PCR - Cancelarie, dosar nr. 20/1953, ff. 1–6.
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DOCUMENT No. 25:
Letter by the Archbishop of Szatmár to the Apostolic Nuncio on Soviet 
Deportations from Hungarian Territory
January 25, 1945
The penetration of Soviet forces into the Carpathian Basin enabled the Soviets to 
exploit Hungary’s material and human resources.
Any survey of the deportations from Hungary is made difficult by the fact 
that both the manner of gathering prisoners and the circle of those ordering and 
carrying out the deportation changed by period and by region, as did the com-
position of the victims. On the whole, three forms of Soviet prisoner-gathering 
campaigns may be usefully distinguished. 
Cases described in reminiscences and contemporary documents indicate that 
soon after capturing a given settlement—often within days—the Soviets would 
round up and deport part of the working-age civilian population. 
Deportations sporadically followed the localized battles in the territories 
that belonged to Hungary during World War II and were later annexed by the 
neighboring countries—primarily in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, incorporated by 
the Soviet Union, and its broader region. There were also prisoner-gathering cam-
paigns designed not merely to increase the number of future forced laborers but 
to “pacify” and change the ethnic profile of the given region.
The third type of deportation occurred as part of a campaign that can be 
precisely defined in time and extended to all of Eastern Europe.
According to the directive issued by the State Defense Council on Decem-
ber 16, 1944, deportation and forced labor in the Soviet Union awaited all able-
bodied ethnic German males between the ages of 17 and 45 residing in the terri-
tory of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, as well as 
women of working age between 18 and 30 years old.
This campaign was directed against the ethnic Germans, but most of those 
deported from Hungary as “Germans” did not even speak German as their 
mother tongue, and both the Soviet agents and their Hungarian assistants were 
aware of this. 
The mobilization of the “Germans” commenced in the southern areas of the 
country, in Somogy, Baranya, Békés, and Szatmár counties largely all at once, 
in late December 1944. In general it was the members of the local administra-
tion who had to compile the list of those ordered to appear for “public works” on 
orders from the evacuated NKVD detachment. But the ultimate decision was in 
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the hands of the local NKVD officers, who interpreted German national affilia-
tion in the broadest terms possible. Indeed, alongside the ethnic Germans very 
often Hungarians were also “mobilized.”
The following report by János Scheffler, bishop of Szatmár, describes the 
deportations that occurred in Szatmár County. After 1918 about two-thirds of 
the county’s territory, which previously had belonged only to Hungary, ended up 
in Romania, and a small part in Czechoslovakia. After the Second Vienna Award 
in 1940, the entire county once again became part of Hungary. In the fall of 1944, 
after the region’s occupation by the Soviets, a Romanian and later a provisional 
Soviet military administration was introduced into that part of Szatmár County 
that had previously belonged to Romania. The bishop’s report confirms the prac-
tice, known also from recollections, eyewitness accounts, and other documents, in 
which not only ethnic Germans but also inhabitants who declared themselves to 
be Hungarian were deported en masse from Northern Transylvania. In the eyes 
of the local authorities compiling the deportation lists, belonging to the Catholic 
Church served as evidence of German origin, despite the fact that most Catholics 
were of Hungarian nationality. The partial deportation of the Catholics therefore 
affected the Hungarians significantly. The deportation of part of the ethnic Ger-
man and Hungarian working-age population was in alignment with Romanian 
ambitions aimed at removing and/or weakening the nationalities. 
Your Most Reverend Excellency, Archbishop and Apostolic Nuncio!1
It is with a heavy heart that I inform Your Excellency of the difficult fate 
of my flock of Szatmár County, who have been forcibly uprooted, taken to 
a reception camp in the former Czechoslovak area, or persecuted by the 
Romanian authorities. Perhaps it will be possible for Your Excellency—
1  Angelo Rotta (1872–1965): papal (apostolic) nuncio in Budapest, 1930–1945. During 
World War II he was the dean of the diplomatic corps and a guiding force behind 
the diplomatic campaigns to save the Jews in 1944. After the German occupation 
of Hungary on March 19, 1944, he personally lodged protests on several occasions 
with Hungarian secular and ecclesiastic leaders against the labeling of the Jews, 
the ghettoizations, and the deportations. In his reports he informed the Vatican in 
detail about conditions in Hungary and urged Pius XII to take action. At the time of 
the Arrow Cross regime, he provided thousands of Jews with Vatican letters of safe 
conduct and placed several apartment houses under Vatican protection. On April 4, 
1945, at Soviet insistence, the Allied Control Commission expelled him from Hungary. 
On his activity, see Margit Beke, “Angelo Rotta apostoli nuncius (1930–1945). (Hazai 
források alapján) [Apostolic Nuncio Angelo Rotta (1930–1945). (On the Basis of 
Domestic Sources)], Magyar Egyháztörténeti Évkönyv 1 (1994).
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knowing your kind heart—with the benign influence of the Apostolic Holy 
See to effect some solution.
1. Forced resettlement.
In this region several thousand persons have been registered and 
transported to Russia so that—as the military authorities stated to me 
when I interceded on their behalf—they might work there to repair the 
damages caused by the enemy troops. Even if this can be understood in the 
spirit of retribution, it can hardly be prevented. But even comprehending 
this, it stands in diametrical opposition to justice and fairness that almost 
all of those taken away and to be taken away are recruited from among our 
Latin-rite Catholic faithful. Around the town of Nagykároly [Carei] and 
Erdőd [Ardud], there are approximately 25–30 municipalities that are either 
entirely or mostly Catholic. From these villages and the town of Nagykároly 
itself, those among our faithful of both sexes between the ages of 17 and 45 
have been registered and have either already been taken away or are about 
to be.2 The same holds true for very many, almost exclusively Catholic, Hun-
garians from Szatmár. Others, be they Greek Catholics, Protestants, or 
Jews, are rarely or never taken away.
It is true that those of the aforementioned villages who have been 
taken away or are to be taken away are largely of German origin. But 1) 
they moved to Hungary as early as circa 1711; 2) during this lengthy time, 
as a result of the goodwill of the Hungarian authorities, by force of natu-
ral assimilation and by upbringing, they have become Hungarians both in 
language and soul; 3) most no longer even speak German and have also 
adopted Hungarian names; 4) during the period of Romanian rule (between 
1920 and 1940), the Romanian government [tried] with all its might and 
cunning to force them to take back and re-learn their German language: 
no force, however, was able to make them do this, and for this they had to 
endure cruel suffering—after 1940, when the Romanian government was 
trying eagerly to please triumphant Germany, a department head in the 
2  Resolution No. 7161 of the State Defense Committee of the Soviet Union (December 
16, 1944) decreed the mobilization of the able-bodied German population residing on 
the territory of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia occu-
pied by the Red Army—men between the ages of 17 and 45, women between 18 and 
30 years of age. The internees were meant to be used primarily in restoration work for 
coal mining in the Donets Coal Basin and iron metallurgy. The text of the resolution 
appears in T.V. Volokitina et al., eds., Sovetskii faktor v Vostochnoi Evrope 1944–1953. Vol. 
I, 1944–1948. Dokumenty. (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999), 116–118.
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Ministry of Education, the Greek Catholic priest Zeno Paclişeanu, discussed 
this question in the Romanian Academy, and he reproached the people and 
their priests for not wanting to become Germans again; and now, probably 
at the urging of precisely the Romanians, these same people are punished 
and taken away as Germans; 5) German propaganda tried everything to 
drive these believers into their Volksbund, but without noteworthy result 
in most localities. The members of this association fled with the German 
army; it was the innocent who remained here, and now they are unjustly 
punished as Germans. 
Many—and almost all Catholics—and of Hungarian origin—have 
been taken away from other villages as well. This is what happened to the 
pure Hungarian Catholics of the municipality of Érmindszent, along with 
their Hungarian pastor, László Lengyel. In this entire region there is only a 
single municipality from which Greek Catholics and Protestants have also 
been sent away along with the Catholics: Szaniszló [Sanislău]. 
Many suspect that the returned Jews are also taking part in this activity.
Beyond this, it also seems heartless to take away: 1. women, particu-
larly girls aged 17–20; 2. boys and girls in secondary school who would com-
plete their studies in the current or the next year; 3. mothers who have left 
behind a number of children and some of whom were taken away along 
with their husbands; 4. the sick. Many fall into this latter category.
Among those taken away, thus far there have been nine priests:
Ferenc Melau, parish priest of Nagybánya [Baia Mare] (Diocese of Szat-
már); Fr. Ernő Gruber, Minorite prior of Nagybánya; Ferenc Monostori, 
parish priest of Nagymadarász [Mădăraş]; Fr. Gellért Semptei, Salvato-
rian parish priest of Nagykároly [Carei]; Károly Franczen, parish priest of 
Aporháza; Fr. Elzear Simon, Franciscan chaplain of Csomaköz [Ciumeşti]; 
from the Diocese of Nagyvárad [Oradea].: László Lengyel, parish priest of 
Érmindszent; Antal Baumgartner, curate of Székelyhíd [Săcueni]; and Péter 
Kühne, parish priest of Bodonos [Budoi]. In addition, another four semi-
narians: Lajos Láng, ordinand of Gilvács [Ghilvaci]; János Szeibel, ordinand 
of Gilvács; and novices István Homoki of Vállaj and Károly Barna of Erdőd 
[Ardud].
It would have been desirable for pastors to escort the believers, and—
if the former had not been taken away by force—others would then have 
accompanied them voluntarily. But the number of those taken away is 
greater than is necessary; and it is to be feared that still others will be taken 
away, which would be disastrous for the faithful. Our faithful live in con-
stant terror, and their fear that there will be even more forced removals is 
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not groundless. We may fear that other priests will also be forcibly taken 
away. Indeed, now rumor also has it that young children, too, are also being 
rounded up and taken away.
2. The reception camp.
In the northern part of the diocese, which between 1919 and 1938 
belonged to Czechoslovakia, almost every Hungarian male has been taken 
away and placed in the camp located in the municipality of Szolyva (near 
Munkács). There they have been subjected to inhuman treatment for 
approximately two months, and many are perishing or have already per-
ished from hunger and cold. Their only crime is that they are of Hungar-
ian origin. If only the Apostolic Holy See could intercede on behalf of these 
unfortunate souls!
3. Persecutions by the Romanians:
are nearly everyday occurrences in the ethnically mixed villages. By 
night armed Romanians dressed in military uniforms break into the houses 
of our faithful, terrorize, savagely beat and rob them. And there is no 
redress. The faithful and their pastors complain about this bitterly.
Indeed, in the first days of the Russian occupation, the soldiers of the 
Romanian army, without the slightest reason, rounded up several hundred 
men, took them away and—we hear—are holding them captive. Concern-
ing this I hereby attach the report by Lajos Czumbel, canon of the cathedral 
of Szatmár.
I consider all these things to be communicated to Your Excellency in 
full confidence, with the most humble request that you intercede with the 
competent authorities.
I remain commended to Your Excellency’s esteemed graces and devout 
prayers.
Signature:  János Scheffler3
Source: MNL-OL, XIX-J-1-q, KÜM HDFO. Box 1, 25168/1945. 
3  Dr. János Scheffler (1887–1952) was named bishop of Szatmár County by Pope Pius XII 
in 1942. In January 1945 he spoke out against the deportation of thousands of men 
and women, partly of Swabian origin, by the entering Soviet and Romanian troops. He 
refused to turn against the Vatican despite the pressure of the Romanian government, 
and on March 19, 1952, he was arrested and sent to the prison in Jilava , where he soon 
died from the torture he suffered. In 2011 Pope Benedict XVI beatified him.
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DOCUMENT No. 26:
Letter by the Lord Lieutenant of Szabolcs and Ung Counties  
to the Minister of Interior on the Roundup of Civilians
January 25, 1945
The events linked to the deportation of the “Germans,” as well as the manner in 
which the population was selected, all indicate that the Soviet Interior Ministry 
troops had to assemble contingents of prisoners broken down by territory and 
transport them to the Soviet Union. If the contingent could not be filled with eth-
nic Germans, then Hungarians with German names and finally those with Hun-
garian names were rounded up. On the pretext of rounding up the Germans, an 
especially large number of Hungarians were taken away from Szabolcs County, 
situated in the northeastern part of the country. From the account commissioned 
by the lord lieutenant (főispán) of the county, we gain an accurate and reliable 
picture of how the deportation took place in a given region. It was the terrorized 
leaders of the settlements who had to compile the list of the working-age men 
and women. The rounding-up of a part of the civilian population took place on the 
basis of the prepared lists.
The document also reveals that the Soviet units themselves took part 
directly in the deportation of the working-age “Germans.” Nor were pregnant 
mothers spared. Moreover, the document shows that the local representatives of 
the Hungarian administration, which was at the mercy of the occupying authori-
ties, and the county leaders watched the deportations taking place in their settle-
ments in complete disbelief and confusion. 
The chief constable of the lower district of Dada in his report today 
informed me that in the localities of the lower district of Dada beyond the 
Tisza, there appeared a Soviet lieutenant with a team of about six men in 
the municipality of Tiszatardos, summoning the magistrates of the munici-
palities of the Taktaköz area, and ordered the registration of men and 
women between the ages of 16 and 65.
On January 22 the chief constable of the district went over to Tiszatar-
dos, where he sought out the aforementioned commander. The latter dis-
closed to him in confidence that he was the representative of the secret ser-
vice and that his authority extended to the territory of the entire county and 
also disclosed that he would brief the chief constable the next day about the 
purpose of his coming and what he had seen. This briefing did not take place.
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In the meantime the notary of Rakamaz municipality personally 
reported yesterday that the Russian military unit that appeared in the 
municipality had registered and rounded up 830 individuals, some men and 
some women. Likewise, yesterday I received a report from the municipal-
ity of Tímár to the effect that 120 individuals, likewise a mix of men and 
women, were assembled there. Finally, this morning, the organizer of the 
National Peasant Party, Barna Kovács, who was staying in the Taktaköz 
area, sought me out and reported that from the municipalities of Tisza-
ladány, Báj, Tardos, and Csobaj, around 100 individuals each,  between 
the ages of 15 and 48, were likewise registered and rounded up, including 
expectant mothers and those with small children as well.
The lord lieutenant and government commissioner, Dr. János Erőss,4 
who was entrusted with handling these matters, is currently in Ungvár and 
Szolyva on official business and therefore is unable to take action in this 
matter.
4  János Erőss (1889–1962): Smallholder politician. During World War II he took part 
in the anti-fascist resistance. After October 31, 1944, the Soviet authorities assigned 
him to temporarily oversee the duties of Lord Lieutenant of Szabolcs County. From 
December 19, 1944, to early May 1945, he was chairman of the Szabolcs County 
National Committee. On December 19, 1944, he was chosen to be a deputy in the Pro-
visional National Assembly. From January 4 to October 27, 1945, he served as lord 
lieutenant (főispán) of Szabolcs and Ung counties and later (January 27–late April, 
1945) of the temporarily united Szatmár, Bereg, and Ugocsa counties. From August 
11, 1945, on, he was chairman of the SHP organization in Szabolcs County; beginning 
on August 20 he was a member of the national executive committee. From Novem-
ber 4, 1945, on he was a deputy in the National Assembly and later Parliament for the 
Szabolcs and Szatmár-Bereg County electoral districts. From December 1945 to March 
1946, he was national party director. From February 23 to November 20, 1946, he 
occupied the post of chairman of the Reparations Office, while on April 18, 1946, he 
received the title of state under-secretary. From November 20, 1946, to September 24, 
1947, he was minister for public supplies in the governments of Ferenc Nagy and Lajos 
Dinnyés. In 1946–1947 he was a board member of the National Center of Consumer 
Cooperatives. After the leftist turn that took place in the Smallholder leadership in 
early June 1947, he turned against the Dobi-Gyöngyösi wing and became one of the 
leaders of the right wing. After March 1948 he withdrew from political life, then ille-
gally departed for Italy, for which the SHP Political Committee expelled him from the 
party at its  April 15, 1948, session. On November 17, 1948, his mandate was officially 
terminated as well. In May 1948 he traveled to the United States. In the spring of 1955, 
he became a member of the Hungarian National Committee, but he did not take part 
in émigré politics. In the early 1950s he was editor of Amerikai Magyarság and later, for 
a long time, a part-owner of the paper. 
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Under the circumstances, I feel it is my duty to report urgently what 
has been observed and to request, for the sake of the population of Szabolcs 
County, the Interior Minister’s immediate and effective assistance, if pos-
sible.
Finally I also report that this campaign does not and cannot bear any 
relation to the round-up of the population of German origin. For although, 
in the aforementioned municipalities, very many in the population in 
Rakamaz have German names, who nevertheless, settled in the area cen-
turies ago, in the other municipalities German family names are quite rare, 
and almost all those rounded up also have Hungarian names, and thus that 
they belong to the Hungarian race cannot even be called into doubt.
Signature: [notary]
Source: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-q, KÜM HDFO. Box 2, 25450/1945.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 27:
Letter to the Foreign Ministry on Behalf of an Individual  
Deported by the Soviets
Undated [1945]
Immediately after World War II, various Jewish organizations in Hungary put the 
number of Hungarian Jews who ended up in Soviet captivity at 20,000–30,000.
Beginning in 1939, the Jews in Hungary were not allowed to perform armed 
service; thus they ended up being transported to the Eastern Front as forced labor-
ers or as conscripts into labor batallions. The overwhelming majority of Hungarian 
Jews who fell into Soviet captivity did so as members of labor batallions, the bulk 
of them in 1943. At the same time, in the “Keressük” [We Are Seeking] columns of 
newspapers after the war, numerous people inquired about family members who 
had left concentration camps for home but had fallen into Soviet captivity on the 
way. In the contemporary press, accounts also appeared stating that numerous 
Hungarian Jews had been transported from the concentration camp directly to the 
Soviet Union. The following letter, written to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, also 
demonstrates that many of the inmates liberated at Auschwitz were treated by the 
liberators as prisoners and taken to the Soviet Union. In Soviet captivity they were 
treated the same way as the actual prisoners of war. They performed forced labor, 
and their brigade leader was often a German prisoner of war.
I, the undersigned Kálmán Bárdi, resident at 17 Szövetség Street, VII Dis-
trict, myself a deportee, a member of the Social Democratic Party and a 
master engraver, turn to you with the humble request that you kindly inter-
cede in the matter of my son’s return home.
My son Tamás Bárdi is 22 years old and ended up in the death camp at 
Auschwitz as a deportee in a labor brigade. From there he escaped, and the 
Russians took him out of the country along with 480 Hungarian Jews. On 
April 1 this transport was heading via Katowice and Krakow towards Czer-
nowitz (Chernivtsi).
My son suffered greatly in the Auschwitz death camp, because he was 
assigned to a group and was the only one in the group to escape.
Repeating my request, I remain
Most humbly,
Signed: Kálmán Bárdi 
Source: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-q, KÜM HDFO. Box 56, 28256/1945.
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DOCUMENT No. 28:
Letter to the Foreign Ministry regarding the Soviet Deportation  
of Civilians
Undated [1945]
Surveying the deportations is made difficult by the fact that the manner of gath-
ering prisoners, the circle of those ordering and carrying out the deportation, 
and the composition of the victims all changed depending on the period and the 
region. In numerous settlements the various waves of prisoner round-ups struck 
not consecutively but all at once.
It was a general practice that, following the occupation of a large local-
ity, some of the working-age male population were dragged from their homes 
and arrested or ordered to appear for public work. After completing the work, 
or instead of it, the rounded-up prisoners were marched to reception camps in 
Hungary, and from there they were transported to camps in the Soviet Union. 
The largest number of civilians was deported from Budapest. After each street 
and block was taken, a round-up of the apparently able-bodied men taking cover 
in the shelters immediately commenced. The arrests and deportations contin-
ued after the occupation of the city as well. Between December 1944 and April 
1945, the number of those taken away from the capital based on various Soviet 
military reports may be put at 50,000–100,000 persons. Parallel to the prisoner-
gathering campaign linked to military operations, the deportation of the ethnic 
“Germans” proceeded in Budapest and its vicinity, including Pestszenterzsébet. 
Thousands of men and women living in Budapest and in the settlements near the 
capital ended up in “military captivity.” Among those deported were many boys 
and girls under the age of 18 as well. From the accounts and the lists of deportees, 
it may be concluded that in Budapest and its environs, as in numerous other set-
tlements in the country, the Soviet authorities regarded those who had German 
or German-sounding names to be of German descent. 
After the war, on the governmental level it was the Hungarian Foreign Min-
istry and its War Prisoners Department, which were in contact with the Soviet 
government and its representatives in Hungary that dealt with the deportees’ 
cases and promoted their repatriation. The relatives of the deportees turned to 
the Foreign Ministry in hundreds of thousands of petitions and letters, recount-
ing the circumstances of the deportations and requesting help in initiating 
repatriations. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry requested from the Soviet gov-
ernment the return of deportees mentioned in the received petitions and letters 
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as a rule in notes verbales. In practice, the Hungarian government was unable 
to accelerate the process of returning the prisoners; the fate of the deportees 
depended exclusively on the Soviet leadership. The hundreds of thousands of peti-
tions and eyewitness accounts coming in to the War Prisoners Department, how-
ever, are unique historical sources on the prisoner-gathering campaigns carried 
out by the Soviet troops. The following letter reports on a deportation affecting 
more than 2,000 people carried out in Pestszenterzsébet, located near Buda-
pest and today a part of the capital. The truth of the mass deportation is also 
confirmed by several hundred other accounts arriving from the settlement. The 
description reveals that Hungarian “police” appointed by the Soviet occupying 
authorities also took part in rounding up the “Germans.” Round-up campaigns 
of similar scope took place in Sashalom, Érd, Rákosszentmihály, Pestszentímre, 
Pestszentlőrinc, and Soroksár, all likewise located near Budapest. 
I, the undersigned, take the liberty of turning to the Hungarian Foreign 
Ministry with my request below. On January 14 of this year in Pestszenter-
zsébet, 2,100 civilian inhabitants, among them those listed on the reverse, 
together with my husband were rounded up by the local deputies wearing 
armbands, allegedly because of their foreign-sounding names. Then on 
January 30 they were placed in railroad cars at the upper train station in 
Kőbánya.
I ask that you inquire where our loved ones have been sent; we would 
like to know their fate, we would like to be reassured of their situation. I 
take the liberty of hoping for your goodwill, to reassure the greatly suffer-
ing mothers, wives, and children of the situation of the family breadwinner, 
brother, father.
Repeating my request, also on behalf of those listed on the reverse, I 
remain
Respectfully yours,
Signed: Mrs. János Polauer
Source: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-q, KÜM HDFO. Box 91, 142932/1945.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 29:
Report to the Sixth Hungarian Army Headquarters on Soviet Deportations
May 24, 1945
The number of Hungarian soldiers who fell into Soviet captivity in Hungary 
and, because of the general retreat, in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia 
may be put at 350,000. The transport of the prisoners in reception camps to the 
Soviet Union lasted from the beginning of 1945 to the end of the summer. As a 
rule the prisoners were rounded up on the pretext of various misleading measures 
(e.g., public work). While being loaded onto railway cars and transported, they 
learned, to their astonishment, that what awaited them was not work in Hun-
gary but a Soviet forced labor camp. Military captivity particularly embittered 
those soldiers who had been armed and voluntarily surrendered because they 
believed the promise in Soviet leaflets that, if they did so, they would be permit-
ted to leave freely at war’s end.
While being transported, the prisoners were able to give word of their fate 
on slips thrown out of the wagons. Those who found these signs of life (often rail-
way workers) forwarded them to the relatives. Because of the important and con-
fidential information they disclosed, the two letters below were handed over to 
the Sixth Hungarian Army District Command in Debrecen by employees of the 
Hungarian State Railways. The Ministry of Defense sent the text on the slips, 
now typed out, to the War Prisoner Department of the Foreign Ministry for pur-
poses of information and taking further action. The attached cover letter also 
reports on how the prisoners were loaded on cars and transported.
I report that the attached letter received from prisoners was handed in by 
the traffic manager’s officer of the MÁV (Hungarian State Railways) station 
in Karcag. The station master recounted how the Hungarian prisoners of 
war, transported in locked wagons, were beaten with rifle butts by the Rus-
sian soldiers in the station as well, and it was not permitted to give water 
to the thirsty soldiers either. I forward the two attached letters for possible 
further action.
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Annex I.
HUNGARIANS!
Inform everyone, including the Hungarian government, that 12,000 Hun-
garian soldiers and officers are being taken out of the country to Russia. 
Behind us several hundred thousand more Hungarian prisoners of war are 
being sent on their way thus, so that your sons, husbands, and brothers 
might never return. We gave ourselves up voluntarily because we did not 
want to fight for Germany, and now, instead of our promised return home, 
we are being dragged off to Russia as “prisoners of war” after the armistice 
(we departed from the camp in Bratislava on May 17). Pass this news on to 
everyone and do not resign yourselves to it, for our sake and your own!—
Imprisoned Hungarian soldiers are being taken in locked railway carriages.
Direction at present is the Romanian town of Focşani.




I ask whoever finds these lines to inform Mrs. Gyula Zayzon, resident of 
Sepsibodok, that Zolti is alive and probably being taken through Romania. 
If possible, I will give a sign that I’m alive. From the camp at Bratislava, 
10,000 enlisted men and 250 officers are now being taken to an unknown 
location, most likely without the knowledge of the Hungarian government. 
These facts may not be written via the post; if you inform her on a postcard, 
write only what I have underlined with a double line.
Signature: [unsigned]
Source: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-q-136352/1945 (Box 70).
K
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DOCUMENT No. 30:
Note regarding Soviet Removal of United Incandescent  
Bulb and Electrical Company
June 22, 1945 
As in Germany and Austria, the arbitrary dismantling of industrial plants not 
only caused enormous damage to the local economy but also impeded produc-
tion needed for reparations. In certain cases the occupying Soviet authorities 
could not be stopped from appropriating certain factories, even when the Hun-
garian government pointed out that the plants were producing articles intended 
as reparations for the Soviet Union. A case in point was the Hungarian State 
Iron, Steel, and Machine Works (Magyar Vas-, Acél- és Gépgyárak) in Miskolc, 
which manufactured locomotives and other machinery intended for the Soviet 
Union. Neither this nor the Hungarian government’s repeated diplomatic efforts, 
nor the fact that the factory’s workers were communists was enough to spare it 
from the depredations of the Soviet trophy brigade. The dismantling of the fac-
tory’s equipment put 5,000 workers out on the street. The dismantling had been 
started by the Germans but was continued by the Soviets. The Soviets took away, 
to a lesser or greater extent, some 100 factories. These included the pride of Hun-
garian industry, the United Incandescent Bulb, known as Tungsram. Tungsram 
was owned in part by American interests. Its dismantlement began on March 
28, 1945, under the direction of Soviet general Galdin. It took eight weeks to ship 
the 600–700 wagons of equipment and goods. Fully 96 percent of the factory’s 
production capacity and half of its light bulb inventory were carried off. Three-
quarters of the raw material supplies of the factory in Újpest and 90 percent of 
the raw materials and supply of unfinished goods from the warehouses in Tárnok 
were loaded onto the wagons bound for the Soviet Union. The total value of the 
materials thus plundered was estimated at 11–12 million dollars, that is, nearly 
six percent of Hungary’s reparations obligation. Despite the Hungarian govern-
ment’s repeated requests, Moscow was unwilling to include this as part of the 
reparations payment. The American government sent four notes to the Soviet 
Union regarding the Tungsram case but did not receive a single response. At the 
intervention of General William S. Key, the U.S. representative on the ACC, the 
Soviets at first gave an evasive answer. Later on, however, they were forced to 
acknowledge that Tungsram was not included on the reparations list but had 
been acquired as a war trophy, since it possessed materials that the Soviet High 
Command badly needed. What happened to Tungsram was not an isolated inci-
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dent, and for this reason in June 1945 the Hungarian government asked the ACC 
to halt the dismantling and shipment of the equipment of the factories and other 
production units. The Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that 
the dismantling of industrial objects was causing serious burdens for the econ-
omy. Therefore the Hungarian government demanded in the strongest possible 
terms that the Soviet army forbid the dismantling and/or shipment of indus-
trial plants, finished products, raw materials, and other products not included 
in the reparations agreement. It also asked that the Soviet Union return those 
goods that it had removed but that, on the basis of international law, could not 
be regarded as war booty and did not count as reparations. Since the government 
received no reply, Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy personally sought out Voroshilov 
to reiterate the above request, but to no avail.
We do not have even an approximate picture of the equipment and inven-
tories that the Soviets dismantled and shipped in part or in whole as war booty. 
These included, for instance, Felten and Guillaume Cable and Wire Ltd. Its value 
was estimated at 6 million dollars, and its dismantling impeded the fulfillment 
of reparations shipments. Of the more significant representatives of Hungarian 
industry, a similar fate befell the Hungarian Optical Works (Magyar Optikai 
Művek), Goldberg and Son Textile Works (Goldberg és Fia Textilgyár), Ganz and 
Associate (Ganz és Társa), the Danubian Aircraft Works (Dunai Repülőgépgyár), 
the Hungarian Precision Mechanical Works (Magyar Finommechanikai Művek), 
and the Manfréd Weiss Canning Plant (Weiss Manfréd Konzervgyár). Part of the 
latter’s equipment had been carted off by the Germans in 1944, but they did not 
have time to take it out of the country. The wagons, laden with machinery, were 
left abandoned on the tracks and ended up in the hands of the Soviets. However, 
they allowed the valuable but uncovered equipment to continue to rust. Three 
hundred Soviet soldiers and 50 workers loaded the 1,200 tons of equipment of 
the country’s largest paper factory, Neményi. There were factories that, although 
not dismantled, had their inventories shipped away. These included the Hofherr 
and Schrantz Hungarian Wagon and Machine Factory Co. Often the Hungarian 
government only learned that a factory had been dismantled after the fact, when 
nothing could be done about it. In 1950 there were still 220 Hungarian locomo-
tives originally removed by such detachments located on Czechoslovak territory. 
Obviously, it is impossible to calculate the total damage the arbitrary actions of 
the Soviet occupying troops may have caused. To mention only one case of many, 
by March 1947 Soviet troops had removed from the forest economy wood materi-
als valued at some 62.5 million forints.
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The last member of the Russian military committee dismantling our factory 
departed from our plant on the eighth of this month. At this time we wish 
to provide a brief overview.5 
Our plant in Újpest was included on the list, dated February 15, that 
the Hungarian government received from the Russians concerning those 
services that the Russians desired as reparations. We learned of this only in 
the last third of March.
Starting from the Russian entry [into Hungary], we manufactured 
radio tubes for the Russians right up until March 28. Our Russian com-
mander at that time and his superiors—including two generals—demanded 
the production of greater and greater quantities up until the very last min-
ute, assuring us that for their part no obstacle of any kind would be placed 
in our way. 
On March 28 our Russian military commander at that time introduced 
Colonel Galdin and a lot of officers by saying that they had come on a spe-
cial mission.
Colonel Galdin declared that on orders from above, he would dismantle 
and ship our factory. He would assume command over the factory immedi-
ately and with a few hundred soldiers would occupy the factory at once. He 
asked the factory management to make experts available for professionally 
dismantling and packing up the factory. He promised that a list would be 
compiled of every object, and at the same time we, too, could prepare a list 
of the objects handed over, based on which the accounts would be settled. 
A couple of days later Colonel Galdin arranged a meeting at which 
one of the members of the Control Commission—an accountant [named] 
Sobow—also participated. At this time they stipulated a form with 25 head-
ings for itemizing the objects taken away; the headings referred to the 
percentage of wear, the value of each item, and their worth as recorded 
on the balance sheet, etc. Regarding wear and tear and obsolescence, the 
instructions were that our experts would agree with the Russian officers 
dismantling [the plant], and if they could not come to an agreement, then 
the higher authorities would decide. We were told that the valuation of the 
objects would be in 1938 prices and either in pengős or dollars, whichever 
we preferred. 
5  For the history of the United Incandescent Bulb Company after World War II, see Ákos 
Koroknai, ed., A Tungsram Rt. története 1896–1996 [The History of Tungsram Rt., 1896–
1996] (Aschner Lipót Alapítvány, 2004), 67–69.
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The dismantlement lasted eight weeks and the objects removed were 
shipped in 600–700 railroad cars. Removed were:
1)  96 percent of our equipment in Újpest
2)  50 percent of our light bulb stock
3)  75 percent of our stock of raw materials 
4)  100 percent of the 130 crates of lamps stored in our relocated ware-
house in Tárnok
5)  90 percent of our stock of raw materials and semi-finished goods 
relocated to Tárnok
6)  100 percent of our krypton gas factory in Ajka
7)  approx. 25,000 radio tubes.
(On the last item, we note that already under our former commander, 
approx. three-quarters of our radio tube stock, approx. 300,000, and more 
than 1 million light bulbs were taken away on behalf of the trophy detach-
ment. Moreover, the entire stock of radio tubes—more than 100,000—in 
our office in the city was removed: Budapest, VI District, 11 Eötvös Street).
The Russians looked over our lists of the items dismantled or shipped 
off by the Galdin group. Colonel Galdin revised the lists mainly along two 
lines: with regard to the quantity and specification of the machines and 
goods shipped off, and with respect to the percentage of wear. Mr. Galdin 
announced that we would sign the lists jointly, should we agree on the 
above-mentioned items; if there was no agreement, his list and our list 
would go out separately. At the time the lists were handed over, Mr. Galdin 
stated that with regard to certain percentages of wear, he did not know for 
sure whether his men had reached an agreement with our men (the offi-
cers in question had departed in the meantime), and therefore Mr. Galdin 
said that his signature would not apply to wear but only to the quantity 
and specification of the objects received. In accordance with his wish, we 
divided the papers filled out and signed by us into four groups: 
Group 1 consisted of those items for which we agreed with respect 
to the quantity and specification of the removed objects. In this group we 
recorded the removed light bulbs in a quantity of 3,860,000, after we had 
accepted the Russian figure, even though according to our records approxi-
mately 4,200,000 were removed.
Group 2 consisted of those machines, raw materials, semi-finished 
products, and finished products that in our opinion the Russians had taken 
away, but which they either claimed not to have taken away, or whose quan-
tity they could not verify because, at the time of shipment, they had not 
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weighed or counted the removed objects. The latter applied to raw materi-
als, diamonds necessary for wire-drawing, tools, and fluorescent tubes and 
their spare parts, as well as the auxiliary machines housed in the workshops 
and machine depots of the plant. Galdin and his men promised that pre-
cisely what kinds and quantities of raw material and semi-finished products 
had arrived would be established, and we would receive a precise list of this 
from Moscow. We assume that this promise would apply to those machines 
that according to us had been shipped but which did not appear on the Rus-
sian list. Regarding the tools, Mr. Galdin promised that he would state from 
Moscow the percentage that we could add to the value of the equipment 
because of the removed tools. In their view it is not customary to record 
the number of tools on a separate list; the Russian procedure is instead to 
determine what percentage in a similar factory would correspond to the 
tools, and it is this percentage they would pay, without regard to whether 
more or fewer tools were shipped from our factory.
To Group 3 belonged our warehouse in Tárnok. Although a precise Rus-
sian list of the machines in Tárnok was also prepared, Mr. Galdin neverthe-
less did not want to sign the list we had prepared, because the Russian offi-
cer in question had already departed with the Russian list. The same thing 
that applies to the raw materials in Újpest mentioned in Group 2 applies to 
the raw materials removed from Tárnok.
The krypton gas factory in Ajka belongs to Group 4.
A summary specification of goods was prepared for each group. Mr. 
Galdin signed the specifications for Groups 1 and 4 with the text: “I certify 
that the specification and quantity of the equipment removed tallies with 
the list compiled by me regarding this. Colonel Galdin.” We enclose here 
a selection of these consignments; the relevant several hundred pages of 
details are available to the Ministry.
The value of the objects removed—calculated in 1938 prices—is 
approx. 12 million dollars.
As can be seen from the above, throughout the dismantling, not for a 
minute did we have reason to doubt that the removed goods would count 
towards reparations, and thus it is understandable how surprised we were 
by their notification that the Russians are of a different opinion in this 
regard. We hope that the Hungarian government will be able to arrange for 
this great value to be included in the reparations.
Most respectfully,
MNL-OL KÜM SZU TÜK XIX-J-1-j IV-536 (Box 30.)
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DOCUMENT No. 31:
Memorandum by the Allied Control Commission regarding Provisions  
for the Red Army for the Fourth Quarter of 1945
Undated [1945]
The Soviet Union placed on Hungary the onus of fully provisioning the occupy-
ing Red Army, the total number of whom was kept strictly confidential from 
the Hungarian authorities. Hungary had to feed the occupying army, supply it 
with industrial goods and utility services (water, gas, and electricity), provide 
railway transportation, and make telecommunication devices available. The 
Hungarian treasury also had to take care of the Soviet soldiers’ pay as well. All 
this took place despite the fact that Article 11 of the Armistice Agreement obli-
gated Hungary to supply only the Allied (Soviet) High Command as well as the 
Allied missions operating within the ACC; thus supplying the occupying Soviet 
army could not have been stipulated legally. In his 1945 memorandum prepared 
for the ACC, Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi wrote that supplying the Red 
Army had almost exhausted Hungarian food reserves. The value of the food-
stuffs made available to the Soviet armed forces during the months of April, 
May, and June reached one-and-a-half billion pengős. In the second, third, and 
fourth quarters of 1945, 64,500 tons of flour, 23,000 tons of beef, 91,000 tons 
of oats, and 175,000 tons of hay were earmarked for the Soviet army, which 
would have severely disrupted public supply even if the Soviets had been willing 
to pay for it; there was never, however, any question of this. And this is not to 
mention the 52 tons of candy for the “non-smokers,” 25,000 zinc-coated buck-
ets, sour cream, cottage cheese, milk, sugar, matches, tobacco, ground pepper, 
and other products featured on a Soviet wish list for a three-month period. For 
the last quarter of this same year, the Soviets also demanded 40,000 tons of 
coal and 25,000 cubic meters of wood, even though there were grave shortages 
of both. According to a contemporary estimate by the Ministry of Finance, in 
the one year following April 1945, the Hungarian state spent a sum equivalent 
to 13,489.7 kilograms of 14-carat gold on reparations payments, and 4,089.3 
kilograms on supplying the Red Army. To this was added a sum equaling 2,028 
kilograms of identical-weight gold used by the Allied Control Commission. We 
can form a more accurate picture of the expenses of the Red Army in the period 
between August 1946 and September 1947, when, according to a balance sheet 
prepared by the Ministry of Finance, the Hungarian state paid out 511.295 mil-
lion forints for supplying the Soviet army. Of this, industrial supplies cost some 
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48.3 million forints, food provisions 97.2 million forints, public subsidies pro-
vided in connection with quartering the Red Army 5.8 million forints, transpor-
tation 200.3 million forints, telecommunications services 40.3 million forints, 
and the cash supply for the Soviet army occupying Hungary 119 million forints. 
Given that the total number of Soviet armed forces stationed in Hungary was 
reduced from the previous period, it may be presumed that between April 1945 
and August 1946, the Hungarian budget spent proportionately at least this 
amount (16 times 37.8 million, the monthly average of the aforementioned 
511 million forints). In other words, the cost of maintaining the Red Army in 
essence doubled the officially established reparations obligation per annum in 
this period.
The Allied Control Commission in Hungary under number 1.041 disclosed 
the list of foodstuffs demanded for provisioning the units of the Red Army 
located in the territory of Hungary for the fourth quarter of 1945.
The quantities demanded for the fourth quarter substantially exceed the 
quantities delivered in the previous two quarters. Regarding this, Rus-
sian officials made statements to the effect that in the more important 
foodstuffs, not only the fourth-quarter supply but the needs for the entire 
financial year, until July 1, 1946, have been indicated. (Unlike the previ-
ous practice, however, the demanded quantities have not been broken 
down by the Russians monthly; instead they demand their immediate 
 collection.)
In connection with the demands, the following must be made clear:
a.)  In the area of the more important foodstuffs, fulfillment of the 
demanded quantities—irrespective of the date of the collection—
will completely upset domestic supply and will represent serious 
obstacles to agricultural production (mainly bread-cereals, corn, 
legumes, rough fodder, and livestock).
b.)  Irrespective of the quantity issues mentioned in Point A, immedi-
ate collection in certain foodstuffs can hardly be carried out, since 
it is possible to fulfill some of them only from the spring harvest 
(mainly rough fodder and potatoes). This same difficulty appears in 
corn as well, where in the autumn months we are unable to deliver 
the demanded 30,000 tons of corn, and thus in the best case, only 
in the early spring months can there be any question of fulfilling 
this.
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Regarding certain more important foodstuffs, the following must also be 
mentioned:
I. Flour
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 28,500 tons
  3rd quarter: 13,000 "
  4th quarter: 29,000 "
The demanded quantity of flour, taking into account that 15 percent of it 
can be fulfilled in corn fltour, equals approx. 30,000 tons of wheat, which 
is approximately sufficient for the supply needs of Greater Budapest for 
three months. Of the compulsory deliveries of bread-cereals—amounting 
to 100,000 tons—together with the quantity collected for reparations and 
waived, approx. 54,000 tons have been delivered to date. Thus the remain-
ing approx. 46,000 tons upon fulfillment would have to be used largely for 
supplying the Red Army, and domestic supply would remain unsolved. As 
things stand, we are forced to allocate the mill dues largely for the local 
supply of the counties, while in our opinion it is not really possible to base 
domestic supply on the quantities to be expected in grain levies and from 
the exchange of industrial goods.
II. Legumes, hulled products, pasta
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 8,760 tons
  3rd quarter: 4,000 "
  4th quarter: 20,000 "
The demanded quantity of 20,000 tons according to [the] memorandum 
may be fulfilled in legumes, hulled products, and kinds of pasta. Since, 
because of the cereal situation previously reviewed, we were able to deliver 
only a very small quantity of pasta, it would be possible to fulfill the larger 
share of the demands in beans, peas, lentils, pearl-barley, and millet-pap.
In proportion to the yields, the following solution may be proposed:




The solution is only theoretical because, based on the known supply and 
that obtainable under the current system, their fulfillment can only be 
solved in part because of their minute quantities. 
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III. Grain fodder (oats and corn)
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 34,000 tons
  3rd quarter: 20,000 "
  4th quarter: 37,000 "
Of the above quantity, 30,000 tons of corn and 7,000 tons of oats are 
requested for delivery. The delivery of corn in the autumn months—due 
to the lack of drying plants—can hardly be arranged; during the spring 
months, however, continuous delivery can be undertaken. In the same way 
we can largely deliver continuously the demanded quantity of oats until 
year’s end.
IV. Potatoes, vegetables  Of this, potatoes:
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 48,000 tons 24,000 tons
  3rd quarter: 37,000 " 18,500 "
  4th quarter: 94,300 " 56,580 "
Delivery of the above quantity of potatoes in the autumn months is incon-
ceivable. In the opinion of experts, the potato surplus that can be placed on 
the market may be put at 60,000 tons, which is hardly sufficient for supply-
ing the capital and industrial regions for the winter. Thus, if the deliveries 
are guaranteed, domestic supply would completely break down. We expect 
to be able to deliver the smaller proportion of the potatoes in the spring 
months.
We will deliver some of the vegetables in dried or canned form already 
in the winter months, if all the coal, sugar, and salt promised by the Rus-
sians are delivered. We will be able to deliver fresh vegetables in larger 
quantities only during the spring months, within the bounds of possibility.
V. Rough fodder
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 50,000 tons
  3rd quarter: 50,000 "
  4th quarter: 74,520 "
   8,652 "
Delivery of the demanded quantity of hay is hardly conceivable, since 
according to the unanimous reports of the commissioners of the Ministry 
of Public Supply, fulfillment of the third-quarter quota itself encountered 
the greatest difficulties. In the best case, one-third of it could be delivered 
in part only from the first spring reaping.
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VI. Milk and dairy products
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 2,069 tons
  3rd quarter: 2,400 "
  4th quarter: 2,390 "
Of the third-quarter quota, we were able to fulfill only 691 tons, and we 
cannot undertake more than this in the fourth quarter either, since the 
demand amounts to more than one-third of the country’s entire milk pro-
duction (200,000 liters per day).
VII. Livestock
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 9,400 tons
  3rd quarter: 6,000 "
  4th quarter: 7,645 "
Our cattle stock may be estimated at some 850,000 head. The fourth-quar-
ter demand of the Red Army corresponds to approx. 50,000 head of cattle 
with an average weight of 300 kilograms. Since the fall of 1944, according to 
the counties’ data, the Red Army has received some 200,000 head of cattle, 
so, along with the present demand, the resulting 250,000 head represents a 
29 percent decrease in the stock. By contrast, in peacetime farming a maxi-
mum of 20 percent can be taken out without endangering breeding and 
production. Regardless of the question of quantity, we must by all means 
request postponement of the requisitions until completion of the autumn 
ploughing, since, according to the data of the Agricultural Ministry, with 
the draught animal power available to agriculture, some 3.7 million cadas-
tral yokes can be cultivated, meaning one-third of our arable land. A reduc-
tion in that, therefore, would cause the paralysis of production. 
VIII. Animal and plant fats
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 2,800 tons
  3rd quarter: 1,700 "
  4th quarter: 1,985 "
Fulfillment of the deliveries, both in fat and in plant oil, places a very great 
difficulty on the Ministry of Public Supply. Our usable stock of pigs for the 
most part must be applied to reparations deliveries, and thus providing the 
demanded quantity of fat would only be possible from private slaughtering. 
The prospective quantity of this during the entire slaughter season may be 
put at some 2,000 tons, which is not even sufficient to provide for labor-
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ers performing heavy physical work. The surrender of a part of our oil-seed 
harvest when it comes to providing oil to the industrial workforce repre-
sents a similar-sized deficit as well.
IX. Eggs
 Quota: 2nd quarter: 87 crates
  3rd quarter: 130 "
  4th quarter: 146 "
There are no major difficulties in delivering the demanded quantity of eggs, 
and indeed, that quantity could be increased two to three times as compen-
sation for other foodstuffs.
Source: MNL OL XIX-J-1-j SZU TÜK IV-483/1-1945 (Box 24.) 
K
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DOCUMENT No. 32:
The Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s Note Verbale to the ACC and Georgii 
Pushkin, the Soviet Representative in Hungary6
July 9, 1945
In the aftermath of World War II, the repatriation of those deported to the Soviet 
Union was one of the key issues for Hungarian society. Beginning in the spring of 
1945, the Hungarian government several times raised the question of releasing and 
sending back the prisoners of war and civilian internees with the Soviet side. In the 
spring and summer of 1945, the Foreign Ministry besieged the Allied Control Com-
mission with hundreds of notes verbales in support of bringing the civilians back 
home. Generally, the Soviet side did not even reply to the various requests. 
After the conclusion of military operations, in Central Europe several mil-
lion prisoners of war and civilians were crowded together in the reception and 
transit camps in the territory of the former fronts. Their transport to the Soviet 
Union proceeded slowly. During the months spent in the reception camps, the 
prisoners became weak and fell ill, and typhus epidemics were also common. 
In June 1945 the State Defense Committee decided that those prisoners who 
had become incapable of work would not be transported to the Soviet Union 
but instead set free. The decision, which also served propaganda purposes, was 
explained by the Soviets on humanitarian grounds, emphasizing that the Soviet 
Union would repatriate every prisoner of war prior to the signing of the peace 
treaty. According to Soviet sources, at this time some 25,000 Hungarian pris-
oners were released. In the note verbale below, the Hungarian Foreign Minis-
try welcomes and expresses its gratitude for the Soviet decision but at the same 
time asks the Allied Control Commission that the rest of the Hungarian civilians 
still in captivity but not yet dispatched also be released. Hungarian government 
organs naively assumed that it was only the abitrary actions of certain camp 
commanders that were delaying repatriation. In reality this was not the case. 
The State Defense Council and later the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union 
6  Georgii Maksimovich Pushkin (1909–1963): Soviet diplomat. From 1937 on, he worked 
in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. From 1942 to 
1944, he was chief consul in China. From 1945 on, he was political commissioner 
alongside the Allied Control Commission in Hungary and subsequently the Soviet 
Union’s minister and ambassador to Hungary (1945–1949). Between 1949 and 1952 he 
was head of the Soviet Union’s diplomatic mission in East Germany and later served 
as deputy foreign minister (1952–1953).
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decided on repatriation without taking the Hungarian notes into account. The 
mass and systematic repatriation process began in the spring of 1947 and lasted 
until 1949. 
In the matter of Hungarian citizens transported and held in custody in 
prison camps by the Soviet authorities, the Hungarian government peti-
tioned the Allied Control Commission on several occasions via note verbale 
and through personal intercession. It is with great gratification and sincere 
thanks that the Hungarian government wishes to record that at its request, 
the Soviet authorities have sent several thousand persons home in the past 
weeks from the prison camps in Hungary and Romania, and that moreover, 
they have improved both the nutritional situation of the prisoners and 
their health conditions.
In connection with the benevolent and understanding promise made 
by the Allied Control Commission before the representatives of the Hun-
garian Foreign Ministry, that all non-fascist civilian prisoners, after the 
examination of their cases, would be allowed to go home within a foresee-
able time, the Hungarian government respectfully calls the kind attention 
of the Allied Control Commission to the fact that tens of thousands of 
civilian individuals, as well as many military persons older than the mili-
tary age limit and younger than 18 years of age, and numerous disabled 
and ill persons are still in custody in the various prison camps in Hungary 
and Romania. Such a scenario prevails, for example, in the prison camp at 
Temesvár (Timişoara), the headquarters of which, according to information 
from those released, is still holding back several hundred persons despite 
the instructions of the Soviet military high command, on the pretense that 
allegedly they are awaiting a Hungarian commission that would receive 
the prisoners of war. In connection with this, the Hungarian government 
wishes to state that it has no knowledge of the invitation to such an alleged 
Hungarian commission.
The Hungarian government respectfully asks the Allied Control Com-
mission to kindly investigate this matter as urgently as possible and, in justi-
fied cases, take the steps that appear necessary so that those individuals who, 
in the judgment of the Soviet authorities, may be released, be permitted to 
return to their families and jobs from the Temesvár and other camps as soon 
as possible, all the more so because the prisoners of the camps are mainly 
workers who are needed for the building of the new democratic Hungary.
Source: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-q, KÜM HDFO. Box 53, 131473/hf-1945.
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DOCUMENT No. 33:
Note by the Ministry of Defense Requesting Foreign Ministry  
Intervention on Behalf of Deported Persons
August 1, 1945
On November 13, 1944, the Military Council of the Fourth Ukrainian Front 
issued a decree on the arrest and deportation of ethnic Hungarian and German 
men of military age in Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which belonged to Hungary 
prior to 1918 and again after 1939. The territory, occupied in October 1944, was 
incorporated into the Soviet Union under the name “Transcarpathian Ukraine.” 
In November 1944 the wave of deportations that occurred in Subcarpathian 
Ruthenia passed through the operational zone of the Fourth Ukrainian Front and 
thus touched the postwar territory of Hungary, namely the part of Bereg County 
(bordering on Subcarpathian Ruthenia) that was bounded by the Túr and Tisza 
Rivers. This territory was occupied by Soviet troops in late October 1944. Since 
the front passed through the region rapidly, no great devastation took place, and 
life there soon resumed. The momentum of the new start was broken by the depor-
tation unexpectedly ordered by the occupiers. In the villages of Bereg County, the 
deportations took place at the same time and in the same way as on the other side 
of the border. On November 20, men between the ages of 18 and 50 were ordered 
to appear for three days’ public work. However, instead of public work the people, 
equipped with food and clothing for three days, were driven to Beregszász and 
then Szolyva (Svalyava), which at that time belonged de facto to the Soviet Union. 
There the deportees were placed in railway cars and taken to Bryansk.
The dignitaries of the settlements of Bereg County, like the leaders of 
Barabás Commune in the document below, wrote to the minister of defense in 
support of bringing the deportees home. The petitions were forwarded from the 
Defense Ministry to the Foreign Ministry, which had jurisdiction in the matter 
of repatriation. In the brief letter printed here, mention is made of 6,000 deport-
ees in connection with the village of Barabás. This figure presumably includes the 
number of those deported from the neighboring villages as well.
I hereby refer to your kind consideration the petition of the village of 
Barabás in rump Bereg County, in which it requests the release of some 
6,000 forcibly removed persons.
Signature: Col. Literáty
SOURCE: MNL OL, XIX-J-1-Q, KÜM HDFO. BOX 87, 141886/1945.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   171 2015.02.17.   6:53
172 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY
DOCUMENT No. 34:
Agreement on the Establishment of Hungarian-Soviet  
Bauxite-Aluminum Companies
April 8, 1946
Under the terms of the agreement reached at the Potsdam Conference, the 
Soviet Union was allowed to acquire German assets located in Bulgaria, Hun-
gary, and Romania, as well as in the Soviet zones of Austria and Germany. In all, 
some 400 companies and plants of varying size, hundreds of immovable assets, 
houses, landed and wooded properties, shops, and movie theaters in Hungary 
were expropriated. In certain cases, however, the Soviets obtained merely a small 
percentage of a given company, though there were also cases where a company 
passed into Soviet ownership in its entirety. It was in this way that the Soviet 
Union acquired one of the largest estates, that owned by the Pappenheim fam-
ily, which thus avoided being included in land distribution. The Soviet occupation 
authorities in numerous cases exploited the opportunity and acquired assets that 
had only a small percentage of German ownership, or none at all. The problem 
in Austria, for example, was that although before the war a mere 10 percent of 
the assets had been German, due to the Germanization following the Anschluss, 
the amount of assets rose substantially. The question was whether these transac-
tions had been made under duress or on a voluntary basis. Contrary to the Anglo-
American interpretation, Moscow naturally maintained that it was the latter. 
The expropriation of further assets was made possible by the Soviet Union’s 
stance, according to which “the headquarters of the legal entities decides the issue 
(of ownership), consequently there is no room for investigations into whether 
non-German persons have a financial interest.” Thus, in July, 280 German prop-
erties were taken over, and the Potsdam Agreement applied to 90 percent of 
these cases. 
The Soviet wish list regarding Hungarian enterprises likewise indicates that 
Moscow was striving to gain strategic positions. Thus, among the firms passing 
into Soviet hands were the Count Béla Zichy Urkut Mining Works (Gróf Zichy 
Béla Urkuti Bányaművek), which were the most important deposits of manga-
nese ore in the country, the Danube Valley Aluminum Oxide Plant (Dunavölgyi 
Tímföldgyár), the Transdanubia Bauxite Co. (Transdanubia Bauxit Rt.), and the 
Aluminum Ore Mine Industrial Co. (Alumínium Ércbánya Ipari Rt.). It should be 
noted that at that time Hungary was one of the world’s most important bauxite-
producing countries. Since there was a shortage of coal in the Soviet Union, the 
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occupiers laid claim to the Urikány Jiu Valley Hungarian Coal Mine (Urikány 
Zsilvölgy Magyar Kőszénbánya Rt.), the Salgótarján Coal Mine Co. (Salgótar-
jáni Kőszénbánya Rt.), and the Upper Hungary Mining and Smelting Works Co. 
(Felső-Magyarországi Bánya- és Kohómű Rt.), as well as to the Hungarian Gen-
eral Coal Mine Co. (Magyar Általános Kőszénbánya Rt.), the Edelényi Coal Mine 
(Edelényi Szénbánya), and the mine in the vicinity of Pécs. The latter were later 
amalgamated into the Hungarian-Soviet navigation firm that became known as 
MESZHART. Among the industrial units, the Danubian Aircraft Works (Dunai 
Repülőgépgyár), Orenstein and Koppel Industrial Railways General Machine 
Works (Orenstein és Koppel Iparvasutak Általános Gépgyár Rt.), the Ganz and 
Associate Electrical Machine, Wagon, and Ship Works Co. (Ganz és Társa Elek-
tromos Gép, Vagon és Hajó Művek Rt.), and the AEG Unio Hungarian Electric 
Company (AEG Unio Magyar Elektromos Rt.) all came into Soviet ownership, 
as did significant units of the Hungarian textile industry, including the Domes-
tic Spinning and Weaving Mill Co. (Hazai Fésüsfonó és Szövőgyár Rt.) and the 
Cloth and Carpet Factory of Sopron and Újpest (Soproni és Újpesti Posztó- és 
Szőnyeggyár Rt.). According to the Hungarian position, the firms listed above 
had only a small percentage of German ownership at most, but on the basis of 
the London Declaration, even in such cases the extent of their German ownership 
could be called into question. To justify its position, the Hungarian government 
presented an array of evidence. Thus, for example, Bakonyi Bauxite Co. (Bakonyi 
Bauxit Rt.) had been Swiss-owned, and the German-owned shares in the Sal-
gótarján Coal Mine, the Urikány Coal Mine, and the Upper Hungary Mining and 
Smelting Works had been repurchased by Hungary during the war. Only five per-
cent of Ganz and Associates had been owned by the Germans. Some 76 percent 
of the Telephone Works Co. (Telefongyár Rt.) was American-owned. In 1943 the 
Hungarian state had bought back numerous companies in German hands. As a 
result of the peace treaty, the Soviet Union was permitted to expropriate Ital-
ian interests in Hungary as well. While the significance of this provision was less 
marked, it still represented a further point of penetration, mainly in the finan-
cial and insurance spheres. Some of the Soviet enterprises were turned over to 
Hungary during an exchange of shares in 1949 in return for 14 million dollars. In 
1952, under the terms of a Soviet-Hungarian protocol, the Soviet Union sold the 
remaining 77 enterprises to Hungary in return for deliveries of goods valued at 
990 million forints.
In addition to the reparations and the expropriation of German assets, Soviet 
economic (and through this, political) penetration was promoted largely by the 
Soviet-Hungarian joint enterprises. These companies were established in the areas 
of air transportation, Danube navigation, and oil production and processing, as well 
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as bauxite and aluminum production. The Soviet contribution in these enterprises 
was a part of the German assets acquired by the Soviet Union, while the remain-
ing equipment, installations, and in the case of bauxite and oil companies, the raw 
materials to be extracted by them formed the Hungarian contribution. Due to the 
overestimation of the Soviet contribution and the underestimation of the Hungar-
ian contribution, Moscow may have obtained a greater share of the Hungarian 
economy than the value of the previous German property would have warranted. 
Although the post of chairman in the companies was occupied by Hungarians, 
actual power was wielded by the managing directors, who were Soviet citizens.
On March 29, 1946, the two governments signed a navigation agree-
ment, based on which the Hungarian-Soviet joint navigation company known 
as MESZHART was established. It controlled navigation on the Danube and 
its tributaries, Lake Balaton and the seas; operated ports, stations, ship facto-
ries, and maintenance installations; and managed companies that produced and 
transported fuel. The Hungarian government leased to the company all ports on 
the Danube and Tisza rivers, as well as the free port on the Danube island of Cse-
pel, the only such establishment in Hungary, for a period of 30 years. The vessels 
of MESZHART were granted most-favored-nation treatment, and the company 
enjoyed a complete exemption from taxes and duties. As the Soviet contribution 
the mines located near the city of Pécs (Pécs, Mecsekszabolcs, Somogy, Vasas, 
Hosszúhetény) became the property of MESZHART. This arrangement resulted 
in favorable conditions for Hungarian maritime navigation, since an agreement 
signed in 1947 granted the contracting parties the right to use each other’s ports 
and port installations on the most-favored-nation basis, which obviously bene-
fited landlocked Hungary.
A similar accord was reached a few days later, when MASZOVLET (Hungar-
ian-Soviet Airlines), which was in charge of organizing and controlling Hungarian 
air traffic as well as participating in the international airline network, was estab-
lished. MASZOVLET was granted the right to use the country’s civilian airports 
and all of their installations for 30 years and was given territory to construct new 
ones. In early 1947 a protocol was attached to the agreement guaranteeing the 
Soviet civilian air fleet the use of Hungarian airspace and landing rights. These 
rights, it may be noted, were denied to the United States. With the exception of 
Hungarian and Soviet aircraft, all airlines could utilize Hungarian airspace or 
land on Hungarian soil only with Soviet permission, despite the fact that Ferenc 
Nagy had personally promised the American president landing rights for Ameri-
can airlines. Although the peace treaty had stipulated the application of the 
most-favored-nation treatment, this had no impact on the provisions assuring the 
Soviets exclusive rights. The protocol signed in 1947 was needed precisely because, 
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until the signing of the peace treaty, Hungarian airspace was under the military 
control of the Soviet Union. Thus landing and transit rights could be granted only 
by the ACC, in other words, in practice, the Soviet military authorities. However, 
since the peace treaty wound up the activity of the ACC, Hungary had its sover-
eignty restored and thus in principle regained control over its own airspace.
On April 8, 1946, one day before the Hungarian government delegation was 
to leave for Moscow, Deputy Prime Minister Árpád Szakasits and Soviet Min-
ister of Industry Lev Nikolaevich Bobkov signed the Hungarian-Soviet bauxite 
agreement, which provided for the establishment of three joint enterprises. It is 
an interesting coincidence that the Hungarian-Soviet companies were established 
when Junkers in Germany had begun to manufacture jet aircraft for the Soviet 
Union, as a result of which the Soviet authorities prohibited the use of aluminum 
for other forms of manufacturing in the eastern sector of Germany. The govern-
ment debated the agreement with great haste, since it had to be signed prior to 
departure. Ferenc Nagy’s comment that the Soviet Union had to be persuaded 
to support Hungary at the peace negotiations appears to buttress the view that 
there was some kind of agreement between Rákosi and Stalin that Moscow 
would support certain territorial demands in exchange for a rapid signing of the 
economic agreements. For this reason, reservations about the lack of time lim-
its on the companies’ operations or about the monopoly on bauxite exports were 
swept aside in minutes. The deliberations among the experts were adjourned, and 
the agreement was signed without the special committees reaching a mutually 
acceptable agreement. Thus the Soviets rejected the Hungarian request that one 
solely Hungarian-owned bauxite mine be allowed to survive. They also did not 
provide a specific guarantee to satisfy the bauxite needs of the Hungarian state. 
However, they did agree to allow Hungary to have its own aluminum oxide plant 
as well as two bauxite furnaces, and they did not introduce, at least at first, a 
complete monopoly on the exploration and sale of bauxite. The companies oper-
ated according to Hungarian law.
Under the terms of the agreement, the Soviet Union received a 50 percent 
stake in the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company (Aluminiumérc Bánya 
és Ipar Rt.) as well as its subsidiaries, which controlled 90 percent of the coun-
try’s bauxite reserves. It likewise obtained a 50 percent ownership in the bauxite 
industry’s second most important enterprise, the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Com-
pany (Magyar Bauxitbánya Rt.). The Soviets were to contribute the former Ger-
man assets of the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company, which they had received 
on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement, as well as equipment obtained as repa-
rations. The German assets of the Aluminum Ore Co. and its subsidiaries, the 
Victoria Chemical Works Company (Victoria Vegyészeti Művek Rt.), the Tapolca 
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Mining Company (Tapolcai Ipar Rt.), the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company 
(Magyar Bauxitbánya Rt.), and the Danubian Valley Aluminum-Oxide Industrial 
Company (Dunavölgyi Timföldipar Rt.), were ceded to the Soviet Union. Out 
of the latter a joint enterprise known as the Danubian Valley Aluminum Oxide 
Industrial Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Co. (Dunavölgyi Timföldipar 
Magyar-Szovjet Bauxit-Aluminium Rt.) was formed. 
The agreement emphasized that in the interest of increasing imports and 
exports, bauxite production would be elevated, while stipulating that the needs of 
the Soviet Union enjoyed priority. The companies were vested with all the conces-
sions of their predecessors to explore new deposits throughout the entire coun-
try for an indefinite period of time. In March 1947 this stipulation was amended 
in order to grant the Hungarian-Soviet companies an exclusive right to explore 
bauxite deposits in Hungary. The original agreement stipulated the quantity of 
ore to be produced in the next three years, which was to rise from 400,000 tons 
in 1946 to 700,000 tons two years later. In 1953 Hungary delivered 500,000 tons 
of bauxite and 350,000 tons of aluminum oxide to the Soviet Union. The three 
joint enterprises—the Soviet-Hungarian Bauxite-Aluminum Ore Mine and 
Industry Company, the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite Company, and the Danu-
bian Valley Aluminum Oxide Industrial Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum 
Co.—were permitted to operate for an unspecified length of time. The Hungar-
ian authorities were obliged to make available to them unlimited foreign currency 
deriving from the companies’ revenues. This provision created an exceptional 
situation for them, since other Hungarian firms and foreign-owned firms operat-
ing in Hungary were not allowed to keep their revenues and for all intents and 
purposes could not receive any foreign currency whatsoever. They were also in a 
privileged position in that they enjoyed exemption from taxes and duties. 
The companies were headed by the board of directors, the managing direc-
tor and his deputy and, until the nationalization, the board of shareholders. 
The chairman of the board of directors was Hungarian, and the managing direc-
tor, who was responsible for administrative matters, was Soviet. True power 
was exercised by the managing directors, since it was they who could act in all 
matters involving the company, sign contracts, apply for loans, and  purchase, 
encumber, or lease company assets. The managing directors were responsible for 
the company’s banking and credit operations, and they could hire or fire the com-
panies’ managers and workers as well as determine their salaries. On one occa-
sion the managing director of the Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite Company decided 
to appoint new directors without consulting the Hungarian managers; the latter 
were expected to consent to the appointments without knowing whom he wanted 
to hire. The Hungarian board members therefore asked the managing director to 
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postpone the appointments and, in the future, inform them of his intentions in 
advance. This, however, he dismissed by declaring: “personnel matters fall under 
my competence, and therefore I can decide the matter even without the board of 
directors.” Although the joint companies were subject to the laws of Hungary, the 
Soviet managers often disregarded them and acted arbitrarily.
A mere four days after the Iranian government consented to setting up 
a Soviet-Iranian oil company to exploit crude oil deposits in northern Iran, an 
agreement was reached establishing a similar company in Hungary as well. Like 
the bauxite-aluminum agreement, this was signed on April 8. Two new enter-
prises were created: MASZOVOL (Hungarian-Soviet Oil Company) and MOLAJ 
(Hungarian Oil). MASZOVOL inherited the concessions of the Hungarian-Ger-
man Oil Company or MANAT to extract and produce gas and crude oil, as well 
as to process and sell oil and gas products. MANAT’s 1940 concession passed to 
MASZOVOL, which simultaneously also became the owner of Orenstein and 
Koppel. MASZOVOL acquired the Hungarian government’s 15 percent share 
of all crude oil produced in Hungary, which it could export to all countries with 
which Hungary had a commercial treaty. For its part MOLAJ was established 
out of a previously state-owned company, the Hungarian Oil Works (Magyar 
Olajművek), in such a way that 50 percent of its shares were handed over to 
the Soviet Union in return for compensation. MOLAJ’s profile was oil refining. 
It was granted a 15 percent share in Hungarian oil production as well as a set 
amount of the remaining 85 percent.
To implement that part of the Agreement on economic cooperation signed 
between Hungary and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Moscow 
on August 27, 1945, concerning the establishment of the Hungarian-Soviet 
Bauxite-Aluminum Company, the Parties signing the above-mentioned 
Agreement, being duly represented to conclude the present Agreement, 
namely the Government of the Republic of Hungary by Deputy Prime Min-
ister Árpád Szakasits, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics by Lev Nikolaevich Bobkov, have agreed upon the following:
Article 1.
The Contracting Parties agree that the already existing Stock Companies 
named below, the assets of which, having previously formed German prop-
erty, have passed into possession of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
namely: 1. The Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company and its subsid-
iary companies, the Victoria Chemical Works Company and the Tapolcza 
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Mining Company; 2. the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company; 3. The Danube 
Valley Aluminum-Oxide Industrial Company, are transformed into joint 
Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Joint Stock Companies in such a way 
that in each of the above-named joint stock companies, the two sides pos-
sess an equal share. 
The capital stock of the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company is 
established at 14,000,000 (fourteen million) pengős.7
The capital stock of the Victoria Chemical Works Company is estab-
lished at 1,500,000 (one million five hundred thousand) pengős.
The capital stock of the Tapolcza Mining Company is established at 
60,000 (sixty thousand) pengős.
The capital stock of the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company is estab-
lished at 24,640,000 (twenty-four million six hundred forty thousand) 
pengős. 
3. The capital stock of the Danube Valley Aluminum-Oxide Industrial 
Company is established at 35,000,100 (thirty-five million one hundred) 
pengős.
The capital stock of all of the aforementioned joint stock companies is 
determined in 1938 pengős.
Article 2.
The Hungarian Side agrees, above the 42.24 (forty-two and twenty-four 
hundredths) percent of the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company 
and its subsidiary companies—Victoria Chemical Works Company and 
the Tapolcza Mining Company—forming the property of the Soviet Side, 
to hand over a further quantity of shares so that the share of the Soviet 
Side in the aforementioned company thereby increases to 50 percent of the 
share capital. With this the Soviet Side receives possession of 50 percent 
of the shares in the subsidiary companies of the Aluminum Ore Mine and 
Industry Company—the Victoria Chemical Works Company and the Tapol-
cza Mining Company—since all shares of the latter companies are in the 
possession of the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company.
As a partial settlement of the additional quantity of shares assigned to 
it, the Soviet Side agrees to hand over to the Hungarian Side 42.24 (forty-
7  The pengő was the Hungarian currency from January 1, 1927, until July 31, 1946. Due 
to high inflation after World War II, it lost its value completely. It was replaced by the 
forint on August 1, 1946.
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two and twenty-four hundredths) percent of the shares of the Bauxite 
Industry Company, which forms the property of the Union of Soviet Social-
ist Republics.
For the purpose of establishing the actual value of those shares that one 
Side hands over to the other Side, the appraisal of the fixed and other assets 
of the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company, as well as its subsidiary 
companies—the Victoria Chemical Works Company, the Tapolcza Mining 
Company, and the “Bauxite Industry Company”—must be carried out jointly 
within two months from the day of signing of the present Agreement.
The Soviet Side will pay compensation to the Hungarian Side for the 
difference appearing in the value of the shares mentioned in Paragraphs 1 
and 2 of the present article according to the attached Protocol.
Article 3.
The Contracting Parties agree that the share of the Soviet Side in the share 
capital of the Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company be increased from 33.33 
percent (one third) to 50 (fifty) percent by increasing the share capital of 
the aforementioned Company from 18,480,000 (eighteen million four hun-
dred eighty thousand) pengős to 24,640,000 (twenty-four million six hun-
dred forty thousand) pengős in such a way that the Soviet Side alone will 
cover this increase of capital. 
For the purposes of establishing the value of those contributions of the 
Soviet Side that are necessary for increasing share capital, the appraisal of 
the fixed and other assets of the Company mentioned in the first paragraph 
of the present Article must occur jointly within three months of the signing 
of the present Agreement.
Within the framework of its contributions mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraph, the Soviet Side consents to hand over the existing equip-
ment of the Székesfehérvár Aluminum Rolling Mill Works to the Hungar-
ian Bauxite Mine Company, whereby the value of this equipment is to be 
credited simultaneously to the reparations deliveries, and furthermore the 
additional equipment of this factory which the Government of the Republic 
of Hungary would have to deliver to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
as reparations, so that the value of the existing equipment and that to be 
shipped in addition amounts to 1,028,000 (one million twenty-eight thou-
sand) American dollars.
If it is established that the value of the above-mentioned equipment is 
not sufficient to fully cover the amount of the capital to be increased, then 
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the Soviet Side shall bring other assets into the Company as per agreement 
of the Sides.
Article 4.
The Contracting Parties agree that 50 (fifty) percent of the share in the Dan-
ube Valley Aluminum Oxide Industry Company shall form the property of 
the Hungarian Side and 50 (fifty) percent the Soviet Side.
Equal shares in the above-mentioned Company will be achieved in the 
following manner: 1/3 (one-third) of the shares are directly owned by the 
Ministry of Industry of the Republic of Hungary, 1/3 (one-third) directly by 
the Soviet Side, and the remaining 1/3 (one-third) forms the property of the 
Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company, in which the Hungarian and 
Soviet Sides own an equal number of shares.
The Soviet Side agrees that the equipment of the Aluminum Oxide 
Works in Almásfüzítő be excluded from deliveries against the reparations 
bill, as well as the additional equipment of this factory which the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Hungary must ship as a supplement.
Instead of this the Government of the Republic of Hungary shall ship 
to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics other equipment, raw materials, 
or other goods, by agreement between the two Governments, in the amount 
of 880,600 (eight hundred eighty thousand six hundred) American dollars.
Article 5.
Both Governments will ensure the above-mentioned Companies’ share-
holders the opportunity to fulfill the conditions prescribed in the present 
Agreement in every aspect.
Starting from the signing of the present Agreement, the Soviet share-
holders exercise all shareholder rights based on 50 (fifty) percent of all 
shares of the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company and its subsidiary 
companies: the Victoria Chemical Works Company and the Tapolcza Mining 
Company and the Danube Valley Aluminum-Oxide Industrial Company.
The life of the Companies is not bound by any time limit.
The Companies’ headquarters are located in Budapest.
Article 6.
The companies will operate according to the Bylaws attached to the present 
Agreement (Appendices 1, 2, and 3).
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Article 7.
The shares of the companies mentioned in Article 1 of the present Agree-
ment shall be exchanged for new shares within two months from the day of 
the signing of the present Agreement. The Government of the Republic of 
Hungary will ensure the implementation of the regulations related to the 
exchange of the shares through the appropriate governmental organs. 
Article 8.
Depending on the development of the Companies, the share capital of the 
latter may be increased to an amount agreed upon by the Contracting Sides.
In connection with this, the equal shares of the Hungarian and Soviet 
shareholders remain unchanged. 
Article 9.
The Hungarian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Companies shall retain all the 
rights pertaining to the Aluminum Ore Mine and Industry Company, as 
well as its subsidiary companies the Victoria Chemical Works Company, the 
Tapolcza Mining Company, and the Bauxite Industry Company, likewise the 
Hungarian Bauxite Mine Company and the Danube Valley Aluminum-Oxide 
Industrial Company, that apply to the exploration of bauxite areas.
Within the entire territory of the Republic of Hungary, the Hungar-
ian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Companies shall enjoy privileges in bauxite 
exploration under otherwise equal conditions. 
Article 10.
The Contracting Sides agree that the Hungarian Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum 
Companies will work out production schedules, which will ensure the pro-
duction of approximately the following quantities of bauxite:
 In 1946 400,000 tons
 In 1947 500,000 tons
 In 1948 700,000 tons
The aforementioned companies shall dispose of the produced bauxite in 
accordance with their commercial interests, taking into consideration the 
internal needs of Hungarian industry, as well as the export intentions and 
other obligations of the Government of the Republic of Hungary, in connec-
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tion with which the needs of the Soviet Union shall be satisfied primarily 
under extension of most-favored terms.
The operating schedule of the Hungarian Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum 
Companies for the subsequent period will be worked out with the participa-
tion of the two Contracting Governments on the basis of the principles laid 
out in the Agreement signed in Moscow on August 27, 1945, on economic 
cooperation between the Republic of Hungary and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, taking into consideration the necessity of further devel-
opment of the Hungarian bauxite-aluminum industry. 
Article 11.
The Contracting Sides agree that the Hungarian and Soviet shareholders 
shall have an equal share in the leadership of the Companies; the Hun-
garian and Soviet shareholders shall be represented by an equal number 
of members in the Companies’ Boards of Directors in such a way that the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors will be selected from among the Hun-
garian members of the Board and the Deputy Chairman from among the 
Soviet members of the board.
Executive duties will be overseen by the Managing Director recom-
mended by the Soviet shareholders and the Deputy Managing Director rec-
ommended by the Hungarian shareholders.
Article 12.
During the sale and purchase of foreign means of payment at the Hungar-
ian National Bank—in accordance with the existing Hungarian currency 
regulations—the Hungarian Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Companies shall 
enjoy the most favorable terms that the Bank employs vis-à-vis any other 
company.
For the purposes of acquiring necessary equipment and materials 
abroad for the Companies, as well as for payment abroad of the Compa-
nies’ other expenses, the Companies shall receive foreign means of payment 
without hindrance from the Hungarian authorities out of those sums which 
originate from transactions completed by the Companies.
With regard to the premiums related to export and import transac-
tions, the Companies shall enjoy the most-favored-nation treatment estab-
lished for the same countries for such articles.
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Article 13.
The Government of the Republic of Hungary agrees that every contract and 
legal transaction ensuing from the present Agreement shall enjoy tax and duty 
exemption. This includes every tax and duty connected with the potential 
increase or reduction of equity capital; the issuance of new shares; the registra-
tion of amendments to the bylaws; the transfer, purchase, and sale of shares; 
and likewise with the shareholders’ agreements and purchase contracts.
The Government of the Republic of Hungary shall extend to the Hun-
garian-Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Companies the tax and duty concessions 
ensuing from the law on industrial development.
The Government of the Republic of Hungary is in agreement that the 
tax and duty concessions granted to the Danube Valley Aluminum Oxide 
Industry Company shall be valid on the condition that the aluminum oxide 
factory in Almásfüzítő is put into operation by the end of the year 1948.
Article 14.
The shareholders of each company will form shareholders’ agreements, with 
which the internal relations of the shareholders among one another will be 
determined in the course of the company’s activity.
The Companies shall conclude a separate agreement among themselves 
for the purpose of coordinating their production and commercial activities.
The Contracting Governments shall confirm the shareholders’ agree-
ments as well as the agreement mentioned in the second paragraph of the 
present article.
Article 15.
Both Contracting Governments shall cooperate in organizing the exchange 
of technical information relating to bauxite production, as well as to the 
manufacture of aluminum oxide and aluminum between the Hungarian-
Soviet Bauxite-Aluminum Companies and organizations of the Soviet baux-
ite-aluminum industry.
Article 16.
During their activity the Companies shall operate in accordance with Hun-
garian law and shall enjoy the same rights as companies of purely Hungar-
ian capital.
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Article 17.
If a difference of opinion arises in connection with the implementation 
of the present Agreement, these differences of opinion must be resolved 
jointly by the Contracting Governments.
Disputed questions relating to the operation of the companies that 
arise within the Boards of Directors must be decided in accordance with the 
terms of the Shareholders’ Agreements mentioned in Article 14 of the pres-
ent Agreement.
Article 18.
The Government of the Republic of Hungary shall issue the Company 
Bylaws attached to Article 6 of the present agreement as a decree, and the 
competent judicial authorities shall register them within a deadline of two 
months from the day the present Agreement is signed.
Article 19.
The present Agreement shall enter into force on the day of signing.
The Agreement remains in force until the Companies cease opera-
tions through their liquidation. The liquidation of the Companies may be 
announced only by the mutual consent of both Governments.
Done at Budapest, this eighth day of April, 1946, in two copies, in the 
Russian and Hungarian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the Government of the Republic of Hungary:
Signed: Szakasits
For the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Signed:  L. Bobko
MNL-OL KÜM IV-548 Box 34 97.res/h 1946
K
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DOCUMENT No. 35:
Report of Mátyás Rákosi at the Meeting of the HCP Central Committee
May 17, 1946
Rákosi’s speech, which contains an extraordinarily detailed description of the tac-
tics pursued by the Hungarian Communist Party to obtain power, as well as of 
the latest plans of Soviet foreign policy, was based on fresh information obtained 
from the highest quarters. In late March, in preparation for the peace negotia-
tions, Rákosi traveled on a secret mission to Moscow, where on April 1 he negoti-
ated with Stalin and Molotov and shared what he had heard there with the par-
ty’s leaders. 
This took place after the Hungarian Communist Party’s leadership launched 
an offensive in mid-January 1946 on the heels of its defeat in the elections of 
November 4, 1945. The purpose of the campaign was to weaken the Smallholders’ 
Party, which had garnered an absolute majority of 57 percent in the elections, 
as well as to strengthen the Communist Party’s economic position and power. 
They accentuated their economic and political demands by organizing mass 
movements and later by establishing the Leftist Bloc (Baloldali Blokk) in early 
March. The party’s leaders soon also found the means of exploiting the matter 
of the peace preparations in order to promote the success of the attack against 
the Smallholders. From the Soviet leaders (who made no secret of the fact that 
they had expected much better results from the Hungarian party in the elections) 
Rákosi received a promise that, if they successfully carried out the left-wing shift 
that began in January (and consequently precipitated the collapse of the Small-
holders’ Party) and furthermore succeeded in establishing the Hungarian-Soviet 
joint companies, which would lay the groundwork for decisive Soviet economic 
influence in Hungary, the Soviet Union in return would support the Hungarian 
government’s claim against Romania to a 4,000–10,000 sq. kilometer strip of 
territory along the border. The Soviets also agreed, after these conditions were 
fulfilled, that a Hungarian government delegation could come to Moscow to dis-
cuss questions related to the preparations for the peace and the various economic 
problems.
Thus, at the time of the political crisis in March 1946, Rákosi made a pro-
posal to Ferenc Nagy: if the Smallholders’ Party fulfilled the demands of the 
Left-Wing Bloc, Rákosi would see to it that the Hungarian prime minister would 
be received in Moscow at the head of a government delegation, and in the event 
Moscow would support certain Hungarian territorial demands of a limited scope 
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against Romania. For the Smallholder prime minister the offer must have been 
tempting: to the public it would be he who had “delivered” the only positive result 
of note related to the peace settlement in Moscow, a border modification vis-à-vis 
Romania. In addition, Ferenc Nagy must also have reckoned that this would help 
increase not only his personal prestige but also that of his party, the Smallhold-
ers. Thus this political bargain also contributed to the Smallholders’ Party leader-
ship ultimately accepting the demands of the Left and carrying out the party’s 
first self-mutilation (which later proved to be fatal), expelling from the party 20 
deputies branded as “reactionary” by the communists. 
However, the Hungarian government delegation’s negotiations in Moscow 
between April 9 and 18, 1946, brought genuine success only to the Soviets. They 
succeeded in making the Hungarian politicians believe that the Soviet Union 
would support their territorial claims against Romania, without the Soviet lead-
ers having to make even a single decisive and unambiguous declaration regarding 
this. It is characteristic of the Soviets’ approach that simultaneously, on the days 
of the Hungarian government delegation’s negotiations in Moscow, they assured 
the Romanian government that the Soviet Union would protect the existing Hun-
garian-Romanian border against any kind of modification.
In his speech Rákosi presents in detail the tactics that needed to be pursued 
in order to strengthen the position of the Communist Party vis-à-vis the vari-
ous coalition parties, regarding the trade unions, the peasantry, and so on. In 
this area the most interesting concept is that the union of the two workers’ par-
ties must be proposed, ignoring the fact that in the short term not even the left 
wing of the Social Democratic Party supported that. It cannot be ruled out that 
this idea, too, originated from Moscow, and it was part of a general trend: as is 
known, in the Soviet zone of Germany the two workers’ parties were united in 
1946, and as Rákosi recounts, in 1945 the French Communist Party attempted 
the same.
Raising the idea of merging the two workers’ parties in the spring of 1946 
meant that at this time the HCP was experimenting with a model of obtaining 
power that differed from what it later accomplished. As Rákosi clearly explained, 
a united workers’ party with 35 percent of the vote would represent a much 
greater political force than two parties with 17 percent, and could take more effec-
tive action against the overwhelming parliamentary superiority of the Small-
holders. If so, the main target and first victim of the HCP’s salami tactics would 
not have been the political opponent positioned on the right of the coalition, the 
Smallholders Party, but rather its primary ally, the left-wing SDP.
The dominant role of the HCP within the political structure and its self-con-
fidence are similarly well illustrated by the way Rákosi speaks of how the Com-
munists needed to “transform” the internal political relations of the Smallhold-
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ers’ Party: “we will try to force progress to the left from below and from above at 
once, and thus ensure that the danger, which today is ever stronger, that the right 
wing of the Smallholders’ Party will absorb the center of the Smallholders’ Party 
and with this essentially the bulk of the Smallholders’ Party, is reversed so that 
the left wing of the Smallholders’ Party absorbs the center of the Smallholders’ 
Party, and we thereby prevent this largest party from turning to the right.” 
The speech contains three extremely important pieces of information on 
the current priorities of Soviet foreign policy coming straight from Stalin: 1. The 
Soviet leadership was already planning to establish a new communist world orga-
nization: in other words, the idea of forming the Cominform was not a response 
to the Marshall Plan; 2. In the next 20 to 30 years there would not be a new world 
war; 3. A new situation had arisen in the area of the international class struggle.
1. Rákosi analyzed in detail how, according to Stalin, the Comintern, estab-
lished in 1919 and disbanded in 1943, because of its excessive centralization had 
not aided but hindered the development and effective activity of the various par-
ties. He stated that now—or in March 1946 at the latest—the Soviet leadership 
was once again planning the formation of an international communist organiza-
tion, though it would have to operate on a completely different basis: 
“This will not be an executive body; its task will be to compose, to help in 
making objections, to communicate the good or bad experiences of one country’s 
communist party to that of another country, so that they learn from their neigh-
bors’ experiences and losses.” 
In other words, the model Rákosi described in detail largely corresponded to 
the Cominform established later, in September 1947, though at this time it was 
not yet clear—or at least not revealed in Rákosi’s speech—that the new organi-
zation was not striving for the global solidarity of communist parties but instead 
would be regional, that is, an organization primarily of the emerging Soviet bloc. 
Rákosi’s speech also reveals that Stalin took a flexible approach to the ques-
tion and was planning the establishment of the new international communist 
organization only after the French, Czechoslovak, and Romanian elections, as 
well as the conclusion of the peace with Germany’s former European allies. That 
is to say, he strove to ensure that the formation of the new organization would 
not prevent the maintenance of cooperation with the Western Allies. 
2. According to Stalin, in the next 20 to 30 years, there would not be a new 
world war. It is noteworthy that this confidential statement occurred one month 
after Churchill’s speech at Fulton. Thus it did not influence Stalin in the least 
towards confrontation, and he knew that Churchill was speaking only of the 
actual situation concerning the division of Europe. In other words, in the spring 
of 1946, Stalin still wanted to maintain cooperation with the Western Allies, and 
he considered this a realistic possibility.
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3. A new situation had arisen in the area of class struggle. Because of its 
outstanding significance, the part of the speech concerning this third point is 
worth quoting in its entirety: “the view will change that was widely spread at 
the Third International, for example, that we have to wait for the conditions 
for revolution to appear in at least a number of countries, and only then can we 
instigate the revolution. […] One part of this concept is that in these changed cir-
cumstances, whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of the 
proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for whether 
the respective country is in a capitalist environment or not. This is also a new 
perspective, which simply means that in a country where, as a result of the work 
of the Communist Party, these conditions are present, it has to be realized. This 
is fresh encouragement for all communist parties, because now it will depend 
mainly on their work whether or not the conditions for the liberation of the prole-
tariat are created in their own country.” 
This “encouragement” arriving from Moscow in the spring of 1946 had an 
effect in Hungary as well: the period of consolidation and preparation had ended, 
and the complete takeover of power by the communists now began. 
Thus one part of the Stalinist concept was accomplished almost to the letter: 
by mid-1948 the Sovietization of Central Eastern Europe was essentially com-
pleted, and moreover, without civil war. In the end, however, this did not happen 
according to the original plan, since cooperation with the Western Allies could not 
be maintained simultaneously. 
Dear Comrades!
I would like to begin my report by briefly reviewing the international 
situation. The peace negotiations are leaving their stamp on the interna-
tional situation. The Anglo-Saxon powers want to use the peace negotia-
tions to ensure for themselves the greatest possible spoils and to stem as 
much as possible the democratic tide that has been appearing all across 
Europe with the collapse of fascism. And because the Soviet Union has 
thwarted this intention at every turn, the peace negotiations will drag on 
for quite a while. Despite this, it is to be expected that during the month 
of July, at least those countries that are so important to us, primarily 
our country and the neighboring countries, will conclude peace, which 
undoubtedly will be a very serious stabilizing factor, because there will be 
one less uncertainty, one uncertain factor will be eliminated.
Outwardly it is our impression that England and the United States 
form a united front against the Soviet Union at these negotiations. Occa-
sionally this is indeed the case, but if one takes a closer look, of course it 
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becomes clear everywhere that there are differences, at times significant, at 
other times only subtle. The comrades are probably familiar, for example, 
with those proposals that relate to the solution of the Trieste question.8 
They have seen the sketch maps, and on these small maps it can be seen 
precisely what the difference is in the policies of the Soviet Union, England, 
the United States, and, in this case, France. We might say that in drawing 
lines, one may notice that, even on a question such as this, the stance of the 
United States is not identical to [that of] England. In addition, in England 
a gradual internal transformation is underway. There is a quite significant 
contradiction inwardly; under the pressure of the working masses, events 
are undoubtedly developing to the left in such a way that an entire array 
of important branches of industry and the National Bank are being taken 
into state ownership and nationalized, and the consciousness of labor has 
increased extraordinarily. In this regard it is characteristic that when the 
representatives of the Labour Party were here, they declared that never 
again can a conservative government come to power in England. So sure 
are they of themselves that even if we cut away a good amount of self-
confidence, it is in any case symptomatic of how the British Labour Party, 
and not even its most radical part, thinks. Thus inside the country there is 
undoubtedly a serious radicalization. This radicalization, however, has not 
shown itself at all in foreign policy, where the old conservative-reaction-
8  The Trieste question was one of the most serious European territorial disputes after 
World War II. As early as November 1943, the Yugoslav Council of National Libera-
tion had made a decision to lay claim, after the conclusion of hostilities, to the entire 
Istrian peninsula and adjoining parts of Gorizia (including Trieste, Montfalcone, and 
Tarvisio), and Tito’s partisans accordingly attempted to create a fait accompli when 
they advanced all the way to Trieste. Because the Yugoslav-Italian border coincided 
with the border between the Soviet and Western zones of influence, the British and 
the Americans opposed the Yugoslav territorial ambitions, while the Soviet Union 
supported them. By the spring and summer of 1946, the Yugoslav-Italian border issue, 
especially the issue of where to assign Trieste, had become one of the most impor-
tant disputes among the Allies. The impasse was broken only in the summer of 1946; 
the Soviets and the Yugoslavs renounced Tarvisio, Gorizia, and Montfalcone in the 
north, while the Western Allies agreed that Trieste and its environs would be set up 
as a free territory belonging neither to Italy nor Yugoslavia. Regarding the subject, see 
György Szántó, A trieszti kérdés [The Trieste Question] (Budapest: Cserépfalvi, 1946), 
and Ignác Romsics, “Az újraosztott Köztes-Európa. A térség szovjet uralom alá kerül-
ése 1945 után” [The Redivided Middle Europe. The Coming of the Region under Soviet 
Control after 1945], Európai Utas 11:1 (2000). Leonid Gibianskii, “The Trieste Issue and 
the Soviet Union in the 1940s,” in Vojna in mir na Primorskem. Od kapitulacije Italije 
leta 1943 do Londonskega Memoranduma leta 1954 , eds. Jože Pirjevec, Gorazd Bajc, and 
Borut Klabjan (Koper: Univerza na Primorskem, 2005), pp. 357–390.
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ary line is pursued uninterrupted. And the contradictions of this duality 
are beginning to show themselves within the Labour Party. The critics of 
that line that is unwilling to apply democracy in foreign policy are increas-
ing in number and are more and more vehement. Naturally, when this first 
change will also appear in foreign policy is an unknown factor. For the pres-
ent it is our impression that this internal radicalization will not have a par-
ticular impact at the peace negotiations. The British will still pursue these 
peace negotiations in the spirit of the old reactionary, Eden-type foreign 
policy. Further complicating the British situation is that, because Eng-
lish capital is not strong enough, it is beginning to use its own influence 
to repress the radicalization of British labor at home and intrigue against 
its own working class, hand in hand with American capital. This, too, is a 
new symptom, and naturally, capital from the United States is very glad to 
take part in this game, with a maiden whom it is not difficult to take to 
this dance. Anyone who observed the circumstances surrounding the vote 
approving the loan to be offered to England in connection with this can 
see that, regardless of this, the imperialist antagonisms between the two 
countries are indeed on the rise. Proposals that, for instance, wanted to 
make the loan America is giving England dependent on ceding further naval 
bases, or that demanded England be obligated to spend 90 percent of this 
loan in the United States, were after a long battle rejected by a quite small 
majority. And when it was finally passed, points were incorporated into the 
American version, which meant a further burden for British capital. Thus 
the Anglo-American antagonism is undoubtedly growing, but it would be a 
mistake to imagine this growth at so rapid a tempo that it could play some 
critical role in these peace negotiations, only a few weeks away. Naturally, 
the Hungarian people are also extraordinarily preoccupied with the ques-
tion of the peace negotiations. And one of the important steps in prepar-
ing for the peace negotiations was the fact that the government delegation 
traveled to Moscow to prepare the peace negotiations. Thus, looking back, 
our impression is that this visit came quite late. It is enough to point out 
that 10 days after the delegation departed from Moscow, the actual peace 
negotiations were already beginning in Paris. So in this regard we were 
undoubtedly late. This delay was caused primarily by Hungarian reaction. 
It was not possible for the government delegation to go to Moscow9 until, 
9  The visit of the Hungarian government delegation to Moscow took place between 
April 9 and 18, 1946. For the memoranda on the discussions of April 9–10, see Csaba 
Békés, “Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 1946. áprilisi moszkvai tárgya-
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inside the country, the new regime had given the signal that it was seriously 
fighting for democracy. And proving this was extremely difficult after the 
elections of last November,10 when there was a generally widespread view 
that the course must be turned to the right. And turning the course and 
steering the democratic evolution once again towards the left required very 
hard work by Hungarian democracy. This change was brought about by our 
party’s well-thought-out, planned policy. I list only stages: when the res-
torationist-legitimist intrigues began after the elections, when the heir to 
the throne, Otto,11 appeared in Innsbruck, and when the idea that the elec-
tions might be used for a royalist restoration suddenly reared its head in 
Hungary, too, primarily with the help of the Catholic Church, we immedi-
ately raised the issue of the republic and duly saw this through.12 When, as 
a result of the elections, a general attack was launched against completing 
the land reform, and this attack was fully supported by every reactionary in 
the village and in the county headquarters, after suitable preparation, we 
began popular campaigns. As a result, in March, after the demonstration 
lásairól” [Documents on the Hungarian Government Delegation’s Negotiations in 
Moscow in April 1946], Régió 3 (1992): 160–171, as well as T.V. Volokitina et al., eds., 
Vostochnaia Evropa v Dokumentakh Rosiiskikh Arkhivov, 1944–1953 gg. Vol. I. 1944–1948 
(Moscow and Novosibirsk: Sibirskii Khronograf, 1997), 402–406 and 407–419. In 
Hungarian they appeared in István Vida, ed., Iratok a magyar–szovjet kapcsolatok tör-
ténetéhez 1944. október–1948. június. Dokumentumok [Papers on the History of Hun-
garian-Soviet Relations, October 1944–June 1948. Documents] (Budapest: Gondolat 
Kiadó, 2005), 191–194 and 195–206.
10  The elections to the National Assembly took place on November 4, 1945. In the elections 
the Independent Smallholders’ Party (SHP) received 57 percent of the vote, the Hungar-
ian Communist Party (HCP) 16.95 percent, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) 17.41 
percent, while 6.87 percent of the votes were cast for the National Peasant Party (NPP).
11  Otto von Habsburg (1912–2011): the last heir to the Habsburg throne. His father, 
Charles IV, was legally deposed in Hungary in 1921 (Law XLVII of 1921), which he did 
not acknowledge, and he tried to return on several occasions. Otto hoped to return up 
until the end of World War II and only relinquished his claim to the Austrian throne in 
1961. However, the monarchists continued to revere him as Emperor Otto I of Austria, 
and the Hungarian legitimists as King Ottó II of Hungary. See Márton Békés, “A legiti-
mizmus és a legitimisták” [Legitimism and the Legitimists], Rubicon 20:1–2 (2009). 
12  On the day after the Tildy government entered office, November 16, 1945, the prime 
minister, accompanied by Béla Varga, paid an official visit to Prince-Primate József 
Mindszenty in Esztergom. At the meeting Mindszenty took a stance against the creation 
of the republic. According to the prince-primate, at that time Tildy and Varga assured 
him of their support, which Mindszenty duly reminded them of in his letter of Decem-
ber 31, 1945. The Smallholders’ Party did not support the prince-primate, however. See 
Gizella Föglein, Államforma és államfői jogkör Magyarországon 1944–1949 [Form of State 
and Jurisdiction of Head of State in Hungary, 1944–1949] (Budapest, 1993), 43–44.
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in Greater Budapest, we dealt a severe blow to the right wing of the Small-
holders’ Party and ensured the completion of the land reform as well as a 
few serious democratic reforms. Parallel to this the sentences of the peo-
ple’s tribunals proceeded, showing that Hungarian democracy was deter-
mined to settle accounts with the war criminals. With the Soviet Union we 
concluded those economic treaties13 that proved that Hungarian democracy 
understands that not only close political but also economic relations must 
be established with our eastern neighbor. And after these preconditions 
were obtained, we immediately tried to exploit them and sent this govern-
ment delegation to Moscow. Unfortunately time had passed us by and, as 
I said, we were much too late, despite the fact that we seized the opportu-
nity in the strictest sense of the word. On March 12 the Smallholders’ Party 
deferred,14 and at the end of March, I was already in Moscow in order to 
prepare this government visit,15 and one week after my return the govern-
ment was already in Moscow.
13  On August 27, 1945, in Moscow, representatives of the Soviet and Hungarian govern-
ments signed a short-term commercial agreement as well as a treaty of long-term 
economic cooperation. The commercial agreement guaranteed that in the area of raw 
materials, oil products, food products, and pharmaceutical goods, Hungarian foreign 
trade would be conducted overwhelmingly with the Soviet Union, while the treaty on 
economic cooperation prescribed the formation of joint Soviet-Hungarian companies 
in the most important areas of industry and trade (oil, aluminum, steel, and chemical 
industries; river, air, and road transport). The Western states protested the exclusive 
agreements on numerous occasions, but after lengthy debates the Supreme National 
Council ratified it nevertheless, on December 20, 1945. See Péter Sipos and István 
Vida, “Az 1945. augusztus 27-én megkötött szovjet–magyar gazdasági egyezmény és a 
nyugati diplomácia” [The Soviet-Hungarian Economic Agreement of August 27, 1945, 
and Western Diplomacy], Külpolitika 4 (1985): 102–124, and László Borhi, A vasfüggöny 
mögött. Magyarország nagyhatalmi erőtérben 1945–1968 [Behind the Iron Curtain: Hun-
gary in the Great Power Arena, 1945–1968] (Budapest: Ister, 2000), 31–36. 
14  The aim of the Leftist Bloc, formed on March 5, 1946, with the participation of the 
HCP, SDP, and NPP, beyond defending the land reform, braking inflation, and purg-
ing the administrative apparatus, was to have those politicians they considered right-
wing removed from the Smallholders’ Party. Rákosi was alluding to the fact that the 
Smallholders on March 12 had replied officially to the demands of the Leftist Bloc, 
and in the letter, signed by Ferenc Nagy, the party essentially accepted every major 
political demand of the Leftist Bloc. Sándor Balogh, Parlamenti és pártharcok Mag-
yarországon 1945–1947 [Parliamentary and Party Struggles in Hungary, 1945–1947] 
(Budapest: Kossuth Könyvkiadó, 1975), 181–190.
15  In early 1946 Rákosi began to put out feelers in order to ascertain whether the Soviet 
leaders would be willing to support certain Hungarian territorial demands, and 
whether they would be willing to receive a Hungarian government delegation for 
the purpose of discussing the Hungarian peace aims. In his February 2, 1946, letter 
to Rezső Szántó, the representative of the Hungarian Communist Party in Moscow, 
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Thus we did what we could to accelerate matters and to make up for 
the time we lost primarily through the error of the Hungarian reaction and 
specifically because of the vacillation of the Smallholders’ Party. The visit 
undoubtedly had the effect of improving Soviet-Hungarian relations. As 
the comrades know, the external trappings of this visit were very impres-
sive, and it had tangible results, both economically and politically. Among 
the economic results were the easing of the reparations payments16 and an 
array of economic alleviations, while the political ones included the assur-
ance that—in contrast to the Czech plan, which sought to deport the [Hun-
garian] population remaining after the voluntary population exchange17—
we would receive a guarantee that we could raise this issue at the peace 
negotiations and that the Soviet Union would support our request that the 
Hungarian population remaining there be assured every democratic right. 
Undoubtedly the situation will be similar vis-à-vis the Hungarians of Roma-
nia as well; moreover, it was established that under the terms of the armi-
stice, Hungary has the right to raise certain territorial claims against Roma-
nia.18 I must say that concerning this formulation—that Hungary has the 
Rákosi states that “there is talk that I may have to go to Moscow in connection with 
the preparation for the peace negotiations;” PIL 274. f. 2/34. ő. e. About Rákosi’s nego-
tiations in Moscow see Csaba Békés, “Dokumentumok a magyar kormánydelegáció 
1946. áprilisi moszkvai tárgyalásairól” [Documents on the Hungarian Government 
Delegation’s Negotiations in Moscow in April 1946], Régió 3 (1992): 160–171 as well as 
Document 35 in this volume.. 
16  During the Hungarian government delegation’s visit of April 1946, the Soviet side 
made concessions concerning the Hungarian reparations obligation. The deadline for 
the reparations payments was extended from six to eight years, and the Hungarian 
government’s debt for the railway lines built by the Red Army was waived, as was a 
penalty of 6 million dollars. 
17  According to the February 27, 1946, Slovak-Hungarian agreement on population 
exchanges, as many Hungarians could be deported from Czechoslovakia as ethnic 
Slovaks who reported to the authorities their desire to leave Hungary in the future 
and live in the Slovak state. The representatives of the two governments were already 
accusing each other of violating the agreement during the applications for resettle-
ment, but relations between the two countries truly became tense when, in June 
1946, the public also became aware that Czechoslovakia, independently of the agree-
ment on population exchanges, wanted to deport an additional 200,000 Hungarians 
from the country and had requested the support of the peace conference for this.
18  Article 19 of the ceasefire agreement signed with Romania on September 12, 1944, stated 
that Transylvania or the larger part of it be returned to Romania. This highest-level 
Soviet decision, which, based on the recommendation of the so-called Litvinov Commis-
sion, voted to give all of Transylvania to Romania, was reached in the first half of Sep-
tember 1945. See István Vida, “A Szovjetunió és a magyar békeszerződés előkészítése” 
[The Soviet Union and the Drafting of the Hungarian Peace Treaty], Külpolitika 3 (1997).
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right to raise certain territorial claims—our people, jumping the gun, took 
this a little further and presented it as if the right to raise the issue at the 
same time meant that the Soviet Union fully supported this matter. 
Undoubtedly a certain exaggeration occurred on the part of the return-
ing delegation in this regard. Nevertheless, we can see that it undoubtedly 
strengthened Soviet-Hungarian relations, and precisely for this reason the 
reactionary forces went on the offensive against it while the delegation was 
still in Moscow. The comrades must recall that while Ferenc Nagy19 and his 
people were in Moscow, in the meantime the right wing of the Smallholders’ 
Party, [Kálmán] Saláta20 and others like him, raised the alarm here. Naturally 
we immediately reacted to this by attacking, but this did not change the fact 
that when the delegation came home, it found here at home a mood within 
19  Ferenc Nagy (1903–1979): Smallholder politician. In 1924 he joined István Nagyatádi-
Szabó’s Smallholders’ Party, serving as its vice-chairman for Baranya County from 
1928 to July 1930. Along with others in 1930, he formed the opposition Independent 
Smallholders’ Party (SHP), occupying its post of general secretary from October 12, 
1930, to August 20, 1945. He was one of the initiators of the Hungarian Peasant Alli-
ance, filling the post of chairman from September 28, 1941, to November 3, 1943, as 
well. He was chairman of the Hungarian Peasant Alliance from April 1945 on, and of 
the SHP from August 20, 1945. From May 11 to November 15, 1945, he was minister 
of reconstruction. From November 29, 1945, to February 5, 1946, he was president of 
the National Assembly; at the same time, he was a member of the Supreme National 
Council from December 7, 1945 to February 2, 1946. He was prime minister of Hun-
gary from February 4, 1946, to June 2, 1947. On June 2, 1947, in Switzerland, where he 
was spending his vacation, he was blackmailed into resigning by the Hungarian Com-
munist Party and remained abroad. The SHP Political Committee expelled him from 
the party on June 3, 1947, and on October 7 he was stripped of his citizenship. In 1948 
his property was also confiscated. He settled in the United States, living and farming 
in the small town of Herndon, Virginia, not far from Washington, DC.
20  Kálmán Saláta (1917–1958): Smallholder politician. Beginning in February 1945 
he was the SHP deputy general secretary in Budapest, deputy head of the political 
department, a member of the executive committee, and for a brief time its secre-
tary. Together with Ferenc Nagy, he drafted the party’s land reform plan. From May 
1945 on, he was a ministerial secretary in the Ministry of Reconstruction, then an 
employee in the secretariat of the Supreme National Council and the Office of the 
Prime Minister. Until April 1946 it was he who headed the secretariat of the party’s 
faction in the National Assembly, and later, from the fall of 1946 on, he was chairman 
of the Smallholders Foreign Affairs Committee. On September 7, 1946, he was elected 
to the SHP National Executive Committee. As he was a “person implicated in the 
conspiracy against the republic” (based on trumped-up charges), the political police 
wanted to take him into custody, but he went underground to evade arrest. He was 
hidden by, among others, Béla Varga, then Piarist and Franciscan monks. On January 
24, 1947, he was stripped of his mandate. On February 26, 1947, he fled to Czechoslo-
vakia and from there, on April 4, to the American zone of occupation in Germany. In 
1948, with the assistance of Ferenc Nagy, he settled in the United States. 
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the Smallholders’ Party that was not at all cordial to the atmosphere of the 
Moscow visit. And it is characteristic that Ferenc Nagy’s own party listened to 
his report in Parliament with rather lukewarm enthusiasm. In this situation 
the center of the Smallholders’ Party, to which Ferenc Nagy belongs, could 
have chosen one of two policies. One would have been to demand fully the 
continuation of democratization and thereby show that they had drawn the 
lessons of the Moscow visit and understood that Hungary’s healthy future 
development could be conceived only through the pursuit of a consistent 
and unswerving democratic line. Unfortunately this did not happen. Instead, 
the center of the Smallholders’ Party somehow tried to work out a course 
that outwardly was loyal to the Soviet Union, but inwardly deviated strongly 
rightward from what it was previously. As I jokingly told Ferenc Nagy, here at 
home they wanted to prove through their domestic policy manifestations that 
they had not sold their souls to the devil in Moscow, whereas in fact by doing 
so they cut the tree out from under themselves, because a foreign policy that 
is not in harmony with domestic policy is inconceivable. Displaying friend-
ship towards the Soviet Union and not creating the indispensible precondi-
tions for this friendship, the consolidation of democracy, here at home is an 
impossibility. Thus in this regard, on the domestic policy line the Moscow visit 
not only did not bring about a serious strengthening of democracy, but to a 
certain degree the Smallholders’ Party undoubtedly turned to the right. And 
this turn to the right one again underscored the phenomenon that is start-
ing to become an unbearable burden to the coalition. It is namely that, apart 
from the Communist Party, not one governing party wishes amid the pres-
ent difficulties to pursue the coalition fully but rather, except for us, each one 
attempts to be in opposition, showing that what is now happening is not to 
its liking, and that if this continues thus, then it is obvious that the coalition 
government cannot be taken any further this way. Gradually a situation is 
developing whereby the Communist Party is the only one that is truly a gov-
erning party and is forced to bear every unpopular consequence of this. This is 
the case with the Swabian question,21 where except for us all the other parties 
21  The Potsdam Conference, held from July 17 to August 2, 1945, passed a resolution on 
the resettlement of the German population (or a part of it) from Poland, Czechoslo-
vakia, and Hungary to Germany. Responsibility for drafting the plan for the popula-
tion transfer lay with the Allied Control Commission in Germany. Its plan included 
the removal of 500,000 “Swabians” from Hungary, which was to have been carried 
out between December 1945 and July 1946. For more details, see István Fehér, A mag-
yarországi német kitelepítések 1945–1950 [The German Deportations in Hungary, 1945–
1950] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1988).
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openly, but mostly under cover, made everyone concerned understand that 
this whole Swabian question was not to their liking. And to varying degrees, 
they pursued the rescue of the Swabians.
We find a similar situation when it comes to the imperative questions 
of reconstruction and the discussion of the proposal to downsize the state 
apparatus, where we and we alone have consistently acted in the inter-
est of the nation. Here, too, the other parties, albeit to varying degrees, 
attempted in part to save their own followers or class as much as possible 
and make them understand that they do not really agree with this entire 
affair. This gained expression above all in each one declaring that it did not 
even expect anything special from this move. And it thus fundamentally 
demeans the importance of the entire matter.
A similar situation exists, for example, in the restoration of labor dis-
cipline, where it is an increasingly common occurrence that the Commu-
nist Party demands labor discipline in the factories, while the Social Demo-
cratic Party in the best case remains idle on this question, but more than 
once has openly opposed it. In this regard the position of the coalitions is 
growing quite difficult, because more and more the tasks are those that can 
be solved only through united strength and cannot be solved if one party 
works while the others just watch or even pull development backwards. 
Thus, from this situation, where the Communist Party is, practically speak-
ing, the lone governing party, a situation is gradually beginning to emerge 
in which it is we who are responsible for every difficulty. This is best seen, 
for example, in the general antipathy received by the Supreme Economic 
Council, which they want to portray simply as a communist organization. 
The absolutely necessary, unpleasant, often crucial economic measures have 
been successfully ascribed by and large to our party.
The popular movement that we launched in January and February22 
had similar results in some respects. Today it is now possible to calculate 
22  The rural, peasant demonstrations aimed at defending the distributed lands, and 
the ever-widening mass protest of the workers dissatisfied by the extremely grave 
economic situation, were utilized by the Hungarian Communist Party to exert pres-
sure on the government “from below” as well. At the rally held in the Sports Hall in 
Budapest on February 16, 1946, General Secretary Mátyás Rákosi presented the Com-
munist Party’s proposal for resolving the country’s economic and financial situation, 
which was intended as the action plan for the mass movement as well. Following the 
speech at the Sports Hall, the mass movements across the country gained strength, 
also spreading to areas where previously they had hardly occurred or not at all; 
Balogh, Parlamenti és pártharcok, 175–180.
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the balance of the popular movement. Undoubtedly the result of the popu-
lar movement is, on the whole, positive. It was necessary and it was cor-
rect to rouse the masses for the defense of democracy, the completion of 
the land reform, and the removal of reactionary officials. So in this regard, 
the popular movement was undoubtedly quite a significant step forward 
in beating back reaction. The reason I emphasize this so sharply is because 
afterwards I want to present its negative side. For in connection with the 
popular movement not only the positive but also the negative sides of our 
party, its errors, have come to light. Its positive side was that it turned 
out that from Szatmár County to Vas County, we truly were able to move 
the masses, primarily the village masses, in favor of democracy. This mass 
movement naturally was not uniform everywhere. Beyond the Tisza, in the 
Viharsarok it was substantially stronger than in Transdanubia, but in any 
case it showed that in this regard our party is strongly interwoven with the 
masses. At the same time, however, there was a host of indiscretions and 
all sorts of left-wing sectarian phenomena, which in many places substan-
tially detracted from the result; indeed, there were places where the excess 
was so strong that it wiped out the good result in a moment. And in more 
than one place, they led to our party losing its initial sympathy and the 
non-communist masses pulling back from the party precisely because of the 
excesses, fighting, and indiscretions, as well as the party becoming isolated 
in such places. And  with such excesses, we gave the other parties an oppor-
tunity to attack us quite thoroughly and reduce our influence in such places. 
The situation today in the country is that the people are by and large tired. 
This is a natural symptom after every war. And the people want tranquil-
ity and peace. This factor, however understandable, is extremely dangerous, 
because after all, rest is possible only if we have done a thorough job, and 
the fact that people demand order and peace, if we are not careful, provides 
grist for the mill of reaction, because in our opinion, we can only rest when 
we have completed the work, when we have secured every achievement of 
democracy, and unfortunately we are still far away from this state of rest. 
Because of this we must continue to pursue the existing policy, direct-
ing the vigilance of the people to those dangers that threaten democracy, 
and must not permit any state of rest from which reaction could profit. We 
will have no choice in the future as well but to continue urging our peo-
ple, including of course the workers, to those difficult tasks, the resolution 
of which is still before us. But in any case changes must be made to our 
tactics here and it must be shown that our activity is actually that which 
serves to achieve this peace and reaction is that which is now playing the 
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subversive role. This may be shown in part with such conspiracies, which 
in essence are the beginnings of a civil war; it may be shown by the fact 
that all their measures that disturb economic strengthening, reconstruc-
tion, and the good-neighborly attitude towards our neighbors (and reaction 
does all this) at the same time disturb the much-needed peace as well. So 
this weapon must be turned around and reaction portrayed as that which 
is responsible for our not being able to restore the much-needed order and 
peace. The gigantic advantage of the Communist Party last year during the 
wartime disruptions was what we call, let us say, pioneer spirit: bold initia-
tive and the undertaking of difficult tasks. In these weeks and months, it 
was truly nation-saving work when the Communist Party literally grasped 
people by the collar, shook them out of their lethargy, and thrust them 
onto those tasks which the nation’s interest demanded at that moment. 
Since then, however, the situation has changed, the parties have formed, 
the classes have recovered from their lethargy, and now we must change 
these methods, because if we work in May 1946 as we did in February 1945, 
then despite our best intentions, the result will be that those who no lon-
ger consider this method as necessary as it was last year will turn against 
us. Our comrades in the meantime also became used to this method. Our 
comrades everywhere speak even today, when a task must be completed, 
as if we were in February of last year and still today work with the same 
methods. Which was correct last year. This year, however, these methods 
must be changed to a certain degree. And one more thing: last year one of 
our mistakes was that, although we worked properly, we did not think of 
using our work immediately for strengthening and organizing the party. 
Many communists worked in such a way that this question completely dis-
appeared from view. They were unable to use their jobs and positions to 
increase the party’s influence. Furthermore, they became so accustomed in 
these weeks and months to the broad lines that they somewhat neglected 
the mass agitation work. It must be said that the breeding ground for this 
negligence exists in the party’s leading stratum. 
The party—as the comrades know—at that time, and to a certain 
degree even today, was composed of two main strata: one is the illegal com-
rades here at home, the other the comrades returned from emigration. It 
is characteristic of both strata that over many years their major strength 
was to work out the broad political lines, to point out the international con-
nections, the fight of the working class against fascism, or the great prob-
lems of the working class, and little time remained for mass agitation, spe-
cial communist work. Our illegal comrades did not become used to this; in 
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fact, it was impossible to freely become used to it, as, let us say, the legal 
Social Democrats had the opportunity for this. And the result was that now, 
after the liberation, we continued to excel in questions affecting the broad 
lines, the entire nation or the entire capital, in which we undoubtedly were 
ahead of all the other parties, whereas we were unable to work out suffi-
ciently the everyday agitation work, the mass work, that could answer the 
everyday small questions of the masses. To a certain degree the Muscovite 
emigration also found itself committing this error. With us this was deliber-
ate. During the war, for example, when we operated the Kossuth Radio, we 
suffered greatly from the fact that we were able to provide the country the 
broad political line, but we were unable, lacking data and local knowledge, 
to convert this broad line for the individual villages and towns or for use 
in everyday practical life. And the result was that gradually we grew accus-
tomed to watching primarily the broad line and, for lack of data and local 
knowledge, neglected the agitation work, and now, when this work is begin-
ning to come to the fore, we are of course weak at this. In this regard, the 
events of February and March are a typical example. In February the fac-
tory committee elections took place, and these factory committee elections 
did not turn out well for us, because we were not prepared. Last year the 
factory committee elections were conducted in an atmosphere in which the 
Communist Party did not particularly have to exert itself. 
This year, under the changed conditions, these factory commit-
tee elections should have been prepared by preliminary agitation lasting 
weeks or months, and there were problems in this preparation, which 
showed in the factory committee elections. At the same time, when reac-
tion was being driven back in high politics, the large mass rally of March 
723 was a proper, carefully planned line. In other words, at the same time 
that, in national politics, the Communist Party once again proved that it 
23  On March 5, 1946, representatives of the Hungarian Communist Party, the Social 
Democratic Party, the Council of Trade Unions, and the National Peasant Party held 
a joint discussion on the political situation. They passed a resolution that they would 
cooperate in defending the land reform, slowing inflation, purging the administrative 
apparatus, and to remove the politicians they considered right-wing from the Small-
holders’ Party. It was also at this time that they decided, in order to achieve their 
demands, to organize a mass demonstration for March 7, 1946. The general assembly 
adopted a resolution that a delegation from the Executive Committee of the Leftist 
Bloc, which had been formed in the meantime, handed to the prime minister the next 
day. The left-wing parties gave a deadline of 10 a.m. on March 12 for acceptance of 
their demands. See “A demokratikus pártok és Budapest népének határozata” [Resolu-
tion of the Democratic Parties and the People of Budapest], Szabad Nép, March 8, 1946. 
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stood in control of the situation, that it was leading Hungarian democ-
racy, in the minor questions of detail, an error crept into the factory com-
mittee elections. And from this we must learn, comrades. All the more so 
since the big questions affecting the entire country or international ques-
tions do not come along every day. Not every day is there a land distribu-
tion; not every day is there a republic established or a protest rally, a mass 
movement like what we carried out in February and March. The more life 
becomes stabilized, the greater significance this agitation work has. And 
now our party must realize that in addition to continuing to maintain the 
broad outlook, agitation work must at all costs be put at the forefront. 
As we shall see, reconstruction itself demands this agitation work. In all 
those areas where the Communist Party works, above all in the facto-
ries, partly as a consequence of these great battles that we waged for the 
strengthening of democracy, we neglected the factories, and this must be 
quickly compensated for. And it must be made up for in such a way that 
we carefully examine the questions of the factory, and in solving every-
day questions, too, we must show that we are at least as good at it as the 
Social Democratic Party, if not better.
The situation is similar in the trade unions. In recent months the Com-
munist Party has somewhat neglected work in the trade unions, and it 
is especially in the most significant trade union, the Trade Union of Iron 
Workers, that the weakest communist work is being conducted. And this 
must be changed at all costs, because if we do not change it, then what will 
happen is that the Social Democrats, who are ahead of us with long decades 
of legal practice and experience—this is their advantage—will overcome 
us in agitation work. And we must beware of an opinion evolving in the 
plants, the factories, and the trade unions that, although the communists 
understand the national questions very well, they are unable to demon-
strate sufficient results in protecting and elaborating the everyday minute 
concerns of the workers. If this impression arises among the working class, 
sooner or later this will undermine the party’s influence, because the simple 
person does not judge the party so much by broad national lines, but rather 
in his everyday concerns, everyday minute issues, that appear day after day, 
how well prepared it is to handle these questions. Here, too, the situation is 
the same, namely while huge questions were on the agenda, the workers did 
not really show much concern either. Now, however, the minute concerns 
are beginning to flood into the forefront, and we must understand that, 
besides maintaining our broad policy outlook, we must apply ourselves to 
this agitation work, mass agitation work.
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The situation is similar in the village. We completed the land distribu-
tion, and we led the defense of the results of the land distribution as well. 
So here, too, in the broad picture we completed the work or the leading part 
of that work that falls to the Communist Party in such a situation. But now 
come the defense and improvement of these results, and this demands not 
just a broad, national policy, but everyday agitation work there in the vil-
lage. And more and more the signs are multiplying that our comrades do not 
understand this. And just as nature abhors a vacuum, so, too, does politics. 
And if we neglect this agitation in the village, someone else, a non-commu-
nist, will perform it for us. And with this we promote the undermining of 
communist influence. There as well the view will emerge that whenever land 
must be distributed or the result must be defended, the Communist Party 
is good, but if copper sulfate is needed, or it is necessary to intervene in 
the distribution of the animal quota per village, there it seems the Commu-
nist Party is no longer up to the task. And just as in the factories the simple 
person will, in the long run, evaluate the party’s activity first and foremost 
through agitation, in the village, this is even more so. There, as is well known, 
political sophistication and the appreciation of the successes achieved in the 
broad national lines play even less of a role than in the factories.
The situation is similar, for example, in our municipal policy. In con-
nection with the normalization, municipal policy is more and more impor-
tant in the life of the simple resident of the village or small town, but 
also of the capital. And in this regard we communists are lagging very far 
behind, in part due to historical reasons. Everyone knows that the Social 
Democratic Party participated in the leadership of the capital and of many 
provincial towns for more than two decades. They have, so to speak, an 
advantage of two decades in this regard, and we must make up for this 
advantage literally in a matter of months, because otherwise we will fall ter-
ribly behind. Whoever, for example, regards the municipal life of the capi-
tal, Budapest, and municipal policy must state that in this area the Social 
Democrats are beating us resoundingly. And yet precisely because condi-
tions are beginning to be normalized, the municipality and the capital 
increasingly reach into the everyday life of the simple person. And if there 
the workers and the petty bourgeois become accustomed to the idea that 
the communists do not understand such things and cannot deal with them, 
whereas the Social Democrats do understand them and can deal with them, 
then the absolute consequence of this will be that our party’s influence will 
decrease, and as a result of the failure to understand municipal policy, we 
will lose a sizeable share of our influence.
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The situation is similar in the press. The rural press in particular shows 
very clearly this dual profile of our party. It shows on the one hand that we 
understand the broad political lines. This partly stems from the fact that, 
let us say, the provincial press copies the well-elaborated line of the com-
munist press of the capital, and in this regard it undoubtedly outdoes the 
local press of the other parties. But at the moment it is a question of the 
local application of the broad communist policy; there we are immeasurably 
weak and lag far behind the other parties in this regard. So we must make 
changes in this regard as well.
Concerning agitation work, we must make changes to our peasant 
policy as well. Beyond the fact that we know, broadly speaking, that we 
are protecting the new farmers, protecting the interests of the poor peas-
antry, and that we are fighting against the kulaks, outside of these broad 
lines our peasant policy is extremely weak. And this naturally is reflected 
especially in the peasant press, in Szabad Föld and Dózsa Népe. Whereas it 
also holds true here that the practical confirmation of our correct political 
line is provided by performing those everyday minute tasks from which the 
simple person can judge the correctness or incorrectness of our policy. So 
one lesson from this is that not only in the factories and the trade unions 
and the municipal hall must we quickly and thoroughly make up the short-
coming and disadvantage that exist in our party vis-à-vis the other par-
ties. We must also work out a peasant policy, going into details, how the 
broad lines—let us say, helping the new farmers recover—can be reinforced 
through small and detailed regulations. Because if we do not do this, then 
the poor peasantry, for all its sympathy, will sooner or later turn away from 
us. In this respect it is extremely characteristic that when we are out among 
the workers and speak about the great political questions, a considerable 
number of the speakers, involuntarily, unconsciously bring up everyday 
concerns. For example, now the piece-wage question24 is playing a large 
role throughout the factories. The piece-wage question is one in which our 
party essentially has taken only a theoretical position and as it turns out, a 
considerable number of our comrades, not even those in the trade unions, 
see the entire significance of this question. Yet this is a question of no less 
than giving a giant impetus to labor discipline and providing an elabora-
tion of a wage system in which he who works more also receives more, and 
24  The piece-wage, a form of payment by results, meant a wage earned for completing a 
set number of pieces of work (in contrast to the hourly wage).
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he who works poorly should receive less if possible. Because otherwise the 
encouragement that motivates the workers to give their all under the pres-
ent conditions will be lacking. This question is a topic of debate throughout 
the factories. This is indeed what the workers are talking about all over the 
entire country and, sure enough, this is not expressed in our party’s press 
and everyday work. This is a question of such importance that it interests 
the entire proletariat at present. The piece-wage system, and agitation work 
in general, takes on gigantic importance the moment we link it to recon-
struction. I want to speak about reconstruction separately, but in any case 
I must say that the engine of reconstruction, just as in every major step 
previously, must be the Communist Party, the reason being that the other 
parties either do not really want democracy to carry out reconstruction 
and thereby grow strong—I am thinking in this respect of a significant 
part of the Smallholders’ Party—or they turn up their noses at reconstruc-
tion, because this demands a sacrifice also from those masses whom those 
parties represent, and naturally they are loath to perform such unpleas-
ant tasks. Extremely typical of just how deliberate it is in the right wing 
of the Smallholders’ Party that economic chaos and economic difficulties 
help reaction and weaken democracy is the observation that these people 
greeted these good spring May rains rather gloomily, regarding them as an 
attack against them, since, after all, it cleared up one of our burning ques-
tions, it provided an opportunity for an average harvest, and they naturally 
disapproved of this as the strengthening of democracy, so that we must 
understand that reconstruction will be a gigantic battle. The decisive eco-
nomic battle of democracy, it must be said. And if we win reconstruction, 
undoubtedly we will have taken an enormous step forward on the path to 
consolidating Hungarian democracy. And one precondition of reconstruc-
tion will be how we can, so to speak, convert the communist broad line into 
money, to implement it on a small scale everywhere where the critical com-
ponents of reconstruction are underway, in the factories, in the villages, in 
the municipal hall, etc. Now it is this agitation work that is coming to the 
forefront, comrades!
The broad line remains, but it is this agitation work, the mass work, 
that will have increasingly greater significance. And it is this mass work 
that will ensure the success of reconstruction, and if we cannot perform 
this mass work properly, then reconstruction will suffer. Let us examine in 
this regard what our attitude is to the other parties with whom we want to 
tackle the question of reconstruction. Let us take first of all the Social Dem-
ocratic Party, which stands closest to us. There are serious problems with 
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the Social Democratic Party. Outwardly this is not so visible; it is obscured 
in part by the success of the May Day parade, in part by the Moscow trip, 
etc., but it must be stated that there are serious problems within. In recent 
months the Social Democratic Party essentially has become alienated from 
us. We sought the reason for this. Comrade Kádár25 very wittily pointed out 
that the lesson the Social Democratic Party drew from the elections was 
that this was the defeat of the Social Democratic Party not at the hands of 
the Smallholders but rather the communists. Those of us familiar with the 
mood of the Social Democratic Party around the election know this very 
25  János Kádár (1912–1989): communist politician. From January 19, 1945, he became a 
member of the central committee in Budapest organized after the front had passed 
through. From January 21 to April 28, 1945, he was deputy police chief for Greater 
Budapest. From April 28 to May 21, 1945, he was secretary of the regional party com-
mittee for Greater Budapest, and from April 13, 1945, he was a member of the Hun-
garian Communist Party (HCP) Central Committee Secretariat and head of the cadre 
department. From November 22, 1945, to August 18, 1948, he was secretary of the 
the HCP party committee in Greater Budapest. At the Third Congress of the HCP in 
late September 1946, in addition to his membership on the CC and Politburo, he was 
elected deputy general secretary. On April 22, 1948, he became deputy to Mihály Far-
kas on the military committee created by the Politburo. From March 17, 1948, he was 
head of the “unity committee” preparing the unification of the two workers’ parties in 
Greater Budapest, as well as a member of the national HCP–SDP (Social Democratic 
Party) joint organizing comittee. At the constituent congress of the Hungarian Work-
ers’ Party (HWP), he remained deputy general secretary, and in the new party, too, he 
was made a member of the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat. As 
a result of the Politburo’s decision, Kádár assumed the post of interior minister at the 
time of László Rajk’s appointment as foreign minister, August 5, 1948. On April 20, 
1951, he was arrested on trumped-up charges, and one month later the Central Com-
mittee stripped him of all his party offices. On December 26, 1952, the Supreme Court 
sentenced him to life in prison; on July 30, 1954, he was released. After his release 
Rákosi made him party secretary for the capital’s 13th district, and on September 6, 
1955, he was elected first secretary of the HWP Party Committee for Pest County. At 
the session of the HWP Central Committee held between July 18 and 21, 1956, he was 
elected a member of the Politburo and the Central Committee secretary. On October 
25, 1956, following Ernő Gerő’s dismissal, the HWP Central Committee elected Kádár 
as the party’s first secretary. From October 31, 1956, to November 4, 1956, formally 
he was minister of state in Imre Nagy’s governments. At dawn on November 4, 1956, 
he announced on the radio station in Szolnok the formation of the Hungarian Revo-
lutionary Worker-Peasant Government, of which he became the prime minister. In 
addition to the post of first secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, until 
January 28, 1958, and then again from September 13, 1961, to June 30, 1965, he was 
prime minister. Between his two stints as head of state, he filled the post of minister 
of state in the cabinet. At the national party conference of May 20–22, 1988, although 
he became chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, he was relieved of his 
post as general secretary.
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well. The comrades remember that in October there was a conference, based 
on which all the democratic parties wanted to campaign on a joint list, and 
there a debate ensued over the distribution of the mandates. The Social 
Democratic Party demanded at least 25 percent for itself. Originally they 
began with 32 percent, then went down to 25 percent, but said that the only 
reason they were going so low was to help the poor, wretched Communist 
Party out a little. This was roughly the atmosphere in which they went into 
the elections, and accordingly they regarded the results of the elections as 
the defeat of the Social Democratic Party vis-à-vis the communists, not the 
Smallholders. 
It was not merely a simple psychological factor that the very influential 
figures in the Social Democratic Party disapproved of good relations with 
the Communist Party and wanted to imagine the entire future as much 
as possible with the Communist Party destroyed. Therefore, as a result of 
this idea of revenge, when the Social Democratic Party looked around and 
devised a plan for its future, its plan was not so much about close coopera-
tion with the Communist Party against the Smallholders’ Party but instead 
taking revenge against the Communist Party and aimed at undermining 
the position of the Communist Party. Everyone experienced this later in 
the factory committee elections, where in more than one place, the Social 
Democrats fought relentlessly with the Communist Party. For example, in 
the Trade Union Council election, they went so far as to print a declara-
tion in Népszava, the essence of which was the splitting of the trade union 
[movement] into two in the event that the Communist Party did not grant 
their demands. In this area, naturally, reactionary forces also joined in, as 
did the general discontent that stems from the economic conditions, and 
all of it led to the Social Democratic Party internally moving quite some dis-
tance from the Communist Party, even if outwardly this is not so clearly 
visible. Whoever observes, for example, the slackness of the Social Demo-
cratic Left can see how much the situation has changed in this regard, and 
it must be said that in this, regarding the idea of revenge, essentially there 
is no great difference between the Social Democratic left wing and center. 
In this regard everyone is a party chauvinist and, enthusiastically or not, 
takes this line. But this has gigantic dangers, comrades, because as we shall 
see, alone the Communist Party cannot implement reconstruction. It is 
doubtful whether we can carry it out with the collaboration of the democ-
racy’s left wing, but alone we cannot carry it out in any case, and we can-
not carry it out without the Social Democratic Party either. For this reason 
we must direct all our efforts toward strengthening the unity of the two 
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parties. This will not be easy, because after all, now reconstruction means 
roughly that the masses of every party must make sacrifices, and the Social 
Democratic Party will try to get out of this. Precisely because we noticed 
this internal change in the Social Democratic Party, already weeks earlier 
we had issued a new slogan that gave fresh content to labor unity; we raised 
the question of the unification of the two parties. The issue of the merger of 
the two parties is naturally an extremely serious blow to those who wanted 
to take revenge on the Communist Party, and it is no coincidence that this 
immediately met with strong rejection in the leading stratum. The com-
rades remember well that Szakasits26 and I gave speeches in the Sports Hall 
on April 28. Szakasits, to whom I had already raised the idea of a unified 
party, spoke extremely warmly about cooperation between the two par-
ties, but at the same time unmistakably rejected the notion of unifying the 
two parties, which naturally did not stop me 20 minutes later from under-
scoring once again the question of the two parties’ merger. Therefore in 
the near future and in the future in general, in addition to labor unity, we 
must raise the question of a united party. However, not as a direct, immedi-
ate aim, because if we do not raise it astutely, if we raise it as an immedi-
ate demand which, let us say, must be discussed at the Social Democratic 
Party Congress in August as the direct offer of the Communist Party, then 
we might easily share the fate of the French comrades who raised this last 
year, prematurely. The result was that the Right pounced on this question, 
26  Árpád Szakasits (1888–1965): Social Democratic politician. From 1931 to 1948 con-
tinuously, he was a member of the leadership of the Social Democratic Party. In 1938 
he was entrusted with position of deputy to the party general secretary, and in Janu-
ary 1939 the party caucus elected him general secretary. Simultaneously he assumed, 
first temporarily, then from 1940 on permanently, the duties of editor-in-chief of 
Népszava as well. On October 10, 1944, on behalf of the Social Democratic Party he 
signed the agreement on the two workers’ parties’ postwar cooperation. On Febru-
ary 19, 1945, he was elected general secretary of the party, becoming a member of the 
Politburo as well. From November 5, 1945, on, he was a minister of state; between 
May 31, 1947, and August 5, 1948, deputy prime minister; and from February 26 to 
August 5, 1948, he was minister of industry. In late 1947 and early 1948, he collabo-
rated in preparing the merger of the two workers’ parties, and from June 14, 1948, 
on, he was chairman of the Hungarian Workers’ Party created in the aftermath of 
the unification, also becoming a member of the Central Committee, the Politburo, 
the Orgburo, and the Secretariat. Between August 3, 1948, and August 23, 1949, he 
was president of the republic; following this he was chairman of the Presidium of the 
Hungarian People’s Republic until May 8, 1950. On April 24, 1950, he was arrested on 
false charges and was sentenced to life in prison. He was set free on March 29, 1956, 
and rehabilitated on June 27. 
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thoroughly exploited it, rejected it, and thereby further loosened the rela-
tionship between the two parties. Therefore we must learn from this, but at 
the same time theoretically, without emphasizing the date or the extreme 
urgency of the matter, we must underscore the gigantic significance of this 
question for the Hungarian workers’ movement in general and for Hungar-
ian democracy in particular. 
A few very simple and understandable points must be emphasized in 
this regard. One concerns the path of the Social Democratic Party on the 
question of whether the way the Soviet Union built socialism was correct; 
on this question, the divergence has ceased. No thinking Social Demo-
crat in the world today would say that the path the Soviet Union took in 
1917 was incorrect. Yet this was one of the decisive theoretical differences 
between the Social Democrats and the communists. This question has fallen 
by the wayside, and with this one of the biggest obstacles to the closer 
union of the two parties has ceased to exist. It must be pointed out that 
in the event of the two parties’ merger the dialectic process, when quan-
tity shifts to quality, becomes evident. One party in Hungary, a workers’ 
party that is represented by 35 percent in parliament, has greater weight 
than two parties represented by 14–17 percent. And such a merger in itself, 
without any new growth, would mean a colossal increase in strength for the 
Hungarian working class. This everyone understands, and it would imme-
diately counterbalance that certain 57 percent to which the Smallholders’ 
Party constantly and proudly alludes. Next, the question of socialism must 
be raised. Here, too, the comrades must be told that here too the situation 
has changed profoundly compared to last year. Last year in the spring and 
summer and prior to the elections, we intentionally downplayed our social-
ist nature. This stemmed in part from the fact that a quite significant part 
of the working class, but mostly the bourgeoisie, believed that since it was 
the Red Army that liberated us, the communists undoubtedly wanted a 
soviet republic or a socialist republic. And to reassure them, we deliberately 
downplayed our socialist profile. In the meantime we succeeded in convinc-
ing them that we were not striving for immediate socialism, and in some 
respects we may state that this persuasion has succeeded too well. But in 
any case, under the given conditions, since they now know that we are not 
striving immediately for a soviet republic or socialism, it is now time to 
remind our own party and the working class once again that we are also 
socialists. And in connection with socialism, it is time to call attention also 
to the fact that if 20 years ago or 40 years ago, we spoke of socialism as an 
unattainable distant ideal, in the meantime we have come closer to the time 
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when socialism can be achieved. And if the Social Democratic Party also 
wants to achieve socialism and so do we, and in the not-so-distant future, 
then the question must be raised on all accounts whether it is a good idea 
to merge the two parties in the fight for socialism. This is all the more so 
since, in the fight for socialism, the Soviet Union will have quite a signif-
icant role in the future as well. And it is these factors that must be held 
before the Social Democratic comrades in the factories during the debates, 
and there is no doubt that this will have a large echo in the masses. When 
we made this question public to the functionaries at that certain meeting 
in the Sports Hall, on the next day, and on subsequent days, this was the 
subject of debate in the factories all over Budapest. The people understood 
that a new idea had emerged here, an idea which, going beyond the daily 
concerns, points to the future. An idea worth pursuing, so we must push 
this at all costs, all the more so because this makes it impossible for the 
Social Democrats’ leading stratum to continue that policy with which they 
seek to distance the Social Democratic Party from the Communist Party. In 
the working masses, and these working masses include the poor workers 
of the village as well, such a watchword will undoubtedly strike root and, 
for the time being, will prevent the unity between the two parties from 
weakening, while later it will undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening 
of this unity between the two parties. Naturally this will not happen with-
out crises, because after all, now that the question is being raised, we can 
see that in this regard the so-called left wing of the Social Democratic Party 
welcomes the idea about as unenthusiastically as the center of the Social 
Democratic Party. We, however, know that the situation is different below, 
among the masses, and through attractive means we are striving again to 
force the leading stratum to take this path by guiding the masses of the 
Social Democratic Party onto the correct socialist path. To strengthen this 
idea, we raised the idea of joint, unified party days with the Social Demo-
cratic Party. As could be expected, the headquarters did not accept this, not 
publicly but in the form of internal directives, and instructed the organi-
zations to avoid joint party days with communists. Naturally this will not 
bother us, and wherever possible, joint party days are to be striven for. The 
leading comrades in particular, if they are in the countryside, should try to 
realize such joint party days. (In certain places, like Győr and a few sub-
urbs of Budapest, for example, such joint party days are already being held.) 
Nevertheless, we must take care that no conflict with the Social Democratic 
Party ensues from this issue. Wherever the Social Democratic Party cate-
gorically opposes it, let us not force it. On the other hand, a method of joint 
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party days that no one can object to, and to be practiced at all costs, is to 
hold joint factory meetings. The Budapest comrades have probably noticed 
that in recent weeks the Communist Party has been engaged in incompara-
bly greater activity in the factories than before. We are holding factory ral-
lies with the leading comrades one after the other, the purpose of which is 
partly that, since Social Democrats, communists, and non-party members 
are together in the factory, this notion of unity, and the practical realization 
of labor unity in general, can be carried out much better. For this reason, 
then, in the future, wherever joint party days are not possible, absolutely 
greater weight than before must be placed on the factory meetings. And 
in this way, and by conducting good agitation work, we shall undoubtedly 
strengthen our influence in the factories and force the Social Democratic 
Party not to continue its policy heretofore of essentially distancing itself 
from the Communist Party, but rather to come closer once again to the 
Communist Party.
I do not have much to say about the Peasant Party. The situation of 
the Peasant Party is that, as a consequence of the difficulties visible in the 
Smallholders’ Party, it is undoubtedly growing. Since the Peasant Party is 
the smallest party and outwardly seems the least responsible for the diffi-
culties of the present situation, this automatically lends it a certain opposi-
tionist role, and in some places it knows how to play this oppositionist role 
quite cleverly. As a result the Peasant Party is also growing—unfortunately, 
at the expense of our party—in some places, especially in such places where 
our party is sectarian, violent, and literally provocative or unruly, and espe-
cially where the peasant masses have seen that the Peasant Party is still 
more oppositionist and at the same time not as violent, not as demanding, 
as the Communist Party. In connection with this, there is a certain turn to 
the left in the Peasant Party. We who are familiar with the party’s condi-
tions can verify this. We have seen, for example, that the new leadership 
elected at the party’s congress is undoubtedly taking a more consistent 
democratic line than the previous one. This was seen also in the Peasant 
Party taking part in the May Day demonstrations to demonstrate worker-
peasant unity. Incidentally the Peasant Party quite consistently and loyally 
fought the battle shoulder to shoulder with us in the March campaign as 
well, where together with the trade unions we established a left-wing line. 
And naturally in the future of worker-peasant unity, as well as in pressur-
ing the Smallholder democratic masses, the Peasant Party will have a huge 
role in the future as well, which in turn prompts us to deal with the Peasant 
Party now even more intensively than in the past.
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The situation of the Smallholders’ Party is a crisis that is manifesting 
itself more and more clearly. The Smallholders’ Party is a heterogeneous 
party, in which—now that we know the results of the elections—it was 
revealed that the urban element is almost the size of the rural element in 
terms of percentage as well. Recently I have often rubbed this in the faces 
of the Smallholders, because it is after all an unusual phenomenon that the 
absolute majority of, let us say, Csongrád County was not Smallholder in the 
elections, but an absolute majority of the city of Szeged was Smallholder. An 
absolute majority of Hajdú County, in other words the peasant population, 
was not pro-Smallholder, but an absolute majority of the city of Debrecen 
was Smallholder. The situation was similar in Miskolc as well. An absolute 
majority of Borsod County was not Smallholder, but the city of Miskolc was 
Smallholder. And essentially the situation was similar in Budapest as well, 
which shows that the party is by no means a smallholders’ party, and nat-
urally this circumstance is making itself felt in endless crises, because the 
interests of the peasantry do not coincide with the interests of the urban, 
conservative, reactionary, capitalist circles. And the first serious sign of this 
crisis is the Sulyok party,27 which essentially means that the capitalist repre-
sentatives of the reactionary cities have founded a separate party in opposi-
tion to the Smallholders’ Party. And with this the rightward progression up 
until now of the Smallholders’ Party and its monopoly on all those masses 
who, we might say, stood to the right of the Peasant Party, has ceased. Now 
they cannot speak so calmly of the election and so calmly of the 57 percent. 
Everyone knows that in the event of a new election, in which the pro-Sulyok 
elements would participate to the right of the Smallholders’ Party, they 
would siphon off a significant portion of the Smallholders’ Party’s urban, 
and most likely rural, reactionary elements for themselves. This is in any 
case a new factor with which we must reckon and which significantly dimin-
ishes the current importance of the Smallholders’ Party. 
Let our policy vis-à-vis the Smallholders’ Party be that we support and 
strengthen its left wing with all our might. Here in the Smallholders’ Party 
as well, if on a different basis, we encounter a phenomenon similar to that 
in the Social Democratic Party. Namely, its masses react differently to the 
27  Led by Dezső Sulyok, the Hungarian Freedom Party was formed on March 15, 1946, 
from the parliamentary deputies expelled from the Independent Smallholders’ Party 
three days earlier. A few weeks later Sulyok turned to the Allied Control Commission 
and requested permission for the party to operate legally, which he duly received on 
July 4, 1946: A SZEB jegyzőkönyvei 1945–1947 [Minutes of the ACC, 1945–1947], 186, 192.
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movement of the left wing than the leaders do. If we look, for example, at 
the peasant group of the Smallholders’ Party, then it must be stated that in 
one direction, towards the left wing of democracy, let us say, towards the 
Communist Party, they are fairly uniform. In this regard, perhaps it can be 
said that antipathy to the Communist Party is one of the cohesive forces of 
the Smallholders’ Party today. Below, among the masses, though, we experi-
ence something else. From all sides we hear that within the Smallholders’ 
Party upheaval, ferment, and, here and there, decay are quite noteworthy. 
The comrades yesterday or the day before yesterday saw that Smallholder 
party organization in Salgótarján essentially disintegrated and opposed 
the current party. The May Day demonstrations themselves showed that 
throughout the country, in small villages too, the left wing of the Small-
holders’ Party participated in the May Day demonstration, and in more 
than one place the local leaders, and even parliamentary deputies, made 
speeches at these May Day gatherings. In some places this phenomenon 
was completely unexpected. From Szabolcs, for example, which is, after all, 
the country’s most reactionary county and where, accordingly, the Small-
holders’ Party received more than 60 percent of the votes, our party sec-
retary reports that 150,000 people took part in the May Day parades and 
demonstrations. Since the size of the industrial proletariat there is quite 
negligible, undoubtedly the peasantry made up at least three-quarters of 
these 150,000 people, which in a county such as Szabolcs is undoubtedly 
a new phenomenon. It was surprising for us that, for example, in the dis-
trict towns of Transdanubia unusually large crowds turned out, and now, 
when we are preparing for our new rally, primarily in Transdanubia we 
are now receiving the news that interest is huge, and this, too, will attract 
quite large peasant masses. These facts show that within the Smallholders’ 
Party, the ferment has started, and we must reach into this and accelerate 
this process. Up till now we tried organizing the left wing of the Smallhold-
ers’ Party, with fairly scant success. However, this does not mean that we 
should not pursue this experiment further. At the same time, however, 
we will turn to another method; we want to organize the left wing of the 
Smallholders’ Party from below as well. We shall seek out a few counties 
where relations between the Communist Party and the Smallholders’ Party 
are good, where the Communist Party has sizeable peasant masses, mainly 
beyond the Tisza, and there, with the help of the local communists, we will 
organize the Left from below as well. In this way we will try to force prog-
ress to the left from below and from above at once, and thus ensure that 
the danger, which today is ever stronger, that the right wing of the Small-
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holders’ Party will absorb the center of the Smallholders’ Party and with 
this essentially the bulk of the Smallholders’ Party, is reversed so that the 
left wing of the Smallholders’ Party absorbs the center of the Smallhold-
ers’ Party, and we thereby prevent this largest party from turning to the 
right. This is also needed, comrades, because reconstruction is imminent. 
And here I will touch upon this question.
I do not want to present the figures for reconstruction here. We have 
already dealt with it in the press and in the radio speech. Here I want to say 
only that the economic preconditions for reconstruction are given. They are 
given mainly by the fact that the harvest, unless some catastrophe inter-
venes, promises to be average, in some places somewhat above average, and 
because the area under cultivation almost reaches that of peacetime, if not 
quite identical, because the area planted with grain is almost one million 
yokes less, yet conversely there are more potatoes, sunflowers, and corn, 
but taken together essentially today we are at 92–93 percent of the area 
under cultivation in peacetime and it is not out of the question that we 
could improve this by a few percentage points more. Especially if backward 
counties, which unfortunately include also Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok County 
and the northern part of Pest County, improve their harvest. In northern 
Pest County the situation is thoroughly unsatisfactory, but in any case the 
agricultural harvest—unless something intervenes—as a consequence of 
the May rains is holding out good prospects, promising an average, in some 
places a decent average harvest, while grapes throughout the country are 
better than average, so that in this regard the hope exists that we can reap 
75 percent, perhaps even 78 percent, of the peacetime harvest.
Industrial production is somewhat worse off. The reason I say this 
so cautiously, that it is somewhat worse off, is because compared to 1938, 
which we now want to take as a starting point, the matter is rather encour-
aging. Our daily coal production fluctuates between [illegible] wagons, 
which if we multiply by [illegible] workdays, means 6–6.5 million tons in 
one year, and this is approximately 65–70 percent of the peacetime, 1938 
quantity. Our petroleum production began in 1938 and was 42,000 tons; 
today it is somewhat over 700,000 [tons], which is not trifling, because 
the value of our petroleum production is greater than the value of our coal 
production. As more precise data come in, it is increasingly clear that the 
capacity of our industry is not below that of 1938, and everywhere a certain 
increase in production is occurring, in some places more, in some places 
less, but in any case such that, if perhaps not at the beginning of August, 
but during the year following August 1, the hope that it will reach, indeed, 
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even exceed, 75 percent of 1938 production is not exaggerated. Thus one of 
the critical parts of the economic base and one of the critical preconditions 
for reconstruction, a certain level of production, undoubtedly exists. At 75 
percent production, the preparation of a reconstruction plan that ensures 
75 percent of the living standard in 1938 is not an exaggeration and not a 
utopia. If we could devise a reconstruction that would raise the workers’ liv-
ing standard to 75 percent of that in 1938 and subsequently increase it by 1 
percent monthly, that is an incomparable result considering today’s circum-
stances, even if we reach only 65 percent. But in any case, considering pres-
ent circumstances, that would be an unheard-of result, and since the level 
of production permits this, we must absolutely head in this direction. 
The other condition is that we put the state budget in order, and here 
there is a gigantic difference between the communist and the non-commu-
nist positions. We communists want to carry out reconstruction by incor-
porating in this the reparations as well, which is naturally quite a significant 
burden, because according to our plans, too, approximately one-third of 
all our expenditures will have to be spent on reparations. All of the non-
communist reconstruction plans start partly from the premise that recon-
struction is impossible, and partly that it is only possible if we do not pay 
reparations or pay extremely little. But whether we take one or the other, 
in essence, anyone who seriously examines the question will conclude that 
the economic preconditions for reconstruction exist, and what is missing is 
the political precondition for reconstruction. Which means that, aside from 
the Communist Party, the other parties lack the determination to carry 
out reconstruction on the basis of a proportionate distribution of taxes, in 
other words, to put an appropriate burden on the shoulders of those strata 
they represent, and in addition, to jointly shoulder the odium and the 
unpopularity of every crucial measure, without which reconstruction ini-
tially cannot be carried out. So it is this decisive issue that will be the true 
trial by fire of our coalition. 
From the idea that we create the political preconditions for recon-
struction and force the coalition to create, in the existence of the economic 
preconditions, this political precondition as well, two things immediately 
follow. One is that we still want to maintain the coalition with all our 
strength. In the first place the reduction of the state apparatus requires 
it, because just as in the case of reconstruction, we could not complete the 
downsizing alone either, and in our opinion, no matter how much they 
reduce the tempo and the size of the downsizing, ultimately the most reac-
tionary elements of the administration will be successfully removed during 
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the reduction, and this is one of the preconditions for reconstruction. For 
this reason we want to continue to maintain the coalition, but afterwards 
we can carry out reconstruction itself only if we force the other parties of 
the coalition also to implement by and large loyally those measures neces-
sary for reconstruction. Therefore, when it comes to taxation, for exam-
ple, the Smallholders’ Party should not try to get the rich peasant or the 
urban capitalist, and the Social Democratic Party, let us say, the civil ser-
vants, petty shopkeepers, and capitalists, out of the burdens of reconstruc-
tion; this is a basic condition of reconstruction. We want to achieve this in 
two ways: one is that we must absolutely press the battle against reaction. 
Reconstruction will include, for example, this time a truly unrelenting fight 
against speculation and black-marketeering. This will be the psychological 
atmosphere before the commencement of reconstruction and one of the 
guarantees after the commencement of reconstruction that the enemies of 
reconstruction will not undermine the success with simple economic sabo-
tage. Secondly, a relentless fight in politics against reaction and a resolute 
behavior towards the other parties, which will make them understand that 
we must stay together and that the political preconditions for reconstruc-
tion cannot be made more difficult. 
Complicating this question is the fact that the issue of the peace settle-
ment also falls precisely in these days and weeks. I remember the first peace 
settlement, the Trianon peace treaty. That brought about a feverish state 
in the country literally for months. Every day the widest range of rumors 
circulated one after the other. One minute we got back Transylvania all 
the way to Nagyszeben [Sibiu]:  , and the next the Romanians received the 
entire territory up to the Tisza River. Out of this each attempted to pursue 
his own political agenda at the time. And the situation will undoubtedly be 
this way today as well. The uncertainty prior to the peace negotiations is 
fertile soil for all kinds of reactionary propaganda and rumor-mongering. 
And we already feel this now. For example, because the Paris Peace Confer-
ence restored to Romania its borders with Hungary, reaction is trying to 
suggest that it was not worth going to the Soviet Union because, behold, 
nothing came of it. And this has been voiced in the press as well. I read an 
article of Parragi’s which compares it to an enormous blow, whereas we still 
remember very well that one year ago, everyone would have licked all 10 
fingers if the Trianon borders had been guaranteed to him. So this foreign-
policy situation is what makes the battle for reconstruction more difficult 
for us because, by virtue of the uncertainties of the peace treaties, reaction 
receives an opportunity for a quite useful maneuver and could disturb the 
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political climate that is needed to prepare and carry out reconstruction. 
Now, having brought the question to the public’s attention, we can actually 
see approximately those points where they want to torpedo reconstruction, 
and here, naturally, foreign-policy considerations also play a role. One is 
that we do not know what it will cost to maintain the Red Army, we do not 
know what we will receive from abroad, whether our gold and our assets 
taken out of the country28 are returned to us. The answer of the Smallhold-
ers’ Party, for example, regarding our reconstruction plans is lying here 
beside me, and this explicitly states that there can be no talk of reconstruc-
tion until we know what we will get back out of our assets that were carried 
off to the West. So there is no doubt that great battles will occur in this 
regard, and the Smallholders’ Party, but most likely the Social Democratic 
Party as well, will attempt to place the responsibility for the unpopular 
measures of reconstruction on us. 
As to the way this will happen, the comrades just saw the tug-of-war 
surrounding the Czech treaty. The question of the Czech voluntary popula-
tion exchange naturally is not popular anywhere, not with us in the Com-
munist Party either, but we accept it as a necessity and hold ourselves to 
this. The Smallholders’ Party, however, seeing the unpopularity, is trying 
to conduct a policy that outwardly shows that they are not doing it of their 
own accord. The comrades saw the maneuver whereby they first submitted a 
proposal, which is essentially a rejection of it, and afterwards, when this did 
not succeed, they abstained from voting. If, therefore, in such a non-crucial 
question they take a line that is so contrary to the spirit of the coalition as 
28  Beginning in the fall of 1944, the Germans and the Arrow Cross transported a signifi-
cant proportion of the Hungarian national wealth to Austria, Germany, and Czecho-
slovakia. Taken away was a great deal of the railway rolling stock (locomotives, cars), 
the ships, the most important machines, raw materials, livestock, artworks, and the 
gold supply of the Hungarian National Bank—a significant portion of which wound 
up in the American zone of occupation. The matter of returning Hungarian assets 
taken to the West (the value of which was estimated by the Soviets at 3 billion dol-
lars) was discussed on several occasions at the meetings of the Allied Control Com-
mission in Hungary, but the idea that this was the reason for the poor Hungarian 
economic situation was firmly rejected by the Anglo-American powers. Following the 
visit of the Hungarian government delegation to Washington between June 8 and 25, 
1946, the American government decided to return the gold supply, which arrived in 
Budapest on August 6, 1946. For more, see István Vida, “Harminc tonna arany hazak-
erül” [Thirty Tons of Gold Comes Home], História 3 (1979), and János Botos, A Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank története II. Az önálló jegybank 1924–1948 [The History of the Hungar-
ian National Bank, II. The Independent Central Bank, 1924–1948] (Budapest: Prescon 
Kiadó, 1999), 278–283, 303–305.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   215 2015.02.17.   6:53
216 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY
well as the needs of the nation, one can imagine just how difficult it will be 
to force them to take the unpopular measures of reconstruction. We foresaw 
these difficulties, and for this reason we worked out the following plan for 
implementing reconstruction: we will try as much as possible to keep the 
coalition together. As part of this, or to achieve this, we shall strengthen 
the Leftist Bloc. And for this reason we are not really going to portray our 
reconstruction plan as a purely communist reconstruction plan. The Hun-
garian public of today is already aware that it was the Communist Party 
that launched reconstruction. For us this is sufficient; now we will share in 
introducing this question with the Social Democratic Party and the Peasant 
Party as well. We will send our proposal over to the Social Democratic Party. 
(I believe this already happened today.) We will send it to the Peasant Party 
as well, we will agree upon a common program, and thereafter we will repre-
sent it as the common program of the left wing, and as such, it will naturally 
be much more difficult for the Smallholders’ Party to get out of it. We will 
see to it that everyone supports the question of reconstruction from below 
as well. For example, next week the trade union will go to the government 
and inform them that the current system of paper money, and everything 
connected with it, is no longer tenable and that it demands from the gov-
ernment the reconstruction program. This same idea, primarily the unity of 
the Leftist Bloc and a united aspiration for reconstruction in the unity of 
the Leftist Bloc, we will implement at joint rallies. The first such rally will be 
on May 26 in Kaposvár. Yesterday, for example, a delegation from Nyíregy-
háza visited me, the county secretaries of the Communist Party, Social Dem-
ocratic Party, the Peasant Party, and the trade union, and they requested 
the Communist Party’s help in establishing just such a Leftist Bloc rally in 
Nyíregyháza. We in fact agreed that during June we would hold this rally as 
well. So we will do everything to make reconstruction a joint program, and 
we will see to it that the Smallholders’ Party also truly carries out this joint 
program. And we will get reconstruction done. 
Naturally, the more we succeed in forcing them to carry out the abso-
lutely necessary economic tasks, the more successful reconstruction will 
be. It can already be foreseen that when it comes to approving the plans, 
there will be colossal battles, and for these battles the Communist Party is 
prepared. Our program work within reconstruction and the proportionate 
distribution of taxes will be that we will try with all our means to distribute 
the burdens in such a way that the industrial proletariat and the rural poor, 
first and foremost the new farmers, receive proportionately less, because 
undoubtedly, during the war and the inflation, it was these two strata that 
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suffered the most and are financially the weakest. No matter how difficult 
our conditions are, we cannot economize so much that we do not protect 
the basic vital interests of the industrial proletariat and do not do the 
utmost in these difficult conditions to help the new farmers to strike deep 
roots. Undoubtedly there will be tough battles, because it can be foreseen 
that the other parties will protect their own strata: the Social Democratic 
Party the petty bourgeoisie, the petty shopkeepers, and capital, and the 
Smallholders’ Party the fat peasant, the big kulaks and the decisive share of 
capital. And these battles will require the entire strength of the Communist 
Party. We asked the comrades here at this time in part so that they might 
see what significant battles we are facing and how difficult these tasks are, 
and so that it is clear to us that we are waging one of the biggest battles 
of the young Hungarian democracy. Whoever heard the question of recon-
struction raised and the reaction this provoked knows that the opinion is 
widespread that the young democracy will stand or fall on this question. 
If we succeed in completing reconstruction—and for us the issue is that 
we must complete reconstruction come what may—we will have achieved 
another enormous victory for Hungarian democracy. For this reason all of 
our strength must be concentrated on this question. And we will mobilize 
every stratum of our party and we will see to it that, by the fall, reconstruc-
tion truly does occur. Naturally this has foreign policy preconditions as 
well. Above all the return of the gold in American hands is decisive. We will 
see to it that this also happens.
Finally I would like to raise another question, which, like socialism, 
we have not spoken about so far. This refers to the creation of a new Inter-
national. The comrades know that the Third International29 had to be dis-
solved because developments proved that it damaged rather than benefited 
the growth of the communist parties. Comrade Stalin elaborated his view 
concerning this theoretically as well. He pointed out that the Leninist the-
ory, according to which the cause of wars under modern conditions is the 
uneven development of capitalist states, is beyond doubt. One state devel-
ops more rapidly, the other more slowly, and the more rapidly developing 
capitalist, imperialist state at a certain degree of development will raise the 
[idea of a] redistribution of the earth’s riches, and from this ensue wars. 
29  The Communist International, or Comintern for short (also known as the Third Inter-
national), was formed on March 6, 1919, and until 1943 it was this international orga-
nization that united the communist parties of the various countries. The Comintern 
was disbanded on May 15, 1943.
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And yet, until now this was the starting point of all the Internationals. 
Now, if it is true that the course of the development of capitalist states is 
not identical, but that instead there are differences among them, then it is 
absolutely true that the preconditions for revolution cannot mature all at 
once and identically either, on an entire continent and in several countries. 
When Marx and Engels created the First International in 1864, they started 
from the assumption that all across Europe the situation was revolution-
ary, equally everywhere, or at least equally in the Western states, and to 
lead and develop this revolutionary situation, a strong, centralized Inter-
national was needed. However, because their starting point was incorrect, 
the International would have been smashed in seven or eight years by reac-
tion. When the Second International was established, it, too, essentially 
started from similar bases. Suffice it to say that it was Engels who was the 
founder of the Second International, the same Engels who established the 
First. When we arranged the Third International, I remember the trouble 
we went to in order to show that we wanted a centralized, strong Interna-
tional with executive powers, similar to how Marx imagined the Interna-
tional in 1864, and not just the sorting office and so on that the Second 
International became before World War I. And this was the catastrophe 
of the Third International. Because instead of every country looking sepa-
rately for the conditions for revolution, and not trying the impossible task 
of centralizing and directing the whole movement, it directed it from the 
center. The result was that the parties gave up independent politics, contin-
ually looked toward the center, and waited for its instructions. This view led 
the comrades to announce the discontinuation of the Third International. 
And afterwards, now that the International has been discontinued, the par-
ties are coming forth one after the other to say how the existence of the 
International limited their progress. For example, most recently we heard 
from our Yugoslav comrades how much they were held back by such a cen-
tral institution, which, unaware of local conditions, sometimes demanded 
quite the opposite of what they needed. So this sort of International can no 
longer be established. 
On the contrary, the International should be such that it does not hin-
der the progress of individual parties but provides a means for individual 
parties to execute the tasks leading to the liberation of the proletariat, 
while adapting to local conditions. I should immediately say that as far as 
this is concerned, the new International cannot be compared to the previ-
ous ones. This will not be an executive body; its task will be to compose, 
to help in making objections, to communicate the good or bad experiences 
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of one country’s communist party to that of another country, so that they 
learn from their neighbors’ experiences and losses. This will undoubtedly 
be very useful, as not just we, but communist parties the world over, are 
beginning to feel that without the exchange of experiences and objections, 
they cannot produce adequate plans on international questions. It is this 
kind of International that we now intend to establish, and this Interna-
tional will help rather than hinder the international communist move-
ment. On the same note, the view will change that was widely spread at the 
Third International, for example, that we have to wait for the conditions for 
revolution to appear in at least a number of countries, and that only then 
can we instigate the revolution. I remember that when the situation was 
revolutionary in Germany in 1923, in all the neighboring countries we pre-
pared for such revolutionary action, so that there could be a revolutionary 
situation in more than one country at the same time. I remember that in 
Bohemia, France, and other countries where the situation was not nearly so 
developed as in Germany, we prepared assistance programs, similar upris-
ings, etc. History has shown that that was wrong. Now we are going to fol-
low another route. Here I should immediately say that not many people are 
aware of this interpretation of the dissolution of the International, because 
they did not talk about it very much in this period, and therefore com-
pletely incorrect views are spread among some of the parties. For example, 
when we were with the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia and we tried 
to reconcile the Hungarian Communist Party’s line on the question of the 
Hungarians in Slovakia with that of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 
the comrades announced the theory that the International had to be dis-
solved, because the international aspirations of the individual communist 
parties are so much at odds with each other that they could not fit into the 
agenda of an International. Because of this they calmly recommended to us 
that we attack the Czech Communist Party, while they attacked the Hun-
garian Communist Party. We rejected this theory. We were convinced that 
this was wrong, and that Stalinist reasoning would say something totally 
different. There is not a bit of evidence to show that the national aspira-
tions of the particular communist parties do not fit into the International; 
it points to completely different reasons. 
Now that communist parties everywhere have become stronger 
and come to the fore, the institution of the Communist International or 
some other international communist body is also gaining prominence. At 
the moment this is being disturbed by the whole list of parties preparing 
for elections. The comrades know that they are preparing for elections in 
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France, Czechoslovakia, and Romania and that our comrades there are oth-
erwise occupied. They are also occupied with the question of peace. But as 
soon as the elections die down and peace is agreed upon, at that moment 
this will come to the fore, and then we will establish some kind of inter-
national body. One part of this concept is that in these changed circum-
stances, whenever a country achieves the conditions for the liberation of 
the proletariat or for socialism, this will be carried out, with no regard for 
whether the respective country is in a capitalist environment or not. This 
is also a new perspective, which simply means that in a country where, as 
a result of the work of the communist party, these conditions are present, 
it has to be realized. This is fresh encouragement for all communist parties, 
because now it will principally be dependent on their work whether or not 
the conditions for the liberation of the proletariat are created in their own 
country.
To conclude, in connection with this, we would also like to speak about 
the question of war, given that this third world war is one of the greatest 
hopes of reaction and this hope is quite strong. It is no coincidence that in 
his recent statements, not only on May 1 but before that as well, Comrade 
Stalin addressed the issue of warmongers. It is our opinion (and it is Com-
rade Stalin’s opinion, too) that all across the world there is massive fatigue. 
After such a world war, another world war is not possible so quickly. It is 
likely that our generation will not see a new world war in the next 25–30 
years. This is not to say, of course, that there will not be clashes of varying 
size and scope, just as there was an entire host of such [clashes] between 
the world wars. However, this does not mean that one must let up for even 
a moment in the battle against warmongers, and where such things appear 
they must be dealt with unsparingly. And in this regard we are undoubt-
edly supported everywhere by the majority of the population, precisely the 
politically least accessible stratum, women, so the maximum vigilance and 
maximum counterattack are necessary against the threat of war. At the 
same time, however, there is yet another fact that speaks against war, one 
that not only the communists know but the capitalists as well. And this is 
the circumstance that World War I ended with capitalism being eliminated 
in one-sixth of the world and the Soviet Union being established, while 
World War II ended with the prestige of the Soviet Union increasing unbe-
lievably, doubt about the survival and stability of the Soviet Union was 
dispelled once and for all, and at the same time all over Europe the com-
munist parties were unbelievably strengthened. And everyone knows that 
World War III, if it starts, could conclude with capitalism being destroyed in 
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Europe, so not only the communists know this, but the capitalists know it, 
too. And this is one of the reasons why, although capitalism toys with the 
idea of a world war, it is unlikely to try to make this come true. 
These, my dear comrades, are our prospects. I have posed the questions 
quite starkly, I have shown where the weaknesses of our party are, which 
areas we must quickly concentrate our attention on, and I repeat once 
again that in addition to mass work, we face quite harsh battles, battles 
that require the Communist Party to flex its every muscle. Fortunately we 
are a battle-hardened party and are not afraid of struggle, and I am con-
vinced that we will stand our ground in the months ahead of us as well. 
The decisive issue will be the economic reconstruction and everything con-
nected with it. It is around this that every battle in Hungarian political life 
will center, and we shall make sure that we will fight this battle, as we have 
previously, triumphantly.
Source: Politikatörténeti és Szakszervezeti Levéltár 274. f. 2/34. ő. e.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 36:
Note by the Supreme Economic Council on Provisioning  
and Quartering the Soviet Army
November 19, 1946
The Supreme Economic Council, for the purpose of settling disputed ques-
tions arising in connection with the provisioning and quartering of the Red 
Army and the demands made by the Red Army—based on the discussion 
with General Levushkin30—resolves as follows:
1.)  Hotel rooms may be requisitioned on the basis of vouchers issued 
by the city commander, and therefore members of the Red Army 
are required to pay the discounted price. For this reason, in the 
future, the Reparations Office will not record the demand for 
hotels. Demands after August 1 may be reimbursed in cases where 
the requisition is certified by the voucher. 
2.)  The requisitioning of private apartments by the city commander 
may take place through the administrative authorities and the req-
uisition is to be verified in writing. Compensation is, for the pres-
ent, to be held in abeyance.
3.)  Bills for chimney-sweeping certified by the Russians may be settled 
by the Reparations Office. 
4.)  The Reparations Office absolutely cannot reimburse the costs of 
obtaining supply items (household appliances, soaps), the costs of 
laundering bed linens and underwear, and the costs of shaving, use 
of baths, clothing, and shoe repairs; these the officer or soldier of 
the Red Army is obliged to reimburse out of his pay or allowance. 
Exceptions to this are water, gas, and electrical work based on cen-
tral Hungarian and Russian permission, which may be carried out 
under the supervision of the local Hungarian authorities and the 
verified costs of which may be reimbursed.
5.)  Employment of interpreters, chauffeurs, cooks, cleaning women, 
woodcutters, and movers is forbidden. Expenses may not be allo-
cated under this heading in the budget of public institutions.
30  Major General Ivan Ivanovich Levushkin (1899–1963) was chief of staff of the Allied 
Control Commission in Hungary.
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6.)  Personal and freight vehicles may not be requisitioned for inciden-
tal deliveries, and therefore compensation may not be paid either. 
7.)  The repair of Russian vehicles and weapons cannot be reimbursed 
by the Reparations Office.
8.)  Medical and nursing costs and costs of medications cannot be 
reimbursed by the Reparations Office.
9.)  The costs of provisions demanded and fulfilled over and above the 
compulsory delivery may not be reimbursed by the Reparations 
Office.
10.)  Fees for slaughtering carried out by Russians and refrigeration in 
rural abattoirs will be reimbursed by the Ministry of Public Supply 
against credit transferred for supplying the Red Army.
11.)  The compensation for heating fuel (coal and wood) may be reim-
bursed only in the manner prescribed by the Reparations Office, on 
the basis of documents verified by the Russian and Hungarian local 
authorities.
12.)  Motor fuel may be allocated and reimbursed only on the basis of 
Russian central authorization and the special permission of the 
general secretary of the Supreme Economic Council.
13.)  Gas, water, and electricity fees may be reimbursed in the case of 
quartering in barracks; public utility fees arising in requisitioned 
private apartments are to be paid, in the case of forced billeting, 
by the Reparations Office, and otherwise by the requisitioning Red 
Army officer or soldier.
14.)  Repairs to buildings and reconstructions both in Budapest and in 
the countryside may be carried out only on the basis of Russian 
central authorization and Hungarian central authorization granted 
on the recommendation of the Reparations Office. In the country-
side, construction works are overseen by the state architectural 
bureaus and the organs of the Ministry of Construction and Public 
Labor. The Reparations Office will reimburse the verified expenses 
of work carried out on the basis of the authorization.
15.)  Russian and Hungarian central authorization is likewise necessary 
for establishing heroic monuments and cemeteries, and reimburse-
ment will also take place in a similar fashion.
16.)  At present the Reparations Office cannot pay for incidental pre-
viously requisitioned and removed property or damages that 
occurred during military exercises; nor may it keep a record of such 
claims.
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The Supreme Council will inform the prime minister, the foreign minister, 
the interior minister, the finance minister, and the chairman of the Repara-
tions Office of this.
Signed: Dr. Rácz
Source: MNL OL XIX-J-1-j SZU TÜK IV-483/1-1946 (Box 24.) 
K
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DOCUMENT No. 37:
Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Situation of Hungary
May 17, 1947
The Soviet penetration into Hungary had serious political and economic con-
sequences. It contributed to a drastic restriction on sovereignty and national 
independence, as well as to the country’s communist transformation. Moreover, 
Soviet economic demands placed a significant strain on the country’s relations 
with the Western world and played a significant role in the deterioration of Hun-
gary’s relationship with the United States. The sabotage trials involving Ameri-
can citizens created an inimical relationship between Hungary and the leading 
power of the Western world. These trials were connected to the transformation 
of the economy on the Soviet model through the ideological imperative that no 
capitalist economic interest be allowed to survive. But it would be an error to see 
only ideological considerations behind this. The interplay of “practical” and “ideo-
logical” factors, to use George Lichtheim’s words, can be detected. But nor was 
the motive of profit lacking either. Here can be mentioned the approximately 380 
million dollars in reparations and the 150–180 million dollars paid for damage to 
German property, as well as the maintenance of the Soviet Army, which, based 
on the available figures (510 million forints in 1946–1947, 180 million forints 
in 1948) in the decade following the Soviet occupation, may be estimated at 2.6 
billion forints. Only a few figures are available regarding goods carried off as 
war booty, the value of which may have been tens of millions of dollars. Addi-
tionally, 45 million dollars’ worth of goods had to be paid for the debts of Ger-
man companies in Hungary, and another 14 million dollars’ worth based on the 
1949 exchange of shares. The purchase of Soviet firms in 1952 cost the Hungarian 
treasury 990 million forints, to which was added the sum to be paid for the joint 
companies bought back in 1954, part of which the Soviet Union waived; the two 
altogether represented nearly 1.8 billion forints. The transfer of the Soviet-owned 
firms may be put at some 55–60 million dollars. Taking into account the official 
dollar/forint exchange rate, the payments made to the Soviet Union in any event 
exceeded 1 billion dollars, or five times the sum established as reparations. The 
final figure, however, may never be known.
For Hungary the war has had extremely dire consequences. According to a 
survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics, the war caused dam-
age to the Hungarian national income valued at a total of 22 billion 1938 
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pengős (which, calculated at the official rate with surcharge and rounded 
off, is 4,300 million dollars). The majority of this damage was a consequence 
of military operations; however, the damage caused by the Germans and 
Arrow Cross31 men, including the goods transported out of the country to 
the West, may be put at more than 6 billion pengős. 
From the economic point of view, among wartime damages it is pri-
marily those affecting production and transportation that have signifi-
cance. These the Bureau of Statistics puts at a total of 10.2 billion pengős 
with the following distribution:
In millions of 1938 pengős
Agriculture 3,682




Of the damages listed, fully 2.5 billion pengős went to the supplies of pro-
duce, materials, and goods, and 1.5 billion to livestock.
This great wartime destruction was the main reason that, after the war, 
production started only with great difficulty and at a quite low level. But 
other circumstances also played a role in this, including the absence of a 
significant part of the labor force, due to military captivity or being shipped 
to the West; the temporary paralysis of money circulation and the virtually 
complete cessation of credit activity; the paralyzing effect of the military 
occupation; and so on.
Today two years separate us from the conclusion of the war. During 
this time, with great effort, we have managed to reach the point that, in the 
year 1946–47, the national income has attained 62 percent of that in 1938–
1939, that is, a full 12 billion forints (1,200 million dollars). Although this is 
undoubtedly a significant accomplishment compared to the spring of 1945, 
even this national income makes possible only a barely tolerable standard 
of living. For it cannot be overlooked that the Hungarian living standard 
already prior to the war was extremely low. According to Colin Clark’s cal-
culations, between 1925 and 1934 the average national income per worker as 
31  The Arrow Cross (nyilasok or nyilaskeresztesek in Hungarian) were adherents of the 
right-wing radicalism that evolved in Hungary in the 1930s; they received their name 
from their emblem.
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expressed in dollars of identical purchasing power calculated on the basis of 
American prices for the years 1925–1934 was as follows:








We may outline the size of production in the individual production 
branches, as well as the main obstacles to increasing production, as follows:
Our agriculture lost most of its animal stocks and suffered great dam-
age in machinery and other equipment as well. The lack of manure and 
draft power that has arisen as a consequence of this make proper cultiva-
tion of the land impossible; because of the capital shortage in agriculture 
and wartime damages to the lone Hungarian artificial fertilizer plant, 
at present the substitution of artificial fertilizer for manure can hardly 
come into consideration either. Adding to these problems was the tempo-
rary, production-paralyzing effect of the land reform, affecting 51 percent 
(3,015,000 hectares) of arable land, gardens, and vineyards, as well as the 
extremely unfavorable weather conditions of the past two years. The figures 
below show the decline that occurred in arable production:0
1. 2. 3. 4.
1938 1945 1946
Column 3
as a % of 
Column 1
                                                   million  q
Wheat 26.9 6.6 10.0 37.2
Rye 8.0 3.0 3.7 46.3
Barley 7.2 4.4 4.0 55.6
Oats 3.1 1.7 1.7 54.8
Corn 26.6 18.7 13.5 50.8
Sugar beet 9.7 1.8 4.9 50.5
Potatoes 21.4 16.9 12.5 58.4
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The following figures illustrate the decline that occurred in livestock:
Cattle Horses Pigs Sheep
stock in 1000s
May 31, 1938 1,882 814 3,110 1,629
May 31, 1945 1,070 329 1,114 328
May 31, 1946 1,104 401 1,315 353
Parallel to the decrease in livestock, milk, meat and fat production also 
declined. The quantity of the latter products available for consumption var-





as a % of 
Column 1. 
1,000 q or 1,000 hl.
Milk 11,280 6,970 61.8
Fat 1,228 780 63.5
Meat 3,802 1,378 36.2
One of the consequences of the low level of agricultural production is the 
unfavorable development of nutritional conditions; another is the severe 
shrinking of agricultural exports. The deterioration of nutritional condi-
tions is best shown by the fact that in the year 1946–47, a mere 11.9 million 
q of wheat and rye were available for domestic consumption, as opposed 
to 19.25 million q in 1938–1939. The available quantity was not capable of 
covering even the requirements resulting from the severely reduced rations, 
which would be 15.57 million q. Part of the 3.86 million q shortfall that 
results in comparison to the needs calculated based on rationing, we made 
up for in corn and barley. In early May the shortfall still expected until the 
end of the business year amounted to 510,000 q, of which the prospective 
wheat and flour imports would cover 130,000 q. There were 3.5 million q 
less potatoes, 2.5 million q less meat, 0.2 million q less fat, and 4.6 million 
hectoliters less milk available for domestic consumption than in 1938–1939, 
while it should be noted that Hungarian fat and dairy consumption was 
substantially lower than what is desirable.
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It is characteristic of the decline of agricultural exports that, while in 
the year 1938, we exported 330 million pengős worth of agricultural items 
and products of the agricultural industry, in 1946 the exported quantity 
of such items amounted to 202 million forints, which, when appraised in 
1938 prices, may equal at most 34 million pengős. The situation improved 
somewhat in the first three months of 1947, when agricultural exports 
totaled 92.7 million forints; however, this result, too, when calculating in 
1938 prices would equal at most 62 million pengős, since when converting 
to pengős we must divide present export prices by at least six.
Although our manufacturing equipment suffered extremely grave dam-
age, it is not the lack of production capacity that is the main obstacle to 
our industrial production today. Our industrial production capacity rose 
significantly from 1938 to 1943, after repair of some of the wartime dam-
ages; today it now stands at approximately the 1938 level. In most branches 
of industry, however, we are far from fully utilizing the production capacity. 
The main limiting factors on industrial production are the insufficiency of 
coal production, the lack of raw materials, and the lack of capital.
Our coal production since the stabilization has risen significantly. In 
the first quarter of this year, it had already reached 89 percent of the aver-
age for 1928. It must be taken into account, however, that the caloric value 
of the current coal is smaller than of that produced before the war. The 
average heating value today is 3,781 calories, in contrast to 3,978 calories in 
1938. However, out of the smaller quantity of coal, we are also able to allo-
cate proportionately less to industrial production than in 1938. The quan-
tity of coal allocated to industry in March 1947 was only [blank] percent of 
the monthly average in 1938.
The production trends in the individual branches of industry display 
great differences, which is explained primarily by the differing conditions 
of the raw-material supplies. Production of the iron, metallurgical, and 
manufacturing industries stands at a relatively high level, which may be 
traced back to the fact that these are the industrial branches burdened by 
the overwhelming share of reparations production and a significant part of 
reconstruction production. Because the requirements of the reparations and 
reconstruction are of primary importance in our industrial production, it is 
understandable that it was primarily in these branches of industry that we 
had to concentrate our efforts. It stands at a relatively high level in a part of 
the textile industry, in particular the cotton industry, as well as the chemi-
cal industry. By contrast, the situation is extremely unfavorable in the wood-
working industry. On average our manufacturing production in March 1947 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   229 2015.02.17.   6:53
230 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF HUNGARY
amounted to approximately 70 percent of production for the year 1938. In 
the industrial branches that achieved the biggest production, iron, metal, and 
manufacturing, production may have been about 85 percent of that in 1938.
It is not possible to form an accurate picture of the Hungarian eco-
nomic situation, the development of living standards in Hungary, or Hun-
gary’s economic capacity if we do not take into account those special bur-
dens that are encumbering the Hungarian economy as a consequence of the 
war and the peace treaty, as well as through foreign debts incurred prior to 
the war. A quantitative estimate of these burdens is very difficult, on the 
one hand because quantitative data are available for only some of these bur-
dens, and on the other hand because the timetable for fulfillment has not 
been determined with regard to the greater part of the obligations abroad.
As a consequence of the war’s devastation, the reconstruction of 
the country’s economic life imposes a quite serious burden on the coun-
try. With the aim of having production as well as reconstruction and eco-
nomic development directed according to plan, the Hungarian parties have 
worked out a three-year economic plan whose implementation will com-
mence in August of this year. The plan has not been finalized; its invest-
ment needs for the three years total approximately 6,300 million forints, of 
which not quite one-third is due the first year. 
Among the obligations falling on Hungary as a result of the peace 
treaty, we must mention first of all the reparations obligation, according 
to which Hungary is required to deliver goods valuing a total of 300 mil-
lion dollars over eight years. The goods to be delivered in 1947 represent a 
value of 29.6 million dollars, and goods to be delivered in 1948 represent 37 
million dollars. These figures do not include the shares of the Petrozsényi 
Coal Mine Co. under liquidation in these years. The reparations deliveries 
hitherto have represented a significantly greater burden, mainly for two 
reasons: 1) the delivered goods, in accordance with the provisions of the 
armistice agreement, were calculated at prices increased by 10 percent over 
1938 world market prices, and by 15 percent in the case of industrial equip-
ment, whereas since 1938 prices have risen by much more than 15 percent; 
2) world market prices in 1938 were significantly lower than the manufac-
turing costs of Hungarian industry.32
32  In 1947 the Ministry of Industry established the Reparations Appraisal Commis-
sion (Jóvátételi Értékelő Bizottság), which, with the involvement of Professor 
Kálmán Kardos of the Technical University and of every interested bureau, had 
drafted the first thorough report on the divergences between the 1938 world mar-
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According to the data of the Reparations Office, in reparations to be 
fulfilled in the year 1947, one dollar would cost on average 34.3 forints, 
whereas according to the monetary standard one dollar is equal to 11.74 
forints. In reparations to be paid to the Soviet Union, the average exchange 
value would be 37 forints, that to be paid to Yugoslavia 33 forints, and the 
reparations to be paid to Czechoslovakia 25 forints in industrial reparations 
and 33 forints in agricultural reparations.
In the nine months of the 1947–48 fiscal year that have elapsed thus 
far, the state has paid out 680.6 million forints for reparations and also 
owes the transport companies a sum of 62.3 million forints. Thus, in three-
quarters of a year, reparations payments have resulted in a deficit in the 
state budget of 742.9 million forints, which if recalculated for one year 
would correspond to 990.5 million forints.
The expenses of the Allied Control Committee and the army of occu-
pation today represent a severe burden on Hungary. During the past nine 
months, the Hungarian state has spent 326.5 million forints on these pur-
poses, and beyond this there remains a further debt of 26.4 million forints. 
Recalculated for one year, these sums altogether correspond to 472 million 
forints. With the coming into force of the peace treaty, these burdens will 
foreseeably cease, but with the coming into force of the treaty, the following 
severe debit items will befall Hungary.
Under the terms of Article 26 of the peace treaty, Hungary is obliged 
to pay compensation for damages that occurred to the property of citizens 
of the United Nations. Precise figures on the magnitude of the damages are 
not yet available; some estimates put these at 150–200 million dollars.
Under the terms of Article 27 of the peace treaty, Hungary owes resti-
tution to persons who suffered confiscations or control measures because 
of race, origin, or religion. The quantitative size of these burdens cannot 
be determined; however, they undoubtedly represent a severe burden to 
Hungary.
ket prices and those established in the reparations agreement by November 30, 
1947. The commission reconstructed the 1938 world market price for 50 percent of 
the 160 goods included in the reparations, which, however, amounted to 85 per-
cent of the reparations volume. It was established that the actual prices were 
1.86 times higher than the prices set out in the reparations treaty (e.g., five times 
higher for the power plants). This meant that Hungary overpaid by 123.387.000 
 dollars. Calculating with the 1946–1947 world market prices, however, the Hungarian 
government’s loss or reparations overpayment was 283.387.000 dollars.
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Article 29 calls for the liquidation of Hungarian assets abroad and the 
compensation of Hungarian owners affected by the liquidation. Quantita-
tive data on the size of the assets in question are not available.
Under the terms of Article 30, Hungary must waive claims against 
Germany and German nationals arising after September 1, 1939. Hungary’s 
active balance deriving from Hungarian-German financial transactions is 
1,050 million marks; to this is added pengő demands resulting from Ger-
man military expenses, which, after deduction of the German demands that 
can be raised under the same heading, can be put at 2,000 million pengős 
and correspond to 1,480 million 1938 pengős. The damages caused by the 
German army, as well as those produced as a result of the measures of the 
German military and civilian authorities, amount to 4,574 million 1938 
pengős.33 
Under the terms of Article 32, Hungary has not only relinquished 
claims against the Allied and Associated Powers based on the war or acts of 
war, but it has also obliged itself to pay compensation to those persons who 
made materials or services available to the Allied forces in Hungary or have 
claims to compensation against the Allied forces not deriving from warfare. 
The size of the compensation obligation likewise cannot be determined.
Finally, we will mention here the provision of Article 28 according to 
which German property in Hungary is transferred to the Soviet Union. 
This transfer in itself would not represent a burden on Hungary; however, 
in connection with the transfer, the Soviet Union has raised claims against 
Hungary that exceed the value of the transferred German property.34
33  Based on this article, Hungary was obligated to repay its debts owed to Germany, as 
well as the debts of companies in Hungary to Germany, to the Soviet Union. On such 
legal grounds 45 million dollars in total was paid out.
34  The handover of German assets in Hungary was managed by a Hungarian-Soviet joint 
commission formed to carry out the Potsdam Conference. In July 1945 the Soviet 
Union received 280 properties classified as German. Under the terms of the ceasefire 
agreement, Soviet assets in Hungary had to be preserved by the Hungarian govern-
ment based on the instructions of the ACC. The ACC issued no instructions regarding 
this; indeed, the Hungarian side learned only immediately prior to the handover what 
constituted German assets according to the ACC. Despite this, based on this part of 
the ceasefire agreement, the Hungarian government by November 1947 had paid out 
more than 12 million forints to the Soviet Union; MOL XIX–A–10 68. d. Memoran-
dum concerning the Handover of German Assets in Hungary to the Soviet Union, 
November 12, 1947. According to the data published by Népszabadság in 1957, Hun-
gary paid the Soviet Union 150–180 million dollars for damage to German assets.
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Hungary’s prewar foreign debts in foreign currency amount to a sum 
of 1,764 million pengős, a sum that corresponds to 6,126 million forints. 
Although Hungary’s economic solvency at this time does not make it pos-
sible for it to service the debts, as a consequence of pressure exerted by 
foreign creditors, Hungary could not avoid commencing the debt service, 
even if in a quite limited scope. Refusing to do this was not possible, if for 
no other reason than because, in its present difficult situation, Hungary is 
especially strongly dependent on the support of foreign capital, which it 
cannot count on if it does not honor its old debts. The probable amount of 
the debt service today still cannot be determined; however, it appears we 
must reckon with a debt service amounting to 2 percent of the capital out-
lay (120 million forints).
The lowest conceivable projection appears to be if, under reparations 
and international obligations, we calculate 1,500 million forints, and under 
investment and other capital requirements, 2,000 million forints in the 
year 1947–48. The resulting deficit of 3,500 million would demand 25 per-
cent of our national income, even if we succeed in increasing the national 
income by 20 percent compared to that for the year 1946–47 (from 11.8 bil-
lion to 14.2 billion forints). However, the likelihood is that the burdens in 
question will require more than this, even if we consider only payments 
owed to foreigners and do not regard compensation to be paid to Hungar-
ian nationals as a burden on the Hungarian economy. It is to be noted that 
in this calculation, national income is valued at the official price index of 
November 1946. Since then the Hungarian price level has increased. From 
late November to late April, the wholesale index number increased by 9 
percent (from 101.3 to 110), while the cost-of-living index number, calcu-
lated taking into account rents, [increased] by 13 percent (from 111.6 to 
125.9). Naturally, we would obtain an even higher price level if, in addition 
to the official prices, we took into account black market prices. As for the 
future, we must likely reckon with a higher price level than that of Novem-
ber 1946 in the year 1947–48 as well. As a consequence, not only national 
income itself but also the burdens in question will amount to a higher sum 
expressed in forints.
One of the consequences of the great burdens weighing upon the 
Hungarian economy is the low standard of living. Because before the war, 
investments and international obligations demanded a much smaller per-
centage of the national income than today, the quantity of goods available 
for consumption in comparison to the prewar figure shows a much greater 
decline than that appearing in the national income.
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However, the burdens weighing upon Hungary not only depress the 
standard of living but also hinder economic development and also endanger 
the hard-won stability of the Hungarian currency. One of the consequences 
of these burdens is the strong decline of Hungarian export capacity. Since 
a significant portion of our industrial production serves reparation and 
investment purposes, our industrial exports, like our agricultural exports, 
are quite low. Thus our exports are unable to reach the level necessary for 
us to import the foreign raw materials that form the precondition for eco-
nomic development. Our commodity exports since the stabilization have 
been around 60 million forints per month, which does not even reach one-
third of the prewar monthly average. In 1937 and 1938, as a matter of fact, 
the average monthly total of our exports was 46 million pengős, a sum 
which, taking into account the price changes that have occurred since then, 
would today equal at least 276 million forints, six times the pengő amount. 
Although the average price level expressed in forints shows a minor 
increase, it may be put at approximately four times that of the prewar 
[level]; export and import prices rose much more sharply than the average.
Because of the limited nature of our export opportunities, it may be 
feared that, although the country wants to make every effort to increase 
its economic productive capacity and fulfill its reparations obligations, 
these aspirations will not be fully achievable because of the lack of foreign 
currency and import difficulties. In the past the aforementioned difficul-
ties were counterbalanced somewhat by the fact that after the end of the 
war, we possessed certain reserves of raw materials and foodstuffs, [and] 
a large role was played by various subsidies received from abroad as well. 
In the future we intend to increase our export capacity primarily through 
control of production and economic development as envisioned within the 
framework of the Three-Year Plan. However, for this endeavor to attain the 
desired result, there are two essential preconditions: 1. that no burdens 
weigh on the country that hinder the economic effort necessary for reach-
ing the goal; 2. that the international community, by extending sufficient 
credit, promote the growth of our raw material imports until we are able to 
pay for them with our exports.
The consequences of the disparity between the country’s economic 
productive capacity and the burdens on the country appear quite mark-
edly in the area of finance as well. An extremely difficult situation arose in 
this area after liberation. The tensions inherent in the Hungarian economic 
situation after the war appeared with such great force that a move towards 
large-scale inflation became inevitable. Inflation in Hungary began already 
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during the war; however, only in 1944, after the German occupation, did 
it begin to take on greater proportions. At the end of 1944, the number 
of banknotes in circulation amounted to 10,672 million pengős, approxi-
mately 14 times the quantity of banknotes in circulation in this same terri-
tory before the war. Whereas before the German occupation, the state had 
been able to cover the majority of its expenses from public utility revenues, 
after the war only a tiny fraction of the state expenditures (6.7 percent on 
average in the second half of 1945) could be covered from public utility rev-
enues. On the one hand, this unfavorable result was the consequence of 
the extreme burdens weighing upon the state budget (reparations, occu-
pying army, supplying the ACC, etc.). On the other hand, it can be traced 
back to the fact that, as a result of the reduction in national income and 
the unsatisfactory functioning of the taxation apparatus paralyzed by 
the consequences of the war, state revenues shrank to an extremely low 
amount. Covering almost the entire amount of state expenditures by issu-
ing banknotes quite soon gave inflation such momentum that as early as 
the end of 1945 it had become uncontrollable, while in the summer of 1946 
it assumed practically unprecedented proportions. Illustrating the extent 
of the deterioration is that the new monetary unit introduced during the 
stabilization on August 1, 1946, the forint, based on the official conversion 
rate, was equal in value to 400,000 quadrillion devalued paper pengős.
Under the circumstances outlined [above], stabilization carried out 
relying almost exclusively on domestic resources appeared to be a quite 
bold undertaking; however, the utterly out-of-control inflation made it 
necessary for the stabilization to be attempted even if not every precon-
dition was present. Undoubtedly, much of the success of the stabiliza-
tion was due to the fact that the burden of the reparations was temporar-
ily alleviated as a consequence of the extension of the timetable for the 
reparations payments and the introduction of the so-called progressive 
scale. But the fact that our gold reserves, valued at 32 million dollars, were 
returned to us by the government of the United States also had great sig-
nificance. With this the government and the central bank acquired the 
means by which they could not only improve the commodity supply situ-
ation but could successfully take up the fight against speculation as well. 
An important role was allotted furthermore to goods received as part of 
various charitable campaigns, as well as from army surplus property of 
the United States, and likewise to supplies of goods produced in the infla-
tionary period but held back by the producing companies, with the help 
of which it was possible to substantially reduce the disparity between pur-
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chasing power and supply. Nevertheless, the most significant means of 
success for the stabilization has been the lowering of living standards to a 
level corresponding to the conditions of production and supply. This same 
principle has prevailed in the state budget. Since the reduced reparations, 
along with the other burdens assumed in the armistice treaty (supplying 
the Allied Control Commission and covering the requirements of the occu-
pying army), still required more than 40 percent of the revenues the state 
could produce, balance in the state budget could be achieved only with an 
unsparing reduction in domestic necessities, particularly personal expen-
ditures. 
The stabilization budget, which the government submitted to Parlia-
ment only in December 1946, but which by and large had served as the basis 
for the management of state finances in the preceding months as well, esti-
mates the revenues and expenditures of the state budget as follows:
1. State administration
Expenditures 2,753.2 million forints
Revenue  2,496.1 million forints
Balance 257.1 million forints
2. State enterprises
Expenditures 1,667.5 million forints
Revenue 1,549.8 million forints
Balance 117.7 million forints
The budget of the administration and the enterprises calculates a total dif-
ference of 375 million forints, of which 300 million forints are covered by 
the credit obtained from the National Bank in the days preceding the stabi-
lization.
Abroad, where the details are unknown, it may appear surprising that 
the country, weakened by the trials of the war and having gone through 
unprecedented inflation, was able to set up an almost completely balanced 
budget all at once. In reality, however, the situation is that even if the stabi-
lization has succeeded up till now, and even if we do have reason to hope it 
will endure, we face grave problems in the areas of state budget and finance.
As far the budget itself is concerned, it cannot be ignored that in the 
budget itself, balance is provided by a total of 735 million forints, that is, 
revenue based on the issuance of banknotes in excess of 25 percent of the 
projected administrative expenditures and the shortfall of the enterprises. 
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Besides the central-bank credit of 300 million forints used to cover the defi-
cit shown, this includes the state’s share of 270 million in the central bank’s 
revaluation surplus, which was listed as non-recurring revenue and forms 
part of the total revenue of 2,496.1 million forints. It also includes the coin-
age profit, projected at 90 million forints. And it was not really possible to 
consider another solution concerning the uncovered 75 million of the pro-
jected 375-million-forint deficit either. Covering a part of state expenditures 
by issuing currency made it possible for inflation to destroy the money sup-
ply almost completely. All payment instruments in circulation on the day 
before the stabilization, July 31, 1946, were equivalent to a mere 13 million 
forints, or calculated based on purchasing power 3 million pengős, whereas 
at the end of 1937, on the present-day Hungarian territory, banknotes and 
coins totaling 473 million pengős were in circulation. After the stabilization, 
the money supply must naturally attain the normal level, which alongside 
the present national income and present price levels, may be put at some 
1,200–1,300 million forints. There was no obstacle to the state acquiring 
some of the banknotes being issued, while the coinage profit of course 
belongs to the state.
As long as this money creation does not result in an increase in the 
money supply above the level dictated by the size of production and the 
national income, increase in state expenditures in this manner does not 
mean inflation. In judging the state budgetary situation, however, it must 
be taken into account that the money supply today has attained the level 
considered to be normal with the present conditions of production (on 
April 30 it was 1,258 million forints), with the result that resorting to these 
means in the future would no longer be worry-free or could be considered 
at most within quite narrow parameters. 
Unfortunately, we still have not succeeded in fully achieving balance 
in the state budget. After the large deficit of the first two months prior to 
the stabilization, the sum of the state’s administrative portfolio revenues 
not based on the issuance of banknotes or loans has already closely approxi-
mated the sum of expenditures. In the first four months of the current cal-
endar year, the state’s administrative expenditures, along with the short-
fall of the state enterprises, on average amounted to 319.7 million forints 
monthly, whereas the average monthly sum of administrative revenues, as 
well as portfolio revenues not based on the issuance of banknotes or loans, 
was 273.3 million forints. The average deficit, totaling 46.4 million forints, 
amounted to 14.5 percent of all administrative expenditures, as well as of 
the shortfall of the enterprises, which hovers at a quite low level.
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The reason for the state budgetary shortfall is not on the revenue side. 
Revenues developed substantially more favorably than what was forecast. 
Nine-twelfths of the administrative revenues projected in the budget equals 
1,297.8 million forints, whereas in the first nine months of the fiscal year, 
1,716.1 million forints flowed in, meaning an amount 32.2 percent larger 
than that projected. Compared to the forecast, portfolio revenues also 
increased significantly, by 16.2 percent, which in nine months reached 542.8 
million, as opposed to the 467.1 million for three quarters of the year. The 
reason for the shortfall is an increase on the expenditure side even stronger 
than on the revenue side. This may be traced back to the fact that, on the 
one hand, certain expenditures in the budget were projected by too low an 
amount, and on the other, unanticipated expenditures arose. The payments 
based on the armistice agreement were projected by too low an amount; 
according to present calculations these will amount to some 560 million 
more than the sum of 968 million projected in the budget. It was neces-
sary to increase the sums allocated for investments as well. The deficit and 
investment requirements of the nationalized heavy industrial enterprises, 
as well as the needs of the equalization fund serving to bridge the difficul-
ties deriving from foreign trade, represented unanticipated new expenses.
The government is doing everything to eliminate the state budgetary 
deficit. On the one hand, new taxes have been introduced (property tax, 
excess profits tax, motor vehicle tax, sales tax on rice). On the other hand, a 
better elaboration of the taxes that have already been introduced has been 
implemented. However, despite every attempt, it appears doubtful that 
the deficit could be eliminated by year’s end. In the next financial year the 
launching of the Three-Year Plan will result in an increase in burdens on the 
state budget. To cover this excess burden the introduction of a capital levy 
is planned. Even if the capital levy is introduced, we must expect the state 
budgetary deficit to represent a serious and grave problem.
Using credit not deriving from the issuance of banknotes to cover the 
deficit could not be considered because of the low level of deposit creation. 
In late April 1947 the holdings of the financial institutions in Budapest and 
the Postal Savings Bank totaled 561 million forints, of which only 110 mil-
lion forints went to savings deposits. This deposit portfolio was formed in 
its entirety after the stabilization, because the previous deposit portfolio 
was completely destroyed as a consequence of the rapid price increases in 
the last weeks of the inflation. In the last three months deposit creation 
totaled an average of 58 million forints. It does not seem likely that the 
monthly deposit creation will reach a sum much larger than this in the 
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immediate future. Aside from the not-large sums flowing in from credit 
repayments, the credit requirements of our economic life today are depen-
dent on this minute deposit creation, unless we want to make use of the 
credit of the central bank.
However, this deposit creation can satisfy only a small part of the 
emerging, economically justified credit needs. Under such circumstances it 
would mean the crippling of economic life if the state were to make use of 
this minute deposit growth in part or in whole.
Thus, to cover the deficit in the state budget, central-bank credit is 
practically the only option, unless we consider the not very likely case that 
the state budget deficit might be covered with the help of foreign loans. 
Furthermore, a situation may arise in the future, too, especially during the 
great economic effort envisioned in the Three-Year Plan, that part of the 
credit needs of the private economy are also satisfied by central-bank credit. 
However, as we have already pointed out, utilizing central-bank credit for 
such purposes without the threat of inflation is possible only within quite 
narrow parameters. Only an increase in the money supply that is justi-
fied by an increase in production can be safely utilized to satisfy the credit 
requirements of the state or the private economy.
Source: MNL OL, XIX-L-1-k, Box 246.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 38:
Memorandum on Expenses Related to the Maintenance of the Soviet Army
March 8, 1948
According to Resolution No. 11/1948 of the Supreme Economic Council, 
the costs of quartering the units withdrawing within 90 days from the rat-
ification of the peace treaty, and subsequently of those staying behind to 
secure lines of communication, are the responsibility not of the Hungarian 
government but rather of the Soviet side, and the committee to be formed 
under the terms of the resolution has received a summons to discuss this 
question with the Russians.
The committee, under the leadership of the Foreign Ministry, fully pre-
pared the material for discussion. The establishment of contacts with the 
Soviet governmental organs was delayed because notice was given of the 
arrival in [Buda]Pest of Deputy Foreign Minister Dekanozov,35 with whom 
this question could be discussed in its main theoretical aspects and, follow-
ing this, the subcommittee designated by him could work out the details.
The deputy foreign minister has arrived, and it appears necessary that 
this question also be raised at the negotiations to be headed by him.
On the sixth day of the current month, the Hungarian inter-depart-
mental committee will hold a meeting and prepare a memorandum for the 
finance minister, briefly indicating the main theoretical points of the mate-
rial to be discussed, and it requests that the finance minister put this mat-
ter on the agenda and that he ask the Soviet side to provide an opportu-
nity to discuss the details within a subcommittee as soon as possible, since 
maintaining the present unsettled state of affairs is not desirable, either 
from the point of view of the state treasury or the private entrepreneurs.
The figures below provide information on the expenses related to quarter-
ing the Red Army:
35  Vladimir Georgievich Dekanozov (1898–1953): Soviet politician and diplomat. 
Between 1939 and 1946 he served as deputy people’s commissar for foreign affairs and 
later, until 1951, as deputy head of the Chief Directorate for Soviet Property Abroad 
(GUSIMZ) under the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. In 1952 and 1953 he 
was a member of the Radio Committee under the Council of Ministers. In 1953 he was 
minister of internal affairs of the Georgian SSR.
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Payments made by the Reparations Office
from Aug. 1, 1946 to Sept. 15, 1947: 511,295,917.48 Ft.
Monthly average: 37,873,775.22 Ft.
K
Paid out from Sept. 15 to Dec. 15, 1947 for
quartering the Red Army, etc. 17,046,461.71 Ft.
Submitted but unpaid bills: 687,955.72 Ft.
 17,734,417.43 Ft.
Monthly average: 5,911,472.47 Ft.
From December 15 on, the sum of the expenses approximately corresponds to 
the average monthly figure of 5.9 million, but payouts have not yet occurred.
Statement
of monthly allocated sums from August 1, 1946, to February 1, 1948
1.  Industrial provisions for the Red Army.
2.  Food provisions for the Red Army.
3.  Support of public institutions in relation to quartering the Red Army.
4.  Transport of the occupying troops.
5.  Telecommunication services to be provided to the Red Army.
6.  Cash supply of the Red Army (pay).
7.  Cost of supplying the Soviet forces after the entering into force of 
the peace treaty.
Summary
1. 48,373,031.36 Ft. monthly average 3,583,187.51 Ft.
2. 97,229,025.78 Ft. " " 7,202,150.05 Ft.
3. 5,878,204.28 Ft. " " 435,422.54 Ft.
4. 200,378,931.60 Ft. " " 14,842,883.82 Ft.
5. 40,362,693.28 Ft " " 2,989,829.13 Ft.
6. 119,074,061.18 Ft. " " 8,820,300.83 Ft.
Total: 511,295,917.48 Ft. " " 7,873,773.88 Ft.
Signed:  Dr. Diósszilágyi
Source: MNL OL XIX-J-1-j SZU TÜK IV-483 (Box 24.) 
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DOCUMENT No. 39:
Transcript of Soviet-Hungarian Negotiations regarding Payment of 
Services Rendered for the Soviet Occupation Forces36 
May 1949
During talks held in Undersecretary Antos’s37 office on April 20, 1949, Gen-
eral Remizov promised to make arrangements for an examination of the 
Hungarian demand arising from the settlement of accounts relating to 
utility, railway, and telecommunications services provided to soldiers and 
contract employees belonging to the units of the Soviet Union securing the 
lines of communication during the period extending from December 16, 
1947, to December 31, 1948.
On May 5 of this year, a committee composed of four Soviet officers arrived 
in Budapest from the Soviet High Command in Vienna to negotiate the dis-
puted questions. By name, these are the following:
The head of the committee: Major V.I. Vulfovich
The expert on public utility services: Captain Zherebtsov
The expert on MÁV services: Captain V.M. Chusov
The expert on telecommunication services: Major J.B. Zinger
36  Article 22 of the peace treaty signed on February 10, 1947, with Hungary stipulated 
that all Allied armed forces were to withdraw from the territory of Hungary within 
90 days after the peace treaty went into effect, though the Soviet Union retained 
the right to keep on Hungarian soil armed forces that it might need to maintain the 
Soviet army’s communication lines with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria. 
For the services utilized by the units securing the lines, the Hungarian government 
should have been paid compensation. Delegates for the two governments held nego-
tiations over this on several occasions, but only partial results were achieved.
37  István Antos (1908–1960): in 1945 he was chief auditor of the Center for Financial 
Institutions and later was appointed general secretary of the National Economic Coun-
cil. From November 23, 1945, to January 27, 1951, he was political undersecretary in the 
Ministry of Finance. He had a large role in preparing the way for the stabilization and 
in drafting the first Three-Year Plan. In August 1946 he was government commissioner 
of the Hungarian National Bank. On January 27, 1951, he was appointed deputy to the 
minister of finance. Between April 25, 1955, and October 1956, he was head of the HWP 
CC Planning and Finance Department. From November 16, 1956, on, he was first dep-
uty for the minister of finance in the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Gov-
ernment; then from May 9, 1957, until his death he was minister of finance. From June 
29, 1957, to January 15, 1960, he was a member of the HSWP CC, then between June 29 
and December 5, 1959, he was an alternative member of the HSWP CC. 
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In addition, the delegate of the Soviet Army Group Headquarters in Buda-
pest, Major Shurigin, participated in the deliberations as an observer.
The Hungarian delegation was composed of the following persons:
The head of the committee: Dr. Lajos Balthazár (Ministry of Finance)
The presenter on public utility services: Dr. József Gáspár (Reparations 
Office)
The presenter on MÁV services: Tivadar Elek (Railways Department, 
Ministry of Transport)
The presenter on postal services: Dr. Antal Welter (Postal Department, 
Ministry of Transport).
In addition, the section head of the Ministry of Finance, Lajos Rácz, partici-
pated in the consultations as an observer.
Prior to the commencement of the talks, the head of the Hungarian del-
egation through Major Shurigin asked that his thanks be communicated 
to General Remizov, whose understanding and goodwill had made such a 
quick discussion of the pending questions possible. As an agenda, he pro-
posed that, in the interests of utilizing the time available, three subcommit-
tees be formed to discuss the specific questions in their details. This motion 
was accepted by the Soviets.
Below we will review the questions relating to the settlement of accounts, 
broken down into three points: 
A) Public utility services
It is well known that in December 1948, the Reparations Office submitted 
to the Soviet High Command a statement of 3,355,349 forints as remunera-
tion for utility services (electricity, gas, water, sewer use) provided during 
the period in question. In April of this year, the Reparations Office submit-
ted subsequent bills in the amount of an additional 3,551,413 forints for this 
same period. For its part the Soviet headquarters, on December 30 of last 
year, transferred a mere 833,798 forints, namely 694,616 forints to cover 
household and industrial electricity consumed by the units assuring the 
lines of communication, and 139,182 forints for the use of water. The Soviet 
position in connection with utility services was that the inter-governmen-
tal agreement signed on December 6, 1948, but put in force retroactively to 
December 16, 1947, precisely prescribes the method of billing utility servic-
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es.38 Since the competent Hungarian authorities could have obtained knowl-
edge of the form of billing from the negotiations preceding the signing of the 
agreement, they would have had the opportunity to appropriately brief the 
subordinate organs in due time. According to the agreement, bills relating to 
the electric, water, or gas energy consumed in every case must be certified 
with the commander of the local Soviet unit, yet in not a single case had the 
local Hungarian authorities done this.
On the Hungarian side, we pointed out that, at a date well in advance of the 
opening of negotiations aimed at concluding the agreement, the interested 
organs had received appropriate instructions from the Supreme Economic 
Council, under the terms of which, when reading the meters and/or certi-
fying the bills, in every case they were to act in close cooperation with the 
local Soviet military organ. If they were unable to have the bills acknowl-
edged, they were obliged to make a record of this. In every case the Hungar-
ian local authorities had complied with this provision.
The objection to this was that as soon as we had learned of the first refusal 
to sign, we should have immediately contacted the competent Soviet cen-
tral authority. In reply we pointed out that the Hungarian authorities 
learned the whereabouts of the Soviet Central Army Group High Command 
only after the signing of the agreement.
In calculating the fees payable for the utilized electricity and water, the 
Soviet side took into consideration the data that the commanders of the 
local units periodically reported to Vienna. With regard to even the partial 
acceptance of the bills not verified by the Soviets, the Soviet position was 
quite rigid, and nor did the numerous numerical and other errors that had 
crept into the account statements (lack of documentation, etc.) make it 
possible to advocate the Hungarian position either. The only result achieved 
was that the head of the Soviet committee promised subsequent payment 
for the value of the gas consumed, though he asserted that here, too, the 
Soviet account figures would be kept in view.
To attenuate the great difference between the two sides’ positions, and with 
a view to partially maintaining the Hungarian position, with a great deal 
38  The text of the agreement signed on December 6, 1948, is published in István Pataki, 
“‘Egyezmények’ a szovjet csapatok magyarországi tartózkodásáról” [“Agreements” on 
the Presence of Soviet Troops in Hungary], Múltunk 3 (1995): 137–149.
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of difficulty we succeeded in including in the minutes the Hungarian side’s 
request that, in view of the fact that the signing of the agreement occurred 
nearly a year after the starting date, the Soviet side recognize the circum-
stance whereby the adjustment of the documents to the provisions of the 
Agreement after the fact had been impossible, and therefore we asked the 
Soviet partners out of fairness to increase the already paid amount.
The Soviet side in any case insisted on the insertion into the minutes of a 
passage according to which, with the payments they [the Soviets] had made, 
the Hungarian side acknowledged all of the utility services as having been 
paid. In the end we managed to employ a more diplomatic text than this. 
According to this the Hungarian side regarded the 1,817,533 forints paid by 
the Soviet headquarters as covering the fee for the utility services actually 
used in the period between December 15, 1947, and December 31, 1948.
B) Railroad services
For the period in question, the management of Hungarian State Railways, 
in December of last year, submitted a bill to the Soviet headquarters of 
15,719,046 forints, of which 10,619,851 forints was paid. The aim of the dis-
cussions was to examine the difference of 5,099,195 forints.
The Soviet expert, with quite convincing thoroughness, pointed out the 
errors that had crept into the billing statements of MÁV. Through concrete 
examples and documents, he proved that in very many cases the railway 
account statements contain unjustified items (e.g., Hungarian POW train 
recorded as a Soviet train); starting from a given date, the distance in kilo-
meters for the same route (Hegyeshalom-Csap) had changed; “Russian” 
documents relating to completed passenger transports were worthless slips 
of paper; for freight shipments, in very many cases the consignment notes 
were missing, etc. He summed up his observations into five groups:
1.)  1,005,159 forints could not be recognized, since the bills submit-
ted related to freight shipments were not furnished with the “No. 
2 application”;
2.)  A difference of 385,804 forints had come about because, according 
to the testimony of the No. 2 applications, the MÁV had overbilled 
by this amount;
3.)  A difference of 78,814.15 forints stems from surplus charges estab-
lished for passenger transports;
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4.)  The reason for a difference of 2,399,417.79 forints was that the 
accounting documents submitted by the state railways for passen-
ger transports were unacceptable;
5.)  A difference of 1,230,000 forints arose from the differing method 
for billing the furlough trains.
The Hungarian committee declared its readiness to acknowledge the accu-
racy of the deductions effected by the Soviet side, though it pointed out 
that the lack of appropriate formats was not necessarily due to the neg-
ligence of the railway officials. In connection with Point 4, however, it 
informed the Soviet side that the slips collected from the Soviet soldiers 
by the Hungarian railway ticket inspectors—as it subsequently turned 
out, mostly irregular—and the receipts for payment issued based on them 
proved the fulfillment of the railway services, which cannot be called into 
question, since it was not in the ticket collectors’ interest to issue such 
excess tickets (indeed, doing so was extra work for them). To demonstrate 
a willingness to arrive at a compromise, we offered, with payment of 50 
percent of our original claim (1,200,000 forints), to consider all passenger 
transports as having been paid.
The Soviet counter-offer, taking a monthly average of 24,000 forints as 
a basis, was 144,000 forints, and they cited the fact that, during the dis-
cussions in Undersecretary Antos’s office in the month of December, the 
undersecretary had acknowledged this.
On the Hungarian side, we pointed out that this average was the average of 
the first three months of 1949, which could not form the basis for comparison 
with the average of the first six months of 1948, because at that time many 
more Soviet soldiers had resided in Hungary, and furthermore, because the 
trips were not yet tied to Formula No. 1, their number was naturally larger.
The Soviet committee promised to submit the matter to Headquarters.
In the matter of billing the furlough trains, under the unanimous instruc-
tions received from Undersecretary Antos and Minister Bebrits—we 
accepted the Soviet objection, but we reserved the right in the minutes as 
well to resolve the settlement of accounts through diplomatic channels.
C.) Postal services
The Hungarian Postal Service submitted a bill in the amount of 3,014,915.17 
forints for the period in question, of which the Soviet High Command con-
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sented to pay 1,700,000 forints, thereby leaving an unpaid difference of 
1,304,915.17 forints. Of this the Headquarters rejected payment of 790,368 
forints by saying that the Postal Service had billed this sum in return for 
the use of channels and aerial cables not included in the Agreement, 
whereas the Soviet units had not made use of these;
It refused payment of 499,858.16 forints on the grounds that the account 
statements of the postal service did not contain bills for the installation 
and use of telephone sets (stations);
It declined to pay 14,689.91 forints by saying that this sum included the 
reimbursement of services (fees for of interpreters, value of removed mate-
rials) for which the Agreement does not provide.
The representatives of the postal service acknowledged that the 1,710,000 
forints reimbursed by the Soviet side settled the fee for services rendered 
in accordance with the contents of the Agreement, but they pointed out 
that the telecommunication organs had performed other essential ser-
vices as well, which they could not corroborate with documents because the 
Soviet military units had refused to verify the services (long-distance calls, 
installation of switching centers, use of telephone sets, use of special aerial 
cables, channels, etc.). In the minutes kept by the subcommittee the Hun-
garian side requested consideration of this and an equitable remuneration 
supplementing the already paid 1,710,000 forints.
In spite of the substantial differences between the two sides’ positions, 
the consultations proceeded throughout in a very cordial atmosphere. We 
must note that from the very outset a softening of the Soviet position from 
any angle seemed completely hopeless, and the positive result of the tough 
negotiations, which lasted from morning until the late afternoon or eve-
ning hours, can be measured in that we succeeded in prompting the Soviet 
partners to appreciate the circumstances of the period of 12-and-a-half 
months over and above the rigid view of the stipulations of the Agreement. 
Beyond the contents of the minutes, Major Vulfovich also made a verbal 
promise that he would submit the arguments raised by the Hungarians dur-
ing the discussions to his superiors for the purpose of a kind consideration.
Signature:  [illegible]
Source: MNL OL, XIX-L-1-k, box 248.
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DOCUMENT No. 40:
Briefing by the Main Administration of Prisoners of War and Internees of 
the Interior Ministry of the Soviet Union on Hungarian Prisoners of War39
December 20, 1949
The document below contains a comprehensive breakdown on the fate of the 
Hungarian prisoners. The reports of the Main Administration of Prisoners of 
War and Internees of the Interior Ministry of the Soviet Union feature various 
(as a rule mutually contradictory) figures concerning the Hungarian prisoners. 
The man who prepared the report printed here, Lieutenant General I. Petrov, in 
his report of November 2, 1945, calculated that there were 541,530 prisoners of 
war who had been on active duty in the Hungarian army when they were cap-
tured. The Soviet documents provide no explanation for why the report reprinted 
here sets the number of Hungarian prisoners of war at “only” 501,624. It should 
be noted that in the reports of the Interior Ministry, there are also figures of less 
than 500,000 for Hungarian prisoners of war. 
The document below does not include the “civilian internees,” whose number, 
according to a report drafted in May 1947, was 32,915. 
In 1946 the Hungarian Central Office of Statistics, in its detailed compila-
tion for the Paris peace negotiations, put the number of Hungarians who fell into 
Soviet captivity at 600,000, based on the data of the Casualty Office of the Hun-
garian Ministry of Defense, petitions looking for prisoners received in the Foreign 
Ministry, and Soviet military reports. 
The mortality figures do not include those who died in the reception camps 
in Hungary, in transit camps in Romania, or in the wagons during the weeks 
they were transported. The available Soviet and Hungarian data suggest that 
400,000 at most returned to their native land from captivity. 
1.  Prisoners of war from the former Hungarian Army registered by the 




Non-commissioned officers and enlisted men—487,054
39  Published in: Éva Mária Varga, ed., Magyar hadifoglyok a Szovjetunióban. Dokumentu-
mok (1941–1953) [Hungarian Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union. Documents (1941–
1953)] (Moscow and Budapest: ROSSPEN-MKTTK, 2006), 465–466.
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Non-commissioned officers and enlisted men—280,902
Of these, those repatriated in 1949—1,007
3. Other departures from among the prisoners of war of the former Hun-
garian Army—199,281
Including:
a)  those released at the front (wounded, crippled, unfit for work)—
126,451 
b)  those handed over to form volunteer units—21,728
c)  those sent into partisan units—55
d)  those killed while attempting to flee, drowned, committed sui-
cide—286
e)  those who died at the front—147
f)  those who died in the special hospitals of the Ministry of 
Health—12,007
g)  those who died in the camps of the MVD—38,455
h)  those who died in the separate work brigades of the Ministry of 
Armed Forces—152
4.  Those who will be held in the special camps of the MVD as of January 1, 
1950—9,005
Of these:
a)  those sentenced—1,280
b)  those to be handed over to the Hungarian authorities—6,117




Source: RGVA [Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv—State Military 
Archive of Russia] f. 1p., op. 01e., d. 81, pp. 6–7.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   249 2015.02.17.   6:53
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   250 2015.02.17.   6:53
AUSTRIA
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   251 2015.02.17.   6:53
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   252 2015.02.17.   6:53
253SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
DOCUMENT No. 41: 
NKVD Decree regarding Struggle against Saboteurs, Spies, and Bandits
April 28, 1942
At the end of March 1945, NKVD troops reached Austrian territory. Five border 
regiments were deployed in the rear of the Third Ukrainian Front and were in 
charge of protecting the Red Army’s rear. It was their responsibility to stop any 
partisan activity in the rear of the front, to protect important infrastructure, and 
to search for and arrest “traitors to the fatherland” (deserted Red Army soldiers, 
former Soviet prisoners of war, and former forced laborers). They also had to “liq-
uidate” any small hostile units that may have made their way to the rear of the 
front. All in all, the special units of the NKVD troops had almost 7,500 soldiers 
under their command.
Decree of the NKVD troops for the protection of the Red Army’s rear. 
I. The protection of the rear of the fronts is organized by the fronts’ mili-
tary council and maintained by the People’s Commissariat for Defense’s 
troop units and authorities for the rear, as well as by special units of the 
NKVD troops of the USSR. 
II. The NKVD troops for the protection of the fighting Red Army’s rear are 
given the following tasks: 
1. Fight against saboteurs, spies, and bandits in the rear of the front; 
2. Fight against deserters and marauders; 
3. Liquidation of small hostile units and groups that have made their way to 
the rear or were smuggled in there (machine-gunners, paratroopers, signal-
ers, etc.); 
4. In special cases (upon decree of the front’s military council), control of 
communication lines in particular areas. 
III. The units of the NKVD troops for the protection of the fighting Red 
Army’s rear are positioned on each front, separately from the General Staff 
of the Red Army and the NKVD of the USSR. 
IV. The NKVD troops in the front areas are commanded by the head of the 
NKVD troops for the protection of the rear, who answers directly to the 
head of the main administration of the internal NKVD troops of the USSR. 
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As regards operational aspects, the head of the NKVD troops for the protec-
tion of the rear also answers directly to the front’s military council and is, 
as defined in this decree, required to fulfill requests regarding the organiza-
tion of the protection of the rear by the military council. 
The depth of the rear to be protected by NKVD troops is determined by the 
General Staff of the Red Army in cooperation with the NKVD of the USSR. 
Deployment of the NKVD troops for the protection of the rear outside of 
normal use can only take place with the permission of the NKVD of the 
USSR. 
V. The NKVD of the USSR is responsible for the organizational structure, 
the cadre personnel, the completion of the units by the commander’s corps, 
and all other issues concerning the organization of the NKVD troops for 
the protection of the rear; no changes are to be implemented without the 
permission of the NKVD. 
Redeployment of the NKVD troops from one front to another can only take 
place upon decree of the Red Army’s General Staff and is to be carried out 
upon the order of the NKVD of the USSR.
VI. The NKVD troops for the protection of the rear are supplied with food 
(and with arms as well) by the supply organs of the Red Army, after a cor-
responding request has been submitted by the supply organs of the NKVD’s 
troop administration. Accounting for all material and technical supplies is 
settled between the administration for military supply of the NKVD of the 
USSR and the central supply organs of the Red Army. 
Source: RGVA, f. 32900, op. 1, d. 226, l. 313.
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DOCUMENT No. 42: 
Report by M.M. Litvinov1 to V.M. Molotov regarding the Soviet Position on 
Germany and Its Allies in Europe [Excerpts]
October 9, 1943
The following document deals with “the [future] treatment of Germany and 
other hostile states in Europe” and also names points and problems that were 
addressed by the British and Americans in this context. They include questions of 
international military, political, and economic control over Germany during the 
armistice period; disarmament; reparations; and military occupation. The docu-
ment also discusses the exceptional position of Austria and the four possibilities 
for the future treatment of the country.
The wording on this issue was expressed in very broad terms in the Eng-
lish as well as in the American agendas [proposal]; it contains almost all of 
the questions concerning postwar Germany. Nevertheless, we should not 
assume that the British and the Americans want to trigger a detailed dis-
cussion about all these issues or that they want to find a final solution for 
them [the issues]. Of course they would like to learn about our position on 
all these problems, although they probably do not have any real proposals 
prepared yet. I think that these questions were raised mainly due to anti-
Soviet propaganda in connection with some of our declarations and the 
establishment of the “National Committee for a Free Germany” and the 
“Bund Deutscher Offiziere.”2 Some groups of people abroad have gained 
the impression that we are planning to treat Germany much more mildly 
than other members of the United Nations do, and for this reason we are 
accused of having the most absurd postwar plans in this respect. 
1  Maksim Litvinov, deputy people’s commissioner (minister) of foreign affairs of the 
USSR, 1941–1943; at the same time, Soviet ambassador to the United States. Head of 
the planning commission for creating a postwar Europe in the People’s Commissariat 
(Ministry) of Foreign Affairs, 1943–1945. Dismissed from the Soviet Foreign Ministry 
by Stalin in 1946.
2  The National Committee for a Free Germany (Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland, 
NKFD) was an anti-Nazi organization based in the Soviet Union. It organized anti-
Nazi training for German (and Austrian) POWs in the Soviet Union. The leadership 
of the NKFD consisted partly of communists. The League of German Officers (Bund 
Deutscher Offiziere, BdO) was the section of the NKVD for the “education” of officers.
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Eden3 and Hull4 can be sufficiently satisfied with a general declaration 
on the fact that the three governments are showing solidarity on the main 
question about the treatment of Germany after the war, namely that all 
necessary measures are being taken to prevent future aggression from Ger-
many. We need to explain to Eden and Hull that it is not in the Allies’ inter-
est to already declare the ultimate measures that we will have to take in the 
future in order to disarm Germany as an aggressor and to weaken Germany 
in a military, economic, and territorial respect. A public discussion of these 
measures would only help Hitler, because it would bind the Germans closer 
together and strengthen their resistance. 
If Eden and Hull are not satisfied with a general declaration about the 
fact that there are no serious conflicts, and insist on discussing the prob-
lems they find important individually, we will have the right to ask them for 
concrete proposals about these problems. This is necessary in order to pre-
vent us from being made responsible for initiating the extreme measures 
that will need to be taken toward Germany. We can then accept some of the 
proposals, decline others, or make our own counter-proposals concerning 
other cases. In this case we are providing short explanations of the prob-
lems that were addressed by the British and Americans: 
1.  International military, political, and economic control over Germany dur-
ing the armistice period. 
2. Disarmament. 
3. Reparations. 
4. Germany’s borders. 
5. Decentralization of the German government system. 
6. Austria.
7. Military occupation. 
[…]
4. Germany’s borders
It is undisputed that any German territorial expansion from the moment of 
Hitler’s takeover—regardless of whether it occurred during the current war 
or before the war broke out—should not be deemed as territories belonging 
3  Robert Anthony Eden, British foreign minister, 1940–1945 and 1951–1955; prime min-
ister, 1955–1957.
4  Cordell Hull, U.S. secretary of state, 1933–1944.
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to Germany. Therefore, Austria, as well as the Sudetenland, which has been 
taken from Czechoslovakia, needs to remain outside Germany. By the way, 
there have been official British announcements on the liberation of Austria 
from German subjugation and on the re-establishment of the Czechoslova-
kian borders before Munich. 
[…]
6. Austria
During the forthcoming conference, Eden obviously plans to pay special 
attention to the problem with Austria and the idea he has developed about 
uniting Austria and Hungary. We need to point out that the memorandum 
Kerr5 has issued on this topic does not convince us of the urgency to pro-
mote this kind of unification at all. In this memorandum, the following four 
possibilities for the treatment of Austria are being discussed: 1) Austria 
remains part of the Reich, although only as part of a federation, 2) integra-
tion of Austria into the South German federation, 3) re-establishment of 
Austria as a free and independent state, and 4) integration of Austria into 
a Central European or Eastern European federation. The last possibility 
envisages Austria’s unification not only with Hungary but with Poland and 
Czechoslovakia as well. The memorandum provides pros and cons for each 
individual alternative. The author of the memorandum strictly advocates a 
mild treatment of Austria; in the view of the author, this country should 
not be punished for past mistakes and should be provided with political and 
economic support. The author deems the re-establishment of an indepen-
dent Austrian state as first priority. Still, Eden’s proposal of establishing an 
Austrian-Hungarian federation is unfounded; the reasons for this proposal 
do not become evident in the memorandum. This is just another argument 
for delaying a solution of the question of federations and confederations, as 
I have already suggested in my October 4 report. 
It should be pointed out that no officials either in England or in the 
USA declared themselves in favor of integrating Austria into a federation. 
In statements about Austria they said only that the country needed to be 
liberated from Hitler’s yoke. For instance, Eden said on September 9, 1942: 
“I would like to remind the House of Commons about a declaration made by 
5  Archibald John Clark Kerr, British ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1942–1946; 
ambassador to the United States, 1946–1948.
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Prime Minister Churchill on November 9, 1940, in which he explained that 
Austria is one of the countries for the sake of which we have reached for the 
sword and to which our victory will bring freedom.” He added: “Although 
the government is not able to acknowledge or support any plan for certain 
future borders in Central Europe, we need to be clear about the fact that the 
English government does not feel bound to any changes that occurred in 
Austria in 1938 or later.” Hull declared something similar on July 27, 1942: 
“The U.S. government expressed itself clearly on the question of Austria’s 
occupation and on the question of how this annexation relates to the U.S. 
government’s well-known policy concerning annexations by force of sover-
eign territories. Never has the American government expressed the view 
that the annexation of Austria to the German Reich had any legal basis.” 
Czechoslovak politicians expressed their views more clearly. Beneš,6 for 
instance, wrote in the magazine Foreign Affairs in January 1942: “To me, it 
seems completely obvious that it will be necessary to ask Germany to give 
back the booty it usurped in 1938. Germany has to be forced to draw back 
from Austria, which it has occupied by force.”
The Czech statements contain no hints about their wish to form a 
federation with Austria. In particular, Austrian emigrants, some of whom 
think that Austria should remain inside a democratized Germany, are bus-
ily discussing the issue of Austria’s past and future. The former counselor 
of the embassy in London, Kunz,7 has come out in favor of a federation. He 
is against all other alternatives and would prefer the integration of Austria 
into a Central European federation. 
Opponents of Austria’s existence as an independent state mostly 
refer to the fact that such a state would not be able to survive. Neverthe-
less, Austria has existed independently over the last 20 years—for better or 
worse—and its population has probably not been living under worse condi-
6  Edvard Beneš, the second president of the First Czechoslovak Republic and the head 
of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in London. He held intensive negotiations 
in London and Moscow about the future of Czechoslovakian statehood. In Moscow in 
1943 he told Stalin that Czechoslovakia could not be included in a federation (accord-
ing to British plans) but would be created on the basis of national statehood. Stalin 
promised him support to re-establish Czechoslovakia in its 1937 borders. In 1944 in 
the Kremlin the decision about the removal of the ethnic Germans (Volksdeutsche) 
from the Eastern European countries was adopted. For Czechoslovakia this meant 
expelling all Sudetendeutsche (3.7 million lived in Czechoslovakia before 1937).
7  Adolf Kunz, at the Austrian Embassy in Great Britain until 1938.
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tions than the people in Austria’s neighboring states in the Balkans. Here 
are some statistical figures about Austria: 
The country has a land area of 84,000 sq. kilometers, a population of 
6.7 million, and a population density of 80 inhabitants per sq. kilometer. 
Before the war, 1.2 million of the 3.2 million self-reliant Austrian people 
worked in industry and 1 million in agriculture. The domestic production 
of grain (240 kilograms per inhabitant per year) and of cattle-breeding 
products does not meet the country’s demand, but is still higher than in 
Belgium (120 kilograms per inhabitant per year), which can be considered 
an even more industrialized country. Still, the production is considerably 
lower than in the industrialized and agricultural state of Italy (300 kilo-
grams per inhabitant per year). Mineral resources to be found in Austria 
are iron ore, oil, bauxite, and magnesite; the energy resources come from 
the large potential of alpine rivers, on which a rather powerful system of 
hydroelectric power plants is based. The amount of coal extracted is negli-
gible. The metal processing industry obtains coal and coke from abroad. The 
extraction of more than 3 million tons of brown coal is more important. The 
exhaustion of oil fields has increased significantly during the war period; 
more than 500,000 tons of oil have been extracted per year. Before the war, 
400,000 tons of pig iron and 700,000 tons of steel were produced in Aus-
tria annually. According to reliable sources, Germany transferred several 
enterprises of military importance and other industrial enterprises from 
the western parts of Germany to Austria. Furthermore, Hitler’s Germany 
established quite a large number of new enterprises in heavy industry for 
military mechanical products and in the military-chemical industry in Aus-
tria. In 1939 the iron works of the Hermann Göring-Konzern were put into 
operation in Linz; 1 million tons of crude steel and an adequate amount of 
rolled steel are produced there [per year]. The most important branch of 
the Austrian industry is the highly developed machine engineering. Before 
the war, 217,000 persons used to work in the metal processing industry. 
More than 20 per cent of all Austrian exports were based on metal products 
(machines/plants, vehicles). 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Austria’s claims on a small area of 
the German national territory, namely the districts of Passau and Berchtes-
gaden, are justified. One could also give Austria back South Tyrol, which has 
been taken by Italy, but this issue is connected with the treatment of Italy 
as well. 
Source: AVP RF, f. 012, op. 9, p. 132, d. 4, ll. 178–209.
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DOCUMENT No. 43: 
Appeal by Austrian Prisoners of War in the USSR to the Austrian People
January 1945
During World War II 150,000 Austrians were captured as prisoners of war in the 
Soviet Union; 15,000 died in the camps of the GUPVI, 130,000 returned home, 
and 5,000 are still listed as missing. Besides the prisoners of war, 2,000 Austrian 
civilians were being held in Soviet custody, predominantly—unlike prisoners of 
war—in prisons or gulag camps. The following document is an appeal by Aus-
trian prisoners of war to their fellow countrymen to immediately end all hostili-
ties against the Soviet army and instead “turn [their] bayonets against Hitler.” 
Propaganda writings of that sort were usually airdropped near battlefronts.
Appeal 
by the Austrian prisoners of war in the USSR to the Austrian people!
Austrians, it is time!
Everywhere in the many prisoner-of-war camps in the Soviet Union, tens 
of thousands of Austrian soldiers are watching their beautiful homeland 
at war with anxious and burning hearts—their homeland which is now 
becoming a theater of war. For more than five years, Austria’s sons have 
been shedding their blood for Hitler’s bandits, who have been cursed by 
God, for German imperialism, for the much-hated Prussian militarism. 
The Red Army is approaching Vienna! The Red Army is not our enemy, 
it is our friend. At the Moscow Conference, the Soviet Union, England, and 
the USA guaranteed Austria’s independence. 
People of Austria! Do not wait for others to release you! Stand up and 
fight for your freedom and independence!
Soldiers of Austria! Turn your bayonets against Hitler! Fight shoulder 
to shoulder with the victorious Red Army against our common enemy and 
for our wonderful and precious homeland. 
Workers in the factories—go on strike! Members of the Volkssturm,8 
do not go back to the barracks; join the partisans in the mountains! 
8  Created in October 1944, the Volkssturm, as the “last stand,” was intended to help to 
turn the tide of war by supporting the operations of the German Wehrmacht. For ser-
vice in Volkssturm units, mostly young men from the age of 16 to 20 and men over the 
age of 50 were recruited. Besides supporting military operations, they were used as 
guards and for security.
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The world must see that the Austrian people have nothing to do with 
Hitler’s barbarism. The world must see how the Austrian people fight for 
their freedom and their independence. 
Arise, people of Austria!
Long live the free, independent, and democratic state of Austria!
[List of signatures]
Source: RGVA, op. 5, d. 20, ll. 121–122.
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DOCUMENT No. 44: 
Speech by NKVD Brigadier I. Pavlov9 regarding Espionage Activity
March 1945
For the border regiments of the NKVD troops to carry out their tasks, they 
needed to gain information from the local population. Like the American CIC, 
they used Austrian informants for this purpose. Their possibly “questionable” 
past played only a minor role as long as they were now willing to work for the 
Soviet NKVD. Additionally, the troops closely co-operated with intelligence corps, 
especially with the SMERSH of the GUKR.10
Reconnaissance
During their activities, the troop administration’s reconnaissance depart-
ment and the units’ subdivisions for reconnaissance follow the NKVD’s 
order No. 002761–1942 and, due to the changed operational situation in 
connection with the entering of foreign national territories, the follow-
ing amendments to the aforementioned order as well: directive No. 233 of 
the NKVD of the USSR of 10/6/1944 and the NKVD’s order No. 0016 of 
1/11/1945.
The provisions of order No. 002761–1942 are known to everyone. 
Directive No. 00233 of the NKVD of the USSR determines that the troop 
administration’s reconnaissance department and the units’ subdivisions 
for reconnaissance are to carry out the following espionage measures when 
clearing the rear of the front of hostile elements: 
a)  prevent the emergence of any kind of hostile activity by groups of 
bandits and local nationalists in the rear of the front; 
b)  find and capture small hostile groups and individual soldiers and offi-
cers who are surrounded by our units and try to cross the front line; 
c)  find and capture deserters and marauders hiding in the rear of the 
front; 
9  Brigadier Ivan Pavlov served as head of the administration of the troops of the NKVD 
for the protection of the rear of the Third Ukrainian Front. 
10  Glavnoe Upravlenie Krasnoi Armii, Headquarters of the Red Army.
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d)  find and capture Soviet citizens in hiding who escaped with the 
occupation troops and who used to do various types of administra-
tional work on our national territory. 
The following instructions by the head of the main administration of NKVD 
troops for the protection of the Red Army’s rear from 1/20/1945 refer to 
NKVD order No. 0016 of 1/11/1945 and oblige us: 
–  to find and capture informants of the German intelligence organs who 
are involved in espionage and diversion, terrorists, members of vari-
ous hostile organizations, groups of bandits and groups of insurgents, 
regardless of their ethnicity and nationality; to find and confiscate 
illegal radio transmitters, arsenals, illegal printing presses, and other 
materially and technically equipped devices for hostile activities; 
–  to capture the commanding and investigational staff of the police, 
the leading staff of prisons and concentration camps, military com-
manders, public prosecutors, investigators, members of military 
courts and tribunals, the leading staff of authorities in the prov-
inces, districts and regions, mayors, members of National Socialist 
organizations, heads of large economic and administrative institu-
tions, editors of newspapers and magazines, authors of anti-Soviet 
publications, the commanders and privates [of armies] of countries 
fighting against the USSR, members of the “Russian Liberation 
Army,” and other suspicious elements. 
The NKVD’s directive No. 233 and the instructions by the head of the main 
administration of NKVD troops for the protection of the Red Army’s rear 
from 1/20/1945 are to be implemented by taking the following measures: 
–  establishment of a network of informants and professional coopera-
tion with this network; 
–  close cooperation with the intelligence service in creating docu-
ments on the informants and in the search for criminals carried out 
by the troop; 
–  thorough filtration of the captured. 
Espionage
The principles and methods of espionage on the territory of foreign states 
in which the Red Army operates are the same as those on our national ter-
ritory. However, the methods for this kind of espionage depend directly on 
the operational situation and the specific features of the particular country. 
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The following rules need to be pointed out regarding espionage: 
1)  Espionage is to be started and carried out only on areas secured by the 
troops. 
2)  Only officers from the administration of the reconnaissance department 
and of the regiments up to the head of the department’s chief adjutant, 
including the deputy commanders of the reconnaissance battalions, are 
allowed to cooperate with informants. The chief adjutants of command-
ers of the reconnaissance department’s battalions can be allowed to 
cooperate with [special] informants only in certain cases—with my per-
mission or with permission issued by my deputy who is responsible for 
intelligence. However, this provision does not exclude the possibility of 
involving other categories of reconnaissance officers or interns from the 
reconnaissance department in the work with informants under the con-
dition that the reconnaissance officers cooperating with the informants 
are required to be present at all times. 
3)  It is absolutely essential that two reconnaissance officers are present 
at any meeting with an agent. For safety reasons, it is recommended to 
secure the meeting point by taking appropriate measures. 
4)  The selection of candidates to be recruited and the recruitment of infor-
mants itself is to be carried out exclusively by authorized reconnais-
sance officers (deputies of regiment commanders and their deputies, 
chief adjutants of commanders for the battalions of the reconnaissance 
department, and deputy commanders of the reconnaissance battalions). 
5)  The procedure for the recruitment of informants and for the creation of 
their dossiers is known. Dossiers are to be stored exclusively in the recon-
naissance department of the troops’ administration. 
6)  The commanders of the regiments and their deputies responsible for 
reconnaissance are obliged to carry out daily controls on the recruitment 
activities within the regiment, on their proper focus and quality. 
7)  It is recommended to select those members of the local communities to 
work as informants who have the possibility to help us search for people 
of interest and find them. Such persons would be, for example: 
–  less active members of National Socialist organizations and groups of 
bandits—under certain circumstances and if we can be sure that they 
will cooperate conscientiously; 
–  members of hostile counterintelligence bodies with good connections 
to local nationalists and the desire to do penance for their former 
connections to German National Socialists; 
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–  members of the intelligentsia, the middle-class bourgeoisie, and 
the merchant class who are respected by local nationalists and who 
are able to discover hostile plans in the rear of the Red Army in due 
time; 
–  persons with a democratic attitude who have the possibility of dis-
covering National Socialist elements and planned hostile activities in 
the rear of the Red Army; 
–  persons from the surrounding areas of objects of our espionage who 
do not share the National Socialist views of these objects; 
–  persons from lower levels of the new administration who could use 
their position for searching for people we are interested in. 
The recruitment of hostile informants for the search of the most famous co-
perpetrators can be carried out only upon my permission or the permission 
of my deputy who is responsible for intelligence. 
Minor criminals are to be recruited as informants if this seems to be 
helpful. For several reasons, such recruitments are to be carried out for the 
search for ringleaders and agitators of any hostile activities in the rear of 
the front as well as for their capture. 
8)  Our constant attention needs to be focused on ensuring the confiden-
tiality of espionage activities. All officers cooperating with informants 
need to pay special attention to ensuring the conspiracy when examin-
ing the objects to be recruited, as well as during the recruitment itself 
and the following meetings with the informants. 
9)  We need to bear in mind that questions of conspiracy are important not 
only in connection with measures for preventing the exposure of infor-
mants but also for the behavior of reconnaissance officers when talking 
to informants. It has to be guaranteed that the reconnaissance agent, 
out of talkativeness, does not talk to his agents about information or 
our methods of operation. There is no need to talk to the agents about 
that. Therefore, the officers’ preparations for meetings with informants 
need to be checked up on by a superior intelligence officer. 
10)  The supervision and control by the commander of the regiment and his 
deputy responsible for reconnaissance are to be carried out through the 
following measures: 
a)  by personal participation in espionage activities, carrying out 
“model recruitments” and high-quality work with the informants; 
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b)  by practical help in the organization and realization of recruitments 
carried out by inferior reconnaissance officers who are allowed to 
work with the informants; 
c)  by critically analyzing the documents the reconnaissance officers 
acquire about informants, and by immediately eliminating errors 
made during the work with the informants as well as by improving 
the reconnaissance officers’ qualification with practical examples. 
Objects of Espionage
The objects of espionage on Hungarian territory were determined by the 
NKVD’s order No. 0016 from January 11, 1945, and the following instruc-
tions by the head of the main administration of the NKVD troops for 
the protection of the Red Army’s rear from January 20, 1945, which were 
explained in detail above (see page 2). 
It must be pointed out that the enemy has been pursuing intense 
subversive activities in the rear of our front recently by smuggling infor-
mants, who are required to carry out intelligence and diversion tasks, over 
the front line. Furthermore, he [the enemy] has been establishing terrorist 
groups consisting of members of National Socialist organizations and local 
National Socialists in the rear of unit of the Red Army. 
For instance, our troops alone arrested 21 hostile informants in Janu-
ary and February, including one signalman, four paratroopers, and 16 mem-
bers of reconnaissance units and saboteurs who had been smuggled over 
the front line by foot. Furthermore, there were 24 bandits and terrorists 
and 22 saboteurs belonging to National Socialist organizations. 
Typical examples of arrests are described in the attachment.11 
Cooperation of Reconnaissance and Intelligence Services 
The close cooperation of reconnaissance and intelligence services in the 
compilation of documents about informants and in the organization of mil-
itary searches for criminals must be permanent and effective. 
The cooperation of reconnaissance and intelligence services is to be 
achieved by taking the following measures: 
11  Not published.
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–  joint development of appropriate operational and military measures, 
compiling of reconnaissance documents about informants and vari-
ous other reconnaissance documents; 
–  direct participation of the regiments’ reconnaissance departments 
in the preparation of important documents on staff level and of lists 
aiming at building up an exchange of experiences with the intelli-
gence service and improving its quality; 
–  establishment of special training for reconnaissance officers by joint 
talks on topics related to the Cheka [ChK]12 and the analysis of spe-
cial documents connected with investigation activities. 
It must be pointed out that the individual departments are adopting the 
aforementioned measures very inadequately. Often the regiment staffs 
have no knowledge of the actual situation in their field of responsibility and 
carry out their work blindly. The subdivisions for reconnaissance, having 
vast information at their disposal, do not draw the right conclusions from 
this information; the main department does not inform the regiment staffs 
in due course and does not carry out any joint measures in the search for 
criminal elements. 
Investigational Work
The additional instructions, arising from the NKVD’s directive No. 00233 
and the NKVD’s order No. 0016, and dealing with the work on territories of 
foreign states, result in several changes in preliminary investigations and in 
the transfer of captured persons for reasons of further investigations. 
A new task to be carried out within the framework of preliminary 
investigations is the receipt of investigational documents that form 
the basis for a possible arrest and for the clarification of the question of 
whether a captured person is to be transferred to the court or not. 
This task is to be carried out as follows: 
a) Only thoroughly checked documents are to be used. 
b)  Inappropriate delays are to be avoided. The crimes committed by the cap-
tured persons are to be proven with documents. 
12  The “Vserossiiskaya chrezvychainaya komissiya po bor’be s kontrrevolyutsiei, speku-
lyatsiei i sabotazhem” (“All-Russian Emergency Commission for Combating Counter-
Revolution and Sabotage”) was founded in 1917. In the beginning its main task as a 
secret police was the investigation and even execution of Lenin’s political enemies. 
The first chairman of the Cheka was Feliks Dzerzhinskii.
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The criminal activities of a captured person are to be proven with objective 
and documented evidence, including the following: 
–  weapons, explosives, flammable materials, or other objects intended 
for criminal use; 
–  National Socialist literature, flyers, and other objects or documents 
containing information about the execution of or preparation for any 
kind of hostile activities in the rear of the front; 
–  fake documents, official statements, and testimonies accusing the 
persons of preparing or carrying out criminal actions in the rear of 
the front. 
Citizens of foreign states are to be arrested only with permission from the 
Military Prosecutor. 
In exceptional cases (capture at the scene of crime, attempt to escape), 
such arrests can be carried out with the Military Prosecutor’s permission 
received after the event. 
Arrests of leading staff and active members of the White Guard and 
anti-Soviet nationalist organizations are to be carried out upon consulta-
tion with the organ for counter-intelligence SMERSH, to which this type of 
captured person is to be transferred. 
In the future, the investigational work will be more complicated than it 
used to be. In this respect, the most qualified intelligence officers should be 
used for investigational work. 
The investigation groups in the regiments need to be under permanent 
and direct control by the heads of the regiments’ reconnaissance departments. 
A very important issue is the espionage activity among arrested and 
captured persons. These activities are to be organized personally by the 
deputy commander of the regiment. 
The informants responsible for captured persons who need to be trans-
ferred to the SMERSH organs are to be present during the transfer. The 
investigational documents about the captured persons are to be completed 
as usual. The operational area of the informants and the results of their 
work need to be mentioned separately. 
Methods of Espionage
The complex operational situation in Hungary requires extreme caution and 
thoughtfulness during the execution of espionage tasks. 
It is necessary to bear in mind the possible use of the recruited infor-
mants in future periods of peace. 
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The errors and deficiencies we have been faced with recently are not to be 
repeated. The most severe are the following: 
1)  A purely target-oriented attitude toward espionage; aimlessness during 
recruitments and poor work with the informants; 
2)  Commanders of regiments who do not participate in espionage; there are 
deficiencies in the participation of the deputies responsible for recon-
naissance work as well; 
Because there is no direct participation in the training and work 
of informants, there are no qualified spies to move up, and the Chekist 
experience and work practices cannot be improved. 
3)  The regiments’ commanders, their deputies, and the heads of the bat-
talions’ reconnaissance departments do not participate in the investiga-
tional work as required. 
These deficiencies increased during several offenses against revolution-
ary law (the 134th, 25th, and 336th border regiments) and due to the fact 
that the espionage and investigational work were being misrepresented. 
Several reconnaissance officers were reprimanded for offenses 
against revolutionary law and for their moral depravity. 
Our main task is to not allow similar deficiencies in the future and to give 
the reconnaissance work the importance it deserves by getting the best 
results in the search for and the capture of criminal elements. 
It is necessary to stop the practice of aiming only at positive facts and 
figures. 
The methods of espionage depend on the concrete situation in which the 
regiment’s subdivision for reconnaissance is working. However, several gen-
erally accepted rules can be recommended: 
1)  Espionage methods should be used as broadly as possible, especially dur-
ing the search for hidden leaders of National Socialist organizations, for 
the leaders of local gangs and terrorist groups consisting of National 
Socialists, and for enemies who are staying in the rear of the front and 
who carry out subversive activities there. 
2)  Various espionage methods should be used for the disintegration of ban-
dit groups and local National Socialist organizations, as well as for the 
prevention of any planned hostile activities in the rear of the front. 
3)  Plans for combined espionage should be developed for the capture or 
destruction of the heads of gangs or terrorist groups, as well as of hidden 
members of National Socialist organizations planning hostile activities in 
the rear of the front. 
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As our main espionage task is to search for criminal elements, the people 
engaged in investigational work in the subdivisions do not lose their sig-
nificance. It is necessary to increase the educational work with the people 
engaged in investigational work and to carry out this work with a strict aim. 
The following conditions are essential for the best resolution of the upcom-
ing tasks: 
1) the clear focus of and great effort from all reconnaissance officers; 
2)  high-quality leadership and strict controls on the situation and the qual-
ity of the espionage; 
3) strict compliance with revolutionary law; 
4) high Chekist discipline and work discipline; 
5) non-admission of former errors into our work. 
Signed: Pavlov
Source: RGVA, f. 32900, op. 1, d. 219, ll. 66–77.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 45: 
Stavka13 Directive on the Publication of an Appeal to the Austrian Public 
April 2, 1945
At the end of March 1945, Red Army units crossed the Hungarian-Austrian bor-
der. Officially Austria was regarded as liberated and not an enemy country by the 
Soviet Union, a fact that was widely and propagandistically disseminated around 
the country. However, most Red Army members did not distinguish between Ger-
mans and Austrians, which resulted in acts of revenge, rapes, and lootings being 
committed against the Austrian public. 
In connection with the advance of the troops of the Second and Third 
Ukrainian Front on Austrian territory, the High Command’s Stavka is issu-
ing the FOLLOWING ORDERS: 
1. The commanders of the troops of the Second and Third Ukrainian Front14 
are to issue an appeal to the Austrian public, containing the following: 
a)  they are to be informed about the fact that the Red Army is fighting 
against the German occupiers and not against the Austrian popula-
tion, and the people are to be asked to remain where they are, to con-
tinue their peaceful work, and to support the Red Army’s Command 
in maintaining safety and ensuring the normal function of industrial 
and trading enterprises and communal and other enterprises; 
b)  the public is to be informed about the fact that the Red Army has 
come to Austria not to occupy Austrian territory, but with the sole 
aim of destroying the hostile German-fascist troops and freeing 
Austria from dependence on Germany; 
c)  it is to be made clear that the Red Army stands on the position of 
the Allies’ Moscow Declaration concerning Austria’s independence 
and will contribute to the restoration of the social order that existed 
until 1938, that is until the German invasion of Austria; 
13  Headquarters of the GOKO (Gozudarstvennyi komitet oborony, State Committee of 
Defense). Established in June 1941, supreme authority in the USSR under the direct 
leadership of Stalin.
14  The commander of the Second Ukrainian Front was Rodion Ya. Malinovskii; the com-
mander of the Third Ukrainian Front was Fyodor I. Tolbukhin. They both were active 
in Austria.
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d)  rumors saying that the Red Army is going to eliminate all members 
of the National Socialist Party are to be disproved, and it is to be 
made clear that the National Socialist Party is going to be dissolved 
but that ordinary members of the National Socialist Party are not 
going to be bothered if they demonstrate their loyalty to the Soviet 
troops. 
2. In addition to the appeal to the Austrian public, leaflets with the same 
content are to be published on the territory that is occupied by our troops; 
they are to be dropped off behind the front line. 
3. Vienna’s mayor is to be informed of the fact that the Soviet command will 
not act against the formation of a provisional Austrian government with 
the participation of democratic forces, but there is to be no information 
about that in the leaflets. 
4. The troops operating on Austrian territory are to be instructed not to 
offend the Austrian population, to behave correctly, and to not confuse 
Austrians with the German occupiers. 
5. Military commanders, who are to appoint provisional mayors and village 
elders from the local Austrian population to act as civil authorities, are to 
be appointed in villages and towns. 
Signed:  Stalin, Antonov
Source: Tsentral’nyi Arkhiv Ministerstva Oborony, F. 148a, op. 3763, d. 212, ll. 
10–11.
K
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   272 2015.02.17.   6:53
273SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
DOCUMENT No. 46:
Stavka Directive on Karl Renner
April 4, 1945
After the Soviet Union—without prior consultation and in violation of the agree-
ments with the Allies—following the entry of the Red Army into Austria imme-
diately arranged for the formation of a provisional government, serious difficul-
ties emerged on the question of Austria’s postwar treatment under the Allies.
The news of Karl Renner’s appearance was presented to the Stavka on April 
4, at 6:50 p.m. Supposedly Stalin was surprised that “old Renner” was still alive. 
Within minutes Stalin instructed (coded telegram No. 29904/š) the Military 
Council of the Third Ukrainian Front under Marshal Fedor that Renner was to 
be trusted. 
With reference to your report No. 24/z from April 4, the Stavka of the 
Main Command issues the following DIRECTIVE: KARL RENNER15 is to be 
trusted. He is to be informed that the headquarters of the Soviet Armed 
Forces will support him in the restoration of democracy in AUSTRIA. He is 
to be informed that the Soviet Armed Forces did not cross the AUSTRIAN 
border to occupy AUSTRIAN territory but to expel the fascist occupiers 
from AUSTRIA.
STAVKA OF THE MAIN COMMAND
I. STALIN, ANTONOV16
Source: TsAMO, F. 243, op. 2912, d. 146, l. 269.
K
15  Karl Renner (1870–1950), “founding father” of the First and Second Republic of Aus-
tria. Leader of the Austrian delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris St. Germain in 
1919. Chancellor of Austria, 1918–1920. President of parliament, 1931–1933. From 1938 
to 1945, he distanced himself from politics. Chancellor of the Provisional Government 
in 1945; afterwards, until his death, president of the Second Republic of Austria.
16  A copy was sent to Molotov. The telegram was sent at 8:30 p.m. 
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DOCUMENT No. 47: 
Report by L. Beria17 to G. Malenkov18 on the Austrian Oil Industry
April 13, 1945
The following secret NKVD report from the end of the war deals with the poten-
tial of the Austrian oil industry situated in the area around Vienna. During 
World War II oil production in Austria and elsewhere had been rapidly increased.
Oil production
The oil fields in Austria are situated in the area around Vienna (60 kilome-
ters north and 30 kilometers east of Vienna). 
The most important areas of oil production are Zistersdorf (Gösting), 
Geiselberg, and Sankt-Ulrich. One hundred twenty drilling operations were 
underway in the oil fields in the area of Zistersdorf in 1943; new drilling 
operations are being set up constantly. 
Recently, the new oil field Krenzefeld (Maustrenk) was opened four 
kilometers northwest of Zistersdorf; 15 drilling operations were already set 
up there in 1943. The most productive oil field with the highest output is 
Sankt-Ulrich (6.5 kilometers from Zistersdorf). One hundred fifty drilling 
operations were underway in the oil fields in the Sankt-Ulrich area in 1943. 
Due to the active involvement of fascist Germany, oil production in Austria 
increased rapidly during the war. 
Oil production: 
1938 – 63,000 tons
1942 – 800,000 tons
1943 – 950,000 tons
1944 – 1.2 million tons (expected)
When German enterprises carried out several geological investigations in 
the eastern parts of Austria before the war, they found that there were oil 
deposits in an area of 1 million hectares. Exploration wells showed that 
there were 10–12 oil pools containing significant oil reserves, which makes 
17  Lavrentii P. Beria, people’s commissar for the interior (chief of the NKVD), 1938–1946; 
member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, 1946–1953. 
18  Georgii M. Malenkov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 
1946–1953 and 1955–1957; chairman, 1953–1955. 
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it likely that there are great opportunities for further development of oil 
production in Eastern Austria. 
Mineral oil processing
In Austria there are six enterprises that are processing oil. They are located 
in the area around Vienna. The processing capacity of these enterprises 
stands at 800,000 tons of crude oil per year. The most important oil pro-
cessing enterprise is located in the Lobau (near Vienna). It has a processing 
capacity of 500,000 tons per year. 
All oil processing enterprises were working at full capacity. 
Oil producing enterprises
No. Location of the plant Name of the enterprise
Capacity 
(tons/year)
1. Vienna-Floridsdorf Shell Floridsdorf 100
2. Vienna-Korneuburg Kreditul Miner 50
3. Vienna-Kagran Vakuum Oil Co. 60
4. Vienna-Vösendorf Österreichische Fanto 40
5. Vienna-Schwechat Nova Öl and 
Brennsstoffgesellschaft AG
50
6. Vienna-Lobau Wintershall-Elwerath 500
Signed:  N. Titkov
Source: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 121, d. 395, ll.1–3.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 48: 
Telegram by Marshal F. Tolbukhin19 to I.V. Stalin regarding  
a Temporary Government for Austria
April 15, 1945
On April 15, 1945, the commander-in-chief of the Third Ukrainian Front, Mar-
shal Fyodor Tolbukhin, and his political advisors, Aleksei Zheltov20 and Andrei 
Smirnov,21 asked Stalin to promote and accelerate [!] the decisions regarding the 
formation of an administrational institution and a temporary government for 
Austria, as Stalin had in mind. According to the proposition, the following four 
parties should have been part of the new government: the Social Democrats with 
35 percent, the Communists with 35 percent, the Christian Democrats with 20 
percent, and the Revolutionary Socialists with 10 percent. These numbers were 
essentially in accordance with the approach of establishing national Popular 
Front governments in Eastern European countries occupied by the Red Army. 
In connection with the liberation of Vienna, the decisions regarding the for-
mation of an administrational institution for Austria, the appointment of 
a mayor for the city of Vienna, and the possible formation of a provisional 
government must be accelerated. 
According to the information available, the former mayor of Vienna, 
Seitz,22 is in a concentration camp in Germany. 
19  Fedor I. Tolbukhin, marshal of the Soviet Union, was the commander-in-chief of the 
Third Ukrainian Front from 1944 on. He was regarded as the liberator of Sofia, Bucha-
rest, Budapest, and Belgrade. From June 1945 until 1947, he was commander-in-chief 
of the Southern Group of the Soviet Army (in Romania and Bulgaria). Furthermore, 
in 1946–1947 he acted as the head of the Military Mission in Yugoslavia.
20  Aleksei Zheltov was the political advisor of the Third Ukrainian Front and later on of 
the Central Group of Forces, based in Austria. From 1945 to 1950 he was deputy mili-
tary (from June 1946 high) commissioner in Austria.
21  Andrei Smirnov was the head of the Third European Desk of the Soviet Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (until 1946 the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs) from 1943 
to 1949 and responsible for Germany and Austria. From 1946 to 1949, he was deputy 
minister of foreign affairs.
22  Karl Seitz, head of state of the Austrian Republic (“Deutschösterreich”), 1918–1920. 
Mayor and Landeshauptmann of Vienna, 1923–1934.
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Possible candidates for the position of the mayor are Kunschak,23 one 
of the leaders of the left wing of the Christian social party (Catholics), who 
is very popular in Vienna, or Vienna’s former mayor, Emmerling.24 Karl 
Renner or the former Austrian president, Miklas,25 could also be offered the 
position of the mayor of Vienna. 
With regards to the issue of the possible formation of a provisional 
government for Austria, I find it necessary to provide you with the follow-
ing information: 
1. As former president of the Austrian National Council, Renner sug-
gests convening a meeting of all members of the Austrian Parliament 
who are on Austrian territory at the moment, except for members of the 
NSDAP, in order to debate the issue of the government. 
The following parties should be represented in the new government: 
Social Democrats: 35 percent of the posts/positions, Communists: 35 
percent of the posts, 
Christian Democrats (Catholics): 20 percent of the posts, 
Revolutionary Socialists (pro-fascist): 10 percent of the posts. 
Renner thinks that the holding of new elections for a provisional 
National Council would not be expedient at the moment, because only a 
small part of Austria near the front has been liberated so far. Almost the 
whole male population and a large proportion of younger women have been 
expelled by the Germans, says Renner. 
This is actually the case.
The holding of new elections is being hampered under these circum-
stances. 
Renner’s proposal regarding this method for the formation of an Aus-
trian government is somehow covered by the constitution and could be 
approved of, if it would not strengthen the position of the Catholics, by the 
Social Democrats and related groups. 
By joining the government, these groups would form a powerful bloc 
and could seriously hamper the strengthening of new democratic powers. 
23  Leopold Kunschak, member of the constitutive National Assembly, 1919–1920. As an 
opponent of the authoritarian Dollfuß regime, he tried to mediate between the par-
ties in 1934. On April 27, 1945, Kunschak, along with Renner, signed the Declaration 
of Independence of the Republic of Austria.
24  Emmerling was Vienna’s deputy mayor from 1919–1934. In 1945 he refused to become 
Vienna’s mayor for physical reasons.
25  Wilhelm Miklas, president of Austria from 1928 until the 1938 Anschluss. In 1945 he 
refused to run for presidency in favor of Karl Renner. 
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2. We consider the following path to the formation of a provisional 
Austrian government more appropriate: give Renner the order to form an 
action group consisting of representatives of the various parties and inde-
pendents. 
3. Members of such a group could be: the Social Democrat Renner; the 
mayor of the city of Vienna and one of the leading persons of the Chris-
tian Social Party, Kollmann;26 the aforementioned Kunschak; the mayor of 
Wiener Neustadt, Wehrl, a Social Democrat and metal worker who has been 
installed by our command; the last president, Miklas; representatives of the 
Communist Party, and independent members of the Austrian intelligentsia. 
This action group, consisting of formerly reputable politicians, will 
form the provisional government and announce the order to promote the 
liberation of Austria and therefore immediately establish a provisional 
national government that is obliged to support the Allies in the liberation 
and the establishment of an independent and democratic Austria. 
Until Austria is completely liberated and free elections for the National 
Council can take place, the provisional Austrian government will have the 
legislative and executive power and fulfill its tasks under Allied control. 
After the liberation of all of Austria’s territory and as soon as the military 
situation allows, the provisional government will announce elections for 
the National Council and confer all powers to it [the National Council] after 
the elections have taken place. 
I request instructions. 
Signed:  Tolbukhin, Zheltov, Smirnov
Copies to: Stalin, Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, Antonov, Vyshinskii, 
Dekanozov.
Source: TsAMO, F. 48, op. 3411, d. 196, ll. 315–319.
K
26  In 1919–1920, member of the constitutive National Assembly. Member of the 
National Assembly, 1920–1934. Opponent of the Dollfuß regime. In 1945 he was 
appointed mayor of Baden (near Vienna), where the headquarters of the Soviet Army 
was based.
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DOCUMENT No. 49: 
Telegram by Fyodor Tolbukhin to I.V. Stalin on Meeting with Karl Renner
April 21, 1945
This coded telegram documents Stalin’s personal instruction on April 17, 1945, to 
submit to Renner a proposal to form a provisional Austrian government. 
To Comrade Stalin,
1. On April 19 the member of the Military Council of the front and the rep-
resentative of the group of comrades, the comrades DEKANOZOV27 and 
KOPTELOV,28 received KARL RENNER in Vienna.
In accordance with your coded telegram No. 11070 from April 17 of this 
year, the proposal was submitted to RENNER to form a provisional Aus-
trian government. RENNER accepted the proposal about forming the gov-
ernment by including the main democratic parties, including the Clericals. 
He promised to provide us with a list of the members of the government on 
April 24.
Source: TsAMO, F. 48, op. 3411, d. 196, l. 337.
K
27  Vladimir G. Dekanozov was deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR from 1939 
to 1947. In 1940–1941 he was Soviet ambassador to Germany. Executed in 1953 for 
belonging to Beria’s clique.
28  Mikhail E. Koptelov was deputy political advisor of the Soviet Element of the Allied 
Commission for Austria (April 1945–April 1948).
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DOCUMENT No. 50: 
Operational Plan for Securing Rear of the Third Ukrainian  
Front by NKVD Troops [Excerpts] 
May 3, 1945
As the army units of the Third Ukrainian Front advanced on the territory of Aus-
tria, the border regiments of the NKVD were confronted with a broad range of 
tasks. They had to not only deal with partisan activities and scattered groups of 
enemy soldiers but also contribute to the seizure of captured military equipment 
and marauding Red Army soldiers who were unlawfully lingering in the rear 
areas. Furthermore, partial responsibility rested with them for the transfer of 
arrested “spies” and captured soldiers to organs of the GUKR SMERSH or army 
and front detention centers.
The Situation in the Rear of the Front
1. As a result of the successful advance of the frontline troops, the territory 
liberated from the enemy has been only inadequately cleansed of criminal 
elements (enemy spies, saboteurs, terrorists, deserters from the Red Army, 
and other criminal elements).
2. Enemy soldiers and officers who have not succeeded in pulling back with 
their main forces are lingering on their own or in groups in the mountain-
ous-wooded terrain of the front area. Those who have given up hope of 
reuniting with their troops are burying their weapons, while others put up 
armed resistance during their capture, and others still, who have acquired 
civilian clothing, attempt to break through to the depths of the rear of the 
front.
3. There are still some cases of members of the Red Army who unlawfully 
linger in the rear and have abandoned themselves to alcoholism and engage 
in extortion and begging.
4. Traitors to the fatherland who fear being held to account for the crimes 
they have committed acquire civilian clothing and pretend to be citizens of 
the USSR abducted by the Germans.
Tasks of the Troops of the NKVD for the Protection of the Rear of the Third 
Ukrainian Front
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1. Discovery and arrest (in the event of resistance, annihilation) of criminal 
elements—enemy spies, saboteurs, terrorists, and traitors to the father-
land, as well as enemy soldiers and officers.
2. Annihilation of small armed enemy groups in the rear of the Red Army 
(who had broken through the defensive lines of the Red Army).
3. Confiscation of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment 
(captured and Soviet) from the local population.
4. Discovery and arrest of deserters from the Red Army, as well as members 
of the army who linger unlawfully in the rear.
[…]
8.) The following arrestees are to be transferred:
a.)  Enemy spies, saboteurs, terrorists, traitors to the fatherland and 
those guilty of high treason, deserters, and other criminal ele-
ments—in accordance with the existing provisions.
b.)  Enemy soldiers—to army and front detention centers for prisoners 
of war.
c.)  Soviet citizens and foreigners released from captivity—to detention 
and rear area centers as well as headquarters in accordance with 
directives no. 5/1089 of April 20, 1945.
d.)  Weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment (captured 
and Soviet) found with the local population are to be transferred to 
the relevant authorities responsible for booty.
e.)  Discovered ammunition dumps and dumps with other military 
equipment belonging to military units of the Red Army are to be 
transferred with protocols to the military headquarters and units in 
the corresponding district.
9.) A report on the course and results of the operation is to be submitted on 
a daily basis by radio to the Staff of the Troops and in operational reports to 
the corresponding sections.
The final written report is to be submitted on May 21, 1945.
Signed: Pavlov, Semenenko
Source: RGVA, f. 32900, op. 1, d. 216, ll. 44–48, 49 and 49a.
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DOCUMENT No. 51: 
NKVD Order regarding Alcohol Abuse by Red Army Personnel
May 13, 1945
After more than 300 officers and enlisted men of the 26th Army suffered from 
poisoning due to the excessive use of captured alcohol on May 11, 1945, and 75 
people subsequently died from the consequences of this poisoning, the deputy 
commander of the NKVD troops for the protection of the logistical lines of the 
Third Ukrainian Front, Colonel Semenenko,29 ordered the following measures for 
the prevention of alcohol abuse. 
To the commanders of the units of the NKVD troops [illegible]
On May 11, 1945, 326 people—officers and soldiers of the troops of the 
26th Army—suffered from poisoning due to the excessive use of captured 
alcohol. On May 12, 1945, 75 people died from the consequences of this poi-
soning. 
The Military Council of the Front thinks that the aforementioned incidents 
occurred due to a lack of discipline and order. 
Based on the aforementioned facts, I hereby order the following: 
1. All commanders of the units are to inform their officers about the afore-
mentioned poisoning and to take immediate and rigorous measures in 
order to prevent the drinking of captured beverages. If such beverages are 
found, they are to be taken into strict and safe custody. 
2. The officers of the sanitary corps are to be requested to take active pro-
phylactic measures among the staff of the subdivisions and to strictly con-
trol all captured beverages and food products. 
3. If a subdivision discovers captured beverages or food products, officers 
of the sanitary corps are to be sent to the location; then, under their obser-
vation, the beverages and food are to be withdrawn from the subdivisions 
29  Chief of staff of the NKVD troops for the protection of the hinterland of the Third 
Ukrainian Front.
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and stored in the regiment’s storage rooms until a thorough analysis is car-
ried out. 
4. The report on the measures taken is to be submitted on May 30, 1945. 
Signed: Semenenko, Pokhuev
Source: RGVA, f. 32914, op. 1, d. 9, l. 63.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 52: 
Minutes of Meeting of Soviet Military Representatives and  
Communist Members of the Austrian Government
May 16, 1945
On May 16, 1945, Johann Koplenig,30 Ernst Fischer,31 and Franz Honner,32 state 
secretaries of the Provisional Austrian Government and leaders of the Commu-
nist Party of Austria (KPÖ), met with members of the Military Council of the 
Third Ukrainian Front.
At the beginning of the meeting, the Soviet party asked their Austrian counter-
parts to openly describe “any problems they have been confronted with in their work.” 
Political Advisor Aleksei Zheltov’s response clearly shows Moscow’s 
strategy for the Communist Party of Austria: the public establishment of 
the party “to get the masses on their side.” The communist’s plan was to politi-
cally capitalize on Renner’s inability and also on the inability of the members of 
his government to solve problems.
The following were present at the meeting: 
The member of the Military Council of the Third Ukrainian Front, General 
A.S. Zheltov; Lieutenant-General Anoshin; Lieutenant-General Morozov,33 
as a representative of the political advisor, Koptelov. 
From the Communist Party: the secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Austria, Koplenig; the member of the Central 
Committee and minister of education, Fischer; the minister of the interior, 
Honner, and the secretary of the party’s city committee, Lauscher.34
30  Koplenig was the leader of the Communist Party of Austria until 1965. In 1945 he was 
sent to Austria from Moscow, where he was in exile during World War II. He played a 
leading role in the Komintern.
31  During World War II, in exile in Moscow. State secretary (minister) in Renner’s Pro-
visional Government (for education and culture). Excluded from the KPÖ in 1968 
because of his criticism of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.
32  After fighting in the Spanish Civil War in 1937–1938, Honner emigrated to Moscow. In 
1944–1945 he instructed the Austrian Partisan Battalions in Yugoslavia. In the Provi-
sional Government in 1945 he was state secretary (minister) of the interior.
33  Stepan Il’ich Morozov was deputy commander of the Ninth Guard Army. From July 1945 to 
1948 he was the chief of staff of the Soviet Element of the Allied Commission for Austria.
34  Josef Lauscher, secretary of the Communist Party’s city committee. In 1949 he was a 
communist member of the Vienna City Council.
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At the beginning of the meeting, Comrade Zheltov asked everybody to 
talk openly about any problems they have faced in their work, about any 
urgent issues they would like to discuss, and about any help they need from 
the Military Command. He also asked them to give him a description of the 
current situation. 
First of all, Koplenig pointed out that there seems to be an inclina-
tion toward the formation of a government coalition between a propor-
tion of the Social Democrats and a proportion of the Catholics, a coali-
tion that is strictly against the communists. This coalition is based on the 
desire to assure certain positions within the leading government organs 
and to ensure a certain sphere of influence for themselves [the members 
of the coalition]. The Catholics consider their main sphere of influence to 
be among peasants, traders, employees, and craftsmen. The Social Demo-
crats see their main sphere of influence in Vienna and among the indus-
trial workers and the industry in general. They are trying to accumulate as 
many leading positions in as many organs as possible in their own hands 
and to divide them among each other in order to eliminate the influence 
of the Communist Party. This is the reason for their inclination to form a 
government based not on an agreement between the parties but on the 
constitution from 1929. This constitution does not comply with the newly 
established situation. The attempt to form a government based on the con-
stitution of 1929 has a certain purpose and would be connected with certain 
practical consequences. This constitution was the basis for the development 
of fascism in Austria that was being implemented by issuing correspond-
ing laws, such as the appointment of mayors, representatives of the govern-
ment, etc. By reintroducing this constitution, they hope to predetermine 
future events. We are against this. We think that the issue of the constitu-
tion has to be solved by a legally elected National Council. The provisional 
government is an institution passing decisions that result from the provi-
sional situation. In this government, there is no order ensuring the solv-
ing of questions in a democratic way. According to the order established by 
Renner, the government can only act unanimously. If there is no consent, 
the chancellor makes the sole decision. We, the communists, oppose this. 
Renner told us to take ourselves out of the equation if we do not like it. 
Renner does not wish to work with us. What is the government currently 
doing? It is mainly trying to provide a legal base to the bills they are plan-
ning to pass. In fact, there are no practical activities. The common opinion 
among the majority of government members is that it would be better to 
concentrate not on positive decisions but on the finding of legal grounds 
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[for their plans]. There is also the inclination to take over the central-
ized National Socialist economy in its original form and to consult all the 
national-socialist experts who have survived for this project. They talk 
about state control a lot, about what should be in the hands of the state. 
The Catholics, for instance, pursue the idea of using the National Social-
ist apparatus for the reconstruction of the economy. The Social Demo-
crats agree with this idea. The communists’ opinion is that economic life 
must and can be re-established by developing individual initiatives in all 
aspects of life within the country. We need to ensure that the enterprises 
start to work again as soon and as strongly as possible; they need to be re-
established and returned to service as soon as possible. The same applies 
to the workmen. All workmen’s workshops need to be re-established, and 
they should start their work as soon as possible, and the workmen them-
selves should make efforts to re-establish their workshops and their estab-
lishments. We know what the workmen say: if they were allowed to take 
charge of the initiative, they would do a great deal to quickly re-establish 
the destroyed workshops, small enterprises, etc. In this respect, there is no 
mutual understanding between the communists and the Social Democrats 
and the Catholics. There is much talk about planned economy, about state 
control. But in fact, their inclination is to fill the state apparatus with their 
own officials and to establish some sort of political monopoly. We don’t 
think that this will work out. We stated our point of view openly. In one of 
his statements, Renner pointed out that we have to re-establish our state as 
soon as possible in order to present ourselves to the outside world as fully 
prepared. This is exactly what the Social Democrats want as well; they want 
to present themselves to the outside world as Austria’s saviors. Currently, 
the relations between Renner and the communists have become rather 
strained. Renner does not take us into consideration at all. We attach great 
significance to working together. If the other parties choose to limit their 
work to empty words and the search for various projects, we will openly 
oppose their activities. As far as we know, the government’s current activi-
ties are not very impressive to the masses, because the masses do not see 
any practical results. The members of the government talk a lot about the 
lack of security, the difficulties with the food supply, and so on. With their 
talk about the lack of security, they want to concentrate these accusations 
at the police, who, as we all know, are headed by a communist. 
After Koplenig, the minister of the interior, Honner, began to speak; 
he said that a proportion of the Catholics and a proportion of the Social 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   286 2015.02.17.   6:53
287SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
Democrats form a bloc against the communists. This coalition is supported 
by the majority of the government. They want to utilize the constitution of 
1929 in order to dismiss the communist mayors and to replace them with 
their own people. As we know, the Red Army’s military commands filled 
most of the vacant mayoral posts with communists who are now manag-
ing and leading the restoration of public life. The majority of the members 
of the government want to reconsider the local administration and appoint 
Social Democrats and Catholics as mayors. They do all they can to force the 
communists back. We can form an opposition against the provisional gov-
ernment. If we are going to remain silent, the masses could think the wrong 
way about us and get the wrong picture of our activities in the government. 
It cannot go on like this any longer; otherwise the situation will lead to a 
collapse. We are getting proposals to leave the government. If this happens, 
we will be forced to talk openly to the public and unmask the Social Demo-
crats and the Catholics. Provisional governments should be established and 
based on agreements between the parties, and not based on “orders from 
above.” The Social Democrats and the Catholics want to establish regional 
authorities similar to those the National Socialists had. Representatives of 
the Communist Party are appointed to such posts, where they can be easily 
compromised. They appoint them to unpopular positions. 
Now something about the police. The Red Army is withdrawing its 
troops from many regions in Austria. In many towns and villages, there 
is no military command post anymore. Foreign workers and prisoners of 
war come across these villages and towns, and some of them behave dis-
gracefully. Nobody intervenes in this respect. The Social Democrats and the 
Catholics use these facts against us. They ask: where are the police, what 
about safety? They propose the re-establishment of the old police appara-
tus and want to fill it with people from the past, i.e., people who used to 
work for the police even in National Socialist times. We are against this. 
We would like to have a new police apparatus with people from the broad 
masses involved in its work. The Social Democrats and the Catholics want 
to declare the Viennese chief of police, the communist Hauptmann, to 
be unsound, and they intend to use the allegation that 30 percent of all 
assistant policemen at the military command posts are riff-raff (i.e., fas-
cists, criminal offenders, and morally corrupted elements) as their main 
argument. According to the old law, the Viennese chief of police needs to 
be appointed by the government, not by the interior minister. I am con-
vinced that they will not appoint a communist to the position of chief of 
police. But I, as a member of the government, will never agree to anybody 
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else for this position. Now they have appointed the 78-year-old doctor Bum-
balla [Raoul Burenau]35 as the interior minister’s assistant. He is Renner’s 
friend. Renner promotes and supports him. He is a very experienced man, 
he knows the business; he used to be vice-chief of police, and he is good at 
organizing things; he is anti-fascist, and he would be prepared to take over 
the position of the police president. Bumballa said that the former police 
force should form the basis of the police, and the auxiliary police should 
be at their side. Whereas I said that the auxiliary police should form the 
basis, and all former policemen who were dismissed by the National Social-
ists need to be employed again. Renner also wants to withdraw the so-
called State Police from the command of the Ministry of the Interior and 
put it under his guidance, as well as the coordination of the elections for 
the National Council. Both of these functions should be in the hands of the 
minister of the interior. The only thing that Renner and the Social Demo-
crats want to leave with the Interior Ministry is criminal prosecution; they 
want to take the most important and prominent duties away from the min-
istry. We think it would be important to establish a new gendarmerie based 
on the former auxiliary police groups in the provinces; former policemen 
who were dismissed by the National Socialists in 1938 should be reinte-
grated there. 
The next one to speak after Honner was the minister of education, 
Fischer, who said that the masses have no clear picture of the further devel-
opment [of society] yet. A process of differentiation is going on among the 
Social Democratic and Catholic organizations. Representatives of reaction-
ary elements are sitting in the government. A new generation has grown 
up inside the political parties. There are new people now who do not agree 
with the old and reactionary generation. The left-wingers of the mentioned 
parties are successful. The communist and Social Democratic regional and 
basic organizations were able to manage some cooperation among the 
masses. A tendency toward unity can be observed. If only the masses had 
the opportunity to have their representation—an overwhelming majority 
would pronounce themselves for unity. We could address the masses with-
out breaking the government’s unity, but we have a serious problem with 
our cadres at the moment. We need people and would like to ask you to 
send us people from Moscow and from Marshal Malinovskii’s anti-fascist 
35  Member of the “O5” resistance group that fought for the rebuilding of an indepen-
dent Austrian state. Under state secretary in the Office of State for the Interior in 
Renner’s Provisional Government in 1945.
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group, to select proven anti-fascists among the captives. The Social Demo-
crats are promoting a very clever demagoguery on the issue of the captives. 
They want to obtain a list of all the people who are being held captive and 
to take measures to release them from captivity; this is how they want to 
gain an advantage for themselves, by saying that the Social Democrats have 
released the people from captivity. I think we should utilize this momen-
tum to our advantage. Then Fischer asked the Soviets to help the Commu-
nist Party with gas because they would not get any help in this respect from 
the government. And if they give them gas, then they say that the cars have 
to be government property. We cannot agree with that. 
The most important questions were answered by Comrade Zheltov. 
He said that it has to be the main task of the Communist Party to get the 
masses on their side. We need to win over the masses, not the government. 
If the majority of the people were on the side of the Communist Party, they 
[the party] could establish the circumstances they need in the government 
as well. Renner and the Social Democrats think that the masses are on their 
side. You should not start a fight with Renner if you have not won over the 
masses; otherwise it is not going to be a fight but only a slight skirmish. 
The work among the masses, among the peasants, the Catholics, and the 
Social Democrats needs to be expanded and deepened as soon as possible. 
If the government showed little activity, it would be an advantage for the 
Communist Party. The approach of enforcing individual initiatives and 
mobilizing the people to establish enterprises and the industry is abso-
lutely correct. If the government goes on with their empty talk, then you 
will have to approach the workers and organize the production and the 
re-establishment of the enterprises with them without waiting for gov-
ernment decrees. You need to show more effort and practical activity; the 
masses need to be convinced as soon as possible, and new cadres need to 
be formed out of the young and proven people. Renner said that he is not 
going to be replaced in the next year; there is no one to whom he could pass 
on his position as prime minister if that were necessary. This means that 
we need to encourage and introduce our own people. What should the com-
munists’ position on Renner be? We will not be able to change him. What 
do we need? We need a well-functioning working environment based on the 
unity of all democratic parties. We support Renner. Let him solve the dif-
ficult problems, such as the problem of reparation or the re-establishment 
of industry, etc., in this complicated phase. The communists need to be in 
touch with the masses; we need to be the real advocates of the united dem-
ocratic front. While the Social Democrats, the Catholics, and all others are 
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talking too much, you need to act practically and act as the instigators of all 
practical measures. The most important thing at the moment is to main-
tain the unity of all democratic parties and not to allow an explosion from 
within. We have to bear in mind that the government is a provisional one, 
and we need to use the current situation in order to strengthen our posi-
tions for the next government. Maybe the time has come to think about the 
publishing of party newspapers. You will need to discuss this issue, because 
for the work with the masses you will need your own party newspaper. Of 
course the Social Democrats and the Catholics will need to have their own 
newspapers as well, but you will have to pose questions sharply in your 
newspaper, in a way that would not be possible in the organ of democratic 
unity, the newspaper New Austria. Furthermore, you need to be the initia-
tors and instigators of all practical measures in connection with the services 
for the majority of Austria’s population. And finally, the last point: you 
need to keep in close contact with us; do not hesitate and wait until you are 
invited or asked, but talk about your problems if there are any, pose your 
questions if you have any, and we will help you as much as we can. 
Signed: M. Koptelov
Source: AVP RF, F. 066, op. 25, p. 118a, d. 7, ll. 64–69.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 53: 
Order by the Fourth Guard Army regarding Summer Routine
May 21, 1945
The following document deals with the daily routine control of the troops of the 
Fourth Guards Army that regulated daily life from wake-up to the lights-out call. 
From 1943 until it was disbanded in 1947, the Fourth Guards Army took part in a 
number of decisive actions, including the Vienna Offensive. 
Contents: On the common daily routine for the summer season. 
In order to enable better planning and control of the combat training process, 
the following common daily routine for the summer season is to be introduced 
by May 23, 1945, for all units, staffs, and institutions of the Army’s troops: 
Point Activity
Time
In all units For staffs and institutions 
1. Wake-up call 6:30 a.m. 7:30 a.m.
2. Daily physical 
exercises
6:35–6:50 a.m. 7:35–7:50 a.m.
3. Morning toilet 6:50–7:15 a.m. 7:50–8:15 a.m.
4. Morning inspection 7:15–7:30 a.m. –
5. Breakfast 7:30–8:20 a.m. 8:30–9:20 a.m.
6. Political information 8:20–8:50 a.m. –
7. Assembly and start 
of exercises
8:50–9:00 a.m. 9:20–9:30 a.m.
8. Exercises 9:00 a.m.–1:50 p.m. 9:30 a.m.–2:20 p.m.
9. Lunch and break 2:00–3:50 p.m. 2:30–4:20 p.m.
10. Exercises 4:00–6:50 p.m. 4:30–7:20 p.m.
11. Cleaning of weapons 
and equipment
7:00–7:20 p.m. – 
12. Political work and 
preparation for the 
exercises of the 
following day
7:30–9:30 p.m. 7:30–9:30 p.m.
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Point Activity
Time
In all units For staffs and institutions 
13. Appointment of 
duties
8:30–9:00 p.m. –
14. Changing of the 
guards and internal 
duty
9:00 p.m. –
15. Dinner 9:30–10:20 p.m. 9:30–10:20 p.m.
16. Evening inspection 10:20–10:45 p.m. – 
17. Evening roll-call 11:45 p.m. – 
18. Lights out 11:00 p.m. 11:00 p.m. 
Signed: Zakhvataev, Shepilov
Source: TsAMO, f. 863, op. 1, d. 50, ll. 126–127.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 54:
NKVD Report on the Investigation and Arrest of Austrians
June 4, 1945
Part of the NKVD troops’ responsibility in protecting the rear of the front and in 
preventing partisan activities lay in searching for weapons stashes and tracking 
down fugitive NSDAP members and German soldiers, often based on informa-
tion given by the local population.
In the course of such searches and manhunts, armed hostilities occurred, 
with victims on both sides.
I. Operational situation
a) According to information from the commander for the city of Korneu-
burg (5090), Major Ogarkov, the soldier on duty at the command post, Lieu-
tenant Kryukov, was visited by an inhabitant of the village on June 1, 1945, 
who told him that Mister Alfred P.36 lived in a house in the woods one-and-
a-half kilometers from the village of Oberrohrbach (7090) and stored weap-
ons there. 
Lieutenant Kryukov then went to this house with a group of soldiers 
from the command post to verify this information and to carry out an 
inspection. During a search of Alfred P.’s house, weapons, cartridges, and 
shells were found. 
Alfred P. realized the hopeless situation he was in and threw a shell 
toward Lieutenant Kryukov; a second shell exploded in his hands. Lieuten-
ant Kryukov and another member of the Red Army were severely injured 
when the shells exploded; Alfred P. and his wife died. 
b) Cases were recorded of enemy soldiers who wanted to evade arrest by 
wearing civilian clothing and pretending to be local residents, and who were 
attempting to deceive the officer on duty at the checkpoint (KPP) by doing 
so. On June 2, 1945, the soldier on duty at the checkpoint of the Second 
Rifle Battalion arrested such an enemy soldier.
c) There are still cases of active NSDAP members returning to their former 
places of residence that they left together with the German troops. On 
36  Name made anonymous by the editorial staff. 
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June 2, 1945, for example, a guarding unit of the Ninth Safety Unit arrested 
10 persons suspected of having an active role in the NSDAP. 
The commanders of the battalions received instructions on points 2 and 3. 
II. The departments of the regiment were not fighting against the enemy 
during the past 24 hours. 
III. The deployment of the regiment’s units remains unchanged. 
10th Safety Unit—Traismauer (5050), Sixth Safety Unit—Herzogenburg 
(4050), Eighth Safety Unit—Wöllersdorf (3010), Ninth Safety Unit—Wil-
helmsburg (2040), Second Reserve Safety Unit, Staff of the Second Battal-
ion—Sankt Pölten (3040), Seventh Safety Unit—secures Assembly Camp 
for Prisoners of War No. 87 in Sankt Pölten. 
Third Battallion—21st district of Vienna, First Battalion—Fifth dis-
trict of Vienna. Staff of the Regiment—18th district of Vienna. 
IV. Results of the Regiment’s operational actions 
a) The Regiment’s units have arrested the following persons during the last 
24 hours: 








1.  members of the Red 
Army
a)  persons who were 
captured by the 
enemy
32 – 47 79
b) persons lagging 
behind their units
– 1 – 1
SUM 32 1 47 80
2. civilians
a)  citizens of the USSR 
who were displaced 















among them: men fit 
for military service
– – – 81
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b)  citizens of Allied 
states
7 - 60 67
c) criminal elements – 6 – 6
SUM 15 156 121 292
3.  soldiers from the 
enemy’s army
– 5 – 5
TOTAL 47 162 168 377
b) None of the captured persons have tried to escape as of the completion 
of the protocols. 
c) Which units the captured persons belonged to and where they have been 
transferred to: 
1. Persons who were captured by the enemy: 79 persons—46 of whom were 
then transferred to the assembly camp. 
2. Persons lagging behind their units: one person belongs to the 34th 
Guards Rifle Division; another person was transferred to the 210th Army-
Rear-Assembly-Camp (AZSP). 
3. Citizens of the USSR who had been displaced by the Germans: 219 per-
sons, transferred to Assembly-Transfer-Camp SPP No. 157. 
4. Citizens of Allied states: 67 persons, transferred to Assembly-Transfer-
Camp (SPP) No. 133. 
5. Civilians: criminal elements: six persons, currently being filtrated37 at the 
regiment‘s department for espionage.
6. Soldiers from the enemy’s army: five persons, transferred to Assembly 
Camp for Prisoners of War No. 87. 
d) The deployment of the espionage group: 
In order to find and arrest criminal elements, five espionage groups (85 per-
sons) under the command of officers have been carrying out search opera-
tions. During these operations 267 persons have been captured. 
37  “Filtrations” (filtratsiya) were NKVD interrogations of Soviet nationals who were 
seized after the Red Army’s invasion of Germany and Austria. After the filtrations, 
organs of the NKVD decided if the people concerned were to be repatriated or sen-
tenced to camp imprisonment or forced labor in the Soviet Union. 
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A typical case of an arrest
While searching the village of Kreisbach (2050) on June 2, 1945, an espio-
nage group commanded by the adjutant of the commander of this Safety 
Unit, Second Lieutenant Konchester, received information on the arrival 
of two unknown persons who would vanish during the day and go to their 
accommodation during the night. After checking up on this information 
and finding the unknown persons’ overnight accommodation, Second 
Lieutenant Konchester sent a patrol, consisting of Sergeant Kirillov and 
the members of the Red Army, Sukliyan and Pustovoii, there to arrest the 
unknown persons. After their arrival at the house, and when they were 
sure that there was nobody in the area around the house, they searched 
the courtyard and the rooms. The patrol could not find anything during 
their thorough search. The patrol member with the highest rank decided 
to search the surrounding area. At 7 p.m., the patrol searched a basement 
200 meters from the mentioned house, where they found two men lying 
on mattresses. When asked various questions, they answered: “We are 
Austrian and live in this village.” Because they were suspected of being 
[former] leading members of the NSDAP, they were arrested and brought 
to the Safety Unit. 
According to information from a lieutenant colonel of the operational 
group of the general major of the technical troops—Comrade Gamov—the 
construction office of the Motoismann-Trauzell [sic] factory in the 21st dis-
trict of Vienna used to be managed by a man named Schimmel. It is said 
that this man used to live in the USSR, in Moscow, in Rome, and in vari-
ous other cities in 1932 and settled in the village of Pressbaum illegally, at 
the exact same time as the Red Army’s units arrived there. An espionage 
group belonging to the 14th Safety Unit commanded by Sergeant Lakhtin 
was sent there to find and arrest Schimmel. 
During the questioning of local inhabitants, Lakhtin found out that 
Schimmel lived in an apartment with friends in Pressbaum. After sur-
rounding the apartment, the patrol checked the documents of the people 
who were in the apartment at this moment, but Schimmel was not among 
them. 
Sergeant Lakhtin decided to carry out a thorough search of the 
apartment. As a result, they were able to find Schimmel in a well-hidden 
and safely locked room. Schimmel was arrested and transferred to the 
Safety Unit. 
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V. Communications situation
Stable radio contact with the administration of troops and the First, Sec-
ond, and Third Rifle Battalion. Telephone connection with the administra-
tion of NKVD troops and the First Rifle Battalion. Via detectors [connec-
tion] with all units of the regiment.
Signed: Martynov, Bushkov
Source: RGVA, f. 32900, op. 1, d. 245, ll. 105–108.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 55: 
NKVD Directive regarding Ideological Training among  
the Third Ukrainian Front Staff
July 4, 1945
After receiving intelligence that Red Army soldiers were planning to stay behind 
in Austria and Hungary after their demobilization due to better living conditions 
in Europe’s “capitalist” countries, the political department of the armed forces 
issued the following proposals concerning the soldiers’ ideological education.
The political department of the armed forces has received the informa-
tion that certain morally weak soldiers in their regiment—the Red Army’s 
soldiers Gulin, Minakin, and Uvarov—are planning to stay in Austria and 
Hungary on a permanent basis after their demobilization. 
They praise the order and the living conditions in Europe’s capitalist 
countries and defame the Soviet Union. Some officers have relationships 
with Austrian women, a fact that carries the risk of political consequences. 
I therefore propose the following: 
1. The political department, the party and youth organizations [Komso-
mol] need to improve their work and teach the staff to show their indefi-
nite devotion and love toward their homeland. Furthermore, they need 
to inform the people about the successes of our socialist state, about the 
reasons for defeating Hitler’s Germany and about the advantages of our 
Soviet system of society over the capitalist system. 
The staff of the troops is to be informed that the total and uncondi-
tional surrender of Hitler’s armed forces does not mean that the subversive 
activities of the German National Socialists against the Soviet people and 
the Red Army have come to an end. 
The enemy uses subterfuge to win the confidence of the Soviet citizens 
and to make them feel comfortable here. They offer them women who try 
to “enchant” and “pamper” our soldiers. By involving the soldiers in inti-
mate relationships, they [the women] want to win their confidence and 
find out military secrets or even recruit less stable soldiers for their net-
works. 
2. The comrades with the highest education are supposed to organize les-
sons, speeches, and talks with the staff on the following topics: 
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a)  “The advantages of the Soviet economic system over the capitalist 
system”; 
b) “Sources of strength and power in our homeland”; 
c) “Treason against the fatherland is the most serious crime”; 
d) “How Soviet law prosecutes treason against the fatherland.” 
3. You should talk to the soldiers of the Red Army Gulin, Minakin, and Uva-
rov in person and inform me of their decisions regarding their remaining in 
the regiment. 
Signed: Naneyshvili
Source: RGVA, f. 32902, op. 1, d. 11, ll. 158–159.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 56:
A. Vyshinskii’s Telegram to Marshal Konev regarding Elections in Austria
November 21, 1945
In his telegram Deputy Foreign Minister Vyshinskii criticizes Marshal Ivan 
Konev and his political advisor Evgenii Kiselev38 about the fact that Moscow had 
not yet been informed about the election campaign in Austria. The timing of this 
rebuke (four days before the election) indicates that the first free elections in Aus-
tria since the end of the war were not of great interest to Moscow. 
The election campaign in Austria is in full swing. The foreign press believes 
that the national elections and the elections in the various federal prov-
inces are of great importance. British observers have arrived in Austria. 
Still, we have not received any information about the development of 
the election campaign or the performance of the political parties. 
I ask you to provide detailed information on the developments of the elec-
tion campaign. 
Signed: A. Vyshinskii
Source: AVP RF, F. (0)66, op. 25, d. 3, l. 29.
K
38  Political advisor to the Soviet military/higher commissioner in Austria, July 1945–
April 1948. From May 1947 also political representative of the USSR in Austria. Head 
of the department on the Balkan states in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
1948–1949. Soviet ambassador to Hungary, 1949 –1954. Deputy UN secretary-general, 
1962–63.
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DOCUMENT No. 57:
Draft Decree by the Council of Ministers on the Transfer  
of Austrian Assets to the Soviet Union
March 1946
The following document contains the first recorded Soviet initiative for establish-
ing the Upravlenie Sovietskim Imushchestvom v Avstrii (USIA)39—the Admin-
istration for Soviet Property in Austria. Konev’s proposal led to the decision of 
the Soviet Council of Ministers on March 28, 1946, which formed the basis for 
Command No. 12 (registration of all German property in the Soviet occupation 
zone) and later for Command No. 17 (transfer of the confiscated German assets 
into USIA administration). 
The administration of Soviet property in Eastern Austria
The Council of Ministers of the USSR decrees the following: 
1. The commander-in-chief of the Central Group of Forces, Marshal 
Konev, is to be obliged to submit the formerly German properties and 
assets in Eastern Austria, which have been transferred to Soviet property 
pursuant to the decision of the Berlin Conference of Three Powers, to his 
administration and to give an order to render the ownership legally valid in 
the Soviet Union (attached).
2. To ensure the administration of the assets that have been transferred 
to Soviet property as per point 1 of the present decree, a department for the 
administration of Soviet property with its own [illegible] battalion and its 
own motorized transport company with a provisional personnel of 280 per-
sons is to be established on the basis of the administration for war trophies 
as headed by the commander-in-chief of the Central Group of Forces. 
Brigadier E.M. Borisov is to be appointed as head of the administration 
of formerly German assets. 
3. Marshal Konev is to be instructed to establish the following incor-
porated companies, based on the formerly German enterprises that have 
39  The USIA was an exterritorial Administration for Soviet Property in Austria and con-
trolled over 400 expropriated factories and transportation and trading companies. 
Similar administrations were also formed for Finland and Eastern Germany (SBZ). 
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been transferred to Soviet property and the assets of which were totally or 
mostly in German hands: 
Incorporated company (stock company) for metal-working and engi-
neering plants; 
Incorporated company (stock company) for plants producing electronic 
machines and devices; 
Incorporated company (stock company) for chemical plants; 
Incorporated company for textile plants; 
and on the basis of enterprises with a partial shareholding of Austrian 
assets, Soviet-Austrian joint companies are to be established. 
A list of all enterprises that have been incorporated into stock compa-
nies and joint Soviet-Austrian stock companies is to be compiled and pre-
sented within one month. 
4. It is specified that the organizational structure, the leading technical 
personnel, the bookkeeping and accounting, the salaries, and the working 
conditions, as well as the internal order in the enterprises which are being 
transferred to Soviet property, are to be kept unchanged. To implement a 
general leadership and to control the administration in the given enter-
prises, a general director (or an authorized representative) with two to five 
Soviet employees is to be appointed in each enterprise. 
5. Marshal Konev obtains the permission to alienate (i.e., sell, rent out, 
or give away for free) those formerly German assets in Austria whose own-
ership is not of interest to the USSR. Such alienations need to be agreed 
with the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR. 
6. The state bank of the USSR (Comrade Golev) is to be obliged to estab-
lish a commercial and industrial bank in Eastern Austria, whose duties will 
include giving credit to the enterprises of the administration of Soviet assets. 
7. Marshal Konev obtains the permission to utilize the captured met-
als and other materials that are at the disposal of the administration for war 
trophies of the Central Group of Forces for the needs of Soviet enterprises 
in Austria and, upon consultation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the 
USSR, to obtain raw materials and heating fuel in Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
and Hungary in exchange for products from the Soviet enterprises in Austria. 
8. Marshal Konev is to instruct that the Council of Ministers of the 
USSR be provided with a production schedule for the Soviet enterprises in 
Austria, as well as a plan for the use of their products by May 1, 1946. 
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9. The Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR (Comrade Mikoyan) is 
to be obliged to establish a stock company called OROP40 with a capital of 
2 million Austrian shillings in Vienna; this company should then regulate 
the trade with the oil products and the natural gas obtained in Austria. All 
shares of this company are to be handed out to the V/O Soyusnefteeksport. 
Comrade A.E. Osipov is to be confirmed as managing director of the 
OROP company. 
10. Marshal Konev is to be obliged to put forward proposals for the 
appointment to the leading functions of the administration of Soviet prop-
erty in Austria and to determine the board members for the stock compa-
nies as well as the tasks for the general directors (or their authorized repre-
sentatives) in the enterprises; Comrade Malenkov is to be obliged to review 
the proposals and to confirm them with the participation of interested min-
isters. 
11. The workers in the administration of Soviet property in Austria are 
to obtain the same rights as the workers in the enterprises of this admin-
istration. Furthermore, the workers in the OROP company should be on 
equal terms with the Soviet employees in the Soviet section/division of the 
Allied Commission for Austria in terms of food and consumer goods supply 
and living conditions. 
I. Stalin
[Annex]
Order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Occupation  
Troops in Austria
Contents: On the process of the registration of German assets transferred 
to the property of the USSR and the guarding of United Nations assets situ-
ated in Eastern Austria. 
According to the decree of the Berlin conference involving the three 
powers concerning the German assets in Eastern Austria that have been 
transferred to Soviet property, and in order to prevent plundering and 
other misuse of those assets and the United Nations’ and their citizens’ 
assets, 
40  Österreichisch-Russische Erdölproduktion (Austro-Russian Petroleum Production).
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   303 2015.02.17.   6:53
304 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
I hereby order the following: 
1. All mayors of Eastern Austrian cities and municipalities that have 
formerly German assets on their territories are to take all necessary mea-
sures to secure them [the assets] and to submit a report on this to the 
Soviet military commander within 10 days from the issue of the present 
order. 
The heads of the administrative offices, organizations, businesses, 
and enterprises, as well as all individuals, who use formerly German assets 
or who possess information about such assets, are obliged to give notice 
about it to the Soviet military commander within the aforementioned 
period. 
2. Assets belonging to states that were at war with Germany, or to 
citizens of the United Nations, that were transferred to Austria by sev-
eral German organizations after September 1 are to be registered and kept 
safely. 
All mayors, heads of organizations, and individuals who know about 
such assets are requested to give notice of this to the Soviet military com-
mander within a period of 10 days. 
3. I would like all aforementioned authorities and all individuals to 
note that they bear full responsibility for the securing and proper use of 
the given assets until they [the assets] are transferred to the administra-
tion or control of the Soviet military command. All contracts signed in 
connection with these assets without the Soviet military command’s con-
sent are null and void. 
4. All persons who do not report their knowledge concerning these 
assets on whatever pretext, who destroy or damage assets or give wrong 
information about them, hamper or try to prevent the implementation of 
the present order, as well as their henchmen and abettors, are to be put on 
trial. 
5. The order comes into effect on the day of issue. 
I. Konev
List of the enterprises that are to be integrated into the stock company of 
the machine engineering and metal processing plants
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1. Iron foundry of the Frank und Co 
enterprise 100 54 67
2. Wagner steel works  92 74 37
3. Mannesmann und Trauzell drilling 
tool factory 100 – –
4. Wiener Leichtmetallwerke light metal 
alloy foundry 100 85 89
5. Wiener Lokomotiv Fabrik AG 
locomotive-building factory 86.5 205 630




7. Wertheim und Co machine factory 99.7 101 318
8. Tabak- und Spezialmaschinenfabrik 
H. Sch. factory for special tobacco 
machines
100 38 109
9. Hans Bilstein figuring machines 
factory 100 38 40
10. Rudolf Otto Maurer factory for the 
testing of aircraft engines 100 54 25
11. Frank und Co instrument and 
machine tools factory 100 24 92
12. Linde Ridinger Maschinenfabrik 
repair factory for cooling devices 100 8 47




14. Ostmärkische Eisenbahnsignalwerke 
railway signal works 75 133 126
15. Bahnbedarf works for the production 
of railway equipment 100 14 42
16. Autokühler engine radiator factory  100 13 33
Source: AVP RF, f. 06, op. 8, d. 312, ll. 4–8.
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DOCUMENT No. 58:
Memorandum by Kiselev on the Political Situation in Austria
June 5, 1946
In the following document the USSR’s political representative in Austria, Kiselev, 
draws a broad picture of the political situation in Austria from the Soviet point 
of view. 
He states that the ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) was openly oriented 
toward America and pursued a pro-American policy; their leaders “are regarded 
as agents of the USA in Austria.” To the Soviet’s chagrin, the Socialist Party was 
able to maintain its influence on the masses. Judging the party by its leaders and 
its policy, Kiselev describes the SPÖ (Socialist Party of Austria) as “one of the 
most right-wing social democratic parties in Europe at the moment; (…) the poli-
ticians of the SPÖ have been acting as strict opponents of the Soviet Union and 
have been leading the anti-Soviet propaganda in Austria. (…) The struggle for 
a united working class by forming a unified party seems to be impossible under 
the given circumstances.” On the other hand, Kiselev mentioned the decrease in 
popularity of the ruling parties and the increasing influence of the communists. 
Appendix on the political situation in Austria and the tasks for our policy
1. Domestic situation
The development of the Austrian domestic and foreign policy since the 
last elections has been influenced to a great extent by the clear election vic-
tory of the right-wing People’s Party (it got 85 out of 165 mandates), as well 
as by the relative success of the Socialist Party (76 mandates) and the failure 
of the communists (four mandates). The government that was then formed 
according to the election results is referred to as “Concentration of All Demo-
cratic Powers” because it involves a representative of the Communist Party as 
well. But in fact it is a coalition of the two victorious parties—the pro-Ameri-
can People’s Party and the pro-British Socialist Party. The ÖVP plays the lead-
ing role in this coalition. Although they are actually part of the government, 
the communists have been playing the role of the opposition party so far. 
The main focus in the domestic policy of Figl’s41 government lies in 
preventing the democratization of the country and delaying the decisions 
41  Leopold Figl (ÖVP), from 1945 (until 1953) first chancellor of the Second Republic of 
Austria, after the dissolution of the Provisional Government under Renner. From 
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about important questions on the economic and political reconstruction of 
the country. By sabotaging all measures connected with the reconstruction 
of the country, such as the nationalization of the economy, the agrarian 
reform, denazification, and the improvement of the food supply situation, 
the government is trying to create a disastrous situation in the country and 
utilize it for their work against the Allies, and especially the Red Army. 
Therefore, the re-establishment of industry and public transport is 
going on very slowly. Two factors could stimulate the industrial upturn: 
quick nationalization and the signing of trade agreements about the supply 
of raw materials with the neighbor states. But the government is hamper-
ing both. Austria has not signed a single trade agreement thus far, except 
for local agreements with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Some time ago, the 
Socialists determined their reconstruction program. Its main point is not 
the implementation of the mentioned measures but the appeal to prevent 
the implementation of the Potsdam agreements. The Socialists accuse large-
scale capitalists and the leadership of the ÖVP of being responsible for the 
prevention of nationalization. 
No efforts were made toward the implementation of the land reform, 
either. The fact that there were cases of farmers who tried to forcibly obtain 
land from a large-scale landowner proves that this problem needs to be 
solved urgently. 
In terms of food supply, Figl’s government and the ÖVP are trying to 
cause an artificial famine in the working-class centers, especially inside the 
Soviet zone. As a result, demonstrations and strikes have been organized 
in the Soviet zone as well as in Styria and the [Western] Allied districts of 
Vienna. Despite all efforts, the Socialists were not able to channel the popu-
lation’s displeasure to the Red Army and the Soviet occupation authorities. 
It [the displeasure] was instead directed toward the government. 
The UNRRA42 turned out to be a great disappointment for the masses. 
After it took over the responsibility for the food supply in Austria, the 
supply situation got worse and the standards were reduced. After a final 
attempt to reduce the rations from 1,200 to 700 calories, the masses, and 
especially the workers, started to call for a trade agreement with the Soviet 
Union as the only way to escape this disastrous situation. In response to 
1938–1945 imprisoned in the Nazi camps of Dachau and Mauthausen. Austrian minis-
ter of foreign affairs, 1953–1959.
42  United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Through this program 
800,000 tons of food were transported to Austria. From the end of 1945, about 
48,000 displaced persons were being cared for by the UNRRA.
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the pressure from the masses, the government and the parliament needed 
to decide on the immediate start of negotiations concerning the conclusion 
of a trade agreement with the Soviet government, although the Americans 
and the British had forbidden them from entering into direct relationships 
with the Soviet Union. 
The transfer of German assets in Eastern Austria to Soviet property43 is 
at the center of the attention of the Allies’ anti-Soviet propaganda and their 
intelligence services—the SPÖ and the ÖVP. The Socialists especially have 
been spreading a lot of propaganda on this question recently. They portray 
the transfer of German assets to Soviet property as an economic catastro-
phe and as the loss of Austria’s economic independence. Nevertheless, the 
campaign against the agreements from the Potsdam Conference did not 
have the effect the Socialists had anticipated. Contrary to their expecta-
tions, [the campaign] did not cause any outrage among the workers. On 
the contrary, the movement in favor of regulating the question of German 
property through direct negotiations with the USSR is getting stronger. The 
Austrian government, which has not made any efforts in this direction so 
far, is now pretending to try to start negotiations with us. 
It is characteristic that the campaign against the Potsdam agreement 
in the Austrian press has decreased recently. 
2. Denazification and punishment of National Socialist perpetrators
According to an official survey from 1939, the number of leading mem-
bers of the National Socialist Party in Austria was 101,582. The total number 
of members of the party and its sub-organizations was 17 percent of the 
adult population. These figures show the enormous importance of denazifi-
cation in Austria. 
Although the slogans that are being distributed by the Austrian gov-
ernment and were spread earlier by the provisional government, as well as 
by the Socialist Party and the People’s Party, look democratic on the sur-
face, the efforts to cleanse Austria of National Socialists are being ham-
pered. The measures the occupation authorities take in order to accelerate 
this process are met with direct resistance from the Austrian authorities, 
institutions, and influential individuals. 
43  In Eastern Austria since 1945, based on the Potsdam Agreement, businesses and 
property were being confiscated as German assets by the Soviets. However, what was 
seized was not only German property but also originally Austrian or foreign (espe-
cially Western European) assets and property “Aryanized” by the Nazis.
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According to official data from the Ministry of the Interior, 514,353 
National Socialists were registered in Austria on May 29, 1946:44 
in Vienna 110,249
in Lower Austria 82,709
in Burgenland 10,435
in Styria 83,662





More than 100,000 National Socialists who were not registered for various 
reasons need to be added to these figures. 





The Allied Commission twice set a time limit for finishing denazification; 
the Austrian authorities, the government, and especially Interior Minister 
Helmer are the only ones to blame for the fact that this time limit could 
not be met. Helmer was [as he said] “the first one to finish denazifica-
tion by dismissing all important and less important Nazis from the min-
istry, police, and gendarmerie.” After a check-up it became obvious that 
in the British occupation zone alone, 40 percent of all National Socialists 
remained in the police force; in the gendarmerie it was even 80 percent. 
The question concerns not just the dismissal of National Socialists 
from state and economic institutions. The Austrians were able to think of 
numerous ways to keep National Socialists within the force or to at least 
ease their fate. National Socialists who have been dismissed in one institu-
tion get a job in another one in which the denazification process has already 
been completed. Many institutions keep paying the dismissed National 
Socialists their full wages and employ them as “consultants.” The most 
44  These figures are accurate.
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widespread method is to pay the dismissed National Socialists pensions. 
This practice is common among absolutely all Austrian institutions, despite 
the categorical ban that was issued by the Allied authorities. 
After Austria’s liberation 12,500 National Socialists and war criminals 
were captured in the Soviet zone. But both the judicial organs and the gov-
ernment tried to do all they could to prevent trials against the captives. 
Out of all of the captives, the Austrian public prosecutors released 8,265 
formerly known National Socialists and referred only 1,235 to the courts. 
Within one year and a couple of months, the cases of 565 captured National 
Socialists were heard at Austrian courts; 500 were sentenced (mostly to 
light penalties), and 64 were acquitted.45
3. Political Parties
The balance of forces between the political parties that has occurred as 
a result of the elections has not changed noticeably. The ÖVP remains the 
strongest party. Although it experienced some difficulties, it has been able 
to unite all right-wing and reactionary elements in its ranks and strengthen 
its position and its influence among the peasants, the bourgeoisie, and the 
Catholic petit-bourgeois masses. Its policy is determined by the right-wing-
ers in the party. The progressive elements of the party have been marginal-
ized; their influence on politics is marginal. The position of the Catholic-
clerical circles has been gaining power; they are oriented toward the Vatican 
and pursue a policy that is similar to the one pursued in the times of the 
Heimwehr. Their aim is to transform Austria into a stronghold of the Cath-
olic reactionary movement. 
Under the current circumstances in which the disputes inside the party 
are growing, Figl and his followers would have difficulties asserting the 
party leadership inside the government if it was not for the support of the 
Americans. 
The People’s Party is basically oriented toward America and pursues 
a pro-American policy. Figl and especially Gruber46 are regarded as agents 
45  The figures cited in the document cannot be verified in detail, as the 12,500 prisoners 
mentioned are not explicitly categorized. The Soviet authorities arrested thousands of 
Austrians in the context of their denazification policy but released the majority with-
out registering their numbers. The Soviet authorities also transferred lesser former-
National-Socialist offenders to the Austrian judiciary. In this respect, Soviet policy 
in Austria differed considerably from in Eastern European countries, where political 
opponents were frequently persecuted under the pretext of an “anti-fascist policy.”
46  Karl Gruber, Austrian foreign minister 1945–1953, known for his pro-Western and 
anti-Soviet orientation. 
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of the USA in Austria. This explains why the Americans are trying to 
strengthen the position of Figl’s government and to prevent new elections 
by any means; they could not possibly imagine a better government than 
the one under Figl. The People’s Party and Figl in particular are expecting 
that they can keep themselves in power with the support of the Americans. 
But the increasingly difficult political situation combined with the prob-
lems in terms of food supply have made it necessary for the ÖVP to take 
some measures to strengthen their positions. For instance, Figl was forced 
to agree on the conclusion of a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 
order to solve the problem of German property through direct negotiations 
with the Soviet Union. But it would be wrong to think that the People’s 
Party is going to change its domestic policy and even less its foreign policy. 
It is dependent on the Americans, and therefore it is only able to perform 
some kind of provisional maneuver. 
The Socialist Party, which has been conducting a broad range of intense 
activities among the workers, has recently been able to maintain its influ-
ence on the masses, but not quite at the expected level. The party has 
350,000 members at the moment, 160,000 of them in Vienna. Judging from 
its leaders and the policy the SPÖ is pursuing, it is one of the most right-
wing social democratic parties in Europe at the moment. It seeks the lead-
ing position in the re-establishment of the new Socialist International. The 
party leadership is in the hands of right-wing elements who used to coop-
erate with the National Socialists in the past—Renner, Schärf,47 Helmer,48 
Speiser,49 Seitz, etc. The left wing, which basically consists of inexperienced 
party members, has no clear organization and is not supported by the party 
and is therefore not able to exercise influence over the masses. 
Tactical maneuvers and demagoguery are typical features of the SPÖ. 
Because the party leadership is against the democratization of the country, 
against denazification, and against the nationalization of industry, it has to 
hide its policy not only from the party’s base but from the members of the 
central committees and the members of parliament as well. 
That is why the socialists in the National Council and the government 
sometimes support proposals against which they are actually leading a 
fierce struggle, such as the trade agreement with the Soviet Union. 
47  Adolf Schärf (SPÖ), vice-chancellor of Austria 1945–1957. President of the Republic of 
Austria 1957–1965.
48  Oskar Helmer (SPÖ), Austrian minister of the interior, 1945–1959. 
49  Paul Speiser (SPÖ), city councilman in Vienna, 1945–1947.
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The SPÖ already started to orient its policy toward Great Britain before 
the election. Since one of the SPÖ’s representatives, Schärf, traveled to Lon-
don and had a meeting with Bevin, during which the SPÖ and the Labour 
Party obviously concluded a direct agreement, the SPÖ has turned into an 
intelligence service for the British and now coordinates its policy with the 
British. From this moment, the politicians of the SPÖ have been acting as 
strict opponents of the Soviet Union and have been leading the anti-Soviet 
propaganda in Austria. The struggle against the Potsdam agreements and for 
the withdrawal of the occupation troops forms the base for this propaganda. 
The SPÖ’s main organ, the Arbeiter-Zeitung—whose editor-in-chief 
is Oscar Pollak,50 a Trotskyist and great enemy of the Soviet Union—has 
turned into the British mouthpiece and the center of anti-Soviet propa-
ganda in Austria. Nevertheless, the newspaper only rarely dares to attack 
[the Soviet Union] openly. 
Upon Bevin’s51 order the leadership of the SPÖ formed a bloc with 
the ÖVP, and now they pursue a common policy on the main issues such 
as nationalization, implementation of a land reform, denazification, and 
German property in Austria. The socialists, who are led by the right wing, 
display an openly hostile attitude toward the communists. The struggle for 
a united working class by forming a unified party seems to be impossible 
under the given circumstances. 
Assuming that the Socialist Party could strengthen their position 
among the masses, they have been trying to provoke a government crisis, 
the resignation of the government and new elections recently. According to 
their plans, the government crisis should have taken place in August and 
the new elections in September. In order to reach this goal, they tried to 
utilize the difficulties in terms of food supply and the propaganda against 
the occupation and the Allies’ control over the Potsdam agreements. The 
starting point of the socialists’ election campaign was the campaign on the 
“Program of Reconstruction,” which was presented with demagoguery and 
populist slogans about the revision of the Potsdam agreements, withdrawal 
of the occupation powers, and the restoration of Austria’s political indepen-
dence. But the campaign has failed. Only 20,000–25,000 people came to the 
305 meetings in Vienna that were regarded as very important, although the 
50  Oscar Pollak, editor-in-chief of the Arbeiterzeitung 1945–1961. In exile in Brno, Paris, 
and London, 1934–1945.
51  Ernest Bevin, British foreign minister, 1945–1951.
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organization has 160,000 members in Vienna alone. This forced the social-
ists to rethink their position and give up on the idea of new elections. 
The Communist Party, which suffered a major defeat in the elections, 
has not only pulled through a crisis on which the other parties were relying 
but could also increase its influence on the masses. The number of mem-
bers increased by 25–30 percent; it has 140,000 members at the moment. 
One thousand eight hundred of all 8,000 factory committees are dominated 
by the communists. Their daily newspaper has a circulation of 220,000–
225,000. 
Formally, the party takes part in government work, but in fact it plays 
an oppositional role and strongly criticizes the government, especially in 
the issues of food supply, denazification, economic reconstruction and 
organization, and nationalization of the big industrial enterprises and 
banks, as well as land reform. 
The KPÖ’s weak point is that thus far it has not touched the main ques-
tion that is of the greatest importance for Austria at the moment—the 
question of Austria’s sovereignty and independence. The party will not be 
really successful in mobilizing the masses if it does not show any initiative 
in this question. 
The communists do not wish to hold new elections in the near future, 
because they do not think that they could gain decisive influence on the 
masses within a short period of time. They could only achieve a greater suc-
cess in new elections if [the elections] were not to take place earlier than 
next spring. 
4. Foreign policy of the Austrian government
The foreign policy of Figl’s government has been oriented toward the 
West from the beginning. The government has turned out to be a British 
and American intelligence service, recently taking only measures that have 
been approved by [the British and Americans]. At the direct request of the 
British and Americans, Figl takes a reserved position toward the Soviet 
Union and still refuses to solve the questions about the Potsdam agree-
ments in direct negotiations with the Soviet government. 
As soon as it became obvious that a food disaster in Austria could not 
be prevented without help from the Soviet Union,52 growing pressure from 
52  Indeed, the food situation in Austria, especially in Vienna, was drastic at the end of 
the battle for Vienna. A catastrophe was avoided only with the help of the Red Army. 
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the masses forced the government to start negotiations about the conclu-
sion of a trade agreement. 
Although Austria seems to be interested in the further development 
of its relations with its neighbor states, the policy of Figl’s government and 
both parties—the SPÖ and the ÖVP—aims at worsening the relationships 
with these countries. Not much has been done with regards to this ques-
tion, which is of great importance for Austria, except for some very small 
and local agreements with Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. This is 
because the Americans and the British are exercising direct pressure in 
order to prevent Austria from becoming somehow dependent on the truly 
democratic countries—the countries that are on friendly terms with the 
Soviet Union. To definitively divide Austria from these countries, British-
American intelligence has initiated some statements by Austria with ter-
ritorial claims on Hungary (Sopron) and Czechoslovakia (a letter from 13 
communities), as well as a massive campaign about the notorious “subver-
sive activities” of the Carinthian Slovenes. At the same time, Figl declares 
that Austria has no territorial claims on Germany. This is obviously done 
to the advantage of the Americans who want to tie Austria to the Catholic 
province of Bavaria. On this question the government and the two parties 
do not have support from the masses, because Austria and the Austrians 
place great importance on their former relations to the East, and those rela-
tions are therefore regarded as a matter of fact and are popular among the 
Austrian population. We need to utilize Austria’s relations with the Balkan 
states as a particularly effective tool for the strengthening of the Soviet 
position in Austria, direct participation in the country’s democratiza-
tion, and for guiding economic development in the right direction. In this 
respect the easiest way to unmask Figl’s government would be to explain 
to the Austrians that the current government policy, aiming at the security 
of Austria’s national interests and British and American business circles, is 
harmful to the reconstruction of Austria’s economy. 
The attitude of the Austrian population toward Great Britain and the 
USA has changed recently, especially since the food supply situation wors-
ened after the UNRRA took over responsibility in this respect, and since the 
conference of foreign ministers made its decision concerning South Tyrol. 
Some of the Austrians have noticed the huge differences between the West-
On May 1, one week before the capitulation of Germany, Stalin gave the order to 
release 7,000 tons of peas, 1,000 tons of bread, and other supplies from the reserves 
of the Red Army. 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   314 2015.02.17.   6:53
315SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
ern powers’ alleged and real policy concerning Austria. According to vari-
ous information, the Western-oriented policy Figl’s government is pursuing 
concerning the failed campaign on the integration of South Tyrol has been 
strongly criticized in Tyrol. The government’s and especially Gruber’s popu-
larity is decreasing. People are becoming more and more convinced that this 
kind of orientation, which makes Austria dependent on British and Ameri-
can politics, does not correspond with the national interests. 
The Allies and in particular the Americans can be satisfied with the 
regime that was established in Austria after the elections and especially 
with the composition of the current government and parliament and its 
obvious orientation toward the West. Their [the Allies’] policy in Austria is 
essentially based on strengthening the reactionary regime and the author-
ity of Figl’s government. 
5. British and American proposals about Austria and our position in this 
respect
Sovereignty. The British and American proposals about Austria are for-
mally oriented toward the re-establishment of Austria’s sovereignty by con-
cluding a peace treaty or a state treaty. (The USA, which did not recognize Aus-
tria’s Anschluss, promotes the idea of a peace treaty, whereas Great Britain, 
which did recognize the Anschluss, supports the idea of a state treaty.) The 
basic idea is this: because the government and the majority of members of par-
liament are being held on a leash by the British-American bloc, the Allies are 
trying to utilize and strengthen their influence in Austria by presenting them-
selves as friends and advocates of Austrian independence, although they obvi-
ously have neither the intention nor the possibility to withdraw the occupation 
troops from Austria and give up the Allies’ control over Austria. 
There is no doubt that the majority of the Austrian population sympa-
thizes with the British and American proposals that were adopted by the 
ÖVP and SPÖ, because national independence and sovereignty are a sensi-
tive issue. This is even more relevant, as both parties’ active propaganda, 
which blames the occupation regime for the difficult economic situation in 
Austria, is successful. 
All declarations aim, and all British-American propaganda in Austria 
aims, at presenting the Soviet Union as the only state that is against the re-
establishment of sovereignty and against the abolition of Allied control to 
the Austrians. 
Reduction of the number of troops. We reject the idea of a peace treaty, 
which would mean the abolition of all control functions of the Allies and 
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the occupation regime, because basic questions about a democratic re-
establishment of Austria’s economy and politics have not been answered 
yet; because Austria has not been cleansed of former leading National 
Socialists, who have settled in particular in the Western occupation zones; 
and because the issue of Soviet claims concerning German property has not 
been solved yet. The control agreement that has recently been concluded 
and proposed to the Allied governments for discussion, on the other hand, 
completely corresponds to our interests and provides the Austrian govern-
ment with more power and authorities. 
If we, however, reject the idea of concluding an agreement with Aus-
tria, and delay the re-establishment of Austria’s national sovereignty, this 
would automatically reduce the sympathies for the Soviet Union, due to the 
aggressive campaign the British and American agents in the ÖVP and SPÖ 
are pursuing. Furthermore, a rejection would put the KPÖ in a much worse 
position than any other party. While both the ÖVP and the SPÖ have not 
acted honorably in the matter of a sovereign Austria in the past, the KPÖ, 
which has always led an honorable struggle for Austria’s independence, is 
not able to take any initiative in this decisive question, because it cannot 
promote the withdrawal of the troops and the abolition of the occupation 
regime until the Soviet government defines and announces its position on 
this question. 
It would therefore be appropriate to announce the Soviet government’s 
position on the issue of Austria’s sovereignty. As far as the further and sig-
nificant reduction of occupation troops is concerned (i.e., the maintenance 
of a significantly reduced troop in the form of police units for the guarding 
of Soviet assets), it could only take place under the following conditions, 
which the Allies would probably not be able to accept: 
1.  The evacuation from Austria of all foreign fascists and all people who 
are not Austrian and are currently in camps—so-called DPs. There 
are 300,000 of them in the Western occupation zones. 
2.  The complete denazification of the political and economic apparatus 
under the control of the Allies and replacement of all dismissed per-
sons with democratic elements. 
3.  The strict and complete implementation of the agreements of the 
Berlin conference on the transfer of German assets in Eastern Aus-
tria into the property of the Soviet Union and the formal settlement 
of this transfer by the government and the parliament adopting the 
necessary legislative acts in this respect. It is necessary to publish 
the value of the German property that is going to be transferred to 
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the Soviet Union. This measure will obviously have a healing effect, 
and the defamatory propaganda that is being pursued by the British 
and the U.S. and their intelligence services in Austria—the ÖVP and 
the SPÖ—will come to an end. 
4.  The announcement of a law by the Allies and then also by the Aus-
trian Parliament saying that, for the next 10 years, no Austrian 
property and no investments shall be transferred to foreign capital 
but must remain property of the Austrian state or its citizens. The 
Americans and the British pursue a policy of economic subjugation 
by taking possession of Austrian property; that is why such a bill 
would clearly be directed against the Americans and the British. 
We think it is also possible and necessary to discuss whether the Soviet 
government is prepared to talk about the withdrawal of the armed forces 
from Austria and the complete re-establishment of Austria’s sovereignty 
under the condition that all the aforementioned preconditions, as well as 
the conditions of the declaration regarding the defeat of Germany and the 
Allies’ declarations regarding Austria, will be fulfilled, especially concern-
ing the destruction of Austria’s potential in the arms industry. The remain-
ing issues—territorial issues, Austria’s admission to the UN, etc.—could 
be regulated in an agreement about Austria’s status that would also imply 
the complete withdrawal of occupation forces from Austria. We think this 
kind of position and propaganda will reduce the [Western] Allies’ influ-
ence, because the rejection of these conditions, which are mostly unaccept-
able for them and partly (point 1) not feasible, will show how hypocritical 
the [Western] Allies’ proposals are. This will bring sympathy to the Soviet 
Union, and it will help the democratic powers in Austria to strengthen their 
position and their policy aiming at the strengthening of relations with the 
Soviet Union, the Balkan states, and the truly democratic countries. As a 
result, the KPÖ would get the chance to lead this movement in Austria, to 
have the initiative in their own hands, and to undermine the ÖVP’s and the 
SPÖ’s influence on the masses. 
Signed: General Kurasov,53 Kiselev 
Source: AVP RF, F. 012, op. 7, p. 101, d. 80, ll. 35–50.
53  From May 1946 to April 1949, Soviet high commissioner in Austria and commander-
in-chief of the Central Group of Forces.
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DOCUMENT No. 59: 
Report on the Moral Discipline of MVD Troops in Austria 
October 10, 1946
The following document deals with the political and moral state and the military 
discipline among the MVD troops for the protection of the rear of the Central 
Group of Soviet Forces from July to September 1946. The report gives an over-
view of incidents—including “immoral incidents and soldiers’ crimes” like deser-
tion and drinking and “soldiers’ offenses” such as disobedience or absences with-
out official permission.
The study and implementation of the new disciplinary regulations and the 
new statutes of the internal service of the Armed Forces of the USSR, and 
the educational work that had been carried out, caused political and moral 
conditions, military discipline, and internal order to be strengthened in 
most of the units and subdivisions over the given period of time. 
There was not a single case of political crime, no negative incidents during 
the times of duty or free time, and no cases of desertion. Furthermore, the 
number of extraordinary incidents decreased, as well as the number of per-
sons who had to be brought to justice for various offenses. 
The one case of politically harmful statements referred to in form No. 
8-b, in which the assistant of the staff leader of the Sergeants’ School, Cap-
tain E.N. Golubchenko, praised life and the system in capitalist countries, 
occurred due to his political and general backwardness and was prosecuted 
duly by army and party organs. 
Golubchenko was brought to justice by the party and was dismissed from 
service (our report No. 01100 from 14/9/1946). 
Comparative data about immoral incidents and soldiers’ offenses among 
the troops are represented in the next table. 
The given data show an insignificant decrease in immoral incidents, as well 
as a slight increase in soldiers’ offenses for the past quarter of the year. 
All troop units and subdivisions except for the 24th border regiment were 
able to achieve a decline in immoral incidents in the given quarter of 1946. 
In the 24th border regiment, the number of immoral offenses has doubled 
over the past quarter, including 23 cases of hard drinking compared to eight 
cases in the preceding quarter. 
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The rise in hard drinking in the 24th border regiment was the main rea-
son why so many immoral incidents took place in the quarter under review. 
It also caused a general increase in hard drinking cases among the troops, 
from 32 cases in the second quarter to 55 cases in the third quarter. 
Accordingly, the number of cases of hard drinking with criminal conse-
quences increased as well. 
Thanks to the prophylactic, medical, and explanatory measures that had 
been introduced, the number of cases of venereal disease among the staff 
was reduced from 28 cases to six. 
There was a slight decline in the number of immoral incidents among 
officers and soldiers in the period under review; nevertheless, the situation 
remains unchanged among the sergeant staff. 
The percentage of immoral incidents among members of the Komsomol is 
considerably lower compared to communists and non-party-members—it 
makes up 1.7 percent. However, the overall number of immoral incidents 
among Komsomol members has increased by seven cases in the quarter 
List of negative 









1. Immoral incidents 
and soldiers’ crimes 65 2.2 67 2.2
Including:
a) desertion None - 4 0.12
b) hard drinking 55 1.7 32 1.1
c) venereal diseases 6 0.2 28 0.9




None - 2 0.06
b) absences without 
official permission 15 0.5 18 0.6
3. Conviction by the 
military tribunal 16 0.5 20 0.7
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under review, while a slight decline could be observed among communists 
and non-party-members. 
A growth in the overall number of soldiers’ offenses among the troops 
from 243 to 293 cases and the percentage of occurrences connected with 
that could be noticed in the following types of offenses against military dis-
cipline. 
a) Negligence of military property and equipment—from 13 to 47 cases. 
b) Sleeping while on duty—from three to eight cases. 
c) Offenses against the internal order—from eight to 26 cases. 
d) Leaving post during duty—from zero to four cases. 
e) Other offenses—from 84 to 106 cases. 
Regarding the type of staff, military offenses decreased slightly only among 
sergeants. In all other groups, there was an increase in all types of offenses, 
especially in negligence of military property. 
The highest increase in the number of military offenses occurred: 
In the administration of troops with subdivisions—from four to 28; 
in the 24th border regiment—from 65 to 87; 
in the 383rd rifle regiment—from 129 to 150. 
This data shows us that despite a significant increase in military offenses in 
several troop units and subdivisions, the disciplinary situation remains par-
ticularly unsatisfactory in the 383rd rifle regiment. Furthermore, a consid-
erable proportion of the officers in this regiment do not set a good example 
in terms of obeying and maintaining the military discipline yet. Individual 
officers are the main culprits in severe offenses against military discipline 
(Rodin, Shibaenko, Gnechko, Uchitel’, Khromin, and others). 
Form No. 8-z shows that the commanders of special subdivisions and regi-
ment staff officers suffer the largest damages from incidents—most of 
them members of the supply troops or the front troops. 
Half of the offenses that were tolerated by the officers over the period 
under review are cases of a negligent attitude to work or negligence of mili-
tary property and equipment. 
The presence of the aforementioned shortcomings, growing alcohol-
ism, and the increase in the overall number of military offenses among the 
troops, as well as the bad disciplinary state in the 383rd rifle regiment, can 
be explained by the following facts: 
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1. The bad organization of educational work in some subdivisions, the low 
awareness of individual members of the army, connected with the possibil-
ity of buying large quantities of wine from the recent harvest for two to five 
shillings per liter. A significant number of soldiers and sergeants from the 
aforementioned subdivisions showed instability in this respect and, utilizing 
the special features of our work, allowed for cases of hard drinking. The com-
mands of the units and subdivisions as well as the political organs, particu-
larly the 24th border regiment, were not able to take this fact into consider-
ation in time to take the necessary preventive measures against drinking. 
2. Carrying out the biannual inspection of clothing, equipment, food sup-
ply, and the inspection of the work of supply organs, the commissions 
noticed a large number of deficiencies, which can be explained by the negli-
gence of individual members of the army who then underwent appropriate 
disciplinary penalties. In the 383rd rifle regiment, for instance, disciplinary 
proceedings were opened against 24 soldiers, sergeants, and officers. Fur-
thermore, proceedings were opened against seven people from the same 
regiment, as well as against seven people from the administration of troops 
for their negligent attitude concerning the storage and stock-taking of food 
supplies and clothing. 
Particularly significant shortcomings and cases of neglect were 
detected in the work of the logistic department of the 383rd rifle regiment, 
because the command and individual political officers had gotten accus-
tomed to the members of the supply troops and therefore did not notice 
the gross violations of their commands and the directives from the center. 
3. The quarter under review has been a period of studying and implement-
ing new regulations. The growing number of violations of the internal order 
and other offenses (offenses in terms of proper uniforms, internal order, 
violations of the rules of behavior toward superiors, etc.) can be explained 
by the fact that many soldiers, sergeants, and officers have not yet adopted 
the new standards of the disciplinary regulations and the statutes of the 
internal service, and therefore allowed for deviations from these standards, 
for which they were consequently punished. 
This situation was the main reason for the increase in military offenses 
in the last quarter; it shows that the study and explanatory work on the 
new regulations in some subdivisions did not meet the high requirements 
that were set to the staff in connection with the implementation of the new 
regulations. 
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4. Due to the fact that some officers do not know their subordinates very 
well and do not control their activities while on duty and in their spare 
time properly, individual undisciplined army members were able to com-
mit various offenses against the military order (sleeping while on duty, 
leaving their posts, being absent without official permission, etc.) behind 
the backs of their superiors. Another reason why these offenses and inci-
dents could occur was the lack of strict internal discipline in some of the 
 subdivisions. 
The controls carried out on the spot showed that the number of such 
shortcomings in the 383rd rifle regiment is higher than in other units, even 
if the disciplinary situation has improved here as well in the past quarter in 
comparison to the quarter before. Still, the situation remains alarming and 
falls far behind the situational requirements. 
5. The large number of offenses against military discipline in the 383rd rifle 
regiment can be explained by the following reasons: 
a) The low standards of party political and educational work among the 
staff, for which the political workers of the regiment in particular are 
responsible, particularly the regiment‘s deputy commander for the political 
department, Lieutenant Colonel Comrade Shevelev. 
b) The inexperience and the poor training of the regiment’s officers, the 
inability and unwillingness of individual officers (especially company com-
manders) to carry out training and educational work among their staff. 
c) The significant number of criminal and politically and morally unreliable 
elements in the regiment. When the regiment was established, they admit-
ted many soldiers, sergeants, and officers with previous convictions—peo-
ple who had not been checked up on and who were in fact untrustworthy 
in regards to their former work experiences and their moral characteristics. 
A detailed report on the reasons for the low level of military discipline and 
about the measures we have been taking has been sent to the head of the 
internal troops of the MVD of the USSR, General-Lieutenant Comrade Bur-
mak, in the internal memorandum No. 001049 from 8/9/1946. 
Measures
1. To improve the training and the educational and party political work, the 
officers of the units’ troop administration were provided with significant 
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practical help in the past quarter of the year; this applies particularly to the 
command of the 383rd rifle regiment. 
In this regiment, a commission of experienced officers from the troop 
administration worked on the organization of the training and educational 
program for all kinds of army members for 10 days. In addition to a compre-
hensive inspection of the work of the regiment’s staff, the battalions’ staff 
and the political workers, a number of instructive, methodological, and infor-
mational lessons were carried out within the military and political training 
program. The results of the commission’s work and their instructions were 
discussed at a meeting of the regiment’s officers. However, the leading offi-
cers of the regiment and the battalions, as well as the commanders of the 
subdivisions, did not display the necessary forcefulness in wiping out short-
comings that were discovered by the officers of the troop administration. 
2. In connection with the receipt of the order by the commander-in-chief 
of the ground forces of the Armed Forces of the USSR No. 014 of 7/11/1946 
about the struggle against desertion and crime inside the Army, the troops’ 
staff and political department developed a review directive and sent it to 
their units; in this directive, our measures for the further strengthening of 
the political and moral state and military discipline were explained. Despite 
its [this document’s] high value and the concreteness of the measures and 
requirements, the deputy commander of the political department for the 
383rd rifle regiment did not find the time to submit it to his officers. Nor 
did he consider it necessary to discuss it with the political workers of the 
regiment until the arrival of the officers of the troops’ political department. 
3. With regard to the issue of strengthening the political and moral state and 
implementing our directives inside the units, party meetings were organized 
with the participation of officers from the troop administration. Unit com-
manders and heads of the political organs delivered speeches there. 
4. After the inspection and controls of the personnel, carried out by officers 
of the troops’ staff and the political department, the units’ command iden-
tified 23 army members in the past quarter who had been untrustworthy in 
their political and moral features and could therefore no longer be used for 
service in the troops. They were all dismissed from the troops. Fourteen of 
the dismissed persons used to serve in the 383rd rifle regiment. 
Sixteen army members who committed military offenses in the past quar-
ter were convicted by the troops’ Military Tribunal. They were convicted of 
the following offenses: 
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six persons—for theft of military property; 
five persons—for absences without official permission; 
five persons—for other offenses, most of which took place in a state of 
drunkenness. 
Disciplinary proceedings were opened against the vast majority of army 
members who had behaved negatively; three of them were judged by the 
officers’ court of honor. 
The Party Commission at the troops’ political department brought 19 
communists to (party) justice for breaching the party’s code of conduct, 
negligence during service, and for other offenses disgraceful to commu-
nists; five of them were excluded from the VKP(b). Furthermore, seven per-
sons were brought to (party) justice for immoral activities. 
5. In connection with the receipt of the order on redeployment to the home-
land and disbandment, the staff and the political department developed a 
plan of measures aimed at sustaining the discipline and order in the units and 
subdivisions during this period; the aforementioned shortcomings in terms of 
discipline and political and moral state were taken into consideration. 
6. At the end of September, a party meeting with the participation of the 
leading officers took place at the administration of troops. At this meeting, 
the decree from the Central Committee of the VKP(b) of July 26, 1946, and 
the directive from the political department of the internal troops of the 
USSR’s MVD No. 24/5–016263 of August 31, 1946, were discussed, the lat-
ter of which had been issued in connection with the given decree. Further-
more, an action plan for the implementation of the aforementioned decree 
by the troops’ political department was submitted. 
In addition to this, the upcoming tasks for the redeployment period 
were explained at the meeting. 
7. In connection with the redeployment and the changed situation, meet-
ings of all officers were organized in the units. At these meetings, special 
attention was paid to the necessity of maintaining strict discipline and high 
moral standards within the subdivisions. 
The tasks resulting from the order to redeploy and disband the troops are 
being discussed at closed party assemblies. There will be talks with soldiers 
and sergeants, the contents of which were determined and sent to the units 
by the political department of the troops. 
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General conclusions
The staff is in a healthy political and moral state. Generally, the discipline 
complies with the spirit and the requirements of the regulations and 
instructions of the Soviet Army. 
The vast majority of soldiers, sergeants, and officers served their state 
outside the homeland’s borders in a respectable and honest manner. 
Now it is the task of the Command and the political organs and the party 
and youth organizations to accomplish the train journey to the homeland in 
as organized a way as possible and to not permit any immoral incidents or 
other criminal acts among the staff. The homecoming will be used broadly 
for political and party work—it should help to teach the soldiers to love 
their homeland, its people, and the Bolshevik party infinitely and to show 
the greatest devotion toward them. 
Signed: Zimin-Kovalev, Shukin 
Source: RGVA, f. 38650, op. 1, d. 1222, ll. 193–199.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 60: 
Letter from the Chief of GUPVI54 M. Krivenko,55 to the Minister of the 
Interior, S. Kruglov,56 on the Repatriation of 5,000 Austrians
January 20, 1947
The following document is the final report on the early repatriation of more than 
5,000 Austrian prisoners of war at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947.
Your order No. 001042 “On the liberation and sending back to their home-
land of 5,000 Austrian prisoners of war” from November 28 was executed 
within the period foreseen. 
Five thousand eighteen Austrian prisoners of war released from the Minis-
try of the Interior of the USSR’s POW camps in the rear (among them 1,038 
anti-fascists) were handed over to representatives of the Austrian govern-
ment in Wiener Neustadt (Austria). 
The officials receiving the prisoners of war, the Austrian press, and the 
Allies’ press (the GUPVI has newspaper clippings at its disposal) noted the 
good physical condition and mental state of the prisoners of war. Repre-
sentatives of the Austrian government—Minister of the Interior Helmer, 
Minister of Justice Gerö,57 Minister for Securing Property Krauland,58 
and representatives of the Communist Party, Socialist Party, and People’s 
Party—delivered speeches at the meetings organized by the Austrian gov-
ernment on the occasion of the liberation of prisoners of war. 
The prisoners of war listened carefully and sympathetically to the speeches 
given by the representatives of the Communist Party and applauded enthu-
siastically. 
54  “Glavnoe Upravlenie po delam Voennoplennykh i Internirovannykh,” Main Adminis-
tration for Affairs of Prisoners of War and Internees.
55  Mikhail Spiridonovich Krivenko, chief of GUPVI, 1945–1947.
56  Sergei Nikiforovich Kruglov, people’s commissar (minister) of interior 1945–1953.
57  Josef Gerö, Austrian minister of justice, 1945–1954.
58  Peter Krauland, Austrian minister for protection of assets and economic planning in 
Figl’s first government,  1945–1949. Member of parliament, 1945–1951. Expelled from 
the ÖVP, 1951. Convicted for abuse of position, 1954. 
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The prisoners of war who spoke thanked the Soviet government for the 
positive treatment they had received. One of the most characteristic state-
ments was that given by the POW Buchner Ferdinand: 
“We do not miss any opportunity,” he said, “to talk about what we saw in 
the Soviet Union. We join the struggle of our homeland to get rid of Nazism 
completely and for the possibility to tread the path the Soviet Union has 
walked and still is walking on.”
[Letter sent to comrades Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Kuznetsov, No. 
419/k from 1/26/47.] 
“Our people still do not have enough spirit and power to recognize the 
hidden and open enemies of democracy and fight against them. We will 
fight for a free and newly democratic Austria,” the orator concluded. 
The Viennese public and Austria’s political parties considered the repatria-
tion of 5,000 prisoners of war to be an important event for the country and 
evidence of the Soviet government’s generous attitude toward democratic 
Austria. 
According to a statement sent to the MVD’s authorized representative, 
Colonel Prikhod’ko, by the Austrian minister of the interior, Helmer, he 
[Helmer] has sent a letter of thanks to the Soviet government on behalf of 
the Austrian government. 
The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Aus-
tria, Fürnberg, also said to Comrade Prikhod’ko that they [the Commu-
nist Party] had sent a letter to the CC VKP(b), in which they approve of the 
return of the released prisoners of war to their homeland. 
Neither the prisoners of war nor the representatives of the Austrian gov-
ernment and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria 
made any claims against those who handed over the prisoners of war. 
Signed:  The Chief of GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR
 General Lieutenant Krivenko 
Source: GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 2664, ll. 18–19.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 61: 
From the Personal File of an Austrian POW
February 9, 1947
While the majority of German prisoners of war were not allowed to return to 
their country until 1948–1949, prisoners of war of Austrian citizenship were 
able to do so earlier, in 1947. Therefore, like Anton Josef Frieß, who was initially 
recorded, mistakenly, as German, many Austrians were forced to go through 
detailed questioning to prove their nationality.




On February 8, 1947, I, the operative representative of the camp depart-
ment No. 2, Lieutenant B.I. Konviser, questioned the prisoner of war Anton 
Frieß, nationality Austrian, born in 1920 in Austria, Feldbach district, Kren-
nach village, unmarried, eight years of school education, originating in the 
peasantry, peasant, no party membership, military rank Private First Class. 
He does not work in the POW camp because he belongs to the third 
group59 due to his physical condition. 
I have been informed about the consequences of giving false information 
pursuant to Article 1989 of the penal code. 
Signature: Frieß
Question: What is your nationality?
Answer: I am Austrian. 
Question: What citizenship do you have?
Answer: I have Austrian citizenship. 
Question: How can you prove that you are Austrian?
Answer: My mother and father are Austrians. 
Question: What is your family’s address? 
59  POW´s were classified in different groups by their physical condition. Group three 
consisted of people whose poor physical condition did not allow them to do any work. 
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Answer: Austria, Feldbach district, Krendach [village], [sic] 70. 
Question: What would you like to add? 
Answer: The translator did not write down my nationality correctly during 
the questioning. 
The protocol was written down in my own words. It was read to me in a lan-
guage I am able to understand. 
Decree
(about the recognition of nationality) 
On February 9, 1947, I, the operative representative of the camp depart-
ment No. 2, Lieutenant B.I. Konviser, questioned the prisoner of war Anton 
Frieß, of Austrian nationality, born in 1920 in Austria, Feldbach district, 
Krennach village, Austrian citizen, and established the following: the pris-
oner of war’s father and mother are of Austrian nationality. Therefore the 
following was legally recognized: 
The prisoner of war Anton Frieß is of Austrian nationality. 
The operative representative of the camp department No. 2
Signed: Konviser
Source: RGVA, 460.799492, ll. 1, 7–8.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 62:
The GOSPLAN’s Report to V. Molotov on Dismantling in Austria
March 7, 1947
The Soviet dismantling of the Austrian industry that was carried out mainly in 
1945 and 1946 involved a total value of approximately 8.5 billion shillings (327 
million dollars). The oil industry alone accounted for 1.7 billion shillings.
The Gosplan of the USSR hereby submits information about reparations 
and about captured equipment and material that was removed from Ger-
many before January 1, 1947. 
The total value of all reparations that the Soviet Union received from Ger-
many over the period from the issuing of the decrees of the Berlin Confer-
ence of the Three Powers until January 1, 1947, is 1,100.5 million (1.15 bil-
lion) US dollars, including: 
a) Equipment and material considered to be German property from August 
2, 1945, until January 1, 1947, with a total value of  850.5 million US dollars, 
including: 
equipment removed from the German zone occupied
by the Soviet troops 733.6 million US dollars
from German territories now belonging to Poland 96.0 million US dollars
from Austria 8.8 million US dollars
from Czechoslovakia 12.1 million US dollars
b) Equipment and material taken to the reparations’ account from active 
production in the Soviet occupation zone 
in 1946 with a total value of 250.0 million US dollars
In addition to this, there is equipment and material received over the 
period from the arrival of the Soviet troops until August 2, 1945, with a 
total value of 362.0 million US dollars, including: 
equipment removed from the German zone occupied
by the Soviet troops 79.1 million US dollars
from German territories now belonging to Poland 235.5 million US dollars
from Austria 42.8 million US dollars
from Czechoslovakia 0.2 million US dollars
from Hungary 4.4 million US dollars
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The following data was taken into account when determining the value of 
reparations and captured goods: 
a) the amounts of removed equipment and materials according to the min-
istries’ and authorities’ reports on the relevant data; 
b) the value of one ton of equipment was determined at 1,500 German 
marks; 
c) the depreciation of the equipment and war damages were determined at 
50 percent; 
d) the value of the materials was determined according to the American 
census for 1939; 
e) one US dollar is worth 4.2 German marks according to the gold parity of 
1929. 
Signed: A. Kuptsov
Source: RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 104, ll. 1–2.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 63: 
Order by the Deputy Minister of the Interior, I. Serov,  
on the Repatriation of Austrian POWs
November 8, 1947
In the following document the USSR’s Deputy Minister of the Interior, Serov, 
gives instructions for the repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war and internees 
in 1947, including mode and number of releases, groups of persons that were not 
to be repatriated (including members of the SS, SD, and SA), and means of repa-
triation. Altogether more than 40,000 Austrian prisoners of war were repatri-
ated to their home country by the beginning of 1948.
I hereby command the following: 
1. Austrian prisoners of war and internees are to be released from MVD 
camps, special hospitals, battalions of the Ministry of Armed Forces, and 
battalions for internees and handed over to the organs of the Administra-
tion for Issues of Repatriation at the Council of Ministers of the USSR. 
The Administration for Issues of Repatriation at the Council of Minis-
ters of the USSR is to carry out the transfer of the released Austrian prison-
ers of war and internees to the cities of Sighet [Sighetu Marmaţiei /Márama-
rossziget] and Focşani (Romania). At both of these places, a certain number 
of people, as agreed with the repatriation organs, are to be handed over. 
2. The repatriation organs are to start the process of releasing the Austrian 
prisoners of war and internees and transferring them to the transfer camps 
in August, and finish it by December 1947. The following number of persons 





December: the remaining persons
3. The repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war and internees from the 
republics, areas, and districts is to take place according to the order estab-
lished in attachment [illegible]. 
4. The following are not to be repatriated: 
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a) Prisoners of war who participated in atrocities and who served in the 
SS, the SD, the SA, or the Gestapo, and persons (including internees) about 
whom we have compromising material, as well as all captured generals and 
officers of higher ranks; 
b) Persons who are ill and cannot be transported. 
5. The interior ministers of the republics and the heads of the Administra-
tions of the Ministry for the Interior in the areas and districts in the ter-
ritory of which there are Austrian prisoners of war and internees in MVD 
camps, battalions of the Ministry of Armed Forces, in battalions for intern-
ees and special hospitals are to: 
a) Establish a commission under the leadership of responsible employees 
of the MVD-UMVD60 and with the participation of doctors and the leading 
staff of the political apparatus, and the operative and accounting depart-
ments of the camp administration, in order to choose those Austrian pris-
oners of war and internees who are to be released and handed over to the 
repatriation organs. 
Commissions for the appointment of Austrian prisoners of war and 
internees are to begin their work immediately and accomplish it by August 
25, 1947. 
b) All persons who have been chosen for repatriation are to be collected in 
groups of at least 100 persons at meeting points at railway stations. 
c) On August 26, 1947, the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR is to be 
informed by telegraph or high frequency transmission about the number of 
appointed Austrian prisoners of war and internees to be repatriated, about 
their physical condition and the transport stations, with an indication of 
the enterprise or ministry they belong to, as well as about the total number 
of Austrian prisoners of war and internees to be repatriated. 
d) Provide all Austrian prisoners of war and internees to be released with 
clothes and shoes appropriate for the season. Before they [the POWs] are 
transferred to the transfer points, the repatriation organs are to carry out 
a thorough sanitary treatment and change the POWs’ underwear; further-
more, they are to return to them their personal belongings, valuables, and 
documents. 
60  UMVD, Upravlenie Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del, [Regional] Administration of the 
Ministry of Interior.
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   333 2015.02.17.   6:53
334 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
e) Provide the trains with food for a traveling distance of 250 kilometers 
a day; furthermore, provide them with cooking facilities, dishes, and the 
equipment necessary to cook two or three warm meals and boil hot water 
during the trip, as well as with high-quality drinking water and heating 
materials for the whole trip. 
f) Carry out the transportation exclusively in equipped wagons. The railway 
administration is to be supported by workers and resources from the POW 
camps for the equipment for the wagons in which the released Austrians 
are to be transported. 
g) Provide the trains with a sufficient amount of medicine, dressing mate-
rial, and dysenteric bacteriophages and disinfectants, and give the head of 
the train a sanitary passport. 
h) The condition of the equipment in the wagons, their supply of food, and 
the sufficiency of medical equipment are to be documented. It needs to be 
indicated in the files from which camps, special hospitals, and battalions 
the contingent was released, the number of people and their physical condi-
tion. The files are to be sent to the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR as soon 
as possible. 
i) One of the deputy heads of the camp administration is to be appointed as 
supervisor for each train. Those supervisors accompany the trains and take 
care of the necessary order during the trip; they organize the food supply 
and the medical and sanitary service for the Austrian prisoners of war and 
internees, as well as their transfer to the repatriation organs. Furthermore, 
a deputy supervisor for supply issues is to be appointed for each train, as 
well as one for operative and one for medical issues. They are to be chosen 
from those officers about whom there are no compromising materials. 
The lists of officers accompanying the trains is to be sent by telegram 
or high frequency transmission to the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR, 
including information about their rank, family, first name and father’s 
name, position, and a short compilation of basic data for confirmation. 
6. At the request of the MVD-UMVD, the head of the escort troops of the 
MVD of the USSR, General Lieutenant Comrade Bochkov,61 is to appoint an 
escort command guided by an officer to support the supervisor of the train. 
61  Viktor Mikhailovich Bochkov, head of the Fourth Department of the GUGB NKVD, 
1938–1940. Prosecutor of the USSR, 1940–1943. Captain of the Escort Troops of the 
NKVD/MVD, 1944–1951. Captain of the Guard Troops of MVD camps, 1951–1959.
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7. The head of the GUVS62 of the MVD of the USSR, General Major of the 
Commissariat Comrade Gornostaev,63 is to provide the POW camps, the 
special hospitals, and the battalions for internees with high-quality uni-
forms, underwear, shoes, and articles for daily use for each transferred per-
son. Furthermore, he is to provide the camps, the special hospitals, and the 
battalions for internees with the full assortment of food as defined in point 
5 of the present decree. 
8. At the request of the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR, the head of the 
department for railway and water transport of the MVD of the USSR, Gen-
eral Major Comrade Arkadevich, is to ensure the supply of wagons equipped 
for the transportation of people to transport the released persons to the 
camps from which they are being handed over to the repatriation organs. 
9. The head of the Main Administration of the Border Regiments of the 
MVD of the USSR, General Lieutenant Comrade Stakhanov,64 is to guaran-
tee permission to cross the USSR’s border for the trains carrying Austrian 
prisoners of war and internees and the troops accompanying them and to 
organize the return of all escorting persons to the USSR within the deter-
mined period of time. 
10. The responsibility for the fulfillment of the present order is to be trans-
ferred to the head of the GUPVI of the MVD of the USSR, General Lieuten-
ant Comrade Filippov. 
Signed: I. Serov
Source: GARF, f. 9401, op. 1, d. 804, ll. 205–210.
K
62  Glavnoe upravlenie voennogo snabzheniya, Head Office for Military Logistics (of the 
NKVD/MVD).
63  Yakov Filippovich Gornostaev, since 1939 in the GUVS of the NKVD. Head of the 
GUVS of the NKVD, 1946–1952. Deputy minister of the interior of the USSR, 1952–
1953.
64  Nikolai Pavlovich Stakhanov, since 1920 in the Red Army, since 1927 member of the 
CPSU, captain of the Border Troops of the NKVD/MVD from February 1942 to March 
1952.
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DOCUMENT No. 64: 
Military Order by the Central Army Group Command on the Burial  
of Soviet Troops Killed in Action 
November 13, 1947
In August 1945 the command was given to establish military graveyards for 
members of the Soviet Army in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The divisional com-
manders were thereupon ordered, together with the respective town majors, to 
find suitable locations for this purpose by September 16, 1945. Thus all Soviet 
military buried in individual graves needed to be transferred to military cem-
eteries. The mortal remains of enlisted men and corporals were interred in 
mass graves; officers and women were put in individual graves. Exempted 
from this rule were only the remains of colonels or generals and “Heroes of 
the Soviet Union” who had been interred in front cemeteries. Responsibil-
ity for the exhumations and cemetery design lay with the deputy head of the 
Central Group of Forces.
Order
To the Central Group of Forces
November 13, 1947
Contents: On the finalization of the transfer of individual tombs and the 
design of military graveyards for members of the Soviet Army killed in 
action in Austria and Hungary. 
The Commander in Chief of the Central Group of Forces
ordered: 
1. The military commanders of the cities in the Soviet occupation zones in 
Austria and Hungary: 
a) to finalize the design of military graveyards as provided for in the plan 
for the third quarter of 1947 until November 25, 1947; 
b) to begin the transfer of the mortal remains of members of the Soviet 
Army and individual tombs to nearby graveyards, as well as the design of 
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military graveyards as provided for in the attached “Plans for the transfer of 
mortal remains and the complete design of military graveyards on Hungar-
ian territory for the fourth quarter of 1947”; the transfer of mortal remains 
is to be finished on December 10, 1947, and the complete design of the mili-
tary graveyards on January 1, 1948; 
c) the transfer of mortal remains and the design of military graveyards on 
the territory that used to be operated by the military commands of the cities 
of Miskolc, Sátoraljaújhely, and Hatvan is to be supervised by the military 
commander of the city of Debrecen; on the territory that used to be oper-
ated by the military commands of Kecskemét, Szeged, and Békéscsaba, these 
works are to be supervised by the military commander of the city of Szolnok; 
d) the complete design of the military graveyards, the conclusion of con-
tracts with enterprises, the accounting for works, the issuing of bills, and 
the acceptance of equipped graveyards and their transfer to the cities’ 
mayors for further maintenance and safekeeping is to be carried out in 
strict compliance with order No. 0251 issued by the Central Army Group 
on November 22, 1946, and with directives No. OU/6/03657 issued by the 
Central Army Group on November 25, 1946, and No. OU/5/03407 issued on 
August 12, 1947.
e) Reports on the progress of the work for the design of military graveyards 
are to be submitted directly to the personnel department, to the depart-
mental staff, and the staff of the Central Army Group on the first and 15th 
of each month. The final report on the fulfillment of the given order is to be 
submitted by January 15, 1948. 
2. The transfer of the mortal remains of members of the Soviet Army killed 
in action and the overall design of military graveyards in the Western areas 
of Austria are to be finished by January 1, 1948, according to the special 
plan by the staff of the Soviet Element of the Allied Commission for Austria 
in Austria. 
3. The head of the financial department of the Staff of the Central Army Group: 
a) according to the two “Plans for the transfer of mortal remains and the 
complete design of military graveyards,” which I have confirmed, the funds 
for the transfer of mortal remains and the design of military graveyards are 
to be supplied to the military commanders of the cities; 
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b) The expenses of the funds released (purpose and accounting) are to be 
controlled in cooperation with the head of the personnel department of the 
Staff of the Central Army Group. 
The deputy head of staff of the group is to be entrusted with the organi-
zational management of the works in connection with the transfer of the 
mortal remains of members of the Soviet Army killed in action and the 
design of military graveyards within the Soviet occupation zone in Austria 
and Hungary. For the Western zones of Austria, the Commander in Chief 
entrusted the head of Austria’s Soviet Element of the Allied Commission 
for Austria with this task. 
Attachment: Plan for the transfer of mortal remains and the design of mili-
tary graveyards as on the list. 
Signed: Kostylev
Source: TsAMO, f. Urfahr, op. 314738s, d. 2, ll. 73–74.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 65: 
Report by the Military Commander of Burgenland on Family Members  
of Military Personnel 
January 20, 1948
Many married Soviet officers had their families follow them—at least temporar-
ily—to Austria. In Burgenland, for example, in mid-January 1948, a total of 17 
family members of officers of the military command posts stayed with their “head 
of family.” This included three relatives of officers of the military command post for 
the province of Burgenland in Eisenstadt, seven family members of officers of the 
military command post for the city of Eisenstadt (including four preschoolers), five 
relatives of officers of the military command post for the city of Oberwart (includ-
ing two preschoolers), and the wife and child of an officer of the military command 
post for the city of Güssing. At the time of the troops’ withdrawal in 1955, a total of 
7,590 officers’ families resided in the Soviet Occupation Zone, whereas the number 
of Army members, including soldiers of lower ranks, totaled almost 40,000 persons. 
Report
About the number of family members of the officers of the military com-
mand posts in the province of Burgenland living in Austria with their heads 
of family on January 15, 1948. 









Military command post for 
the province of Burgenland
City of 
Eisenstadt 3 -
Military command post for 
the city of Eisenstadt
City of 
Eisenstadt 7 4
Military command post for 
the city of Oberwart (Szeged)
City of 
Oberwart 5 2
Military command post 




TOTAL NUMBER 17 7
Signed: Varlamov
Source: TsAMO, f. Berndorf, op. 315698s, d. 7, l. 2.
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DOCUMENT No. 66: 
Final Report by the Soviet Section of the AC on Austria  
for 1947—Summary
Undated [not before January 1948]
The following document is an originally six-page-long summary of the final 
report of all sections of the SChSK (Soviet Element of the Allied Commission for 
Austria)65 for Andrei Smirnov, head of the Third European Department of the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This report amounted to a confession of the 
failure of Soviet politics in Austria.
The report and its supplements provide an accurate and detailed descrip-
tion of the development of the political and economic situation in Austria 
in 1947. 
1. Now that the Americans have subordinated the country economically, 
they are using the current Austrian government and the leaders of the ÖVP 
and SPÖ, who are actively and obediently pursuing a pro-American and 
anti-Soviet path, for their own purposes. 
2. By utilizing the Control Agreement for their own interests and circum-
venting it [the agreement] whenever it seems to hamper their interests, the 
Americans, with the assistance of their partners, sabotaged the Allied Com-
mission’s work and ignored the Soviet part of this work. It was not pos-
sible to achieve unanimity on one single fundamental question during the 
whole year under report. In cooperation with the French and the British, 
the Americans have refused all proposals coming from the Soviets and have 
fully supported the Austrian government. 
Not only did the “Allies” not comply with the agreements on Austria, 
but they have also cast a negative light on the Soviet part of the Allied Com-
mission, which has always acted as the defender of the agreements. For 
example, they used the issue of denazification to produce negative feelings 
toward the Soviet Union, as they are now using the issue of occupation 
costs for the same purposes. 
65  Sovetskaya Chast’ Soyuznicheskoi Komissii po Avstrii.
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3. The breach of the agreement on Austria led to the following results: the 
industry was not nationalized; the agreements on demilitarization, denazi-
fication, democratization, and the agreement on the re-establishment of 
Austria as a free and independent state (especially from Germany) were not 
implemented. 
4. The country’s national and local power is in the hands of anti-democratic 
parties that are hostile toward the Soviet Union. There is not a single mem-
ber of the KPÖ in the government. In the parliament there are only four 
communist delegates. 
5. To achieve their goals, not only are the Americans utilizing the Allied 
Commission and the government, but they have a military administra-
tion as well (as do the British and French), a body that is not present in the 
Soviet zone, where the civil administration is carried out by Austrian bodies. 
6. While the illusions regarding the USA are growing inside the country, the 
hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union is being cultivated. 
7. The year under report was marked by a further decline in agricultural 
production. The gross output of bread decreased by 35 percent compared to 
1946. 
8. In economic terms, the country is giving up its former relations with the 
countries in Southeast Europe and is intensifying [the relations] with the 
USA, West Germany, and countries that are connected through the Mar-
shall Plan. 
9. Thanks to the support of the Austrian government, their military admin-
istration, the ÖVP and SPÖ, and a broad range of propaganda measures, the 
Americans, British, and French were able to oppress the democratic move-
ment and to restrain the KPÖ’s activities and influence. 
10. By giving preference to the development of the Western zones, the 
Austrian government and its bodies have created adverse conditions for 
the industry and agriculture of the Soviet zone, which becomes evident in 
the fact that the Soviet zone remains behind the rest of Austria. While the 
overall level of industrialization in Austria for the year under report was 
60–65 percent (compared to 1937), it reached only 47–50 percent in the 
Soviet zone. 
In terms of coal supply, provision of loans and food, and the imple-
mentation of reconstruction work, the Austrian government pursued a 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   341 2015.02.17.   6:53
342 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
discriminatory policy toward the Soviet zone, which is economically depen-
dent on the Western zones. (On January 1, 1948, the expenditures for the 
postwar reconstruction work in Austria’s Western zones were at 30 percent 
of the required sum, whereas in Vienna and the Soviet zone, only 11.5 per-
cent of the required amount could be provided.)
11. In political terms, the situation in the Soviet zone differs only slightly 
from the overall situation in Austria. For example, there are almost no 
communists in the national government or in the local governments of 
Burgenland and Lower Austria. There are no communists in the adminis-
tration bodies of the various districts, either. A few communist delegates 
were able to keep their seats only in municipal and city governments that 
were mostly formed with the knowledge and with permission of the mili-
tary commander. In Lower Austria’s 1,580 municipalities, there are 8,955 
ÖVP politicians, 4,017 Socialists, and only 707 communists, i.e., around 5 
percent. By exploiting our non-interference in local administration affairs, 
and due to the lack of energy among the Austrian communists, the ÖVP 
and the Socialists were able, unopposed, to replace the communists with 
their own people. 
In the federal provinces, the old bureaucratic apparatus remained 
unchanged, and so did the influence of the National Socialists on economic 
and political affairs. Members of the national government and of federal 
governments openly display their hostility toward the Soviet Union. 
Things in our zone are not too good when it comes to the matter of 
denazification, either. Local authorities are taking every opportunity to 
rehabilitate National Socialists. Industrialists, the Farmers’ Union, the 
Church, the ÖVP, and the socialists set the tone in public life. The commu-
nists are in a very weak position. In Burgenland, for example, their party 
has only 3,700 members, whereas the socialists have 16,000 members and 
the ÖVP 29,600. There are 40,000 communists in the whole Soviet zone, as 
opposed to 140,000 socialists. 
12. The results of the failures that were allowed to take place in 1945 and 
1946 became visible during the year under report: the renunciation of the 
implementation of a land reform, the renunciation of a controlling function 
for the military administration, the disrespect toward cultural and propa-
ganda activities, the control agreement that is not so favorable for us. 
The weak points of our work that are revealed in this report show that 
it was not always possible to protect our interests successfully. In terms 
of denazification, democratization, and the reconstruction of Austria as a 
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truly free and independent state, not everything has been done to comply 
with the Four Power Agreement on Austria. The struggle against the weak-
ening of the control of the Four Powers and against the replacement of this 
mechanism by a purely American control mechanism has not been fought 
vigorously enough. 
The authors of the report recognize that the fact that the anti-demo-
cratic policy the Western occupation powers in Austria are pursuing has not 
been unmasked sufficiently can be regarded as the main inadequacy in the 
work of the Soviet part of the Allied Commission for Austria. The perfor-
mance of the Soviet part was too inactive and not persistent enough. By 
safeguarding the reputation of the Austrian government, which is obedi-
ently following the Americans, the Soviet side gave up its interests in some 
cases. For example, laws and directives from the Austrian government were 
implemented in our zone, although the Soviet side had refused them in the 
Allied Commission. Furthermore, measures prohibiting the implementa-
tion of anti-democratic laws targeted against the legal interests of the Soviet 
Union were taken only after a substantial delay in the second half of 1947. 
Despite this prohibition, the Ministry of the Interior acted on its own, 
without being sanctioned by the Soviet part, when it appointed and dis-
missed leading police and gendarmerie staff and also when it re-employed 
National Socialists. 
One of the weak points of our work was that there was no effective 
control inside the Soviet zone. Due to the fact that there is no military 
administration, this control should have actually been exercised by autho-
rized representatives and the military commanders. As a result, the work 
within the Soviet zone turned out to be useless. According to the report, 
the Soviet part did not pay enough attention to its own zone because of the 
tasks it had to fulfill for the Allied Council. The work the authorized repre-
sentatives and the military commanders have done in terms of control on 
site has not yet brought the expected results. 
The propaganda in the Soviet zone was not satisfactory, either. For 
example, the 55,000 copies of progressive daily newspapers and 200,000 
copies of weekly newspapers that are distributed in the Soviet zone are con-
fronted by 400,000 copies of reactionary dailies and about 1 million copies 
of reactionary weekly newspapers. Soviet films have not been shown in the 
American zone, while American films can circulate freely in the Soviet zone. 
Even though the overall assessment of the political situation in Austria 
in 1947 and the conclusions that comrades Koptelov and Kurasov have drawn 
can be approved, the following comments on the report are necessary. 
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1. It is obvious that the Austrian government has become an obedient pup-
pet in the hands of the Americans and is helping them to pursue U.S. policy 
in Austria. Therefore, Soviet interests in Austria have to be protected per-
sistently and rigorously, especially by preventing the implementation of 
laws and directives that are in fact incompatible with the Four Power Agree-
ments on Austria in the Soviet zone. 
2. The Americans and their partners are utilizing the Allied Council and the 
Control Agreement to disguise and eventually legalize their policy, aiming 
at the cancellation of the resolutions on Austria. The Soviet part must not 
allow the “Allies” to lead them on the leash and fulfill fruitless work that 
only helps to draw away attention from the Soviet zone. It is absolutely 
essential to pay more attention to the federal provinces. The importance of 
the military command posts has to be increased. With their help, an effec-
tive control has to be implemented over the local administrations, which 
should then be obliged to work against reactionary and anti-Soviet actions 
and to implement denazification. No changes in the composition of the 
staff of the local administrations may be carried out without our authori-
ties’ knowledge. We have to exercise control over the police’s and gendar-
merie’s actions. The military command posts have to be supported and 
equipped with more staff, they need translators urgently. The illegal export 
of food from the Soviet zone must be controlled. 
3. Due to the vivid propaganda activity carried out by the Americans and 
the Austrian government, our department for propaganda was not able to 
manage its tasks properly. The department for propaganda was not able to 
adapt and to take more offensive and substantial propaganda measures. 
The department for propaganda was not able to establish facilities that 
would be able to continue activities after the withdrawal of the occupation 
troops. It would be necessary to draw more attention to the Society for Cul-
tural and Economic Relations by giving it more autonomy and more space 
for its own initiatives. The main focus of the propaganda activities must be 
placed on this society, and thus these actions should be taken primarily by 
the Austrians themselves and not by our soldiers. 
The department for propaganda has to be prevented from interven-
ing in the KPÖ’s work and hampering their work with petty paternalism, 
which, according to the report, has been the case up to now. 
Because censorship in advance only takes place formally (one person 
has to censor 50 publishers and several hundred periodicals), the abolish-
ment of censorship for printed works, films, and stage productions should 
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be discussed, and post-publication censorship should be increased. Apart 
from the positive aspect of the report, which is expressed in the enormous 
amount of materials provided in the annex (five volumes, 1,100 pages), we 
need to call attention to its sloppy realization as well. In the sentence “The 
number of DPs decreased to…” on page 31, for example, there were no fig-
ures inserted in the place intended for them. The same was the case on page 
35, where the figure for the amount of occupation costs is missing. Instead 
of “the events point to the fact that” there was “the events that point to the 
fact,” page 38. Instead of “for the signing of the contract,” it is “except for 
the contract.” On page 40 the following sentence can be found: “The influ-
ence of the Communist Party and of enterprises under Soviet administra-
tion.” How can one, first of all, name the Communist Party together with 
enterprises? And secondly, what communist party is under Soviet admin-
istration? Page 41 “the help of the USA” (what does this mean?). On page 
42 there is the phrase “The Soviet zone has a typical capitalist distribu-
tion of land ownership.” But the figures actually point out the large-scale 
agricultural character of the distribution of land ownership: 0.7 percent of 
landowners own 29.6 percent of the land. A land reform is necessary not 
because of the capitalist distribution of land but because of the presence of 
a pre-capitalist large-scale agricultural structure of land ownership. Page 46. 
According to Comrade Molotov’s directive from October 24, 1947, an order 
by the commander-in-chief was issued on November 6, 1946. The statement 
on page 39 that says that “the political situation in the Soviet occupation 
zone can be characterized with the same factors that apply to the overall 
situation in Austria” cannot be approved. The author probably wanted to 
say that the situation in the Soviet zone differs only slightly from the situa-
tion in the Western zones. 
Taken as a whole, the report can be described as satisfactory. 
Signed: Barulin
Source: AVP RF, F. 66, op. 26, p. 32, d. 29, ll. 25–30.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 67:
Record of Conversation between A.A. Zhdanov and the Leader of the 
Communist Party of Austria, Johann Koplenig, and Friedl Fürnberg
February 13, 1948
In February 1948 the Austrian communists Johann Koplenig and Friedl Fürn-
berg66 met Andrei Zhdanov for a conversation at the Central Committee of the 
CPSU in Moscow, where, at the same time, the condemnation of Yugoslavia at 
the upcoming Cominform Conference in Bucharest was being prepared. In their 
conversation, Zhdanov explained the CC’s official position regarding Austria and 
stated that the KPÖ should change its tactics. He said he saw no prospects for 
the Communist Party of Austria if it did not emphasize the consolidation of Aus-
tria’s national sovereignty and independence. He made it clear that the Soviet 
troops would not stay on Austrian territory for a long time and emphasized that 
the USSR did not agree with the division of Austria as recommended by Yugoslav 
KPÖ leaders. Their visit to Moscow was an act of self-abasement for the leaders 
of the KPÖ, who were subsequently reduced to Moscow’s subordinates.
Comrade Zhdanov says that the Central Committee of the VKP(b) has 
acquainted themselves with the documents connected with the arrival of the 
Austrian comrades and the questions posed by them. The Central Committee 
of the VKP(b) does not agree with the position of the KPÖ’s Central Com-
mittee. The CC of the VKP(b) thinks that the Austrian comrades do not see 
everything clearly regarding the prospects and the tactic of the Communist 
Party. The Central Committee of the KPÖ bases its tactic on the presumption 
that the Soviet troops will stay on Austrian territory for a longer period of 
time. The Central Committee of the VKP(b) does not agree with this.
The Austrian comrades even had talks saying a division of Austria 
would be better than any other prospect. The Central Committee of the 
VKP(b) considers this statement to be completely wrong. Both claims of 
the KPÖ’s Central Committee are against the principle of Austria’s inde-
pendence and unity and therefore cannot be satisfactory for the majority 
66  Friedl Fürnberg, in exile in Moscow 1936–1945. Co-founder and co-organizer of the 
First Austrian Freedom Battalion, with which he entered Austria from Slovenia. 
Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Aus-
tria, 1946–1977. 
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of the Austrian people. It would be desirable for the Central Committee of 
the KPÖ to define their tactics and their prospects for struggle in accor-
dance with the declaration of the nine communist parties. This declaration 
implies that the main focus of the communist parties’ struggle for indepen-
dence and sovereignty of the particular states must lie on the release of the 
internal national-democratic powers in every single country. If the Central 
Committee of the KPÖ agrees with the provisions of the declaration by the 
nine communist parties, it will agree with this very basic provision as well. 
There is no future for the Communist Party of Austria, unless it leads the 
struggle for the consolidation of Austria’s national sovereignty and inde-
pendence. If this is not the case, the party will be confronted with a dead 
end and hopelessness.
From this point of view, the Soviet proposals to the Austrian party officials 
shall not be regarded as a disadvantage for the causes of the Communist 
Party of Austria. This is a mistake. On the contrary, they [the proposals] 
should be regarded as a step toward the establishment of the preconditions 
for Austria’s independence. The faster the occupation of Austria comes to 
an end and the faster Austria begins to rely on its democratic powers, the 
better it will be for the Communist Party of Austria and for the consolida-
tion of its influence on the people.
We could, for example, suggest that the CC of the KPÖ contact the Ger-
man comrades. Of course, Germany and Austria have their specific features, 
but there are a number of similarities in their situations as well; therefore, 
the Communist Party of Austria and the SED are confronted with similar 
tasks. The SED successfully uses the slogan of the struggle for a unified Ger-
many. The CC of the Communist Party of Austria should fight for Austria’s 
unity and independence, for peace, and subsequently for a quick abolition 
of the occupation with all  required persistence.
This means that the tasks for the Communist Party of Austria do not 
end with the abolition of the occupation regime, because there will already 
be new tasks for the Communist Party of Austria to fulfill on the day after 
the abolition of the occupation regime. They already have to prepare them-
selves for those tasks now. They will have to consider measures of struggle 
against the influence of the Anglo-Americans in Austria, because they will 
try to subjugate Austria economically and politically by using different mea-
sures after the withdrawal of their troops from Austria. This policy they are 
pursuing has already reached a peak. The closer the moment of the occupa-
tion regime’s abolition comes, the faster the Anglo-Americans are going to 
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take measures to consolidate their influence in Austria. We have to unmask 
the Anglo-American policy, as well as the policy of undermining Austria’s 
sovereignty. The Marshall Plan and other economic measures implemented 
by the Americans and British will lead to the loss of Austria’s independence. 
It must be assumed that only the Soviet Union is striving for the develop-
ment of friendly relations with Austria that are not connected with restric-
tions of independence and sovereignty. It is necessary to convince the Aus-
trian people to establish friendly relations with the USSR and to carry out 
measures that will foil all Anglo-American policies aiming at the restriction 
of Austria’s sovereignty and independence. It is necessary to clearly show 
the differences between the policy of the USSR and the one the British and 
Americans are pursuing, namely to subjugate Austria to their influence.
The Central Committee of the VKP(b) is surprised that, despite the 
current situation in Europe and in the world, which is extremely favorable 
for the democratic powers, the Austrian comrades are discouraged because 
of the future abolition of the occupation regime. The Soviet Union will do 
everything in its power to accommodate the Austrian comrades if they 
should need measures aiming at the abolition of the occupation regime. The 
Austrians have to stand on their own feet soon. Any other possibility can-
not be regarded as a national or a democratic or a revolutionary solution.
KOPLENIG: We learned a lot from our journey to Moscow. It brought clar-
ity to what was formerly unclear to us. We will begin to take the recom-
mended path, and we are convinced that this path will lead us to success. 
Now we understand that our wish to have Soviet troops on Austrian ter-
ritory for as long as possible was a mistake. The main point is, of course, 
to develop our internal democratic powers and to start the struggle for 
real independence and for Austria’s liberation from occupation. The pres-
ence of the four occupation powers on Austrian territory, and the struggle 
between the USA and the USSR, inhibited the development of the internal 
democratic powers in Austria and turned out to be a crucial impediment in 
this respect. We have, up to now, been acting correctly and regarding the 
USSR as the true protector of the interests of an independent Austria. Our 
further activities will be determined by this principle as well. The USA and 
England do not intend to create a truly independent Austria. Their policy 
aims at creating an anti-democratic Austria and turning Austria into an 
appendage of American policy.
Still, it would not be completely correct to say that we are not allowed 
to rely on external powers. It would not be incorrect, either, to regard the 
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development of internal powers as the main difficulty; on the other hand, 
it would not be right to deny the existence of external powers. One must 
not forget about such powers as the USA on one side and the USSR on the 
other side, both exercising influence on Austria. But now, under the influ-
ence of the Anglo-Americans, the reaction in Austria has become stronger, 
and nothing has been done for the democratization of Austria.
We should, for example, not forget that the enormous number of so-
called DPs we have in Austria now is actually a second American occupation 
army. We should furthermore not forget that the Austrian government is 
an American agent. All of this depends on external powers and inhibits the 
development of democratic powers in Austria. On the other hand, the pres-
ence of Soviet troops in the Eastern zone of Austria is an advantage for the 
development of the internal democratic powers. It is a fact that external 
powers do impose their influence, and this influence is reflected in the con-
sciousness of the masses.
In order to promote democratic development in Austria, it would of 
course be better to regain sovereignty and to abolish the occupation regime 
as soon as possible. But we are concerned that this path could lead to unin-
tended results—it could result not only in the creation of an Austrian state 
as described in the Moscow Declaration but in an Austria that is being 
influenced by the USA as well.
The solution of the problem of Soviet assets in Austria poses a number 
of difficulties for our party. Today, our position on this topic is completely 
different from the one we used to have. Now we are talking about buying 
up enterprises that belong to the Soviet Union, which makes it even more 
difficult for us to formulate our positions regarding the consolidation of 
Austria’s independence. Until now, we did not regard those enterprises as 
Austrian properties if they were of German ownership. Now that the Soviet 
Union has become the owner of those enterprises and they are going to stay 
in Austria and Austrian workers are able to work there, it should, given that 
there is a real democratic power, not be difficult to reach a solution with 
the Soviet Union that is beneficial to the Austrian workers. Now we face 
the problem that we will have to pay the Soviet Union 200 million dollars 
for these enterprises within a period of two years. This fact will play a very 
important role in the agitation of the Social Democrats. We do not know if 
Austria will be able to pay the 200 million dollars. It is clear that the USA is 
going to pay for Austria, which will make it difficult for us to stand against 
the USA. Eventually, the whole burden of this money lies on the shoulders 
of the broad masses of the Austrian people. Of course we will try to explain 
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the problem to the Austrian people. The development of the internal demo-
cratic forces will be a crucial factor, of course. But we have to consider the 
specific situation in Austria, as well as the fact that the external powers are 
of great importance [for Austria]. The opinion of the VKP(b)’s Central Com-
mittee is clear to us, and we are going to work toward this direction.
ZHDANOV: It seems to me that the Austrian comrades are still at some 
kind of crossroads, although they have already received our advice. The 
comrades have to understand that the restoration of Austria’s indepen-
dence and sovereignty is the driving force in the democratic development, 
and the Austrian communists have to regard the solving of this problem 
as their main mission. Now we have the following situation: all Austrian 
parties, except the communists, have waived their right to defend Austria’s 
sovereignty and independence. Even worse, they are fighting for the Mar-
shall Plan and dragging the idea of sovereignty through the mire. Now the 
pleasant situation has occurred in which advocating Austria’s sovereignty 
can and must become one of the main tasks for the Communist Party, while 
no other parties show any interest. Comrade Koplenig said that in this 
respect the occupation by Soviet troops promotes stability in Austria. I do 
not share this opinion. It [the occupation] is an evil—a necessary one, but 
still, an evil that, after a certain period of time, will prove to be an impedi-
ment to the real democratic development in Austria. The independence of a 
country must not be based on foreign troops. The internal democratic pow-
ers and the leadership of the Communist Party are the real pillars of inde-
pendence. Your position is the lack of confidence in your power, ours is the 
belief in these powers. This is the main difference between us.
The declaration of the nine communist parties has determined the bal-
ance of forces for a long period of time. It says that the democratic forces 
are growing. They are growing in Austria, too. The slogan of independence 
is in accordance with the legal attempts of the Austrian people. If you were 
able to prove that the Communist Party is the protector of sovereignty and 
independence in Austria, the people would understand and respect you. The 
economic, diplomatic, and other relations between Austria and the USSR 
must be developed on sovereign and equal principles. The Communist 
Party of Austria must use all its energy to develop and follow a policy of 
friendship and broad economic relations with the USSR and the other new 
democracies. The policy of isolating Austria from the USSR and the other 
new democracies as it is pursued by the current Austrian government has 
already caused massive damage to Austria. 
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Your considerations are based on the wish to extend the stay of the 
Soviet occupation troops. This is not right; it damages our, as well as your 
own, influence. We do not want to pass our only political trump card to our 
enemies. Of course it is clear that we will withdraw our troops from Austria 
at exactly the same moment that the English and American troops are with-
drawn.
We understand the difficulties the Communist Party of Austria is con-
fronted with. We understand that the path you have to take is not an easy 
one, but we cannot propose an easy path in this case. Success never comes 
automatically. You must remove the flag of Austria‘s independence from the 
hands of the socialists and people’s socialists [sic]. This is not going to be 
easy, but it is the only path that is right.
FÜRNBERG: Until now, the USSR’s general policy toward Austria was not 
clear to us. After the conference of the nine communist parties, the Yugo-
slav comrades told us that it would be better to divide Austria.
ZHDANOV: The recommendation to pursue a division of Austria is com-
pletely wrong.
FÜRNBERG: We understand that a division of Austria is going to be dif-
ficult for us, but as we did not have the opportunity to assess the inter-
national situation in its full breadth, we would like to clarify what it is all 
about.
Of course, we have not been leading the struggle for Austria’s sover-
eignty and independence yet. Now the socialists and the people’s socialists 
[sic] are speculating on Austria’s sovereignty. Now it is up to us to stand 
up for this slogan even more bravely. The current situation in Austria could 
not be worse for us. It causes a mood of hopelessness and passivity. There 
are two possible ways to change this situation: 1) If the future international 
situation does not allow the withdrawal of the occupation troops from Aus-
tria, the division of Austria will be the best solution; 2) The faster the state 
treaty with Austria is signed, the better.
ZHDANOV: You must not get used to the occupation regime; you must 
fight for the fast abolition of the occupation.
FÜRNBERG: If we pursue the slogan about the withdrawal of the occupa-
tion troops before the state treaty with Austria is signed, the British and 
the Americans are going to cling to this slogan, too.
ZHDANOV: We do not recommend this at all.
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FÜRNBERG: To the problem of former German property. We think that 
Austria could, under the condition of granted credit, pay 200 million dollars 
within a period of five years, but Austria will not be able to pay this sum 
within two years; it has neither the financial nor the material means to do 
so. If the Americans give Austria the 200 million dollars, Austria will have 
to suffer under the American yoke. The People’s Party will be asking us how 
to escape this situation.
ZHDANOV: We are not asking you to act as our propagandists during every 
single phase of our talks with the Anglo-Americans. But you must under-
stand that we waive our property rights to these enterprises and that this 
is a great concession from our side. It makes your situation easier. You say 
it is an advantage for the Austrian workers to work in the USSR’s socialist 
enterprises. But it would be even better for the Austrian workers to work in 
Austrian socialist enterprises. It is necessary to explain the situation to the 
people.
KOPLENIG: We wanted to clarify a number of questions. We have clarified 
them now and we are convinced of our future success.
ZHDANOV: We are also convinced that you have all the possibilities for 
mobilizing the masses, that you have all the possibilities to pull the rug out 
from under your opponents and to take their slogans, which for them are 
only propaganda and have no content except for political speculation.
At this point the conversation ends.
Present: Comrade Suslov and Comrade Baranov.
Source: RGASPI, F. 77, op. 3, d. 100, ll. 1–16.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 68:
Report by Smirnov to A. Vyshinskii on the Soviet Position  
on the Austrian Treaty 
Undated [after May 6, 1948]
From February 1948 to the beginning of May 1948, the Soviet Union formally 
supported Yugoslav territorial claims on Austria. At the end of April, the Yugo-
slavs reduced their claims for the first time. In light of the Yugoslavs’ new will-
ingness to negotiate, the Soviet delegation received new instructions. They said 
that “the Soviet delegation was supposed to support the current Yugoslav claims 
toward Austria, but it was not allowed to risk a failure of the conference should 
the Anglo-Americans reject them […]; the delegation was instructed to leave 
space for a compromise based on minor Yugoslav claims.” However, at this point 
in the negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty, the tactical calculations of the 
Western powers had long been to show the Soviets as advocates of a border revi-
sion in favor of Yugoslavia. 
According to the instructions that were given to Comrade Koktomov67 on 
May 3, the Soviet delegation was supposed to support the current Yugoslav 
claims toward Austria, but it was not allowed to risk a failure of the confer-
ence if the Anglo-Americans rejected them [the claims]; the delegation was 
instructed to leave space for a compromise based on minor Yugoslav claims. 
Although our delegation strictly adhered to this directive and, during the 
discussion of Yugoslav claims, pointed out that a compromise had not been 
ruled out, they could not prevent the failure of the conference. The British 
and American delegations declared that they did not think it was possible 
to continue the conference’s work until the issue of Yugoslav claims had 
been solved to their satisfaction. 
In connection with the situation that has occurred, it is necessary to 
determine our future positions on the following issues: 
1. On the support of the Yugoslav territorial claims on Austria
With the position the British and American delegations have adopted, there 
is no chance that our further support of the Yugoslav territorial claims, 
as described in the Yugoslav memorandum, would satisfy them; it would 
67  Nikolai P. Kotktomov, counselor of the Soviet Embassy in London, 1946–1948. 
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instead put us in a disadvantageous situation, and the Western powers 
could accuse us of intentionally delaying the conclusion of the Austrian 
treaty. Further support of the current Yugoslav claim would also be prob-
lematic, because the Western powers know that Yugoslavia would be satis-
fied if it obtained a smaller territory with two power plants. 
If the Yugoslavs put forward these minimal claims, they are to be sup-
ported by proposing to carry out a conference of Deputy Ministers to dis-
cuss the claims. 
If the Western powers are going to reject even those minimal claims 
Yugoslavia has on Austria, we need to propose an amendment to Article 5 
containing the possibility to change the Austrian borders to its neighboring 
countries (except Germany) through bilateral agreements. 
Source: AVP RF, f. 066, op. 29, p. 136, d. 10, l. 40.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 69:
Resolution by the Council of Ministers of the Politburo of the CC of the 
VKP(b), on the Repatriation of Austrian POWs
June 23, 1948
At the end of 1947 and the beginning of 1948, more than 50,000 Austrian prison-
ers of war were released for repatriation from MVD camps. The following docu-
ment deals with an initial proposal about the repatriation of more than 7,000 
prisoners of war, who—for various reasons—had not yet been repatriated to 
Austria. 
Based on the Council of Ministers’ resolution No. 2773–877ss of August 2, 
1947, 55,291 Austrian prisoners of war were released for repatriation from 
the MVD camps. 
Currently, more than 7,000 prisoners of war and 39 Austrian intern-
ees of various nationalities are still being held in the MVD camps. In con-
nection with Austria’s Anschluss to Hitler’s Germany in 1938, they declared 
themselves to be German citizens and were therefore not repatriated to 
Austria. 
Austrian prisoners of war who, according to the MVD’s data, were sus-
pected to have committed crimes against the USSR were not repatriated, 
either. Because there is not yet sufficient data about them to transfer these 
POWs to the court, they need to be kept in the USSR. 
The MVD of the USSR considers it expedient to think about solving 
the issue of release from the NKVD camps and repatriating the following 
groups of people as well: 
1. Austrian citizens among the prisoners of war and the internees who for-
merly declared themselves to be German citizens. 
2. Prisoners of war and internees with Austrian citizenship, including sol-
diers of the SS, the SA, and other punitive formations, for whom we do not 
have sufficient material to transfer them to court for committing crimes 
against the USSR. Persons who formerly served in the SS or the SA and 
other war criminals are to be officially handed over to the Austrian authori-
ties, who should then bring them to justice. 
3. Austrian prisoners of war and internees about whom we have at least 
indirect materials suggesting that they committed crimes against the USSR, 
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but who cannot be held imprisoned in the MVD camps any longer due to 
their physical condition (chronically sick persons or disabled persons). 
The MVD of the USSR asks for permission to carry out the gradual repatria-
tion of the given categories of prisoners of war and internees—from dis-
covering Austrian citizens among the prisoners of war and internees and 
finding compromising materials about persons suspected to have commit-
ted crimes against the USSR, to the final completion of repatriations. 
The draft for the Resolution by the Council of Ministers of the USSR is 
enclosed. 
Signed: S. Kruglov
On the repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war and internees
In addition to the Council of Ministers’ resolution No. 2773–877ss of August 
2, 1947, the Council of Ministers of the USSR resolves the following: 
1. To allow the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov) to 
release the following types of internees from MVD camps, special hospitals, 
and the battalions of the Ministry of Armed Forces and further repatriate 
them: 
a) Prisoners of war and internees whose Austrian citizenship has been verified; 
b) Austrian prisoners of war and internees who are suspected of having 
committed crimes against the USSR, but for whom there is not sufficient 
material to transfer them to court; 
c) Austrian prisoners of war and internees about whom we have at least indi-
rect materials suspecting them to have committed crimes against the USSR, 
but who cannot be held imprisoned in the MVD camps any longer due to 
their physical condition (chronically sick persons or disabled persons). 
2. Austrian prisoners of war and internees about whom there is not suffi-
cient material to transfer them to court for having committed atrocities or 
other crimes on the formerly occupied territories of the USSR, Poland, Yugo-
slavia, Czechoslovakia, or Albania are not to be released and repatriated. 
3. As regards Austrian prisoners of war who served in the SS, the SA, and 
in other punitive formations and about whom there is no concrete infor-
mation material concerning their participation in atrocities and other war 
crimes, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the USSR (Comrade Vyshinskii) 
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is to be instructed to come to an agreement about the transfer of these pris-
oners of war via our repatriation organs with the Austrian government, 
which should then bring them to justice. 
4. The Council of Ministers of the USSR’s authorized representative for 
repatriation issues (Comrade Golikov) will be obliged to receive the Aus-
trian prisoners of war and internees referred to in points 1 and 3 of the 
present resolution from the MVD of the USSR in camp No. 36 in Sziget 
(Romania) and to transfer them to the Austrian authorities. 
5. The head of the Rear of the Armed Forces of the USSR (Comrade Khrulev) 
will be obliged to ensure the supply of food for the Austrians who are to be 
repatriated during their stay in camp No. 36 as defined in norm No. 3 in the 
NKO’s68 decree No. 312–1941, as well as the medical and sanitary service for 
these persons. 
6. The Ministry of Railways of the USSR (Comrade Beshchev)69 and the 
Central Administration for Transport of the USSR Armed Forces (Comrade 
Dmitriev) will be obliged to provide the MVD of the USSR with the neces-
sary number of wagons equipped for the transport of people, for the trans-
portation of the Austrian citizens described in points 1 and 3. 
7. The Ministry of the Interior of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov) and the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR’s authorized representative for issues of 
repatriation (Comrade Golikov) are to send a report on the fulfillment of 
the present resolution to the Council of Ministers of the USSR on January 
20, 1949. 
Source: GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 204, ll. 104–107.
K
68  Narodnyi kommissariat Oborony, People’s Commissariat for Defense (after 1946, 
Ministerstvo Oborony, Ministry of Defense).
69  Boris Pavlovich Beshchev, Soviet minister of transport, 1948–1977.
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DOCUMENT No. 70:
Report on Setting up a Christmas Tree at the Soviet Command  
Post in Rohrbach
January 4, 1949
The Christmas and New Year’s celebrations played a special role in Austrian-
Soviet social interactions, as they illustrated two very different ideological world 
views. While New Year’s Eve was celebrated extensively by the Soviet Occupation 
Force—including presents and decorated “New Year’s fir trees”—the Orthodox 
Christmas that was traditionally celebrated on January 6 was banned by the 
socialist leaders. All the more remarkable is the intensive support the Soviets 
gave in providing presents and fir trees for Austrian children.
Organizational details and the date when the tree was going to be set up were 
published in the newspapers. Representatives of the community were con-
sulted to help compile the list of children to be invited. Children from the 
poorest and largest workers’, peasants’, and employees’ families were invited. 
Sixty-five persons were invited from Rohrbach, 30 persons from Haslach, 30 
persons from Aigen, and 25 persons from various other places in the district 
of Rohrbach. All invited children received personalized invitations. 
The unveiling of the tree was planned for 3 p.m. on December 29, 1948, 
but the children and their parents arrived long before the appointed time. 
They examined the tree and asked questions—whether there would be a 
puppet theater or any other performances, etc. 
The children invited from Haslach and Aigen were brought to the event 
by special cars. Altogether, more than 300 children and parents came to the 
celebration. The local orchestra played various pieces of music and Christmas 
songs. 
At the opening, the military commander for the city of Rohrbach, Major 
Khomaiko, held a welcoming speech, as well as the mayor of Rohrbach, 
Pöschl, and the head of the district, Spanoki, who said the following in his 
speech: “Today’s celebration is a pleasure not only for the children but also 
for us adults. We all can feel that the Soviet people and the Soviet Army want 
to help us and want to establish a true friendship. We are a small country, 
and our future depends on help from the Soviet Union. I thank the Soviet 
Army for their concern for the children, and I hope that the friendship 
between the Soviet and the Austrian people will grow stronger in the future.”
After the handing out of presents, a student from the primary school 
in Rohrbach and the school’s headmaster, Prell, thanked us on behalf of 
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all the children. At the end, the children watched a play by the puppet 
theater. 
Presents were delivered to the homes of children living far away and to 
the homes of ill children. In the village of Niederwaldkirchen, for instance, 
two presents were delivered to the Baumann family, a family with seven 
children. In Altendorf, the Salburg family, which has six children, received 
presents, as well as the children of the Kleidenger family in Sailer. Alto-
gether, 13 presents were delivered to children’s homes. 
The organization of the celebration and the setting up of the tree were 
carried out in a very organized way, and the people present—the children 
as well as their parents—were satisfied and expressed their thankfulness 
for the celebration. Most of all, they liked the puppet theater—it was the 
first time most of the children had seen a puppet theater. 
Particular moments of the celebration were photographed. For exam-
ple: 1) a present is handed over to one of the children (see photo). 2) Stu-
dent thanking the Soviet Army. 3) Children unpacking their presents. 
The photo cards with the respective headings were handed over to the 
children on the photos as a souvenir of the celebration. When talking about 
the celebration, the children gave the following statements about their 
impressions:
1). Elfriede Klopf. Student, 12 years. “I live in an isolated farmstead and 
I rarely go to the cinema or to celebrations. There are no celebrations for 
children in Austria. All the children are pleased with this celebration; I par-
ticularly liked the puppet theater. I thank the Soviet Army for their concern 
about us.”
2). Aigel Fritz. 10 years. “I liked everything this evening. I have never 
seen a celebration for so many children before. I would like to ask the com-
mander to organize films and puppet theaters for us more often.”
3). Regina Milke. Eight years. “I really liked the tree. We had a joyful 
and pleasant time. The puppet theater was really good. It was the first time 
I had seen something like that. Thank you for the present, too.”
4). Hermann Schramm. 11 years. “I am an orphan and I have never 
been at such a celebration before. I thank the Soviet Army and the com-
mander for not forgetting about the children. If I hadn’t been invited today, 
I would probably never have had the opportunity to see a puppet theater 
and such a beautiful tree.”
Signed: Zhiyakov
Source: TsAMO, f. Urfahr, op. 51624s, d. 12, ll. 2–3.
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DOCUMENT No. 71: 
Report by V. Merkulov to I.V. Stalin on the Employment  
of Experts after Foreign Assignment 
June 11, 1949
The general Soviet skepticism toward the West occasionally had direct conse-
quences on the further careers of those Soviet citizens who had lived and worked 
there. Some specialists who returned to the Soviet Union were no longer wanted 
at their former workplaces, due to the long duration of their stay abroad, a lack 
of professional competence, or other reasons. Therefore the former minister for 
national security and now head of the Main Administration of Soviet Property 
Abroad (GUSIMZ), Vsevolod Merkulov, in June 1949 complained directly to 
Stalin that the responsible ministries and government agencies refused to allo-
cate new specialists for working abroad, as well as, in some cases, to re-employ 
employees returning from assignments abroad. For some Soviet specialists, work 
assignments in Austria likely caused a “career downturn.”
The staff of organizations and enterprises belonging to the Main Adminis-
tration of Soviet Property Abroad at the Council of Ministers of the USSR 
basically consists of experts appointed by ministries and authorities upon 
the decree of the VKP(b). 
A large proportion of the employees of the Main Administration who left 
the country for a longer assignment abroad and have to come back to the 
Soviet Union due to differences at work, upon the decree of the Office for 
Entering and Leaving the USSR or for other reasons, are sent back to their 
former workplaces in the ministries and authorities by the Main Adminis-
tration. 
However, these ministries and authorities refuse to give the Main Adminis-
tration new employees in exchange for the returnees; in some cases they do 
not even want to re-employ the experts coming back from abroad, despite 
their qualifications and sufficient work experience. 
This situation leads to a permanent shortage of employees in the Main 
Administration‘s organizations and enterprises abroad, as well as to prob-
lems in finding work for the experts who come back from their assignments 
in foreign countries. 
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In connection with the facts explained above, I hereby propose to oblige 
the Union’s and the Republics’ ministries and authorities by appoint-
ing suitable experts to work for the Main Administration of Soviet Prop-
erty Abroad at the Council of Ministers of the USSR in exchange for those 
employees who have returned from their assignments abroad to their for-
mer workplaces at their respective ministries and authorities. 
The draft for the order of the Council of Ministers of the USSR is enclosed. 
I ask you for a decision. 
Signed: V. Merkulov
Source: RGAPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 474, l. 32.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 72: 
Report by V. Merkulov70 to I.V. Stalin on the Value  
of Oil Deposits in Austria 
September 23, 1949
In March 1949 in Austria, the Soviets discovered what was, at the time, the big-
gest interconnected oil field in Central Europe. Experimental boring convinced 







To Comrade I.V. Stalin
As a supplement to the information I submitted to you about the opening 
of the new Matzen oil field in the Soviet occupation zone in Austria and 
about the initial operation of two oil wells, I would like to inform you of the 
following: 
On September 8, 1949, the Soviet Oil Enterprise/Administration in 
Austria completed a new well in the Matzen oil field. The well has a depth of 
1,680 meters and produces 140 tons of oil daily. 
The new well is situated 3.3 kilometers from the first well that pro-
duced oil on the Matzen oil field. With regards to its geological structure, 
it has the same structure as the first well and can therefore be regarded as 
evidence of the significant prospects of the entire Matzen oil field. 
Signed:  V. Merkulov
Source: RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 486, l. 87.
70  Vsevolod N. Merkulov, from 1938, chief of the Main Administration for State Security 
(GUGB – Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti) within the NKVD, at 
the same time Beria’s deputy. Minister for state security (MGB), 1946. Chief of the 
GUSIMZ (Gosudarstvennoe Upravlenie Sovetskim Imushchestvom zagranitsei), the 
Main Administration of Soviet Property Abroad, 1947. 
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DOCUMENT No. 73: 
Report by A. Gromyko to I. Stalin on the Status  
of Negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty
October 21, 1949
In 1949 came the first opportunity for a withdrawal of the Allied Occupation Troops 
from Austria. After Tito’s break with Stalin in mid-1948, what was allegedly the 
greatest obstacle to a conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria—the question of 
the Austrian-Yugoslav border—was eliminated at the Council of Foreign Ministers 
in Paris. The USSR no longer supported Yugoslavia’s territorial claims, which at 
that time were already limited to a small area in Carinthia. The negotiations around 
the Austrian State Treaty that already had begun in 1947 were almost finalized.
On June 20, 1949, the last conference day of the Council of Foreign Minis-
ters in Paris, the Allied powers proclaimed that the treaty would reach the sig-
nature stage by September 1. The special deputies of the foreign ministers on the 
Austrian treaty would negotiate the remaining articles. As a consequence, the 
Soviets started to take measures in Austria that led even some contemporaries to 
assume that Stalin genuinely wished to conclude the state treaty. 
Before the negotiations on the last articles, Gromyko warned of the conse-
quences of a conclusion of the treaty for the Soviet Union and advised Stalin to 
issue new instructions to Foreign Minister Vyshinskii.
The attitude the representatives of the USA, England, and France have 
taken on the Austrian treaty during the recent conferences of the deputy 
[foreign] ministers shows that the Western powers are expressing some 
interest in accelerating the conclusion of the treaty with Austria. The fact 
that the Western powers’ representatives, who until recently have been 
rejecting our claims categorically, have made concessions on the main 
points of the draft for the treaty proves that this endeavor really exists. 
For instance, the representatives of the Western powers agreed to 
transfer to the Soviet Union all oil-producing plants mentioned in our index 
No. 2, including the plant that is most capable of development, namely the 
one in Groß-Enzersdorf with a total area of 173,500 hectares. Nevertheless, 
they insist on returning to Austria only 1,500 of the total 175,500 hectares 
of the oil plant that we have put our claim on. 
Furthermore, they have fully accepted our index No. 4 with all enter-
prises engaged in the distribution of petroleum products to be transferred 
to the Soviet Union. 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   363 2015.02.17.   6:53
364 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
They have also agreed to the text we proposed for the point about the 
legal situation of Soviet assets in Eastern Austria that have been estab-
lished or purchased by Soviet organizations after May 8, 1945, as well as 
agreeing to our claims about the procedure of the Austrian National Bank 
issuing bills (of exchange) worth 150 million dollars to the state bank of the 
USSR in order to ensure that Austria pays the mentioned sum to the Soviet 
Union in due time. They also agree to the changes we inserted in Article 16 
about DPs and Article 32 about war graves and memorials. 
The Western powers’ effort to promote the conclusion of the Austrian 
Treaty is obviously connected with their plans to abolish all reasons for 
the further presence of Soviet troops in Austria as well as in Hungary and 
Romania—areas in which the Soviet Union is entitled to deploy armed units 
for the maintenance of the logistical lines to the Soviet occupation zone in 
Austria according to the terms of the peace treaty—as soon as possible. 
If the Western powers comply with our claims on the remaining 
unsolved issues—the transfer of captured railway vehicles from oil refiner-
ies, the duration of lease agreements for properties with various buildings 
belonging to the Donaudampfschifffahrtsgesellschaft,71 the modalities for 
the settlement of disputes resulting from Article 35 (German assets)—then 
the main conflicts that are hampering the conclusion of the peace treaty 
will be removed. 
Under these conditions it is necessary to determine our position for 
the further negotiations concerning the draft for the Austrian treaty. 
Because the Anglo-Americans are interested in the elimination of any 
reasons for the further presence of Soviet troops in Austria, we do not 
think that there is any need to hurry with minor concessions as regards 
the draft of the agreement and particularly as regards the transfer of 1,500 
hectares of the oil refinery in Groß-Enzersdorf to Austria. Instead, we can 
delay the resolution of this question until it becomes definitely clear that 
the Western powers are prepared to comply with our main claims about the 
remaining issues. 
The draft for the instructions to Comrade Vyshinskii is enclosed. 
71  Shipping company founded in the Habsburg Monarchy for transporting passengers 
and cargo on the Danube.
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Enclosure
We interpret the fact that the Anglo-Americans have agreed to our pro-
posals concerning oil refineries, under the condition that we agree to their 
amendment on transferring the oil refinery in Groß-Enzersdorf with an 
area of about 1,500 hectares to Austria, as them being interested in acceler-
ating the signing of the Austrian treaty.
We do not think there is any need to hurry the solving of particular 
issues, until the Anglo-Americans take a clear position on all disputed 
issues. Before we react to the above mentioned Anglo-American proposal, 
it is necessary to find out if they are ready to accept our proposals on other 
important disputed issues such as: the captured railway vehicles, the petro-
chemical enterprises, the periods for lease agreements, and the means of 
solving the disputes from Article 35. 
In accordance with what has been mentioned above, we need to tell 
the Anglo-Americans that we will analyze their proposal, but you must not 
react to the Anglo-Americans’ proposal on this topic. 
Source: RGASPI, f. 82, op. 2, d. 1114, ll. 91–92.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 74: 
Resolution by the CC CPSU Politburo on the Interruption  
of Austrian State Treaty Talks
October 24, 1949
In June 1949 in Paris, the Four Powers agreed to have the Austrian treaty ready 
for endorsement by fall. From the Austrian point of view, the negotiations 
seemed promising, as an agreement had been reached on nearly all disputed 
points. Shortly before completing the negotiations on (relatively) banal details 
in late October 1949, Stalin halted the process, citing reasons that convinced no 
one. In internal discussions in the Kremlin, the fear had surfaced that the treaty 
might deprive the Soviets of the right to keep troops stationed in Hungary and 
Romania. As this document shows, in the Politburo meeting Stalin also brought 
up the subject of Tito, whom he did not want to benefit from the Austrian treaty.
To Comrade Vyshinskii,
There are a number of indications that the Anglo-Americans have begun to 
hurry with the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty, making it obvious that 
they want to support Yugoslavia politically as well. 
Our representatives should assume that we are not interested in the quick 
signing of the Austrian Treaty. Therefore, you are obliged to utilize exist-
ing disagreements and to not complete the preparations of the Treaty at 
the special representatives’ conference in New York. This means that there 
must be no hurry when it comes to reacting to the various compromise 
proposals put forward by the Anglo-Americans. In particular, we must not 
react to the proposal regarding GroßEnzersdorf yet; we have to say that we 
must analyze the proposal beforehand. 
At the conference in New York, we must restrict the tasks for our represen-
tatives to sounding out the position of the Anglo-Americans. They [the rep-
resentatives] must not make any concessions whatsoever, on any important 
issue.
Source: RGASPI, F. 17, op. 162, d. 42, ll. 34, 103.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 75: 
Report by the Soviet Political Representative in Austria, A. Koptelov,  
on the Effect of the Marshall Plan on Austria
June 10, 1950
After World War II Austria was the only country under Soviet occupation that 
benefited from the Marshall Plan. All Soviet protests went unheard, and soon 
Moscow saw Austria’s independence and Moscow’s economic influence at risk. 
I am sending you the report “About the Concrete Consequences of the Mar-
shall Plan for Austria’s Economic and Political Independence,” which was 
written by the second secretary, Comrade M.M. Shavlak.
Austria has been receiving “help” from the Marshall Plan since April 1, 1948. 
The rights and duties arising out of Austria’s participation in the Marshall 
Plan were determined through a bilateral agreement between the USA and 
Austria on July 2, 1948. The terms and conditions of this agreement were 
determined by US Law No. 472 concerning external assistance. 
On October 16, Austria also signed an agreement on “European Eco-
nomic Cooperation.” 
These agreements enable the Americans to intervene directly in Aus-
tria’s internal affairs. The USA used the pro-American People’s Party and 
right-wing Socialists as the main basis for the implementation of the Mar-
shall policies in Austria. 
In 1949 the “Marshallized” Austrian government, guided by the Ameri-
can dictate, took a number of measures that were turned directly against 
the people—for example, the budget consolidation, the devaluation of the 
Austrian shilling, and the abolishment of government price controls. Aus-
tria was also forced to walk the path of the so-called “liberalization” of its 
foreign trade, which resulted in American goods and assets becoming wide-
spread throughout the country. 
The Americans aim to direct the credits Austria is receiving from the 
Marshall Plan on its capital investments and the money Austria gets from 
the sale of goods it receives through the Marshall Plan and which is put in a 
“special account,” mostly to re-establish Austria’s military-industrial poten-
tial, as well as to develop the energy and extractive industries working for 
the export of the “Marshallized” country. The credits from the Marshall 
Plan and the funds released from the “special account” were used in particu-
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lar for the restoration and re-equipment of the metallurgical works in Linz 
and the aluminum works in Braunau, which were built by the Germans dur-
ing the war and are mainly of military importance. 
According to the aforementioned sources, the Americans claim that 
the Austrian government is building several new power plants in Austria’s 
Western zones. 
Five large power plants producing 1301 million kWh of energy per year 
are being built in the American zone. Among them are the power plants in 
Kaprun in Salzburg (600 Mil. kWh), in Großraming in Upper Austria (243 
Mil. kWh), in Triberg in Upper Austria (167 Mil. kWh), in Steining in Upper 
Austria (170 Mil. kWh) and in Mühlroding in Upper Austria (121 Mil. kWh). 
These objects are intended to be 60–90 percent ready for operation in May 
1950. Furthermore, two power plants producing 484 million kWh per year 
are being built in the British zone, as well as one with a production volume 
of 381 million kWh per year in the French zone. 
The construction and positioning of the given power stations aim to 
provide the extractive branches of Austrian industry, whose products are 
being exported at the direction of the Americans, with electricity, as well as 
to export electricity to West Germany (Ruhr). This can be illustrated by the 
fact that there are no intentions to build new power stations in the eastern 
part of Austria and Vienna, where there is mainly manufacturing industry, 
although they receive only 50 percent of the energy/electricity they need 
from Austrian production. 
At the same time, the Anglo-American occupation powers have started 
to build highways and lines of communication in their zones; they have 
started to expand and modernize airports and restore and re-equip some 
subterranean military plants—they are taking measures of completely mili-
tary character. 
The direct American interference in Austria’s economic and political 
life in 1949 has become virtually dictatorial. 
The head of the Mission for the Implementation of the Marshall Plan 
in Austria, King, gave the Austrian government written instructions on all 
important economic measures to be taken. 
In March 1949, King asked the Austrian government to present him 
with the public expenses that were foreseen in the budget and could not be 
covered by current receipts, and to present him a program of measures on 
which they intend to spend the money that will be released by the Ameri-
cans from the special account. 
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King then sent written instructions on the following issues to the Aus-
trian government: the necessity and manner of the budget consolidation, 
the increase of taxes and tariffs, the terms and conditions for the third 
agreement on prices and wages, etc. Copies of these letters were published 
in the Austrian democratic press at the beginning of 1949. 
Due to some pressure from the public, the Austrian government had 
to publish an official statement on the topic of the terms and conditions of 
the third agreement on prices and wages in King’s letter. In this statement 
they confirmed the existence of such a letter and “explained” that the recom-
mendations in the letter were to be regarded as King’s desires, not as orders. 
In his letter to Chancellor Figl on May 19, King asked the Austrian gov-
ernment to abolish import restrictions, price control, clearing formalities, 
etc. The letter ended with the following words: “I hope that your govern-
ment will consult my mission before taking any steps that would be incom-
patible with the aforementioned aims.” 
On November 29, 1949, King delivered a programmatic speech in which 
he directed the Austrian institutions to implement the policy of the Mar-
shall Plan in Austria. He indicated in particular that the Americans regard 
the devaluation of the Austrian shilling that was carried out to have been 
a provisional measure. Therefore he requested that “a complete currency 
reform be carried out” in which the Austrian authorities would lose all 
possibility of influencing the exchange rate of the shilling, i.e., one single 
exchange rate would be implemented (instead of the three rates that were 
established after the devaluation), and this rate would depend on the prin-
ciple of demand and supply. 
He further requested that Austria orient its foreign trade to the cheap 
supply of goods to “dollar markets” and limit the import of essential goods 
to the country. 
Furthermore, he asked the Austrian government to give up the idea 
of protecting the domestic market from a flood of goods from the USA and 
other Marshallized countries. 
King’s program can actually be summarized in the following points: 
1. Austria should give up all influence on its own currency and put it in 
the hands of international speculators. 
2. Austria should become an even cheaper supplier of strategic raw 
materials and other goods that the USA is interested in. 
3. Austria should put its market at the disposal of the American 
monopoly. 
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4. Austria should further weaken its trade relations with its natural 
partners in the East. 
At the beginning of 1950, the Americans requested the amendment 
of the federal law from November 17, 1948: “On the Provision of the Sums 
Needed for the Coverage of American Assistance in Shillings.” On February 
1, 1950, the Austrian Parliament decided to amend this law. The delegates of 
the Socialist Party and the People’s Party voted for the amendment, and so 
did the Federation of Independents. 
The amended law became a further heavy burden for the working 
people and the financial situation of the country. The main point of the 
amendment is the following. Before the law was amended, after receiving 
the notice that goods had been dispatched in the USA, Austria’s national 
bank used to transfer the corresponding [to the value of the goods] sum in 
shillings to the so-called special account. This sum was regarded as a credit 
from the national bank to the Austrian government. The revenue generated 
from the sale of these goods was used to pay off the aforementioned credit. 
Due to the fact that the receipts have normally been lower than the sum 
transferred to the “special account” in advance, because the Americans sell 
their goods at excessive prices, the Austrian government now has debts at 
the National Bank. Until February 1950, the Americans were prepared to 
pay off this debt from the money in the special account. In February, how-
ever, they asked the Austrian government to amend the law from Novem-
ber 17, 1948, onwards, referring to the fact that the current accounting pro-
cedures contradict the American law on the Marshall Plan. According to the 
amended law, the Austrian government is responsible for the difference 
between purchase price and selling price, i.e., this difference will be covered 
not by the special account but by the budget of the Austrian state. 
Basically, this means that a new deficit is arising in the Austrian bud-
get; in order to cover it, taxes and prices are going to be increased again. 
In addition to this procedure, the Americans implemented a new pro-
cedure, according to which all enterprises interested in credit from the spe-
cial account are obliged to provide the Austrian Marshall Plan office with 
their detailed accounts, plans, and drafts about the output and sale of 
their products and about business expansions, costs, prices, etc. Support 
is mostly provided to those enterprises that can contribute to the improve-
ment of the balance of payments. 
Under the guise of carrying out a rationalization of the Austrian indus-
try and improving work productivity while retaining the current wage level, 
the Americans asked the Austrian government to establish a “Center for 
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   370 2015.02.17.   6:53
371SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
Work Productivity.” Besides rationalizing the industry and increasing work 
productivity, this center is also supposed to invite foreign experts who 
should then examine all technical and economic issues that face industrial 
enterprises and other branches of the Austrian national economy. 
According to the Council of Ministers’ decree of March 7, 1950, this 
committee was established under the name “Productivity Center” (Produk-
tivitätszentrum). The board of the committee consists of representatives 
from the Central Office for the Implementation of the Marshall Plan in Aus-
tria, as well as representatives from the Economic Chamber, the Federation 
of Industries, and the Chamber of Labor. Taucher, the head of the Central 
Office for the Implementation of the Marshall Plan, was appointed head of 
the committee. 
The concrete activities of the given committee started with the arrival 
of a commission of American economists—experts for “technical assis-
tance”—in Austria. The commission has already finished its surveys of the 
marketing possibilities for Austrian goods on the American market. 
The second measure is to send Austrian experts in the fields of railway 
transport, paper industry, statistics, and the hotel business to the USA so 
they can inform themselves about modern procedures and the organization 
of the respective branches in the USA. A group of Austrian experts in the 
field of sawing has already been to the USA and has returned to Austria. 
Expenditures related to these business trips are borne by the administra-
tion of the Marshall Plan. 
The director of the Austrian University of Agriculture, who stayed in 
the USA for six months to study the organization and technology of sev-
eral agricultural branches in the USA, returned to Austria in February 1950. 
Recently he has been giving lectures on this issue on the radio and in Aus-
trian clubs. 
For the years 1948 –1949, 282 million dollars were assigned to Austria 
by the “Marshall Plan”; for 1949–1950 it was 252 million dollars. The plan 
for 1948–1949 was essentially fulfilled, except for some minor changes in 
the structure of the goods provided. In 1949, Austria received goods with 
a value of 175.6 million dollars directly from the USA, as well as so-called 
“internal European support”—goods from Marshallized countries (particu-
larly Germany) with a value of 96.3 million dollars, i.e., a total amount of 
goods worth 272 million dollars. 
Sixty-two percent of the goods that were actually supplied by the USA 
in 1949 were food, 11 percent were agricultural products, 20 percent were 
raw materials (particularly for the metallurgical industry and for the indus-
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trial branches producing parts for power plants and metallurgical enter-
prises), 3 percent were fuel, 2 percent were equipment, and 2 percent were 
tobacco products. 
Thirty-seven million dollars were assigned for the first quarter of 1950; 
in fact, goods worth 38.7 million dollars were delivered during this period. 
Fifty-four percent of the goods that were actually delivered in the first 
quarter of 1950 were food, 12.4 percent were equipment, and 25 percent 
were raw materials. 
According to the first outlines for 1949–1950, 18.8 percent of the goods 
supplied during this whole period and 23 percent of the goods supplied in 
the first quarter of 1950 are supposed to have been equipment; in the years 
1948–1949, it was only 4.4 percent. 
The plan to increase the supply of equipment is therefore not being ful-
filled. Food products still take first place among the goods supplied. 
The Americans released 2 billion shillings from the “special account” 
in 1948; in 1949 it was 1.45 billion shillings, and for the first five months 
of 1950, it was 950 million shillings—a total of 4.4 billion shillings. Of the 
money released in 1948 and 1949, 850 million shillings was used for paying 
off national debts, 950 million for the restoration of highways and railways, 
370 million for the construction of power plants, 670 million for capital 
investments in the industry (particularly the metallurgical and other raw 
materials’ industries), and 132 million for capital investments in agriculture. 
According to an article on the released sums for 1950 in the newspaper 
Wiener Zeitung on May 20, 1950, the money is being used for the following 
purposes: 203 million shillings for the planning of power plants, 160 million 
for the steel industry, 120 million for agriculture, forestry and wood indus-
try, 100 million presumably for the construction of homes, 70 million for 
the paper industry, 60 million for railways, 60 million for public buildings, 
40 million for tourism, 35 million for the textile industry, 20 million for the 
coal industry, 20 million for nonferrous metallurgy, 15 million for the met-
allurgical industry, 15 million for the chemical industry, 15 million for the 
construction of residential buildings, 6.75 million for handicrafts, 6 million 
for the electrical industry, and 4.25 million for market research—a total of 
950 million shillings. 
In the official report on the release of these amounts, it is said that 
“the Austrian side is not able to report on any details so far, because the 
note of the Marshall Plan’s mission in Austria provides the Austrian gov-
ernment with the possibility to change particular paragraphs concerning 
the released money.” 
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In the report by the head of the Marshall mission in Austria, King, 
from May 2, 1950, it was said that “a significant part of the Austrian invest-
ment program is applied to those economic sectors that contribute most to 
the achievement of the Marshall Plan mission and Austria’s common aims, 
which are the adjustment of the balance of payments by increasing exports 
and cutting imports.”
The total amount of American money in the “special account” on May 
15, 1950, was 1.9 billion shillings, as opposed to 1.2 billion shillings on 
December 31, 1949. 
Austria has now been receiving “help” from the Marshall Plan for two years. 
The results of this help can be summarized as follows: 
Industry. During this period, i.e., from 1/4/1948 to 1/4/1950, Aus-
tria received supplies worth 592.7 million dollars or 12.684 billion shillings 
(according to the current exchange rate of one dollar for 21.36 shillings) 
from the Marshall Plan. 
The money Austria receives for the goods supplied by the Marshall 
Plan is transferred to the “special account” at the National Bank; the 
account is operated by the U.S. government. Over the two years, the Amer-
ican government was allowed to release 4.4 billion shillings and to invest 
them in those branches of the Austrian national economy whose develop-
ment is of interest for American policy in Europe. As a result, the dispro-
portion in the development of the different Austrian industrial branches is 
growing larger under the influence of the Marshall Plan. 
Branches of the extractive industry, particularly black iron and non-
ferrous metallurgy, as well as the magnesite industry, have significantly 
exceeded the 1937 level (compared to 1937, the black iron industry has pro-
duced 145 percent, nonferrous metallurgy 185 percent and the magnesite 
industry 151 percent), while light industry and the food industry have not 
yet reached the production level of 1937 (compared to 1937, light industry 
has produced 75 percent and the food industry 93 percent). 
The processing branches of the industry have been facing a slight cri-
sis recently. In the first nine months of 1949, 259 enterprises in this branch 
went bankrupt; in 1947, it was only 29 firms. Unemployment has become a 
recurring phenomenon: in comparison to February 1948, the unemployment 
rate was four times higher in February 1950; 195,000 people, or 10 percent of 
all Austrian workers and employees, were unemployed by then. In May 1950, 
the number of unemployed decreased to 108,000 (due to the beginning of 
the seasonal work period, particularly in the construction industry). 
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These figures can be supplemented with the following indicators: over 
30 percent of food industry workers, 20 percent of metalworkers, 27 percent 
of engineers and technicians, and 21 percent of engine drivers, i.e., 254,000 
people, are not able to find work adequate to their learned profession and 
are forced to do unskilled work. 
While the markets in the metallurgical, mining, and machine-engi-
neering industries are not glutted yet, a significant decrease in demand can 
be noticed in the building materials industry (cement and bricks), the foot-
wear and leather industry, the wood industry (carpentry and furniture pro-
duction), as well as the textile and cosmetic industry, leading to overstock-
ing and a decline in production. In the cement industry, the surplus goods 
increased by 1.5 times compared to the year before, while production in the 
same period decreased by 40 percent. 
From January to March 1950, the tobacco industry production 
decreased by 50 percent and the carpet industry by 12–15 percent. The foot-
wear industry is still working mainly for the storehouses. The Vienna Shoe 
Company, for instance, produces 700 pairs of shoes daily, but they only 
sell 15 pairs a day. As a result, the production of footwear decreased from 
440,000 pairs in March to 340,000 pairs in April and several footwear-pro-
ducing companies have switched to half-workdays. 
Due to the Marshallization of Austria, the process of absolute and rela-
tive impoverishment of the working class has become stronger, which can 
be illustrated with the following figures. The industrial production in 1949 
was slightly higher than in 1937 (101.5 percent); according to provisional 
data, Austria’s national income was 101.3 percent compared to 1937. At the 
same time, wages were only 55–60 percent compared to 1937. According to 
official data, the salary schedule for industrial workers and employees com-
prised 3.7 billion shillings in 1948, while the entrepreneurs’ income was at 
2.5 billion shillings, i.e. 70 percent of the total salary schedule. 
On December 6, 1949, the official government newspaper Wiener Zei-
tung published the balance [sheet] of Austria’s largest enterprise Austro-
American Magnesite Corporation (Österreichisch-Amerikanische Magne-
sit AG), showing that the schedule of salaries for workers and employees, 
including the high salaries for directors, was 25.2 million shillings in 1948, 
while the entrepreneurs’ gross profit was at 27.7 million shillings, i.e., the 
capitalists’ income could pay for 110 percent of the salaries. 
Foreign trade. The foreign trade structures went through significant 
changes under the influence of the Marshall Plan—changes leading to a 
clearly negative direction for Austria. 
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While finished goods took first place and accounted for 62 percent of 
the total export before the war, and semi-finished goods and raw materials 
were at second place with 35 percent, the figures turned around by 1949. 
Now raw materials and semi-finished goods take first place with 50.3 per-
cent, and finished products are in second place with 48.7 percent. It has to 
be said that after Austria started to receive “help” from the Marshall Plan 
in 1948, the export of raw materials and semi-finished goods significantly 
increased, while the significance of finished goods for export began to 
decline. Only in 1949 did the proportion of exported finished goods drop by 
17.3 percent compared to 1948; at the same time, the export of raw materi-
als and semi-finished goods increased by 8.3 percent in the same period. 
These changes in the structure of foreign trade have already resulted in 
Austrian industry and particularly its main branch—the processing indus-
try—experiencing grave deficiencies in their foreign exchange earnings, 
which they urgently need to purchase imported raw materials, which con-
stitute 30–50 percent of all raw materials used in the country. 
The foreign trade deficit is increasing year-on-year. In absolute terms 
it was 237 million shillings in 1947, 618 million shillings in 1948, 1.25 billion 
shillings in 1949, and for the first quarter of 1950, it has already reached 506 
million shillings, i.e., it is four times higher than it was at the same time the 
year before (for the first quarter of 1949, the foreign trade deficit was 133 
million shillings). 
This kind of development of foreign trade leads to a decrease in the for-
eign exchange earnings of Austria’s industry. It [the industry] is not able to 
establish a solid basis for its further development and is therefore forced to 
seek foreign help. Its dependence on foreign help increases each year. 
Finances. The devaluation of the Austrian currency, which was carried 
out in November 1949 at the request of the American administration for the 
implementation of the Marshall Plan, caused a 40 percent increase in prices 
for industrial raw materials, which then led to an increase of up to 35 per-
cent in prices for goods manufactured in Austria. Thus the competitiveness of 
Austrian goods on the global market began to decrease. As a result, from the 
second half of 1949, Austrian industry experienced significant problems sell-
ing its products on the world market as well as on the Austrian market. At the 
same time, the devaluation enabled the Americans to plunder the Austrian 
people even more. While the average sum transferred to the “special accounts” 
due to the selling of goods supplied by the Americans to Austria via the Mar-
shall Plan was about 180 million shillings before the devaluation took place, 
this amount increased to 240 million shillings after the devaluation. 
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The devaluation also facilitated the direct penetration of American cap-
ital into important branches of the Austrian industry. For instance, Amer-
ica provided the Semperit enterprise (Soviet zone) with a large plant for the 
vulcanization of tires. This enterprise received equipment and raw materi-
als worth 1.6 million dollars via the Marshall Plan. The Schoeller-Bleckmann 
metallurgical factory received 15 million shillings in 1949 and in the first 
quarter of 1950. Austria also receives credit to be used for the purchase of 
fur from British banks that are particularly interested in the Austrian tex-
tile industry. In the first quarter of the year, the fur factory in Bad Vöslau 
(Soviet zone) received fur at the expense of these credits, and at the same 
time it was visited by representatives of British enterprises. 
The Marshall Plan is also directed against our enterprises in Austria, 
which used to have leading roles in some branches, for instance, in the elec-
tro-technical industry producing electric motors and electronic measuring 
devices, as well as in the field of machine engineering for agricultural pur-
poses and the production of metal constructions. 
Due to the Marshall Plan, new alternative factories are being built and 
old ones are being expanded in Austria’s Western zones. They have already 
become serious competitors for the enterprises of the USIA. 
For instance, in 1949, AEG’s electric motor factory in Deuchendorf 
was put into operation, and the Elin machine engineering factory in Weiz, 
which is competing with the USIA’s Siemens-Schuckert factories No. 1 and 
No. 2, was expanded. The factory [illegible]bacher Werke, which is a com-
petitor of the USIA’s Hofherr-Schrantz factory in the production of agricul-
tural machines, was re-equipped as well. 
The Waagner-Biro factory in Graz and the Stahlbau factory in Linz 
began to compete with the USIA’s Waagner-Biro factories in the production 
of metal constructions. The Steyr-Daimler-Puch enterprise is pushing the 
products of the USIA’s Austro-Fiat (buses and trucks) out of the market. 
These facts and figures show that under the influence of the Mar-
shall Plan, the Austrian economy is increasingly developing into a colonial 
appendage and source of raw materials for the Anglo-American bloc. As a 
result, year by year, Austria’s industry, foreign trade, and financial struc-
tures are becoming more dependent on help from abroad. 
By releasing the funds from the so-called “special accounts,” to which 
they [the funds] are transferred after selling products that have been sup-
plied to Austria by the Marshall Plan, the U.S. government—via the Aus-
trian government—finances those branches of the Austrian economy that 
are not competing with American trusts and monopolies. The Austrian 
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government has turned into a puppet of the Anglo-American bloc; at the 
request of the latter [the Anglo-American bloc], it is leading the country 
down the path of fascism, toward the integration into imperialist military 
blocs and unions. This is demonstrated by the Austrian government’s May 
23 resolution, in which they openly declare themselves to be opponents of 
the Stockholm Appeal, pronounce themselves against the ban on nuclear 
weapons and take the position of persecuting those who want peace. There 
is no doubt that this position is dictated by foreign imperialist powers; it 
has nothing in common with Austria’s national interests.
Signed: M. Shavlak
Source: AVP RF, f. 066, op. 31, p. 149, d. 29, ll. 7–19.
K
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DOCUMENT No. 76: 
Politburo Resolution No. 449, on the Repatriation of 431 Austrians 
September 20, 1950
The following Politburo resolution finalizes the repatriation of 431 Austrian pris-
oners of war and 10 internees to Austria (see Document No. 39).
446. Draft of a note from the Soviet government to the governments of the 
USA, England, and France on the issue of civil High Commissioners in Aus-
tria. 
The draft handed in by the Ministry of the Interior of the USSR as an 
answer to England’s note on the issue of appointing civil High Commission-
ers in Austria (attached) is to be confirmed. 
Analogous notes are to be sent to the governments of the USA and 
France. 
[…]
449. On the repatriation of Austrian prisoners of war and internees. 
1. As a modification to point 2 of Resolution No. 527–207ss by the 
Council of Ministers of the USSR of February 6, 1949, permit the Ministry 
of the Interior of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov) to repatriate 431 Austrian 
prisoners of war and 10 internees, about whom we have no compromising 
materials, to Austria. 
2. The interdisciplinary commission consisting of representatives of 
the MVD of the USSR (Comrade Kruglov), the MGB of the USSR (Comrade 
Abakumov),72 the Ministry of Justice of the USSR (Comrade Gorshenin),73 
and the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Comrade Safonov)74 is to be instructed 
to review the sentences of the Austrian prisoners of war sentenced for 10 
years and to reconsider the cases of persons under investigation, in order 
72  Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, since the 1920s in the VChK - GPU - OGPU, Minister 
for national security, and in this position, head of the MGB, 1946–1951. Arrested 1951; 
executed 1954.
73  Konstantin Petrovich Gorshenin, people’s commissar of justice, 1943–1946; after that 
prosecutor and general prosecutor of the USSR; minister of justice, 1948–1956.
74  Grigorii Nikolaevich Safonov, since 1939, deputy of the prosecutor of the USSR, after-
wards first deputy of the prosecutor of the USSR. First deputy of the general prosecu-
tor of the USSR from 1946; general prosecutor of the USSR, 1948–1953.
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to obtain the possible release and repatriation from the USSR for those 
of them who committed only insignificant crimes on the territory of the 
USSR. 
3. The Council of Ministers’ authorized representative for issues of 
repatriation will be obliged to take over 441 Austrian prisoners of war and 
internees, and those Austrian prisoners of war who are to be repatriated 
according to the interdisciplinary commission’s resolution, from the Minis-
try of the Interior of the USSR and transfer them to Austria.
Source: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1084, ll. 85–86.
K
i6 szovjet 00 book.indb   379 2015.02.17.   6:53
380 SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AUSTRIA
DOCUMENT No. 77: 
Information for Viennese Women whose Relatives Are Held  
as POWs in the Soviet Union
December 21, 1950
At the end of 1950, more than 1,000 Austrian prisoners of war were still held 
in the Soviet Union; most of them were accused of participating in war crimes. 
The following information sheet by the Federal Ministry of the Interior provides 
information about past and future repatriations and the time and place for con-
sultation hours on that matter for their wives and other relatives. 
The Ministry of the Interior is sending you this letter today to inform you 
about the important measures that have been taken by the authorities to 
repatriate those Austrians who are currently still in Russian captivity as 
prisoners of war. 
In connection with this, we would like to inform you about the fact 
that those Austrian prisoners of war who were part of so-called “blocked 
units” (Feldgendarmerie, Police, etc.)75 arrived with the last transportation 
from the USSR on November 6, 1950. Now only those Austrians who have 
been sentenced for a crime or for an alleged war crime (also for collective 
guilt) remain captured as prisoners of war in Russia. 
In December 1949 the Ministry of the Interior asked the Soviet author-
ities for information concerning the names of the sentenced Austrians, the 
reason for their imprisonment, the extent of punishment, and the place 
of imprisonment. Although the official in charge of this issue in the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry ensured the Austrian political representative in Moscow 
that he would be able to answer this question in January 1950, an appropri-
ate answer has not yet been given, despite the fact that several more meet-
ings between officials have taken place. 
75  The Feldgendarmerie (Field Gendarmerie) was the military police of the German 
Wehrmacht. Their nickname was “Kettenhunde” (chaindogs), after the gorget they 
wore with their uniforms. The police in the Third Reich was divided into two parts. 
The main constituent parts of the uniformed Ordnungspolizei (Order Police) were 
the Schutzpolizei (Protection Police) and the Gendarmerie (Rural Police). The main 
subsections of the Sicherheitspolizei (Security Police, Sipo) were the Gestapo (Secret 
State Police) and the Kripo (Criminal Police). All the units of the Sipo were placed 
under the control of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt in 1939.
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In the meantime the returnees who came home with the last transpor-
tation spread the information that there are Austrians who had been sen-
tenced during the last 12 months but were then reprieved, in the camps in 
Kiev, Minsk, and Dnepropetrovsk. According to this information, there are 
350 Austrians waiting to return home. 
Due to this encouraging fact, the Federal Ministry of the Interior has 
decided to refrain from further intervention, because any propaganda of 
whatever kind might threaten the return of the given persons. For this rea-
son, the Ministry of the Interior wishes to provide all relatives of prisoners of 
war in the USSR with relevant information in the form of information sheets 
on a regular basis (starting with information sheet No. 1). The Ministry of 
the Interior considers it very important to ask the relatives of these prison-
ers of war to provide the Ministry of the Interior (Department 14) with the 
important information they obtain on a regular basis. This information will 
then be used for the information sheets that are sent to all Viennese women, 
and all people interested will be able to receive the information they need. 
Until now, many women have been gathering at the Red Cross in the 
Milchgasse to seek comfort and information. The Ministry of the Interior 
hopes that the information sheets will now help provide the relatives with 
information on a constant basis, as was the case with the relatives of pris-
oners of war in Yugoslavia, and will help prevent the often unpleasant and 
time-consuming trips to the Milchgasse. 
It need not be strongly emphasized that the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior will do everything in its power to accelerate the return of the last 
Austrians still imprisoned in the USSR. 
In order to give the relatives of prisoners of war the opportunity not 
only to have contact with Department 14 of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, but also to meet other women whose husbands find themselves in 
the same situation, Department 14 of the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
will introduce consultation hours, held each first and third Monday of each 
month at 9:00 a.m. at Dominikanerbastei 24 in the First District of Vienna. 
The head of Department 14 will be present at these consultation hours. 
During these consultation hours, the relatives of prisoners of war will 
have the opportunity to obtain detailed information about the fate of their 
prisoners of war and about the measures that have been taken in connec-
tion with their return. Because all this information will be published in the 
information sheets on a regular basis as well, we would like to ask you to 
come to the consultation hours only if a personal exchange of thoughts 
seems urgently necessary. 
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We would further like to inform you that the “Red Cross Cards” that 
used to be handed out by the Red Cross in the Milchgasse will be available 
at the consultation hours of Department 14  of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior as well. 
The first consultation hours will take place on January 8, 1951, at 9:00 
a.m. at the office of the head of Department 14. 
On behalf of the Federal Minister: 
Signed: Berdach
Source: Archiv der Republik, Bundesministerium für Inneres, Abt. 14.
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